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 ABSTRACT 
This thesis is concerned with an empirical investigation of the financial performance of UK 
financial institutions over the period 1980-2015. This period reflects numerous changes in the 
development of the UK economy and in the evolution and financial deepening of its financial 
system including also the deregulation and liberalisation of financial markets that culminated 
in financial institutions being able to compete actively in markets for financial services where 
previously they were prohibited; the global financial crisis of 2007-2009 and the Eurozone debt 
crisis which had a strong negative impact on the UK financial sector and resulted in the move 
away from an informal regulatory structure toward a more rigorous and formal structure of 
regulation. These developments make it necessary to investigate empirically important factors 
that shed light on the performance of UK financial institutions which should be of interest to 
policy makers and regulatory authorities.  
Following the introduction to the thesis in chapter one and a review of the literature which is 
presented in chapter two, there are four themes which is the primary focus of this thesis. The 
first theme, which occupies chapter three investigate, using a panel data regression approach, 
whether a number of the key drivers of performance affect the financial performance of UK 
financial institutions over crisis and non-crisis periods, and whether, by means of EGARCH, 
the risk taking behaviour of financial institutions have a decided impact on their financial 
performance. The findings indicate that the strength of the UK economy underpins the overall 
profitability of the sectors. Additionally, we provide strong evidence of risk undertaken is a 
key variable which impacts profitability in all financial sectors, confirming the risk-return 
hypothesis. The banking sector is also able to exert greater performance through a highly 
concentrated market. The second theme, taken up in chapter four, investigates the changing 
risk profile of UK financial institutions using rolling regression, the Kalman filter, DCC-
GARCH, bivariate BEKK GARCH and bivariate GJR-GARCH methodologies. The results 
confirm the literature by determining beta to be a time-varying variable. We also contribute to 
the literature by demonstrating the insurance and banking sectors possesses greatest systemic 
risk throughout our sample years, which can be attributed to their central role in financial 
markets, risk management and their contribution to the economy. The third theme, which is the 
focus of chapter five examines the impact of macroeconomic news and other announcements 
on the stock prices of UK financial institutions. We utilise the event study, SUR and GJR-
GARCH techniques to determine the impact of macroeconomic news, which we demonstrated 
investors were able to distinguish the risk levels of UK banks. Moreover, during periods of 
crisis government announcements are just as effective as the Bank of England to restore 
confidence in the financial system. We demonstrated how integrated financial markets are in 
today’s economic climate due to globalisation. Whereby, announcements from Western 
economies had a greater impact on UK non-bank financials than combined Bank of England 
and Government announcements. The fourth theme, which is contained in chapter six assessed 
the impact of regulatory changes by the UK authorities and other relevant regulatory bodies 
towards the security prices of UK financial institutions through event study, EGARCH and 
VAR GJR-GARCH techniques. The Vickers report sought to implement new standards to 
create financial stability and avert future crisis periods. This led to negative impacts on equity 
prices on the financial sectors, demonstrating the risk-return hypothesis, along with higher 
capital requirement regulations mirroring this result.  
The research provides a basis to develop in-depth knowledge of the UK financial system in 
order to improve risk management, allocation of resources, decision making by financial 
institutional managers’ and aid policy makers future decisions to improve market conditions 
for financial institutions, which will aid overall economic prosperity.  
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Research Background and Motivation 
Financial crises since the turn of the 20th century have become a recurring event, 
propping up across many different economies over time. The most recent major global financial 
crisis of 2007/8 cost the UK economy an estimated £500 billion once accounting for loans and 
liquidity guarantees, bringing the UK economy into recession, due to the losses amassed from 
the financial sectors of the developed world. The problems from the financial sector leaked into 
the real economy, which caused funding issues to facilitate economic activity and led the UK 
into a recession. The unfolding events which transpired from the collapse of the US sub-prime 
market in 2007, led developed governments to implement bailouts/pass laws in order to sustain 
the financial system. Furthermore, the efforts made by respective central banks within the 
affected nations exhausted all their powers to restore confidence within the system. Measures 
taken included coordinated base rate cuts, providing liquidity into the system and launching an 
unprecedented quantitative easing programme. The significant cost towards respective EU 
governments paved way for a Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, which materialised in 2010. This 
follow-on event caused further issues for UK financial institutions, which held an estimated 
£100bn exposure to certain Eurozone nations’ debt such as the Republic of Ireland, Greece, 
Spain and Portugal. Following these volatile years post 2008 financial crisis, there has been a 
period of reconciliation within the balance sheets of the UK financial sectors. Whereby, there 
has been large restructuring of British institutions through closing certain investment 
businesses, selling assets, stricter lending regimes and holding more capital. Following the 
interventions from the UK government and Bank of England, stricter regulations have been 
implemented or in the process of doing so, outlined by the recommendations of the Turner 
Review in 2009. Further to the Turner Review the government reformed the regulatory bodies 
which paved way for the creation of the Financial Conduct Authority and the Prudential 
Regulation Authority (Controlled by the Bank of England). Extra measures were taken in 2010 
by the government to create future financial stability which established the independent 
commission on banking to reform the sector further. The outcome was the Vickers Report in 
2011, which witnessed calls for the banking sector to hold additional capital and ring fencing 
the banking sector, which is to separate banking activities from investment activities. Proposed 
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reforms directly impacted the business models of the industry. The newly suggested regulations 
also can negatively influence overall performance of the economy as this would restrict 
financing in certain financial sectors.   
Traditionally, the performance of the financial sector is linked to current economic 
conditions such as during periods of growth when greater performance levels are expected and 
vice versa for recessionary conditions as exemplified by Smirlock (1985), Berger (1995), 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) and Abreu and Mendes (2001). Additionally to economic 
growth, overall bank performance is sensitive to long-term interest rates and inflation as 
demonstrated by the studies of; Bourke (1998), Molyneaux and Thornton (1992), Demirgüç-
Kunt and Huizinga (1999) through reporting positive correlations between inflation and long-
term interest rates with bank performance. Furthermore, outside of economic conditions there 
are other drivers of performance which has been drawn upon in the existing literature. For 
example, Goddard et al. (2004) report a tenuous relationship between size and profitability, but 
also report a significant and positive relationship between off-balance sheet business and 
profitability for the UK banking firms examined. However, these drivers may have evolved 
over time through technological advances as the industry has dynamically altered over the 
previous decades till the present day. This began during the Margaret Thatcher government era 
through deregulating building societies/banks with the introduction of the Buildings Societies 
Act of 1986 and the Financial Services Act of 1986. These acts enabled building societies to 
offer a range of services from which they were previously excluded from. Furthermore, this 
allowed non-depository financial firms and international banks to offer similar products to 
commercial banks as the regulations reduced barriers to enter into the market. Ultimately, 
deregulation led to a greater degree of competition and contestability for market share, which 
led to a period of declining profit margins. As a result, consolidation occurred within building 
societies as well as banks, which materialised through mergers and acquisitions, reducing the 
number of institutions operating in the UK. These events in history shaped the UK banking 
market over time, which has resulted in a very concentrated banking market that is dominated 
by very few institutions. With a concentrated banking sector and an increase of competition 
from non-banking firms offering banking services, this has led to an industry that is under 
constant pressure to innovate and invent new financial products in order to increase profit 
margins. In order to achieve such returns for shareholders, bank managers increased their roles 
in off-balance sheet activities, in particular mortgage backed securities which fuelled the risk 
appetite of the sector. As the sub-prime mortgage crisis developed, the large losses were 
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sourced from engaging in off-balance sheet activities (through the derivatives market), which 
eventually led to the demise of the financial sector. 
The continued excessive risk appetite demonstrated by the financial sectors in the build-
up to the crisis ultimately destabilised the UK economy. This was through a loss of confidence 
in the financial system when problems of certain banking institutions came to light as a result 
of high exposure levels to American sub-prime debt defaults. Immediately, this was reflected 
within the inter-bank markets over fears of the future existence of banking institutions due to 
the losses incurred, whereby lending between banks halted and a lack of liquidity to the rest of 
economy emerged leading to financial instability. The risk profile of the UK financial sectors 
is one that is always evolving, along with the economic cycle. When economic periods are 
good there is sustained growth present, which is facilitated by the financial sector of the 
economy through greater lending as credit is widely available. However, as part of the 
economic cycle, there will be a period of slowed growth as interest rates rise in order to prevent 
the economy from overheating. As interest rates rise, this is usually followed by increases in 
default as the economy begins to stagnate and this is usually followed by increased 
unemployment as there is less money within the system to facilitate further economic 
expansion. This was mirrored by the UK economy and financial institutions in particular in the 
build-up to the crisis of 2008. As the turn of the 21st century, there was a low interest rate 
environment (in comparison to previous regimes) which ultimately led to increased lending 
from the banking/financial sectors as prosperous economic conditions were present, which 
reduced fears of credit default among borrowers. In the years that led to the financial crisis, 
increased performance levels of the financial institutions were present off the back-drop of 
increased risk-taking behaviour being exhibited. All of which this information is to be reflected 
within the risk profile of each sector from the markets standpoint, in order to price the risk-
return relationship correctly as identified by many academics in their studies of time-varying 
risk, see Choudhry (2005), Mergner and Bulla (2008), Choudhry and Wu (2009), Zhou (2012) 
and many others. 
Following the turbulent years, which the financial crisis brought to the UK economy as 
a whole, the government requested an inquiry in 2010 through the independent commission on 
banking chaired by Sir John Vickers. This was the result of the release of the Turner Review 
in 2009, which highlighted within its recommendations increased supervision as well as further 
inquiries of reforming regulation towards the financial sector within the UK. This eventually 
led to the Vickers Report in 2011, which outlined various recommendations to create financial 
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stability. In order to protect the deposit-taking institutions from future crisis periods, the policy 
implications made is to split the institution from ring fencing and non-ring fencing units, which 
alters banking within the UK. The ring fenced unit is to maintain market integrity and only 
conduct in traditional banking activities (deposit taking and creating loans) and is excluded 
from partaking within non-traditional banking activities. These reforms naturally possess high 
demands towards the UK depository institutions as this requires vast restructuring of their 
business models, which will be costly to satisfy the regulations. However, with the proposed 
changes in the Vickers Report this theoretically will produce financial stability as risky 
activities is solely held within the non-ring fenced units. Thereby carrying out this investigation 
possesses great importance to understand how the market has received incoming regulation. 
Whether increased regulation was perceived to be positive, as a result of increased stability 
encourages more participants to the market. Conversely, a negative reaction from the market 
would suggest the tightening of regulation would impact the business models of the financial 
sectors and thereby reduce their risk and return.  
The motivation of conducting this research thesis are three fold; (i) The financial crisis of 2008 
witnessed in the UK caused ever lasting effects towards the economy, which are still present 
to this day and has effectively impacted the vast majority of the public in one form or another. 
Whether this is through unemployment, lack of government spending on public services due 
to the cuts made by the elected government in 2010 as a result of government bailouts to the 
financial sector or any other reason that can be linked back to the crisis event. One strongly 
feels it is pivotal to undertake such research in order for the general public to gain greater 
knowledge of what occurred within the financial sectors that caused the UK taxpayers dearly. 
(ii) Once greater knowledge is exhibited through this thesis, policy/law makers are more 
informed when decisions are to be made when it comes to preserving the health of our financial 
system. Through understanding the attributes to greater financial performance of the financial 
sectors, we will be able to optimise their performance, which will inherently benefit the 
economy. Furthermore, through gaining greater understanding of their risk profile they exhibit 
we will be able to monitor and effectively be able to improve risk management among the 
financial institutions. (iii) The existing literature across UK financial institutions is out-dated 
and there are few studies that consider the recent financial crisis. With this in mind, this gives 
us further motivation to create a debate within the current strand of literature and make a 
contribution to knowledge within the field of economics and finance. 
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1.2 Research Methods 
In order to undertake the research within this thesis a wide variety of econometric 
methodologies will be implemented. The literature on the financial performance of banks has 
employed a wide range of statistical approaches to examine the profitability of commercial 
banks. The approaches range from cross-sectional regression technique as implemented by 
Smirlock (1985), Molyneux and Thornton (1992) and Molyneux and Forbes (1995); panel data 
regression models as demonstrated by Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999), Pasiouras and 
Kosmidou (2007) and Staikouras and Wood (2011); VAR model as utilised by Goddard et al., 
(2004). These techniques applied explore related themes in the field of determining financial 
performance of banks. All of these techniques have their benefits to reach the final goal of 
explaining financial performance in banks as these studies have demonstrated.  
For the second empirical chapter we will attempt to identify the risk profile of UK 
financial institutions over non-crisis and crisis related periods of the economic cycle. To 
address this we can incorporate many different methodological approaches to capture the 
changes in risk profile. These approaches are as follows; rolling regression technique first 
implemented by Fama and Macbeth (1973), Kalman filter with a random walk as produced by 
Harvey (1993) and Hamilton (1994), DCC-GARCH methodology as outlined by Engle (2002), 
Bivariate-BEKK GARCH model from Engle and Kroner (1995), the GJR-GARCH model 
produced by Glosten et al. (1993), the Schwert-Seguin approach as given by Schwert and 
Seguin (1990) and the Markov switching process from Hamilton (1989). All of these methods 
outlined enable us to produce a conditional time-varying series, from which we will discussed 
at length later in the thesis. The existing literature within this context focuses upon the stability 
of beta, with Literature from Jacob (1971), Blume (1971) Fabozzi and Francis (1978), 
Alexander and Chervany (1980), Bos and Newbold (1984) and many more determined the beta 
variable within the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) to be time-varying, which is assumed 
to be stable in the traditional estimation. Hereafter, the literature develops into empirical 
research regarding the best technique to capture the time-varying beta element of the CAPM. 
Studies from Brooks et al., (1998) and Faff et al., (2000) and many more examine these 
techniques extensively most of which come to the conclusion the Kalman Filter with a random 
walk possesses the greatest accuracy for time-varying beta. 
Our next empirical chapter addresses the impact of macroeconomic news held towards 
the stock price performance of UK financial institutions. This is strand of the literature that is 
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expanding with research from various authors that we will expand upon later in this thesis 
includes King (2009), Grammatikos et al. (2015), Aїt-Sahalia et al. (2012), Fratianni and 
Marchionne (2013), Dumontaux and Pop (2013) and Klomp (2013). Within these studies a 
wide range of techniques have been utilised in order to determine the impact news from the 
financial crisis held towards respective equity prices. Across the theme of event studies, the 
relative literature noted before employ a wide range of approaches within their respective 
studies to achieve similar goals. King (2009), Aїt-Sahalia et al. (2012) and Fratianni and 
Marchionne (2013) apply the traditional event study methodology as set out by MacKinlay 
(1997) within their studies to determine the impact of news. In addition to this methodology, 
Fratianni and Marchionne (2013) extended this methodology through Binder (1998) to apply 
an event parameter approach, whereby the valuation model is estimated over combined 
estimation periods to determine further results of impacting news on bank valuations. 
Grammatikos et al. (2015) undertake a differing approach whereby they apply an EGARCH 
model as given by Nelson (1991). This enables the authors to determine the positive and 
negative innovations news held towards the equity prices through the leverage effect within 
the EGARCH model. Dumontaux and Pop (2013) investigated the collapse of Lehman Brothers 
news impact to the market, whereby they implemented a SUR methodology as given by Zellner 
(1962). The methodology employed enables them to create a system which accounts for 
common modelling issues in time series data such as heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
Klomp (2013) explored a different technique through applying quantile regression methods to 
achieve a similar goal in determining the market impact of government interventions towards 
banks.  
For the fourth empirical chapter we will assess the effects of regulatory announcements and 
volatility of UK institutions. Historical/unrelated literature to our study concerning regulation 
employ similar methodologies as displayed within the third empirical chapter. For example 
Cornett and Tehranian (1990) employ a multivariate analysis via a SUR regression model, as 
given by Zellner (1962). Additionally, other literature from Spiegal and Yamori (2003), which 
concentrated upon the Japanese banking regulation reforms utilised an OLS regression model 
to determine the impact of the reforms. Furthermore, other literature from Larcker, Ormazabal 
and Taylor (2011) utilised the event study methodology to consolidate all the regulatory 
announcements by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), state of Delaware and 
government officials towards limiting executive pay and capture the reaction to such 
statements/laws passed. When turning our attention the current strand of literature where this 
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study will feature, there is rather limited existing literature. Schäfer et, al (2015) is the most 
relevant study which addresses the issue of whether reforms have had any measureable effects 
towards the market. The study employs a SUR similar to previous studies concerning this 
strand of the literature.  
 
1.3 Research Objectives 
Since our objective is to investigate the performance of UK financial institutions over 
non-crisis and crisis related periods, this research is aimed at making an original contribution 
to the literature on financial performance, explaining the risk profile, the impact of 
macroeconomic news events and assessing regulatory changes. The first aim is to discover the 
determinants of financial performance within the differing financial institutions. Further to this 
we wish to understand the risk-shifting behaviour patterns of the UK financial institutions over 
time. In order to conduct this research we firstly utilise a panel data regression methodology as 
given by Pasiouras and Kosmidou (2007) and others. This methodology will enable us to 
account for heteroskedasitcity as well as resolve any limited data issues that may arise when 
conducting the research. As the level of undertaking risk plays such a significant role within 
the financial institutions performance level, we will undertake further scrutiny towards this 
variable in order to understand the risk shifting behaviour among the differing financial sectors. 
In doing so, we will adopt the Bai-Perron multiple breakpoint test to identify the structural 
breaks within our dataset, Bai and Perron (1998 and 2003). From applying this test, we derive 
patterns from the asset pricing of financial sectors and are most suited for our aims within this 
section. From there onwards we will then apply Nelson’s (1991) EGARCH model in order to 
ascertain the varying changes in risk levels that prevailed over time leading to the financial 
crisis of 2007/8 and post crisis era.  
We wish to then explain the risk profile of UK financial institutions from 2000-2012, in order 
to illustrate how the build-up of risk was portrayed by the market through examining the beta 
variable in comparison to general market movements. The goals of this chapter is to determine 
whether beta is time-varying among UK financial institutions, which techniques are most suited 
to determine the time-varying nature of beta and also to determine which financial sector 
possessed the highest level of risk. In order to conduct the research we apply the following 
methods as given by the existing literature above, which are as follows; the rolling regression 
technique first implemented by Fama and Macbeth (1973), Kalman filter with a random walk 
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as produced by Harvey (1993) and Hamilton (1994), DCC-GARCH methodology as outlined 
by Engle (2002), Bivariate-BEKK GARCH model from Engle and Kroner (1995) and the GJR-
GARCH model produced by Glosten et al. (1993). These methodologies will aid us to our final 
goals of answering our hypotheses set, which we be highlighted at length in the thesis.  
Moreover, we outline the necessity to investigate the stock price performance of the 
UK financial institutions during volatile periods and understand market movements to 
macroeconomic news. Firstly, we will apply the event study methodology outlined by 
MacKinlay (1997) as this will identify the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) for 
each sector combined with the type of announcement, which aided/implicated each sector. In 
order to improve further the results we implement a Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) 
model as introduced by Zellner (1962). The SUR model enables us to model data collectively 
as part of a system, which accounts for data modelling issues such as heteroskedasticity within 
time series data, which may be present in stock market data. In order to understand the banking 
sector further we will apply additional variable within a GJR-GARCH model to determine the 
announcement impacts towards the stock price performance.   
Given rise to financial crisis and the significant cost to the government we wish to determine 
the impact regulation held towards the different financial sectors. In addition to this we lastly 
aim to detect whether transmission of information was present within the markets surrounding 
impending regulatory changes. In order to answer these objective we employ the event study 
methodology similar to the third empirical chapter, whereby we generate the CAARs of each 
financial sector in response to regulatory changes. We apply the event study methodology to 
determine the market response of equity prices within the financial sectors. A positive response 
would indicate greater improved market conditions, which would lead to greater demand in 
purchasing equities, creating an upward pressure on equity values. However, a negative 
response in equity prices, suggest there is less risk as a result of increased regulation as this 
hinders the business model certain financial sectors and therefore the regulation is priced  into 
the equity value.  To obtain clearer results, we then apply Nelson’s (1991) EGARCH model as 
it enables us to model positive and negative innovations which will determine the leverage 
effect of equity prices in response to regulatory announcements. In order to determine whether 
investors were able to predict in-coming regulation changes beforehand we apply a multivariate 
vector autoregressive (VAR) GJR-GARCH model as highlighted by Rahim et, al (2009) and . 
It is a combination of the VAR methodology popularised by Sims (1980) and the GJR-GARCH 
was introduced by Glosten et al. (1993), which is an extension of Bollerslev (1986). This 
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methodology will enable us to identify whether there was evidence of the transmission of 
information in the trading days leading up to regulation changes implemented. 
 
1.4 Research Summary and Structure 
In the subsequent chapter I review the related literature on financial institutions 
performance and as such situate the thesis within the main strand of the literature. By doing so, 
we were able to understand theoretical concepts that have been applied when conducting such 
research towards financial institutions during periods of distress. However, more importantly 
we were able to identify key gaps within the literature concerning studies which collectively 
study the differing UK financial sectors. From highlighting this key gap we hope to exploit it 
and contribute to the literature. We reviewed a number of studies that investigate financial 
crisis literature, the performance of financial institutions, bank risk-taking behaviour, the 
stability of beta and historical financial crisis event studies. In addition to the review on 
financial crisis literature, we also provide a brief review of the relevant studies in each of the 
corresponding chapters that follow.  
To summarise the findings in Chapter 3, we demonstrate economic conditions heavily 
influence the overall financial performance of UK financial institutions. Whereby, during 
prosperous economic conditions enables greater financial performance of the sectors through 
the easing of credit worthiness, which is facilitated by the financial sectors of the economy. 
Furthermore, in the UK there is a concentrated banking sector, with which we confirmed within 
our results market share and concentration contribute significantly towards determining 
financial performance. This extensively relates to the historical context of the banking sector 
within the UK, which has witnessed vast changes over the previous decades. There has been 
an unprecedented quantity of competition entering the market from international banks as well 
as market contestability, which led to vast levels of consolidation.  Among other financial 
sectors with respect to market share we demonstrate the same applies to insurance companies, 
real estate firms and finance companies. Moreover, we exemplify risk has a significant role in 
determining overall financial performance of each sector. From which we extensively reviewed 
the variable of risk through identifying risk shifting behaviour and the drivers of risk. The 
outcome was a mixture of results across the differing financial sector as one would expect.   
In reference to Chapter 4 we assessed the risk profile of each financial sector in the UK. 
The first finding is that we confirm previous literature in terms of beta being a time-varying 
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variable. Secondly, we find the insurance sector possesses on average the highest level of risk 
via the beta variable over our sample period. As solely market data was utilised in the chapter, 
this overall highlights the market has historically priced added a risk premium to the insurance 
sector against all other sectors. This also contributes to the literature in terms of the sectors role 
in the build-up to the financial crisis, whereby they underwrite the mortgages being sold by the 
banking and real estate sectors. We also find the banking sector ranks second in terms of beta 
variability over time. This highlights their involvement in undertaking risk in the build-up to 
the financial crisis as well as determining their increasing risk appetite during periods of 
economic growth. Lastly, our findings also suggest the highest precision of in-sample 
forecasting is most suited to rolling regression technique in accordance with the Mean Squared 
Error (MSE) over a long-term window, however the Kalman filter demonstrates its superiority 
over a shorter term period.  
 The findings in Chapter 5 highlight the impact macroeconomic news held towards the 
stock price performance of UK financial institutions. We found investors were able to 
distinguish risk levels between depository institutions, which illustrates the markets understand 
of risk exemplified from the banking sector. This was determined through the CDS spreads of 
each of the banks being highly evident against institutions like Northern Rock. Furthermore, 
we found government announcements were just as significant as monetary policy actions to 
the market. For example the nationalisation of Northern Rock was just as significant as the 
quantitative easing programme launched by the Bank of England. Our results also demonstrate 
the non-banking institutions are highly integrated into global markets. This occurred as 
announcements from Western economies and the IMF held a stronger effect within the UK 
with announcements from the Bank of England and Government combined. Lastly, we also 
provided some evidence of announcements from the Federal Reserve, ECB and IMF holding a 
positive impact on UK banking stocks. This suggests they are also integrated into the world 
banking system, whereby UK banking institutions are exposed to international markets. 
When referring to Chapter 6 we concentrated upon regulatory changes. From which we 
find that announcements surrounding Solvency II and higher capital level requirements resulted 
in negative equity returns towards the banking and insurance sectors. The overall interpretation 
from the reaction is founded from the impact these regulatory reforms hold towards the 
operations of the banking and insurance sectors. With regards towards the banks this inherently 
controls their risk exposure levels and therefore restricts their performance as the greater risks 
taking theoretically lead to greater returns. The same can be argued towards the insurance 
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sector also, as Solvency II has a similar theme to restrict risk taking exposure. These two sectors 
are seen as the most pivotal to ensuring economic stability and to avert future crisis periods in 
the future. We also find there is evidence of prior knowledge of regulatory change and 
highlights market inefficiency. We determined the market priced information of regulatory 
announcements from every governing body by at least one sector prior to the release of new 
information. 
Chapter 7 outlines the main findings of the research conducted as outlined above. We 
have enriched the literature by fulfilling a gap upon financial performance of UK financial 
institutions over stable and unstable market conditions. We indicate policy implications for 
many respective bodies due to the depth and scope of the research conducted. We outline issues 
within the research for policy makers to take into consideration when adopting new strategies. 
For example we have provided evidence of inefficiencies within the market, which need to be 
addressed by regulators as well as have provided greater specified knowledge on the 
performance of financial institutions within the UK. Furthermore, we recognise a limitation 
within our data sample, whereby we were unable to include private financial institutions due 
to financial restrictions; as private companies are not required to publish their financial data 
publically. The potential for future research includes including private institutions into the 
sample as well as applying the concept to other economies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 
 
CHAPTER 2 
A Review of the Literature on Financial Crisis and Bank 
Performance 
2.1 Introduction 
Historically, countries have encountered financial crisis of various types ranging from currency 
crisis to the collapse in equity prices and more recently the global economy witnessed its most 
significant financial crisis since the 1930s which morphed itself into the Eurozone sovereign 
debt crisis, which had a resounding effect on the financial system and its financial institutions. 
A financial crisis may be defined as a period of sustained downward adjustment in asset prices, 
which impairs the liquidity of the financial system. This then produces an inability within 
financial institutions, namely banks to advance credit in order to facilitate economic 
development and growth. Kindleberger (2011) points out that a financial crisis and bank failure 
is usually associated with an implosion of asset prices and sharp depreciations of currencies 
and or including declines in real estate prices, while Minksy sees financial crisis as being part 
of the economic cycle, whereby the build-up of confidence among businesses and consumers, 
as the economy expands, creates a demand for widely available credit which results in a credit 
bubble. Credit bubbles have been reflected in many crisis events of recent times, such as the 
Latin American debt crisis (1970s-1980s), the East Asian banking crisis (1997), Japans lost 
decade/s (1990s-2000s) and the US sub-prime crisis of 2007, which led to the global financial 
crisis. 
The tulip mania bubble of 1637 (in the Netherlands), is often used to illustrate the first 
price bubble and is considered the birthplace of financial crisis. This event was the result of a 
speculative craze of tulip bulbs which appreciated in value over time (from 1593 to 1637). 
Prices peaked in January 1637, which led people to sell simultaneously resulting in a dramatic 
decline in price, thus ending the speculative bubble (Garber, 1990). In British history, the first 
bubble was the South Sea bubble of 1720 when a speculative bubble occurred in shares of 
South Sea which attracted vast investment with the promise of high returns to the public. But 
after speculative purchases inflated the stock price of the South Sea company, investors sold 
the stock en mass due to the failure of the stock to deliver the promised high returns, thereby 
ending the bubble (Malkiel, 2007). Since the turn of the 20th century, financial crises have 
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become an increasing occurrence, generally coinciding with economic cycle via credit bubbles, 
an early example of this was the Wall Street crash of 1929 (Santoni, 1987).  
Minsky (1977) and Allen and Gale (1998a), along with other economists, have 
produced theories and models to explain crisis periods. For example, Minsky (1977) put 
forward the financial instability hypothesis to explain credit bubbles as coinciding with the 
economic cycle as confidence increases. Minsky (1977) suggests that financing positions will 
go through three different phases; hedge borrowers, speculative borrowers and Ponzi 
borrowers, while Allen and Gale (1998a) puts forward a three phase cycle approach, noting 
agency problems, along with excessive risk-taking which is adopted by financial institutions 
as financial incentives. The three phases include; financial liberalisation, bubble bursting and 
credit default.  
In this chapter our goal is to situate the research topic of this thesis in its context, with 
particular emphasis on the connection with different strands of the literature. We review these 
branches of the literature in order to highlight the main research questions, and the variables of 
interest. The study of financial crisis and the performance of financial institutions require that 
we draw on the relevant literature that will help us make sense of the changing environment 
within which financial institutions function. In this respect, there are a large number of studies 
that represent this growing literature and our review will highlight these. The chapter is 
structured as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the financial crisis literature, which is followed in 
section 2.3 by a review of econometric studies on financial crisis. Section 2.4 reviews the 
literature on the financial performance of financial institutions, while section 2.5 provides a 
review of studies undertaken on bank risk-taking behaviour. Section 2.6 reviews event studies 
on a number of related themes. Section 2.7 summarises and concludes. 
 
2.2 Financial Crisis Literature  
2.2.1. The Latin American Debt Crisis 
 
The Latin American debt crisis of the late 1970-1980s inflicted large loan losses to the US 
financial sector due to high exposure in the region. Manuel Pastor (1989) shared many theories 
and different perspectives into the causes of the Latin American debt crisis, the origins of which 
has its root in the 1960s when US financial institutions with a large surplus funds sought new 
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clients, which resulted in opening up international capital markets to South America. The new 
availability of credit to Latin America expanded in the 1970s as the supply of loans increased 
to the region. In 1973-1979 private Western banks experienced an increase in deposits from 
the oil rich (OPEC) nations as the exogenous shock of increased oil price materialised due to 
the Gulf war. US banks then opted for asset creation through loans to Latin America in order 
to strengthen their balance sheets with the new influx of deposits. Net external borrowing from 
South America grew steadily from 1977-1982, resulting in increased trade deficits in balance 
of payments.  
Debt accumulation in Latin American countries spiralled out of control, resulting in 
increased interest payments, some as high as 20 per cent. As a result of the mounting debt 
levels, in 1979 credit availability became a scarce resource within the US, leading the banks to 
withdraw loans and/or to close access to international capital markets to Latin American 
countries most affected. Thus, gaining new finances came at higher cost for indebted countries, 
eventually falling into financial distress as higher interest payments and increased default rate 
followed. All of these resulted in a deep financial crisis with Mexico, in particular, signalling 
in 1982 debt repayment problems. The rationalisation that followed from 1977-1982 varies 
from different economic schools of thought, orthodox, radical, structural, due to conflicting 
ideologies.  
Orthodox Economists and the IMF put this down to domestic policy, partial fiscal 
expansion and exchange rate overvaluation during this period (Enders and Mattione (1984), 
Wiesner (1985) and Sachs and Williamson (1985)). Structural economists focus on the impact 
of external factors such as the decline in industrial growth and changing terms of trade. They 
suggest that the policies of Latin American countries may have required corrections in order to 
avert deepening economic conditions (Dell and Lawrence (1980), Diaz-Alejandro (1984) and 
Taylor (1986)). Unorthodox economists claim that aggressive US banks were responsible for 
initiating the crisis by over-lending in order to maintain market share, as shift in credit 
availability shifts shadow, as argued by Minsky (1992) and Kindleberger (2011).  As credit 
became scarce in 1979 the banks collectively withdrew from the market in a panic which, as a 
result, caused the financial crisis to develop as South American countries required short and 
medium term funding that were no longer available, giving rise to debt default or debt 
forgiveness (Felix (1987), and Kindleberger (2011)).  
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2.2.2. 1997 East Asian Crisis  
 
The 1997 East Asian financial crisis affected many countries including South Korea, Indonesia, 
Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines. Differing opinions have been shared for 
the cause of the crisis. Krugman (1999) and Moreno (1999) claim that the root of the crisis was 
due to the weaknesses of the financial system of these countries, in addition to poor 
macroeconomic policies in the region which led to the failure of government guarantees on 
loans, that led to over-lending, thus the loans were “hidden” due to rapid economic growth and 
influx of foreign capital. The Alternative view lays blame on the high levels of foreign 
investment and the herding effect from investors to East Asian nations (Radelet and Sachs 
(1998) and Lane et al. (1999)).  The region experienced vast capital inflows with foreign 
investors benefitting from high interest rates as well as corporations gaining large loans from 
the U.S. to fund investments in the late 1980s and early 1990s, which led to economic growth 
in the region. Then ultimately external factors, such as the U.S. recovering from recession in 
the early 1990s, increasing interest rates transpired resulting in a strong U.S. Dollar (USD) as 
well as devaluations of the Japanese Yen and Chinese Renminbi. These factors contributed to 
the declined economic growth of South East Asia as South Korea, Indonesia and Thailand had 
pegged their exchange rates to the USD. This appreciated their currencies and declined exports 
as well as asset values within these nations and as a result of reduced competitiveness in the 
global market. Following this, by 1997 Thailand and surrounding nations suffered speculative 
currency attacks and herding led their currencies to depreciate (By 1998 Thai Baht depreciated 
40%, Indonesia Rupiah 80%, Philippine Peso 37%, Malaysia Ringgit 39% and South Korean 
Won 34%). As the USD strengthened, this inflated debt levels in the region, leading to 
increased deficits, defaults and created a financial crisis. Philippines were less affected as 
macroeconomic conditions were solid through the supervision of the IMF which implemented 
the economy on a sustainable growth path, however did still accumulate losses through 
currency depreciation, which inflicted losses to the asset prices to the Philippines. Singapore 
also recovered very swiftly from this episode due to their banks being more capitalized and 
able to withstand losses incurred from loans as well having capital to sustain speculative attack 
on their respective currency, Corsetti et al. (1998). Furthermore other nations such as Japan, 
Russia and U.S.A also faced the prospect of a global crisis. Japanese banks were already 
suffering from the 1980s asset bubble combined with a stagnant economy, also had large loan 
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exposure, deepening the Japanese economy in 1997 as Japanese banks accumulated capital 
losses.  
 
2.2.3. Japanese Lost Decade 
 
The problem encountered by Japan was as a result of an asset price bubble in 1989 which 
resulted in economic stagnation for the next 10-20 years. This is commonly referred to as the 
lost decade(s). The literature highlights three main factors that contributed to the financial 
crisis; financial deregulation, monetary policy and fiscal policy. The Japanese banks were 
liberated slowly from the mid-1970s onwards from a tight system of regulatory control. The 
deregulation of the Japans financial system allowed banks’ to raise capital at a time when they 
were faced with rising costs of capital due to the opening up of international capital markets 
from which they chose to raise new capital.  This was a pivotal factor in the creation of the 
asset price bubble as most banks looked to expand their business by offering real estate loans. 
The over-reliance upon the real estate lending meant that banks overlooked the possibility that 
land prices will not always increase over time and thus should not use such assets as collateral 
(Hoshi and Kashyap (2004)). Since the monetary policy implemented by the Japanese 
authorities was too loose, the Bank of Japan (BOJ) focussed on buying USD in order to resist 
an appreciating yen, as the high trade surplus would only serve to hinder economic growth. 
This expansionary monetary policy resulted in an overheating of the economy, without much 
intervention by the BOJ to tighten monetary policy at a time when asset prices began to rise, 
for the reason that it was more interested in increasing reserves. Fukao (2003) points out that 
had the BOJ taken the necessary early actions the problems it experienced may have had a 
lesser impact on the economy in future years. On the fiscal impact on asset price bubble, 
Japanese tax system favoured debt financed real estate investment up-until the bursting of the 
asset bubble. For example capital gains on land were not realised until the time of sale with 
interest payments being tax deductible for corporations, leading to a large number of real estate 
investments being carried out for tax planning purposes (Fukao (2003)). In addition, the 
financial crisis also had a long lasting impact on the economy due to slow policy response of 
the government, as well as the banks being saddled with non-performing loans which became 
an increasing problem.  
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Throughout the 1980s, Japanese banks and listed companies experienced exceptional 
rates of growth as manifested by the Nikkei Index which was valued at 10,000 in 1984 and by 
1989 at had reached 40,000. Over the same period, land prices to GDP almost doubled with 
commercial prices nearly tripling. These asset values floating in Japan enabled institutions and 
companies to expand their business at unsustainable rates. The levels reached suggest how 
undercapitalized these institutions became after the asset bubble with unrealised capital gains 
from stock and real estate markets disappearing. This forced the BOJ to adopt an expansionary 
monetary policy through a zero percent interest rate to prevent deflation.   
 
2.2.4. 2007/ 8 Sub-prime Crisis 
 
The 2007-2008 US sub-prime mortgage collapse was initiated by rising interest rates following 
a prolonged period of low interest rates and thus low cost of borrowing. It is important to stress 
that most economist viewed this as a credit bubble, which grew due to increasing confidence 
within the financial sector that financial firms could continue to raise new capital through the 
process of securitization. In the build-up to the financial crisis, real estate prices in the US were 
inflating at an abnormal rate due to increased demand and available credit. Banks seeking to 
profit from the favourable conditions lowered their lending criteria for mortgages, resulting in 
many individuals wishing to purchase real estate, thereby creating assets on their respective 
balance sheets’. As US base rate would eventually increase, the supply of money and credit 
diminished, resulting in a slowdown in economic activity, increased unemployment and a rise 
in borrowing costs which increased default rates leading to a large supply of real estate with 
falling housing prices (supply was greater than demand). The fall in house prices had serious 
implications for US banks and investors in mortgage backed securities, as portfolios were 
collateralized on sub-prime mortgages, resulting in large losses, and with many financial 
institutions requiring bailouts from the US government. Many financial institutions around the 
globe, from Western Europe to Asia, were exposed to institutions such as Lehman Brothers 
and Bear Stearns who had underwritten subprime assets. This resulted in lost capital and the 
ability to raise finances at lower cost as the financial crisis unfolded.  
Many UK banks were also exposed to the US sub-prime market, while UK mortgage 
banks, such as the Northern Rock Bank and HBOS were affected significantly as the financial 
crisis unravelled. For example, the Northern Rock Bank experienced a bank run, raising 
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concerns of possible systemic risk. The events surrounding Northern Rock led to widespread 
financial distress over the financial viability of other UK banks’ exposure to US subprime 
lending (Shin (2009)). To prevent the collapse of the bank, the UK government announced that 
it would provide financial assistance to Northern rock. Soon after a number of UK banks made 
their financial exposure known and, as had been feared, quite a number of these would also 
require considerable capital injection from the UK government to keep them afloat and, more 
significantly to prevent a collapse of the UK banking sector. Not too long after the crisis had 
settled, the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis erupted in 2010, partly as a result of the 2008 
collapse as government debt levels increased in order to lessen the impact of the economic 
recession. However by 2011 a number of Eurozone countries required financial assistance that 
would allow them to service debt interest payments.  
 
2.2.5. Contained Financial Crisis Periods  
 
Historically, periods of financial crisis have been averted from impacting the real economy (i.e. 
households and consumption) in countries such as Canada, the U.K, Norway, Sweden and most 
recently Iceland. The UK experienced a small banking crisis in the early 1990s, which pushed 
the UK into recession, which was the result of attempts to sustain macro-economic expansion, 
through monetary policy tightening. Against the declining financial environment small banks 
en mass experienced frailties, which included the failure of 25 institutions. The prompt 
response through providing liquidity and extensive monitoring limited spill-over effects to the 
real economy as confidence was restored and prevented further failures, Logan (2000). The 
Scandinavian banking crisis of the 1990s witnessed swift policy response from Norway and 
Sweden resulted in a short-lived recession. Norway’s response included brokering mergers of 
two large savings banks and complete nationalisation of Kreditkassen, Fokus Bank and 
Christiana Bank (second, third and sixth largest) (Allen and Gale, (1999)). Also provided 
capital injections to the largest bank (DnB), claiming an 87.5% stake. Sweden’s government 
response was similar, in order to prevent systematic failure through capital injections to keep 
banks afloat, which cost the government an estimated 2% of GDP, Englund (1999). Sweden 
and Norway resumed economic growth, with Fokus Bank re-privatised and saw other holdings 
drop to 50% by 1995. Iceland was one of the first victims of the 2008 global financial crisis as 
a combination of deregulation, foreign investment and over-inflated asset prices. The 
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consequences led to a banking collapse, which observed the three largest Icelandic banks 
nationalised within a week as Lehman Brothers failed, this prevented Iceland to borrow from 
foreign markets. The consequences led to drastic measures employed by the government as 
banking reforms were implemented in order to resolve debt forfeiting issues. The policy 
responses have foreseen Iceland’s economy resume positive GDP growth by 2011 and ahead 
of schedule debt repayments to the IMF (Fridriksson (2009) and Jackson (2010)). Bordo, 
Redish and Rockoff (2010) highlight Canada’s banking system has historically not been 
heavily implicated by financial crises. This is due to the structure implemented which allows 
the government to exercise a wrath of intervention when necessary, combined with a tight 
regulatory system. Canada from this tight regulatory control were not impacted from the sub-
prime collapse as their banks’ were unable to partake in such high-risk investments, which 
results in little or no exposure as well as not requiring bailouts as witnessed in US and Europe.  
 
2.3 Econometric Literature 
 
We will now introduce a branch of literature concerning the econometric modelling techniques, 
which have improved our ability to understand relationships within time series data beginning 
with Engle (1982).  
Engle (1982) transformed econometrics by enabling researchers to model prices, time 
varying volatility through a new stochastic process known as autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity (ARCH). This revolutionary model allows the conditional variance to 
change over time as a function of past errors leaving the unconditional variance a constant. 
Bollerslev (1986) established the GARCH model (generalized autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity) progressing Engle’s framework. The model enables researchers to capture 
temporal behaviour of many economic variables or macroeconomic time series accurately. 
GARCH is obtained by assuming an autoregressive moving average equation on an observable 
variable (Y), the conditional variance is expressed as a linear function of past squared 
innovations and of its past values. Sentana (1990) extended GARCH through introducing 
quadratic GARCH (QGARCH) model, by allowing any positive quadratic form of the past 
innovations to capture asymmetry in volatility. Nelson (1991) established issues with previous 
models, firstly finding negative correlation, which GARCH model rules out through 
assumption. Secondly, GARCH model impose parameter restrictions that are often violated by 
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estimated coefficients that may disproportionately restrict the dynamics of the conditional 
variance process. The final issue is interpreting whether shocks to conditional variance persist 
or not is difficult in GARCH models, because the usual normal measuring persistence often do 
not agree. Nelson addressed the errors through the exponential GARCH model (EGARCH), 
via a linear independent variable. This model accounts for positive and negative shocks of 
equal size to have different impacts on volatility, also EGARCH places no restrictions upon 
the parameters. This is an important differential in comparison to the traditional GARCH 
model, as interpreting EGARCH result produces clarity. However Engle and Ng (1993) 
discredit EGARCH as their study suggests there is evidence that the variability of the 
conditional variance implied is too high, but does capture most asymmetry. Higgins and Bera 
(1992) introduced the nonlinear ARCH (NARCH) which can accurately model financial time 
series data such as exchange rates through a nonlinear functional form for the conditional 
variance of an ARCH. The NARCH model is a result of research by Hsieh (1989) and 
Scheinkman and LeBaron (1989) exposed weaknesses of GARCH. As they are not adequate 
to comprehend exchange rates as well as provided evidence that volatility in stock market data 
cannot be captured completely by linear ARCH. Engle and Ng (1993) extended NARCH 
framework by generalising it to nonlinear GARCH (NGARCH) through including Box-Cox 
transformations of lagged dependent variables. NGARCH can determine how news impacting 
events are incorporated into volatility estimates. Glosten, Jagannathan and Runkle (1993) 
created the GJR-GARCH model to sanction seasonal patterns in volatility. The model allows 
positive and negative fluctuations in returns to impact differing conditional volatility, when 
applied to the Japanese crash (1987), the model presented a greater impact on volatility in 
comparison to other models. Zakoian (1994) devised the threshold GARCH (TGARCH) model 
to accommodate for different reactions of volatility to different signs of lagged errors, 
achieving stationarity within the data. TGARCH differentiates by offering the conditional 
standard deviation a piecewise linear function of past values of white noise. This sophisticated 
approach is effective when modelling the asymmetric relation between volatility and past 
returns. 
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2.4 The Performance of Financial Intermediaries 
 
The financial sector is important not only for the allocation of capital, financial intermediation, 
but crucially the transformation of savings into investments of various kinds. In these respects 
banking activities, in particular, is seen as being very important in affecting productivity and 
economic growth. It is perhaps for this reason why the analysis of the performance of financial 
institutions such as banks has been the subject of much empirical investigation which has 
resulted in a growing literature. One of the most important studies is the work of Gilbert (1981) 
who examined the performance and profitability of the banking sector using an approach that 
takes into account 56 market structures in order to determine the most appropriate method of 
estimation. In arriving at his conclusion, Gilbert raises questions concerning regression 
equations in the earlier studies of Whitehead (1977), Harvey (1979), Rhoades (1977) and 
Savage and Rhoades (1981) where the average interest rate on loans is the dependent variable, 
and the independent variable include the ratio of loans to deposits, as well as market structure 
measures. Gilbert note that the inclusion of the ratio of loans to deposits as an independent 
variable creates an issue of bias in the coefficient of market concentration which tended toward 
zero, since some of the influence of market structure is captured in the loan to deposit ratio. To 
overcome this bias within the equation he suggest specifying a demand function of bank 
customers, and a supply functions of banks and to derive a reduced form equation between a 
set of performance variables and a measure of market structure. Overall Gilbert conclude that 
the most accurate studies and estimation procedures find significant influence of market 
structure on measures of bank performance. Smirlock (1985) sought to investigate the 
interrelationships between banking profits, market share, and market concentration using 
simplistic approach that differed from the study of Gilbert (1981). The method applied 
estimates a cross-sectional profit regression equation that include market share and market 
concentration as independent variables. The regression Equation is of the following form: 
 
𝜋 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑀𝑆 + 𝛼2𝐶𝑅 + 𝛼3𝑀𝑆𝐶𝑅 + ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑍𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=4                (2.1) 
 
where: 𝜋 is the profit measure, 𝑀𝑆, market share, 𝐶𝑅, market concentration, 𝑀𝑆𝐶𝑅, an 
interaction term defined as MS multiplied by CR and 𝑎𝑖𝑍𝑖, a vector of additional control 
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variables known as Total market deposits (MKTDEP), the percentage of market growth 
(MKTGROW), the ratio of demand deposits to total deposits (DDTODEP), total bank assets 
(ASSETS), The effect of holding company affiliation (INDEP) and the law as applied to 
multibank holding companies with a value of 1 if the bank is located in a state that allows 
multibank holding companies and zero otherwise (MULTI). Smirlock’s (1985) findings 
indicate that when market share is positively and significantly related to profitability, market 
concentration does not explain bank profitability.  
Bourke (1989) and Molyneux and Thornton (1992) investigated the concentration and 
determinants of profitability amongst international banks with Molyneux and Thornton (1992) 
solely focussing on European banks. The methodological approach taken shadows by 
Molyneux and Thornton mirrors Bourke (1989) through estimating a linear equation, 
regressing independent variables such as; government ownership; concentration ratio; 10 year 
bond rate in given country; money supply; capital and reserves per cent of total assets; cash 
and bank deposits of total assets; CPI of given country and staff expenses as per cent of total 
assets. Bourke (1989) produced conflicting results to Smirlock (1985) and provide evidence 
concentration was positively related to profitability and explains this through achieving 
statistical significance. Bourke (1989) also demonstrates money supply, the 10 year bond rate 
and inflation are positive influences towards profitability. Results from Molyneux and 
Thornton (1992) are in line with Bourke (1989) in many respects, such as finding a statistically 
significant relationship between return on capital and concentration. In addition, capital ratios 
and nominal interest rates are found to be positively related to profitability, which confirms 
Bourke’s (1989) study. Molyneux and Thornton (1992) discovered two conflicting results from 
Bourke (1989) which are government ownership and staff expenditure have a positive impact 
on profitability instead of a negative as found in Bourke (1989).  
Molyneux and Forbes (1995) is a closely related study which focuses on structure and 
performance in European banking by testing the structure-conduct-performance hypothesis and 
the efficiency for the period 1986-1989. The methodology opted for a cross-sectional profit 
regression formula as exemplified in the regression below.  
 
𝜋𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1(𝐶𝑅𝑗) + 𝛼2(𝑀𝑆𝑖𝑗) + 𝛼3(𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐴𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑗) + 𝛼4(𝐿𝑂𝑇𝑂𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑗) + 𝛼5(𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑗)  +
𝛼6(𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑇𝑗)            
                     (2.2) 
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where: 𝜋𝑖, bank i’s profits measured as the return on assets, 𝐶𝑅𝑗, concentration ratio in market 
j, 𝑀𝑆𝑖𝑗, market share, 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐴𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑗, capital-to-asset ratio, 𝐿𝑂𝑇𝑂𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑗, loans to deposits ratio, 
𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑗, total assets of bank i and 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑇𝑗, a binary value equal to 1 if government owned 
(central or local) or 0 if otherwise. 
Molyneux and Forbes (1995) draws upon the market share to yield a negative 
coefficient and not statistically significant to profitability which conflicts Smirlock’s (1985) 
original finding. However, they provided evidence to support the structure-conduct-
performance hypothesis as well as government ownership to have a positive and statistically 
significant relationships against profitability, which is in line with Bourke (1989) and 
Molyneux and Thornton (1992). Additionally, Molyneux and Forbes (1995) demonstrate total 
assets to have a negative relationship towards profitability but also finds capital asset ratio to 
be positively related to profitability.  
The work of Berger (1995) differs from previous studies in that it makes use of variables 
that have been excluded in previous studies. The method applied takes the following form: 
  
𝜋𝑖 = 𝑓7(𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐶𝑚, 𝑀𝑆𝑖, 𝑋 − 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖 , 𝑆 − 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖 , 𝑍𝑖𝑚
7 ) + 𝜖𝑖
7                (2.3) 
 
where 𝜋𝑖, profit, is denoted as return on assets or return on equity, 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐶𝑚, concentration from 
Herfindahl index, 𝑀𝑆𝑖, market share of market deposits, 𝑋 − 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖, x-efficiency - ratio of the 
smallest nine year average multiplicative cost function residual of banks in the same 
competitive environment to the banks nine year average residual, 𝑆 − 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖,  scale efficiency – 
a ratio of predicted unit cost for a scale efficient firm with the same product mix and input 
prices to the bank’s predicted unit cost, 𝑍𝑖𝑚
7 , a vector denoted for control variables and 𝜖𝑖
7 , an 
error term. The reported findings highlight market share and x-efficiency as having a positive 
and statistical association with bank profitability.  
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) examine the determinants of profitability by 
applying the following regression model: 
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𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼𝑖𝐵𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽𝑗𝑋𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾𝑡𝑇𝑡 + 𝛿𝑗𝐶𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡               (2.4) 
 
where 𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡 denote the profit variable (net interest margin) for bank i in country j at time t, 𝐵𝑖𝑗𝑡 
is a vector for multiple bank characteristics of bank i in country j at time t, 𝑋𝑗𝑡 a vector of 
characteristics for country j at time t, 𝑇𝑡 and 𝐶𝑗, a time and country dummy variables and 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 
is a white noise error term. Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) findings suggest there are 
many positive and negative relationships towards profitability. For example, concentration 
ratio, capitalisation, international owner, higher stock market capitalisation to GDP ratio, 
inflation, GDP and real interest rates are found to have statistically significance. These results 
suggests banks are able to convert higher market share through concentration and experience 
greater profitability due to lack of competition. International ownership enables banks to raise 
capital levels much cost-effective and as a result increase profit margins and profitability. In 
terms of the macroeconomic factors, banks are able to convert favourable economic conditions 
into greater profitability as banking sector funds growth through increasing loans as well as 
manage interest rates and inflation efficiently. The negative aspects towards profitability found 
within this literature are high non-interest earning assets; banks that rely on deposits for 
funding; Banks operating in industrial countries are also less profitable which is perceived to 
be due to lack of technology implementation. The reserve requirements are found to depress 
profitability as banks are required to hold liabilities and also concludes law variables with 
higher contractual agreements has a negative impact towards margins and profit. Abreu and 
Mendes (2001) furthered the research within this field and replicated the methodology of 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999). Abreu and Mendes (2001) find as capitalization, interest 
rates and market share are found to be determinants of profitability, which is consistent with 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999). The contradictions raised from Abreu and Mendes 
(2001) is inflation to be negative, which means banks costs are higher than revenues when 
inflation occurs. Other conclusions included loan-to-asset ratio has a positive impact on interest 
margins and profitability. Lastly, Abreu and Mendes (2001) conclude unemployment rate to 
have a positive influence on bank profitability and the exchange rate has no impact on 
profitability.  
Goddard et al. (2004a) applied a pooled cross-sectional time series model, as well as a 
dynamic panel model using the generalized methods of moments (GMM) to determine the 
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profitability of European banks (in a sample that include Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, 
Spain and the UK) over the period 1992-1998. The model employed is as follows: 
 
𝜋𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑓(𝜋𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝑠𝑖,𝑡, 𝑜𝑖,𝑡, 𝑐𝑖,𝑡𝑑1,𝑖, 𝑑2,𝑖)                 (2.5) 
 
where 𝜋𝑖,𝑡  is the profit of bank i in year t measured using return on equity, 𝑠𝑖,𝑡 the natural 
logarithm of total assets in €, 𝑜𝑖,𝑡 the nominal value of off-balance sheet business, 𝑐𝑖,𝑡 CAR for 
bank i, 𝑑1,𝑖, a dummy variable taking a value of 1 for savings bank,  and 0 otherwise, and 𝑑2,𝑖 
a dummy variable taking a value of 1 for cooperative bank, and 0 otherwise. The reported 
findings confirm the need for further investigation into the size-profitability relationship as the 
results are inconclusive and consistent with previous research in this area. Furthermore, their 
results suggest that off balance sheet activities play a role in the determinant of profitability. 
Although Goddard et al. (2004a) report a positive relationship between capital-asset ratio and 
profitability, from the countries examined they found little to no evidence of any systematic 
relationship between ownership type and profitability as German saving and co-operative 
banks appear to be significantly less profitable in comparison to German commercial banks.  
 Goddard et al. (2004b) used the following VAR model to estimate the dynamic 
panel interactions between firm growth and profitability using 583 banks accounting data from 
the 5 largest EU countries (e.g., France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK) over the time period 
1992-1998: 
 
𝜋𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼2,0,𝑖 + 𝛼2,1𝜋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼2,2𝑔𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽′2𝑥𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢2,𝑖,𝑡              (2.6) 
 
where 𝜋𝑖,𝑡 is the profit rate denoted as return on equity of bank i in year t, 𝑔𝑖,𝑡−1 the logarithmic 
growth of bank i between years t – 1 and t, 𝑥𝑖,𝑡, a vector of control variables that include the 
value of off-balance sheet activities, capital-to-asset ratio, liquidity ratio (liquid assets to total 
assets), bank i’s market share, banking sector Herfindahl index for country j and GDP annual 
growth, 𝛼2,0,𝑖 individual bank effects and  𝑢2,𝑖,𝑡, a disturbance term. The findings of Goddard 
et al. (2004b) confirm the results of Molyneux and Forbes (1995) that there is no cross-sectional 
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relationship between size and growth, while also reporting a positive relationship between 
concentration and profitability. The findings also suggest that banks that maintain a high 
capital-asset ratio or a high liquidity ratio are likely to be more profitable, but report little 
evidence of a relationship between x-efficiency and profitability.   
 Pasiouras and Kosmidou (2007) also contribute to the literature by investigating the 
determinants EU countries bank profitability over the period 1995-2001. Using return-on-
assets as the main profit measure, along with variables such as stock market capitalization to 
GDP, stock market capitalization to assets of deposits and assets of deposits money banks to 
GDP, they estimate the following balanced panel regression model: 
  
𝑍𝑖𝑡 =  𝑏𝑜𝑡 + 𝑏𝑖𝑡(𝐸𝑄𝐴𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 +  𝐿𝑂𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡) + 𝑏𝑗𝑡(𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑗𝑡 + 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑗𝑡 +
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐶𝑗𝑡 + 𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡 + 𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑃𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑡 + 𝑀𝐴𝐶𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡)                                                           (2.7)        
 
where; 𝑍𝑖𝑡 is the dependent variable that represents Return on Assets, EQAS  is the equity to 
assets ratio, a measure of capital adequacy. High capital asset ratios are assumed to be 
indicators of low leverage and therefore low risk. COST is the cost-to-Income ratio which 
provides information on the efficiency of bank management regarding expenses relative to the 
revenues it generates. Higher ratios imply less efficient management. LOFUND is the ratio net 
loans to customer and short-term funding. Higher figures denote lower liquidity. SIZE is the 
total assets. INF is the annual inflation rate.  GDPGGR is GDP Growth. ASSGDP is the ratio 
of the total assets of banks divided by the GDP. MACPASS is the ratio of stock market 
capitalization to total assets and MACGDP is the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP. 
The results are broadly in line with the finding of Kosmidou et al. (2005) who report a banks’ 
equity-to-assets ratio has having a positive impact on profitability. The results also reveal that 
the macroeconomic variables in the model have a positive influence on profitability, though 
variables such as the cost-to-income ratio and bank size have a negative impact on bank 
profitability, which supports findings of Kosmidou et al. (2006). We should note that stock 
market capitalization to GDP and stock market capitalization to assets of deposits have 
significant and positive impact on profitability, but interestingly assets of deposits money banks 
to GDP is negatively related to profitability.  
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Where UK real estate companies are concerned, very little research have been carried 
out on their performance. Lizieri and Satchell (1997) using a Threshold Autoregressive model 
(TAR) explored how changes in the rates of interest affect the performance of UK estate 
companies in order to determine whether the real estate sector is sensitive to the economic 
cycle of the UK, particularly at the peak of economic activity when property prices are expected 
to rise as a result of demand pressures. The estimated model is as follows: 
 
∆𝑌𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝜎𝑖𝑒𝑡 if 𝑍𝑡−1𝜀𝑅𝑖                            (2.8) 
 
where ∆𝑌𝑡 measures the change in price of the property index, i = 1, 2, 𝑎𝑖, 𝑏𝑖 and 𝜎𝑖 are the 
parameters associated with regimes 𝑅𝑖 and 𝑍𝑡, and 𝑒𝑡 is as an error term. The findings suggest 
that property company prices are sensitive to interest rate fluctuations, as well as being non-
linear. Furthermore, the impact of high interest rates tends to correspond to lower prices and 
vice versa for lower interest rates. However, when interest rates are low the upward pressure 
on prices is far greater and result in greater volatility in comparison to a high interest rate 
regime.  
In his investigation of the determinants of UK real estate returns, Kohlert (2010) applied 
a Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) in order to identify the long-run relationships among 
returns and economic variables as well as short-term corrective behaviour. The model is 
expressed as follows:  
 
∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿𝑖𝑑𝑖 + 𝛼𝑖𝛽′𝑖𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝑝−1
𝑗=1 ∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡               (2.9) 
 
When; i = 1,… N; t = 𝑝𝑖 + 1, 𝑝𝑖 + 2,…, T. Which becomes cross-sectionally estimated as 
follows: 
 
∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿𝑖𝑑𝑖 + 𝛼𝑖𝛽′𝑖𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝑝−1
𝑗=1 ∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 for t = 1, 2, …, T.           (2.10) 
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where; ∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the changes in each dependent variable (Total return, GDP, total investments 
and unemployment growth) i at time t. 𝛿𝑖 is a parameter, 𝑑𝑖 illustrates a vector of deterministic 
components and 𝑝𝑖 is the lag order for the VAR process. 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽′𝑖 are both matrices of full 
column rank, with 𝜏𝑖𝑗 accounting for unknown matrices and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is defined as an error term. 
Kohlert (2010) showed that the observed economic variables have a strong long-run 
relationship with total return, and further that the relationships are casual and running from the 
economic variables to total return. The results also reveal the existence of a short-term causal 
relationship between total investment, total returns and total returns adjusting to long-term 
disparities resulting from changes in the variables.  
In his study of corporate governance mechanisms within the UK real estate sector, Ke 
(2015) sought to identify the determinants of the discount to net asset value, with the net asset 
value chosen as the dependent variable so as to capture the underlying value of the property 
portfolio, which is Ke (2015) definition for performance. The panel regression model 
implemented is as follows: 
 
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑁𝐴𝑉𝑖,𝑡−𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝑁𝐴𝑉𝑖,𝑡
× 100%  
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇/𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑅𝐸𝐼𝑇𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽6𝐻𝑇𝑌𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐴 −
𝐵𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑚 ∑ 𝐶𝐺𝑀𝑚𝑖,𝑡
4
𝑚=1 + 𝛽16𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡           (2.11) 
 
where 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is  the discount or premium of a listed property company i at time t. 𝑁𝐴𝑉 is the 
net asset value per share of the company and 𝑃 is the share price of property company. 𝛽𝑛 is a 
parameter coefficient, 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 the natural logarithm of total assets value, 𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇/𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇 is the 
ratio of total debt to total assets, 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐺 is the properties held for sale as a percentage of 
total assets. 𝑇𝐴𝑋 is the contingent liability to pay tax on capital gains as a percentage of total 
assets, 𝑅𝐸𝐼𝑇 is a dummy variable used to capture if the company is a real estate investment 
trust with a value of 1, and 0 otherwise. 𝐻𝑇𝑌𝑃𝐸 is explained by the Herfindahl Index, 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅 
is a dummy variable if the company invests across border. 𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇𝐷𝐼𝑆 is a property sector 
average discount, 𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾 is measured by the standard deviation of stock prices, 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁 is 
computed as the average daily stock return over the preceding three years. 𝐴 − 𝐵𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷 is 
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the difference between the ask price and bid price. 𝐶𝐺𝑀 is a measure of corporate governance 
variables, 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 is a dummy variable for 2008-2013 which equal 1, and 0 for other years, and 
𝑒𝑡 is an error term. The findings indicate that debt-to-asset ratio, tax, risk, market sentiment, 
the ask-bid spread and internal ownership contribute positively to the NAV, and that there is 
also a negative correlation between NAV and the size of real estate firms, share price and 
focused property portfolio.   
Studies that examine the performance of UK investment trusts define performance from 
a market perspective with much emphasis on portfolio performances. Fletcher (1995) examined 
the selectivity and market timing performance of UK investment trusts, using the CAPM with 
additional terms to capture selectivity of portfolio performances. The findings indicate a 
divergence between timing and selectivity performances. Leger (1997) also examined the issue 
of performance and timing selectivity of UK investment trusts portfolios using the CAPM 
model to capture selectivity and the predictability of returns. The model is as follows: 
  
𝑟𝑝𝑡 = 𝑛0 + 𝑛1𝑟𝑚𝑡 + 𝑛2𝑟𝑚𝑡
2 + 𝜔𝑝𝑡                          (2.12) 
 
where; 𝑟𝑝𝑡 and 𝑟𝑚𝑡 measures the returns of the portfolio and the market in excess of a risk-free 
rate while 𝑛0 measures selectivity. When a manager is able to predict fluctuations in the market, 
the implied systematic risk is correlated with 𝑟𝑚𝑡, entailing a positive value of 𝑛2 and 𝜔𝑝𝑡 is 
an error term. The result of abnormal performances is found to be weak indicators of selectivity 
and timing with very little persistence. Bangassa (1999) also investigate the selectivity and 
timing performance of investment trusts companies in the UK. The approaches follows the 
work of Jensen (1968), Treynor and Mazuy (1966), Henriksson (1984), Connor and Korajczyk 
(1991) and Fama and French (1992). The results indicate that investment trust managers are 
non-existent within their market timing positions, with evidence of unfavourable perverse 
timing. Elyasiani and Jia (2011) also examine the persistence of portfolio performance of 
closed-end funds using 1, 3 and 4 factor models in order to discover the determinants of 
performance. The model adopted for this purpose is as follows: 
 
 𝑅𝐴𝑃𝑗 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑗 + 𝛿2𝑀𝑇𝑗 + 𝛿3𝐿𝐴𝐺𝑅𝐴𝑃𝑗 + 𝛿4𝐿𝐴𝐺𝐷𝑌𝑗 + 𝑛𝑗          (2.13) 
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where 𝑅𝐴𝑃𝑗 is the risk-adjusted performance, 𝛿 denotes a coefficient parameter, 𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷 is 
the bid-ask spread, 𝑀𝑇 defines momentum, 𝐿𝐴𝐺𝑅𝐴𝑃𝑗  is defined as the lagged risk-adjusted 
performance, 𝐿𝐴𝐺𝐷𝑌 captures the lagged dividend yield and 𝑛 is an error term. Their results 
demonstrate that closed end funds cannot beat the market persistently under all methods. In 
terms of the determinants of performance, Elyasiani and Jia (2011) note that the lagged 
dividend yields as a main driver of performance.  
We should also add that our review of the literature has uncovered only a few studies 
that that examine the performance of insurance companies and to the best of our knowledge 
there is no literature that has to date examined the financial performance of finance companies.   
 
2.5 Bank Risk-Taking Behaviour 
In seeking to maximise profit, financial institutions are invariably exposed to various types of 
risk, some of which if not properly hedged will result in financial losses. Thus it is necessary 
to examine the extent to which the risk-taking of financial institutions over time affects their 
performance. In regard to risk, Koehn and Santomero (1980) examined the relationship 
between capital and risk by measuring the impact of regulation on portfolio risk-taking. The 
model used in this study presents capital regulations as serving to restrict a banks opportunity 
sets and shows why the ratio regulation fails to reduce risk taking. The model, which borrows 
from the quadratic programming insights of Merton (1972) is as follows:  
 
1/2 ∑ ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑥𝑗𝜎𝑖𝑗 − 𝜆0𝐸𝑝
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑛
𝑡=1  for all 𝜆0, 0 ≤ 𝜆0 ≤ ∞             (2.14) 
 
Subject to: 
1 = ∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑡=0   
𝑥0 ≥ 1 −
1
𝑐
  
With: 
𝐸𝑝 = 𝑥0𝑅 + ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝐸𝑖
𝑛
𝑡=1   
where 𝐸𝑖 is the expected return on the ith asset, 𝑥𝑖 is the percentage of equity value calculated 
from the total portfolio value invested in the ith asset i = 1, 2, ...,n. 𝜎𝑖𝑗 is the covariance of 
returns between the ith and the jth assets and the variance of return on the ith asset is 𝜎𝑖𝑗 = 𝜎𝑖
2. 
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Kim and Santomero (1988) assumed that the variance-covariance matrix is positive-definite. 
𝐸𝑝 and 𝜎𝑝
2 are the expected returns and variance of return per unit of capital on the bank 
portfolio. 𝑥0 is the percentage of capital held in the negative asset (deposits) paying the risk 
free rate R, and 𝜆0 is the real trade-off between variance and expected return at any point on 
the efficient investment frontier i.e. 𝜆0 = 𝑑𝜎𝑖
2/𝑑𝐸𝑝. The leverage of the bank is constrained by 
c. The results show that it is possible that regulatory efforts to control risk taking through capital 
ratio regulation may increase the probability of failure for some institutions. Kim and 
Santomero (1988) also distinguish between bank capital regulation and risk using a utility 
maximizing mean-variance approach. In fact, the study presents a new risk-related capital 
model which builds on the earlier framework of Koehn and Santomero (1980) by placing bank 
assets into several risk categories and assigning a risk weight to each category to determine the 
minimum equity capital that should be maintained against it. The findings show that capital 
ratio regulation is an ineffective approach to control the banking system, primarily because it 
ignores individual bank preference structures, while at the same time allowing risky banks to 
evade restriction through leveraging. The results also suggest that bank risk weights depend on 
three factors; the expected returns, their variance-covariance structure and the upper bound on 
the allowable insolvency risk regulators require.   
Saunders et al. (1990) investigate the relationship between bank ownership and risk-
taking by hypothesising that stockholder controlled banks are riskier than managerially control 
banks during times of deregulation. The model used is as follows: 
 
𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐾𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡            (2.15) 
 
where 𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑡, which is one of seven different capital market risk measures 
(𝜎𝑠, 𝜎𝜀
𝑆, 𝛽𝑚
𝑆 , 𝛽𝐼
𝑆, 𝜎𝜀
𝐿 , 𝛽𝑚
𝐿  and 𝛽I
L.) for bank i in year t. 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡 the percentage of stock owned by 
officers and directors in bank i in year t. 𝐾𝐴𝑖𝑡 the book value of capital-assets ratio of bank i in 
year t. 𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑡 the ratio of fixed assets to total assets (operating leverage) of bank i in year t. 
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 the total assets of bank i in year t, and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 an error term. Their findings conclude that 
stockholder controlled banks exhibit significantly higher risk-taking behaviour than 
managerially controlled banks for a given sample period of deregulation. Shrieves and Dahl 
(1992) also examined empirically bank behaviours with respect to observed changes in capital 
and risk to determine whether theoretical arguments support changes within these variables. 
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The approach used the changes in both capital and risk with endogenous and exogenous 
components and with clear focus on the determination of discretionary changes in risk as 
follows: 
 
∆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑐0 + 𝑐1𝐿𝑁𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑗,𝑡 + 𝑐2𝐵𝐻𝐶𝑗,𝑡 + 𝑐3𝑅𝐸𝐺𝑗,𝑡 + 𝑐4∆𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑗,𝑡 + 𝑐5∆𝑁𝑂𝑁𝑗,𝑡 +
𝛽2𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝑈2,𝑗,𝑡′                 (2.16) 
 
where: ΔRisk is a change composite risk index calculated by weighted sum of assets divided 
by total assets. LNSIZE, the natural log of total assets to capture size, REG, regulatory cost, is 
a binary variable that reflects the degree of regulatory pressure. CAP, the capital ratio, NON, 
non-performing loans which is captured by loan loss provision. BHC, bank holding company 
which captures potential organizational effects, a binary variable, Risk, a composite risk index 
calculated by weighted sum of assets divided by total assets, and j,t – j identifies bank, and t 
the time period. The findings indicate the statistical significance between all variables in at 
least 1 of the 3 models tested. The results also suggests that multibank holding company 
affiliation status significantly negatively impacted target capital levels, while also influencing 
target risk levels positively. Shrieves and Dahl (1992) conclude that risk exposure and capital 
levels are simultaneously related to one another and that the majority of banks in their sample 
mitigate the effects of increases in capital levels by increasing risk and vice versa. The findings 
also show that theoretical models that include leverage and risk-related cost avoidance and 
managerial risk aversion of capital structure and risk-taking behaviour in commercial banks 
are consistent. In contrast, Angbazo (1997) show that bank size had no effect on overall target 
capital levels, though this was inversely related to target capital levels for banks with total 
capital ratios less than 7 per cent. Although this finding report a positive association between 
capital and risk, it also reveals that banks with low capital levels will increase capital levels as 
risk increases. Iannotta et al. (2007) also shed light on ownership affecting banks asset quality 
and risk-taking behaviour by making use of two models to identify profitability and risk as 
follows (profitability): 
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𝑃𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑂𝑆𝑗𝑡 + 𝛿𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜆𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑗 + 𝜏𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡  + 𝛾𝐶𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗𝑡           (2.17) 
 
where 𝑃𝑗𝑡  is the observed performance for the jth bank at year t, 𝑂𝑆𝑗𝑡  a vector of ownership 
structure variables, 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 a vector of time specific dummy variables, 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑗  a vector of 
country specific dummy variable, 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡 the annual growth rate, 𝐶𝑗𝑡 a vector of control 
variables, 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛿, 𝜆, 𝜏, 𝛾,  are the regression coefficients, and 𝜀𝑗𝑡 an error term (risk): 
 
𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 + 𝛿𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜆𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑗 + 𝜏𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡  + 𝛾𝐶𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗𝑡          (2.18) 
 
where 𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑡 – the observed value for the variables LOANLOSS for the jth bank at year 
t 
The findings of Iannotta et al. (2007) showed that public sector banks have poorer loan 
quality and higher insolvency risk than other types of banking institutions, which is consistent 
with the existence of government guarantees which allows public sector banks to avoid the 
indirect costs. However, the study shows that Mutual banks have superior loan quality and 
lower classified asset risk than both private and public sector banks, which supports the finding 
of Saunders et al. (1990) as managerial ownership banks are found to benefit from better 
customer relations. Laeven and Levine (2009) also examined the issue of bank risk-taking 
behaviour and ownership structure by applying a regression model with clustering at country 
level. The formulated model differentiates itself from previous studies by including multiple 
independent variables while quantifying bank risk through their z-score. The model is 
expressed as follows: 
 
𝑍𝑏,𝑐 = 𝛼 ∗ 𝑋𝑏,𝑐 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝐶𝐹𝑏,𝑐 + 𝛾 ∗ 𝑅𝑐 + 𝛿 ∗ 𝐶𝐹𝑏,𝑐 ∗ 𝑅𝑐 + 𝑢𝑏,𝑐           (2.19) 
 
where 𝑍𝑏,𝑐 is the Z-score of bank b in country c, 𝑋𝑏,𝑐 a matrix of bank level control variables, 
𝐶𝐹𝑏,𝑐 the cash flow rights of bank b in country c, 𝑅𝑐 country level bank regulations, 𝑢𝑏,𝑐 the 
error term, and 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾 and 𝛿 are vectors of the estimated coefficients. Once the regression is 
performed, a simultaneous equation system was derived to allow for the joint determination of 
34 
 
risk and valuation. Although issues of biasness within the model could arise as high risk banks 
might form concentrated ownership structures if diffuse shareholders have difficulty 
monitoring risky investments. The problem of biasness was addressed by using a variety of 
strategies to minimise biasness with all strategies yielding the same conclusion. Results from 
the study suggest that banks with more powerful owners tend to take greater risks which 
supports Saunders, Strock and Travlos (1990). Laeven and Levine (2009) conclude that 
shareholders have stronger incentives to increase risk than non-shareholding managers and debt 
holders, while large owners with substantial cash flows have the power and incentives to induce 
the bank’s managers to increase risk-taking behaviour. These results support also the findings 
of Koehn and Santomero (1980) who note that capital ratio regulation may actually increase 
the probability of failure for some institutions. 
Fortin et al. (2010) examine three factors which they consider influence risk-taking by 
bank managers; ownership structures, executive compensation and governance. Their study 
differs from previous studies in that they combine these influences into a model that accounts 
for risk-taking prior to the global financial crisis of 2007. The model developed accounts for 
83 depository institutions with share return as risk (dependent variable), which is estimated as 
the standard deviation of daily share return. The independent variables account for CEO salary, 
options granted to the CEO, institution size, corporate governance index, equity-to-total assets 
ratio, ownership, regular shareholders and bonus payment to CEO. The model is represented 
as follows: 
 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡+1 =
𝑓(𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡, 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡, 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡, 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑖,𝑡, 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖,𝑡, 𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡, 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑡, 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡, 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠𝑖,𝑡)  
        (2.20) 
where 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡+1 is the standard deviation of daily share returns for firm i at time t + 1, 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 
the natural logarithm of total assets, 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡  the market-book ratio, 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡  the equity-
assets ratio (which is a measure of bank capitalization), 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑖,𝑡 the corporate governance index, 
𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖,𝑡 the percentage of common shares owned by inside directors, 𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡 the percentage of 
common shares owned by outside block-holders, 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑡 the base salary paid to the CEO 
scaled by the natural log of total assets, 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 the total value of options granted to the CEO 
scaled by the natural log of total assets and 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠𝑖,𝑡 the total value of bonuses paid to the CEO 
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scaled by the natural log of total assets. The findings from this study show that bank CEOs 
with greater power (through share ownership or other corporate governance) take less risk, 
while bank CEOs, who are paid higher base salaries also take less risk. However bank CEOs 
who are paid more in bonuses or in stock options take more risk. The study also finds that weak 
capitalized banks (where ownership is by outside investors) are associated with greater risk-
taking activities, which is consistent with Sullivan and Spong (2007) in the sense that bank 
managers are generally more risk adverse than outside shareholders.   
 
2.6 Time-Varying Risk 
 
The issue of time-varying risk has received much attention in the finance literature, with the 
majority of empirical research utilising the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). Within the 
framework of the CAPM Beta is assumed to be constant through time, which has been reputed 
by Blume (1971), Fabozzi and Francis (1978), Alexander and Chervany (1980), Bos and 
Newbold (1984) and Faff et al. (1992) all of conclude that beta is time-varying. The empirical 
insights of the approaches used are flexible enough to lend themselves to various applications. 
One such approach which lends itself to our investigation is the rolling regression method 
utilised by Fama and Macbeth (1973), which utilises the market model with adjustments to the 
length of the window when computing the desired beta series. The rolling regression window 
is then estimated as follows: 
 
[𝑡 − 𝑤 + 1 𝑡] When 𝛽𝑖 = COV(𝑅𝑖,𝑅𝑀)/VAR(𝑅𝑀)              (2.21) 
 
where w is the length of the window and t is simply time. The process is continued until the 
series one desires for is reached. Schwert and Seguin (1990) study demonstrates the ease by 
which a time-varying beta model can be created by incorporating the market model which 
accounts for heteroskedasticity, through obtaining a conditional time-varying beta series as 
follows:  
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𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝛽2 (
𝑅𝑚𝑡
𝜎𝑚𝑡
2 ) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 ; 𝛽𝑡 = 𝑏0 +
𝑏1
𝜎𝑚𝑡
2                        (2.22) 
 
where 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the return on security i and time t, 𝛽1𝑅𝑚𝑡 is a constant beta multiplied by the return 
on the market. 𝛽2 (
𝑅𝑚𝑡
𝜎𝑚𝑡
2 ) is defined as the conditional time-varying beta as obtained via the 
GARCH(1,1) estimation. 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is denoted as the error term.  
State space models otherwise known as Kalman Filters were proposed by Harvey 
(1993) and Hamilton (1994). The Kalman filter procedure is a powerful recursive algorithm 
that generates a time-varying beta series. The state space model is able to create the series 
through two equations. Firstly the observation equation which is the market model, and second, 
via a transition equation. These two equations are then able to create a dynamic system which 
produces a conditional beta which can be characterised in three forms. First a mean reversion 
model: 
𝛽𝑖𝑡
𝑀𝑅 = 𝜏(𝛽𝑖𝑡−1 − ?̂?) + ?̂? + 𝑣𝑖𝑡−1               (2.23) 
Random Coefficient: 
𝛽𝑖𝑡
𝑅𝐶 = ?̂? + 𝑣𝑖𝑡−1                 (2.24) 
Random Walk: 
𝛽𝑖𝑡
𝑅𝑊 = 𝛽𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡−1                 (2.25) 
 
where 𝜏 is a parameter, ?̂? is the constant mean of beta and 𝑣𝑖𝑡−1 is a disturbance term. 
 There emerge in the literature a collection of models from the multivariate GARCH 
family that are suitable for our investigation. One such model is the bivariate BEKK GARCH 
model which has been applied in numerous finance settings; see for example Brooks et al. 
(1998) and Choudhry (2005) amongst others. The model, as introduced by Engle and Kroner 
(1995), allows us to generate a time-varying beta series through a parameterised Bivariate 
BEKK GARCH framework as follows: 
 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝜇 + 𝜀𝑡                  (2.26) 
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𝜀𝑡
𝛺𝑡−1
~𝑁(0, 𝐻𝑡)               
𝑣𝑒𝑐ℎ(𝐻𝑡) = 𝐶
′𝐶 + ∑ +𝐾𝐾=1 ∑ 𝐴′𝐾𝑖𝜀′𝑡−𝑖
𝑞
𝑖=1 𝐴𝑘𝑖 + ∑ +
𝐾
𝐾=1 ∑ 𝐵′𝐾𝑗𝐻𝑡−𝑗𝐵𝑘𝑗
𝑝
𝑖=1          (2.27)         
 
where 𝑦𝑡 is a 2×1 vector containing the natural logged returns of the stock index and market 
index and 𝜇 is a 2×1 vector of a constant. 𝐻𝑡 specifies the multivariate GARCH conditional 
variance of both variables, returns on stock index and the returns of market index, which is a 
function of the information set in 𝛺𝑡−1.𝐴′𝐾𝑖, 𝑖 = 1, 𝑞, 𝐾 = 1, 𝐾 and 𝐵′𝐾𝑗, 𝐽 = 1, 𝑝, 𝐾 = 1 and 
𝐾, are all matrices of 𝑁 × 𝑁.  
Following the approach of Engle and Kroner (1995), the BEKK bivariate GARCH(1,1) 
allows us to make use of less parameters as there is a diagonal restriction to the model, where 
K=1. 
where: 
𝐻𝑡 = 𝐶
′𝐶 + 𝐴′𝜀𝑡−1𝜀
′
𝑡−1𝐴 + 𝐵′𝐻𝑡−1𝐵               (2.28)            
𝐶is a 2×2 lower triangular matrix with intercept parameters, A and B are 2×2 square matrices 
of parameters. More specifically, A highlights the volatility linkages element, whilst B 
illustrates the extent to which the conditional variances and covariance are correlated with past 
innovations. Thus then leads us to compute the time varying beta which, is calculated as 
follows: 
𝛽𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐻12,𝑡/𝐻22,𝑡                           (2.29) 
 
where 𝐻12,𝑡 is the estimated conditional covariance between the returns on stock sector index 
and market index and 𝐻22,𝑡 is denoted as the conditional variance of the return on the market 
both given by the BEKK GARCH (1,1) model.  
Another useful approach is the GJR-GARCH model introduced by Glosten et al. 
(1993), which allows for positive and negative innovations of returns that ultimately impact 
the conditional variance. Faff et al. (2000) demonstrates how to capture the asymmetry or 
leverage effect through the use of a dummy variable attached to the original GARCH model. 
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For are purpose, we are able to capture the conditional variance and covariance of two variables 
as follows:   
 
ℎ = 𝛼0 + 𝛼𝑏𝑡−1
2 + 𝛼𝑏𝑡−1
2 𝑏𝑡−1<0 + 𝛼𝛿𝑡−1              (2.30)   
        
where 𝛼 represents a constant parameter, 𝑏 holds a residual value and 𝛿 denotes the GARCH 
element within the model and 𝛼𝑏𝑡−1
2 𝑏𝑡−1<0 captures the leverage effect, which is the 
conditional variance. To obtain the time varying beta, it is necessary to apply 𝛽𝑖,𝑡 =
𝐻12,𝑡/𝐻22,𝑡.  
In addition to the approaches outlined above, the DCC-GARCH can also be used 
capture the time-varying beta as demonstrated by Engle (2002). The models design structure 
allows a researcher to estimate the conditional correlation matrix of the returns on the security 
as well as the market. The model is parameterised as follows: 
 
𝐻𝑡 = 𝐷𝑡𝑅𝑡𝐷𝑡                  (2.31)  
 
where 𝐻𝑡 is a matrix of (2×1) containing the natural logged returns of the stock index and 
market index.          
 
𝐷𝑡 = 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙(√ℎ1,𝑡, √ℎ2,𝑡, … √ℎ𝑛,𝑡)                         (2.32) 
𝑅𝑡 = (𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙(𝑄𝑡))
−1/2𝑄𝑡(𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙(𝑄𝑡))
−1/2             (2.33)  
𝑄𝑡 = (1 − 𝜓 − 𝜁)?̅? + 𝜁𝑄𝑡−1 + 𝜓𝛿𝑖,𝑡−1𝛿𝑗,𝑡−1             (2.34) 
 
where 𝐷𝑡 is the diagonal matrix of conditional standard deviations for return series, which is 
obtained from the estimation of the GARCH (1,1) model, where √ℎ𝑛,𝑡 on the diagonal ith term. 
𝑅𝑡is defined as the conditional correlation matrix of the standardised returns, where 𝑄𝑡 is the 
positive definite matrix containing the conditional variances and covariance of 𝜀𝑡. (𝑄𝑡))
−1/2is 
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defined as the inverted diagonal matrix with the square root of the diagonal elements of 𝑄𝑡. ?̅?is 
the unconditional correlations of 𝛿𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝛿𝑗,𝑡−1, 𝜓 and 𝜁 are nonnegative scalar parameters as 
followed by Engle (2002). Where the log-likelihood of the estimators are given as: 
 
𝐿 = −
1
2
∑ [(𝑛 log(2𝜋) + log |𝐷𝑡|
2 + 𝜀𝑡
′𝐷𝑡
−1𝐷𝑡
−1𝜀𝑡) + (log |𝑅𝑡| + 𝛿𝑡
′𝑅𝑡
−1𝛿𝑡 − 𝛿𝑡
′𝛿𝑡)]
𝑇
𝑡=1   
        (2.35) 
The dynamic conditional correlations are produced by the following: 
 
𝜌𝑎𝑏,𝑡 =
(1−𝜓−𝜁)𝑞?̅?+𝜓𝛿𝑖,𝑡−1𝛿𝑗,𝑡−1+𝜁𝑞𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1
[(1−𝜓−𝜁)𝑞𝑖𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ +𝜓𝛿𝑖,𝑡−1
2 +𝜁𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑡−1]
1
2[(1−𝜓−𝜁)𝑞𝑗𝑗̅̅̅̅̅+𝜓𝛿𝑗,𝑡−1
2 +𝜁𝑞𝑗𝑗,𝑡−1]
1
2
           (2.36) 
 
where the time varying beta is capturing by  𝜌𝑎𝑏,𝑡, as 𝛽𝑖 can also be defined as the correlation 
between the two series; returns of the stock index and market index.  
 
2.7 Event Studies  
 
2.7.1 South American Debt Crisis   
 
The empirical literature on bank stock price behaviour following the Latin American debt crisis 
is filled with studies that make of event study analysis to explain the crisis. One of the earlier 
studies is the work of Cornell and Shapiro (1986) and Schoder and Vankudre (1986). In order 
to explain the impact of the crisis, Cornell and Shapiro (1986) used daily, monthly, biannual 
and annual cross-sectional regressions owing to difficulties associated with determining when 
opinions of key investors changed. The cross-sectional regression model integrated three types 
of returns: raw returns; excess returns using the method of Dimson (1979) and a third set of 
excess returns using Bayesian procedure for adjustments in beta estimates. The model utilised 
is as follows: 
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𝑟𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼0𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑡𝐿𝑖 + 𝑏2𝑡𝐸𝑖 + 𝑏3𝑡𝑃𝑖 + 𝑏4𝑡𝑅𝑖 + 𝑏5𝑡𝐹𝑖 + 𝑏6𝑡𝑁𝑖 + 𝑏7𝑡𝑆𝑖 + 𝑈𝑖𝑡           (2.37) 
 
where 𝑟𝑖𝑡 is the return for bank i over the interval t, measured as either the raw return or the 
excess return, 𝐿𝑖 the total Latin American exposure for bank i as a fraction of total assets, 𝐸𝑖 
the reported energy loans for bank i as a fraction of total assets, 𝑃𝑖 Penn Square loans purchased 
by bank i as a fraction of total assets, 𝑅𝑖  real estate loans for bank i as a fraction of total assets, 
𝐹𝑖  non-Latin American foreign loans for bank i as a fraction of total assets, 𝑁𝑖 net purchased 
liabilities for bank i as a fraction of total assets, 𝑆𝑖 the size of bank i measured by its market 
capitalization (in billions of dollars) and 𝑈𝑖𝑡 an error term with mean 0.  
The study of Schoder and Vankudre (1986) relied on vast data testing to determine 
whether an abnormal event occurred on 19 August 1982. Schoder and Vankudre used a two-
factor market model for daily returns based on a weighted least squares (WLS) method to 
account for heteroskedasticity of residuals across bank stocks, as well as the use of a dummy  
to code for whether a bank is a money centre or Texas based bank. Returns and exposures in 
terms of book value were regressed to correlate the events that occurred 29 trading days prior 
to 19 August, 1982, as: 
 
𝜖2𝑖 = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝐸𝑖 + 𝜖3𝑖 , 𝑏 < 0                 (2.38) 
 
where 𝐸𝑖 denotes the exposure to Mexico of ith bank, 𝜖3𝑖 a normally distributed error terms 
with zero mean and uncorrelated across securities 𝐸𝑖 =
𝐵𝑉𝑀𝑖𝑡
𝑁𝑖𝑡−1
 × 𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 .Where 𝐵𝑉𝑀𝑖𝑡 is book 
value in USD of the ith bank Mexican cross border exposure on August 18, 1982, 𝑁𝑖𝑡−1 the 
number of shares outstanding on August 18, 1982 and 𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 the price per share on August 18, 
1982. 
The study of Cornell and Shapiro (1986) and Schoder and Vankudre (1986) offer 
similar conclusions which found little effects on the stock prices of US banks on the event day. 
For example, Schoder and Vankudre (1986) note that stock prices did not correctly reflect 
exposure to Latin debt on 19 August, 1982, which differs from Cornell and Shapiro (1986). 
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However Cornell and Shapiro (1986) considered numerous event dates which revealed that 
exposure adjust over a two year period but not initially. Lamy et al. (1986) examined the 
Mexican debt problem by isolating 19 August, 1982 and drawing on the insights of Cornell 
and Shapiro (1986). The testing procedure applied the market model based on the work of Jaffe 
(1974) and Mandelker (1974) with cumulative excess returns of the portfolio to remove 
biasness from the outcome as follows: 
 
𝐸𝑅𝑗𝑡 = 𝑅𝑗𝑡 − 𝐸(𝑅𝑗𝑡) , where 𝑅𝑗𝑡 the actual return and 𝐸(𝑅𝑗𝑡) the expected return 
𝐸𝑅𝑝𝑡 =  ∑ 𝐸𝑅𝑝𝑡/𝑛
𝑛
𝑗=1                  (2.39) 
 
where; 𝐸𝑅𝑝𝑡 – Excess returns for portfolio. Cumulative excess returns: 
𝐶𝐸𝑅 =  ∑ 𝐸𝑅𝑝𝑡
𝑠
𝑡=−𝑟                  (2.40) 
𝐸𝑅𝐽0 = 𝑦𝑜 + 𝑦1𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒𝐽 + 𝜀0,   
 
Where 𝐸𝑅𝐽0  denotes the excess returns for bank J on day zero taken from the CRSP excess 
returns, 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒𝐽  bank j exposure to Mexican loans where exposure is defined as total Mexican 
loans/(Total owner equity + Total loan loss reserves) and 𝜀0 an error term. A cross-sectional 
sensitivity regression of the excess return of each bank in relation to exposure was applied on 
August 19, 1982.  
Lamy et al. (1986) suggests that the announcement had a significant and negative 
impact on exposed banks and thus investors were aware of the exposure before the 
announcement which contradicts the conclusions reached by Cornell and Shapiro (1986) and 
Schoder and Vankudre (1986). Bruner and Simms (1987) and Smirlock and Kaufold (1987) 
builds on the literature by empirically examining whether bank shareholder returns reflect new 
information on exposure levels, to which they find markets react rapidly to surprising events. 
Smirlock and Kaufold (1987) incorporate a cross-sectional regression similar to Cornell and 
Shapiro (1986) and Lamy et al. (1986) using the SUR approach, which was replicated by Unal, 
et al. (1993) as follows:  
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𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼1 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖𝐷1 + 𝜀1𝑡                             (2.41) 
 
where 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the return on stock, 𝑅𝑚 the return on NYSE on day t, 𝐷1 a dummy variable coded 
1 for the event day and zero otherwise, 𝛾𝑖  captures the effect of the Mexican default on bank i 
and 𝛼1 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑚𝑡 . The model is as follows: 
 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼1 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝜆1𝐷𝑡𝐸𝑋𝑃1 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 ,               (2.42) 
 
where λ is the event parameter which measures the firm’s response to default announcement 
and 𝐸𝑋𝑃1 the exposure denoted as Mexican loan to equity ratio of bank.  
Bruner and Simms (1987) examined issues concerning the duration of response which 
was overlooked by Cornell and Shapiro (1986), Schoder and Vankudre (1986) and Smirlock 
and Kaufold (1987). According to Bruner and Simms (1987), duration is an essential element 
within the empirical testing as the efficiency to new information response can lead to 
alternative outcomes. As such they compute excess returns from a data sample consisting of 
100 trading days before 19 August to 57 trading days after across 48 banks using the market 
model. Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) were calculated, followed by t-tests to determine 
whether daily returns were abnormal. The CAR was then standardized to adjust for the auto-
covariance of returns. Bruner and Simms (1987) then regressed the individual exposures of 
banks as a percentage of market value in equity as follows:  
𝑒𝑖 =  𝑅𝑖𝑡 − (𝑎𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖(𝑅𝑚𝑡))  
Where 𝑒𝑖 is the residual or excess return on stock i, 𝑅𝑖𝑡 – return on stock i for day t, and 𝑅𝑚𝑡 – 
return on the value-weighted market portfolio for day t. The parameters 𝑎𝑖 and 𝑏𝑖 were 
estimated over the period -160 to -101 days before the announcement.  The average residuals 
were calculated as follows: 
𝐴𝑅𝑡 =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑒𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1                             (2.43) 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐿 =  ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑡
𝐿
𝑡=𝑘                  (2.44) 
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Bruner and Simms (1987) also critique the findings of Cornell and Shapiro (1986) by 
labelling the hypothesis as “dribs and drabs” and argued that the August 19 report was not a 
material event relevant to other events regarding the Latin American debt crisis. The findings 
of Bruner and Simms (1987) and Smirlock and Kaufold (1987) conflict with the results of 
Cornell and Shapiro (1986), as they find a negative return upon the arrival of rumour and new 
information as Schoder and Vankudre (1986) found for the announcement day. However the 
results of Smirlock and Kaufold (1987) and Bruner and Simms (1987) are in line with the 
findings of Cornell and Shapiro (1986) with respect to exposure to Mexico which was initially 
positively related to returns, which suggests a temporary investor contagion. The finding of 
Smirlock and Kaufold (1987) are in line with results of Lamy et al. (1986) who note that 
investors distinguished bank exposure levels in the absence of public knowledge.   
Kyle and Wirick (1990) contributed to the debate by providing a study that addressed 
the impact the Latin American debt crisis held towards the required returns of US bank equities. 
The resulting study from Kyle and Wirick (1990) led to a variety of approaches being 
undertaken with a two-factor linear returns-generating function with a pooled cross-sectional 
methodology being adopted. The Estimation procedures opt for OLS and GLS methods to 
permit heteroskedastic variables and non-constant covariances for contemporaneous 
disturbances across banks, as the model illustrates below: 
 
𝑅𝑗𝑡 = ∑ (𝛼𝑗𝑍𝑗𝑡 +
𝑛
𝑗=1 𝛽1𝑗𝑍𝑗𝑡𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑗𝑍𝑗𝑡𝑅𝑏𝑡) + ∑ (Ф𝑡
𝑡1
𝑡=𝑡0 𝑊𝑗𝑡 + ∆𝜏𝑡𝑊𝑗𝑡𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑗𝑡 +
𝜆1𝑋𝑗𝑡𝑅𝑚𝑡𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑗𝑡 + 𝜆2𝑋𝑗𝑡𝑅𝑏𝑡𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑗𝑡 + 𝑢𝑗𝑡                       (2.45) 
where 𝑍𝑗𝑡 is coded 1 for the j bank, 0 otherwise, 𝑊𝑗𝑡 is coded 1 for the t month, 0 otherwise, 
𝑋𝑗𝑡 is coded 1 for t>0, 0 otherwise, Ф𝑡 a coefficient for time shift effects common to all banks, 
𝜏𝑡 a market value of $1 of LDC debt, 𝜆1 a coefficient for time shifts in market return sensitivity, 
𝜆2 a coefficient for time shifts in interest rate sensitivity, 𝑡0 a August 1982, 𝑡1 December 1983 
and 𝑢𝑗𝑡 an error term.  
The model makes use of dummy variables to represent other macro-economic events 
in order to isolate the unfolding crisis events. The conclusions of Kyle and Wirick (1990) are 
in line with Cornell and Shapiro (1986), Smirlock and Kaufold (1987) and Bruner and Simms 
(1987) as participants were able to penetrate accounting complexities and discover exposure 
levels had shifted markedly. Therefore investors were able to position themselves accordingly, 
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resulting in significant negative returns for bank stock prices. Slovin and Jayanti (1990) and 
Karafiath et al. (1991) reinforce the findings of Cornell and Shapiro (1986), Smirlock and 
Kaufold (1987), Bruner and Simms (1987) and Kyle and Wirick (1990) with respect to the 
reaction of equity value in relation to exposure to Latin American debt.  
In applying a SUR model, Slovin and Jayanti (1990) examined 39 banks from the 
American stock exchange including exposure levels to Latin American debt. The model 
integrates dummy variables to isolate event dates, and for capital deficient and capital sufficient 
banks, whilst integrating daily returns and exposure to the model as follows: 
 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑡 + 𝜆𝑑𝐷𝑑𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖 + 𝜆𝑠𝐷𝑠𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡              (2.46) 
 
where 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the return on stock, 𝑅𝑚 the return on NYSE on day t, 𝐷1 a dummy variable coded 
1 for the event day and zero otherwise, 𝛼1 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑚𝑡 the market model, λ the event parameter 
to measure firm response to default announcement and 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖 – exposure denoted as Mexican 
loan to equity ratio of bank i.  
Slovin and Jayanti (1990) conclude that bank capital regulation and examination 
procedures can induce financial markets to alter assessments as to whether regulators will 
enforce policies such as reducing dividends, which implies that investors react accordingly to 
increased regulatory pressures. Karafiath et al. (1991) examine Brazil’s exposure by focusing 
on the reaction of stock prices to default announcements. They differentiate their study using a 
Generalized Least Square (GLS) approach to examine the cross-sectional regression 
relationship between prediction errors and Brazilian debt due to cross-sectional correlation and 
heteroskedasticity in market model prediction errors. The model utilised is as follow: 
 
𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐽,𝑠𝑚 = 0.023 + 0.664𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐽 + 𝑒𝑗 , 𝑅
2 = 0.91, 𝐹 = 197.67            (2.47) 
 
where 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐽,𝑠𝑚  is the exposure variable: Brazilian debt divided by primary capital as defined 
by Musumeci and Sinkey Jr (1990) and 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐽 the exposure variable as defined previously. 
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𝑅𝐽𝑡 =  𝛼𝐽 + 𝛽𝐽𝑅𝑚𝑡 + ∑ 𝜏𝐽𝑠
45
𝑛=−45 𝐷𝑆𝑡 + 𝑒𝐽𝑡 , 𝑡 = −345, +45            (2.48) 
 
where 𝑅𝐽𝑡  is return on security or portfolio, 𝛼𝐽 the OLS estimate of the intercept, 𝛽𝐽 the OLS 
estimate of the slope coefficient, 𝑅𝑚𝑡 the return to the value-weighted market on day t, 𝜏𝐽𝑠  the 
OLS estimate of coefficient on the dummy variable D, 𝐷𝑆𝑡 a dummy variable coded 1 on day 
s and 𝑒𝐽𝑡  a residual for security or portfolio j on day t. Karafiath et al. (1991) examine over an 
event window from 45 days prior to 45 days after following event and test for possible size 
effect. They are able to illustrate banks with low exposure, security prediction errors, which 
are negatively correlated with asset size. Karafiath et al. (1991) overall found that the market 
was able to adjust share prices of US bank equities to level of exposure to Brazilian debt default.  
 
 
2.7.2 Event Studies – East Asian Debt Crisis   
 
The East Asian crisis of the late 1990’s resulted in numerous research that sought to 
explain the origins and effects of the crisis. Tan (1998), for example, highlights the contagion 
affects by investigating the extent to which stock price movements in one country offset the 
stock price fluctuations in other countries. Overall this study discovered Hong Kong, Singapore 
and Taiwan would not have experienced a decline in real stock prices had there been no 
contagion effects or herding. However fundamental issues characterized Thailand and Korea, 
since their real index prices would still have experienced significant decline even with absence 
of contagion effects, with the lesser extent applied Malaysia and the Philippines. Finally the 
crisis stretching to Indonesia would have been sustainable had investors not acted irrationally 
through western investors pulling investments. Pan et al. (2007) examined linkages through the 
exchange rates and index values for the same countries nations using the VAR and Granger 
causality methodology. Their conclusions offer a different and unexpected perception during 
the crisis, as pre-crisis results establish exchange rates and stock prices indicate significant 
relationship with Hong Kong, Japan, Malaysia and Thailand. However during the crisis no 
country demonstrates a significant causal relationship from stock prices to exchange rates. 
Choe et al. (1999), Stulz et al. (2000) and Kho and Stulz (2000) concentrate on bank stock 
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returns as the Far East crisis emerged. Choe et al. (1999) studied Korean effects in depth by 
examining whether herding was evident during the crisis using a binomial distribution 
methodology which computes portfolios based on size and past returns equally, taking an 
average across stock for each portfolio. The model implemented in their study is as follows: 
 
|𝑃𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸(𝑝𝑖𝑡)| − 𝐸|𝑝𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸(𝑝𝑖𝑡)|                          (2.49) 
 
where 𝑃𝑖𝑡 denoted the proportion of foreign investors buying stock i on day t among all 
investors trading that stock on that day, 𝐸(𝑝𝑖𝑡) the expected proportion of foreign investors 
buying on day t relative to all foreign investors and 𝐸|𝑝𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸(𝑝𝑖𝑡)| an adjustment factor 
computed assuming that in the absence of herding the number of foreign investors with net 
purchases follows a binomial distribution. Choe et al. (1999) found no evidence that trades 
from foreign investors had a destabilizing effect on the Korean stock exchange over the sample 
period and that the market-adjusted efficiently to large sales. This was not followed by negative 
abnormal returns.  
Kho and Stulz (2000) investigate the impact of the Asian crisis on bank stocks through 
applying the SUR technique. Their sample incorporated four Western and six East Asian 
countries from July 1997 to January 1998 with the main goal of understanding differing market 
reactions to the East Asian crisis. Their SUR methodology is demonstrated as follows; 
 
𝑅𝑝𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽0𝑅𝑚𝑡 + ∑ 𝛾0,𝑘𝑋𝑘,𝑡
𝐾
𝑘=1 + ∑ 𝐷𝑗∅𝑗𝑡
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑡            (2.50) 
where 𝑅𝑝𝑡 is the logarithmic daily dollar return on the banking industry indices for each of the 
10 countries, 𝑅𝑚𝑡 the corresponding stock market index returns, 𝑋𝑘,𝑡 the daily dollar excess 
returns on the currency holdings (BP, DM, FF and JY),  ∅𝑗𝑡 a dummy variable taking a value 
of 1/n for the jth event days or zero otherwise, 𝐷𝑗   represents CAR for the jth event days, 
𝛼, 𝛽 and 𝛾 are coefficients and 𝜀𝑡 an error term. Kho and Stulz (2000) concluded East Asian 
banks performed poorly, banks in Korea, Indonesia and Thailand do not experience AR’s bank 
indices to exchange rate fluctuations. In addition the IMF announcements did not reduce 
systematic risk as the share price values would have increased as a result of news however 
Western banks were unaffected by this event. Other findings included banks in East Asian 
47 
 
indices incurred losses in excess of 60% in each of the crisis countries in contrast to Western 
banks outperforming the counterparts.  Stulz et al. (2000) delved into the issue of the East Asian 
crisis to examine the impact of the crisis and bailouts in relation to U.S. bank stock prices. Stulz 
et al. (2000) conducted this which is illustrated as follows: 
 
𝑅𝑝𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽0𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝛾0𝑋𝑡 + ∑ 𝐷𝑗∅𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡
𝐽
𝑗=1              (2.56) 
 
Where 𝑅𝑝𝑡 - Logarithmic daily returns on one of the U.S bank portfolios, 𝑅𝑚𝑡 - U.S. stock 
market index return, 𝑋𝑡 – Change in the seven-day Eurodollar rate, ∅𝑗𝑡 - Dummy variable 
taking a value of 1 for the j-th event day shown below, or zero otherwise and 𝐷𝑗  – Represents 
an abnormal return for the j-th event day. Stulz et al. (2000) findings include exposed banks 
are affected by such events whereas non-exposed banks are not, thus meaning investors are 
capable of distinguishing banks that possess exposure. Furthermore, Stulz et al. (2000) found 
banks with exposure to country debt, benefitted from country bailout through increased returns, 
whereas banks with no exposure had no impact on equity returns. Djankov et al. (2005) 
focussed on East Asian crisis and examined the valuation effect of resolutions of insolvent 
banks from Korea, Indonesia and Thailand to commercial clients. To achieve this Djankov et 
al. (2005) applied a multivariate WLS estimate approach which is as follows; 
𝐶𝐴𝑅 =  𝛼0 + 𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸 + 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑆𝐴𝐿 + 𝐷𝑂𝑀𝑀𝐸𝑅 + 𝑁𝐴𝑇 + 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶𝑂𝑉 + 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑉𝐴𝐿 +
𝑀𝐾𝑇𝐵𝐾 + 𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑇𝐴 + 𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑁𝐼 + 𝑀𝑈𝐿𝑇𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐾𝐷𝑈𝑀 + 𝑀𝑈𝐿𝑇𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐾𝐷𝑈𝑀/𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸  
                   (2.57) 
Where; 𝐶𝐴𝑅 - Cumulative abnormal returns for time period t = -1 to 0, where the event date 
t=0 is the date of the announcement of the type of resolution of distress of the firm’s related 
bank, 𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸 - A dummy variable indicating that the related bank would be closed, 
𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑆𝐴𝐿 - A dummy variable indicating the bank would be sold foreigners, 𝐷𝑂𝑀𝑀𝐸𝑅 – A 
dummy variable indicating that the related bank would be merged domestically, 𝑁𝐴𝑇 - A 
dummy variable indicating the bank would be nationalized, 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶𝑂𝑉 - Is the interest coverage, 
𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑉𝐴𝐿 – The natural log of the market value, 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝐵𝐾 - The ratio of the market value to 
book value of the firm, 𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑇𝐴 – Total assets of the bank, 𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑁𝐼 - Net income of the 
bank, 𝑀𝑈𝐿𝑇𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐾𝐷𝑈𝑀 - A dummy variable indicating that the firm has multiple banking 
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relationships and 𝑀𝑈𝐿𝑇𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐾𝐷𝑈𝑀/𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸  - The interaction between the two dummies. 
Djankov et al. (2005) concluded that banks add value to a firm with the value depending on 
solvency of the bank. Additionally, Djankov et al. (2005) discover significant CAR for 50 days 
following event announcement, multivariate regressions interpret the announcement of 
closures and nationalisations of banks endure a significant effect on the performance of related 
firms. 
 
2.7.3 Event Studies – Japanese Lost Decade   
 
As a result of the Japanese lost decade as described previously, vast literature has been 
produced within this strand. We first introduce Yamori (1999), which examined whether 
market participants do not distinguish between solvent from insolvent banks, the study being 
based upon the liquidation of Hyogo bank. To undertake this investigation Yamori (1999) 
cross-sectionally regressed the abnormal returns of the Japanese bank stocks relating to the 
materialising events of the Hyogo bank failure from August 29-31, 1995, which was modelled 
as follows; 
 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌𝐿𝑂𝑊 + 𝐵𝐴𝐷𝐹𝑈𝐾𝑈 + 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑃𝐸𝑅 + 𝐿𝑇𝑂𝐴𝑆𝑆           (2.58) 
 
Where 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 - Abnormal returns for bank i during time period t, 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌𝐿𝑂𝑊 - A dummy 
variable that equals 1 when dividend payments per share of a bank are less than ¥5 and 0 zero 
otherwise, 𝐵𝐴𝐷𝐹𝑈𝐾𝑈 - The ratio of the BADLOAN to the FUKUMI, where the BADLOAN 
is the amount that a bank has loaned insolvent debtors and FUKUMI is the unrealized capital 
gain on banks’ securities portfolios, 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑃𝐸𝑅 - Denoted as the ratio of earnings per share to 
stock prices and 𝐿𝑇𝑂𝐴𝑆𝑆 - The natural log of total assets. Yamori (1999) concluded stock 
market reactions reflect the financial conditions of banks and market participants have the 
ability to distinguish troubled banks more negatively, which supports the Efficient market 
hypothesis (EMH) within Japan. Saporoschenko (2002) commenced further event study 
regarding unanticipated changes or shocks to the systems, which offered a different perspective 
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to existing literature. Saporoschenko undertook a GARCH (1,1) volatility model, which is as 
follows: 
 
𝑅𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽01 +  𝛽11𝐼𝑁𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽21𝐼𝑁71𝑅𝑡 +  𝛽31𝐷𝑆𝑃𝐷𝑡 + 𝛽41𝐼𝑁𝑌𝑊𝑡 + 𝜀1𝑡 − 𝜃1𝜀1𝑗𝑡−1              
        (2.59)       
Where: 𝑅𝑗𝑡 – Weekly returns of Japanese banks, 𝐼𝑁𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡– Japanese stock market return, 
𝐼𝑁71𝑅𝑡– Long term Japanese Government bond return, 𝐼𝑁𝑌𝑊𝑡– Yen trade-weighted exchange 
rate return and 𝐷𝑆𝑃𝐷𝑡– Interest rate spread, difference between short term prime rate and 3-
month bank deposit rate. 
Results from the investigation provide evidence that many Japanese banks had 
asset/liability structures over the period 1986-1992 that resulted in significant negative 
sensitivity to long-term interest rate measure increases. Evidence also suggests Japanese banks 
that served in the main role undertook more market and interest rate risk than most other 
Japanese banks. The impact of bank stock returns are thus found to be significantly and usually 
negatively in relation to long-term interest rate, with market Beta’s always highly significant. 
Japanese banks are generally found to assume more risk as based on market betas. Brewer et 
al. (2003) investigated the ability of the Japanese stock market to appropriately price risk of 
financial firms, similar to Saporoschenko (2002). Brewer et al. (2003) concentrated upon 6 
failures (four banks and two securities firms) by adopting an event study methodology similar 
to MacKinlay (1997) and Binder (1998). Whereby, they examine the ability of stock market 
participants to price risk of banks and digest new information. Their study integrated a 
multivariate model which used GLS regression to estimate the impact of events and variance 
of residuals across banks individually, sampling 115 Japanese banks and the TOPIX index. The 
model implemented by Brewer et. al (2003) is exemplified by the following: 
 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖𝑃 + 𝛽𝑖𝑃𝑅𝑚𝑡 + ∑ 𝛾′𝑘𝑒𝑒 𝐷𝑘𝑒 + ∑ ∅𝑒𝐷𝑘𝑒𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑒 + ∑ 𝜃𝑒𝐷𝑘𝑒𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑒 +
∑ 𝜆𝑒𝐷𝑘𝑒𝑇𝐴𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡𝑒                              (2.60) 
 
where 𝑅𝑖𝑡 - Return of bank i on day t, 𝛼𝑖 – the intercept for bank i, 𝛽𝑖 – the market risk 
coefficient for day t, 𝑅𝑚𝑡 – Return of market index for day t, P – Binary variable that identifies 
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post event periods, 𝛾′𝑘𝑒 – Captures any daily intercept shifts on event day k and provide an 
estimate of abnormal returns associated with failure announcement, 𝐷𝑘𝑒 – Binary variable that 
equals 1 if day t is equal to the event day or window k, 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐷𝑖 - Variable to describe the 
condition of bank, 𝑆𝐻𝑖  – Controls for the exposure of bank i to the failed institution and 𝑇𝐴𝑖 – 
Natural log of total assets to capture size of bank. Brewer et al. (2003) empirical results suggest 
that market participants were able to incorporate new information and offer similar findings to 
Yamori (1999) and Brewer and Pettway (2002), which investors were able to discriminate 
among the banks through the levels of risk they possessed. However, in addition to this not all 
banks were adversely impacted by the failure announcements of banks and thus any contagion 
effects that resulted from the crisis, was based on rational evidence.   
 Spiegel and Yamori (2003), examined regulation, laws and policies effect upon the 
share prices of banks. Spiegel and Yamori (2003) examined the pricing of portfolios of bank 
stocks of common regulatory class on the dates of significant events concerning the passage of 
Stabilization Laws – The Rapid Recapitalization Act and The Financial Reconstruction Act. 
Spiegel and Yamori (2003) also examine disparities between pricing of portfolios from strong 
and weak banks as well as cross-sectional studies of differentiating bank equities by financial 
strength in sensitivity to announcement of laws. Spiegel and Yamori (2003) similar to Spiegel 
and Yamori (2000) and Aharony and Swary (1996) performed a cross-sectional regression 
which was as follows: 
 
𝑅𝑝𝑡 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑚𝑝𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖𝑝∆𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛾𝑝𝑒𝐷𝑒 +
8
𝑒=1 𝜀𝑝𝑡             (2.61) 
 
where 𝑅𝑝𝑡 - Represents the return on the bank portfolio on day t, 𝛼𝑝 - The constant term, 𝛽𝑚𝑝 
– The bank portfolio’s market beta, 𝑅𝑚𝑡 – The market return on day t as the daily return on the 
TOPIX index, 𝛽𝑖𝑝 – The portfolio’s sensitivity to changes in the interest rate, ∆𝑖𝑡 – Denotes the 
changes in the overnight call rate, 𝛾𝑝𝑒 - The sensitivity of the bank stock portfolio to event e, 
𝐷𝑒 – A dummy variable for event e, equal to 1 when t = e and 0 otherwise and 𝜀𝑝𝑡 - A random 
disturbance term. The differences are a different dummy variable in terms of bank regulatory 
classes and the total capital ratio to account for leverage of an institution. Spiegel and Yamori 
(2003) found that large banks regulatory advantages were diminished by Financial 
Reconstruction Act, which affected large banks and trust bank groups portfolios significantly 
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negatively priced on announcements studied. However following these announcements, it 
benefited smaller regional banks as abnormal returns on these events proved to be significantly 
negatively related to bank size, as measured by total assets. As well as the Rapid 
Recapitalisation Act was perceived by investors to benefit the weaker banks within the 
Japanese system and thus improved their performance as a result of regulation implemented.  
An extended study from Kobayashi, Spiegel and Yamori (2006) investigated monetary 
policy effects upon the stock markets through quantitative easing (QE) programme 
implemented by the Bank of Japan as a measure to reignite their economy. The study sampled 
87 Japanese banks, which used CAPM to compute the bank portfolio excess returns during the 
specific dates of QE announcements. Furthermore the study was followed by a cross-sectional 
event study to examine whether QE was perceived to disproportionately benefit weaker 
Japanese banks than large banks upon introduction of QE programme. The cross-sectional 
model is illustrated below as follows; 
𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑅𝑚𝑡 + ∑ 𝛾𝑒𝐷𝑒 + ∑ 𝛽𝑒(𝑅𝑚𝑡 × 𝐷𝑒𝑡) + ∑ 𝛽𝑟(𝑅𝑚𝑡 × 𝐷𝑟𝑡) + 𝛽𝐹𝑋𝐹𝑋𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡
2
𝑟=1
10
𝑒=1
10
𝑒=1
 
Where: 𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑡 – Represents the daily stock return of the TOPIX bank index, 𝑅𝑚𝑡 – Market 
portfolio return for day t, 𝛾𝑒 – Represents the sensitivity of the bank portfolio to the BOJ 
announcement represented by the by the dummy variable 𝐷𝑒, which takes the value 1 on the 
event date t and zero otherwise, 𝐷𝑟𝑡 and 𝐷𝑒𝑡 – Dummy variables equal to 0 prior to the date of 
events e and r respectively and 1 afterwards, 𝛽𝑟 and 𝛽𝑒 - Represent coefficient estimate on the 
foreign exchange intervention measure 𝐹𝑋𝑡 and 𝜀𝑡 – Disturbance term. Two of the ten event 
dates examined, proved the overall banking portfolio yielding significant positive excess 
returns, which also coincides with the financial revitalisation programme, which was expected 
to aggressively clean-up Japan’s banking problem. However after robustness examination, 
deposit growth was indicated to be negatively statistically significant bank excess returns, 
supporting the hypothesis that weak banks were expected to disproportionately benefit from 
such monetary policy actions. As depositors were removing time deposits from problematic 
banks at this time due to the anticipated partial reduction in deposit insurance guarantee. 
Furthermore to information impacting Japanese stocks, Miyajima and Yafeh (2007) 
concentrated on events surrounding the Japanese banking sector stock prices that surprised 
investors (1995-2000). Miyajima and Yafeh (2007) conducted the investigation through 
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sampling 800 listed firms whilst computing the CARs of the stock price fluctuation upon a 
surprising news event emerging to the market. The model utilised within the study is as follows; 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆 + 𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑄 + 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸 + 𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑅𝐷 + 𝐵𝑂𝑁𝐷𝑅𝑇𝐺 +
𝑀𝐵𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑆 + 𝑀𝐵𝑆𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐸𝐻𝐿𝐷𝑁𝐺  
Where: 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 - Cumulative abnormal returns on bank i during time period t, 𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆 – Total 
assets in ¥m, 𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑄 - Ratio of market value to book value,  𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸 - Ratio of total 
liabilities (borrowing and bonds) to assets, 𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑅𝐷 – Dummy variable to capture chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals, machinery, electronics, transportation equipment and precision instruments, 
𝐵𝑂𝑁𝐷𝑅𝑇𝐺 - Bond rating of firm on a scale of 4 (lowest, no rating) to 1(rated A or higher), 
𝑀𝐵𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑆 - Main bank loans total to total assets and 𝑀𝐵𝑆𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐸𝐻𝐿𝐷𝑁𝐺 - 
Main bank shareholding. Results illustrate the banking crisis was far more homogenous as not 
all companies were equally affected by the unfolding events. Companies within sample are 
sensitive to macroeconomic credit crunches for example have limited access to bond market 
and undertake high levels of leveraging. However Miyajima and Yafeh (2007) offer a different 
perspective as little evidence in stock price responses to suggest that the banking crisis led to a 
substantial misallocation of credit from good to bad firms.  
 
2.8 Conclusion 
The purpose of the literature review outlined and discussed above was to identify the relevant 
research that lends itself to the empirical work contained in this thesis relating to bank 
performance and financial crisis. The approach is historical in context owing to the nature of 
the origins of financial crisis which occurred at various points in the economic cycle. In so 
doing, we highlight the most relevant theoretical framework that have been applied, as well as 
the empirical approaches that have been adopted to investigate a range of issues relating to the 
financial performance of institutions, specifically banks, against the background of various 
financial crisis that have occurred.  Our purpose in this respect is to identify possible gaps 
within the literature that can be explored and hopefully may result in meaningful empirical 
research which makes a direct contribution to the existing literature. From the sections above, 
we highlight the first gap whereby, there is no study which considers the performance of all 
financial sectors within the UK during periods of volatility and stability. This gap within the 
literature will enable us to make a contribution to the literature through utilising similar 
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methods as explored above. We identify further within the literature, whereby to the best our 
knowledge there are no studies, which concentrate on the entire UK financial system. The 
second gap we identify is explaining the risk profile of UK financial institutions over good and 
bad times. This will enable us to compare and contrast the changes in risk across all financial 
sectors in the wake of the recent global financial crisis in 2007/8. The third gap we highlight is 
the effect of macroeconomic news events during crisis periods towards the equity price 
performance of UK financial institutions. Lastly, in wake of the financial crisis, respective 
governing bodies have taken vast measures in order to avert future crisis periods from 
materialising again. Considering these actions being implemented, this gives rise to a gap in 
the literature, whereby we can focus on the impact regulatory changes have incurred towards 
the UK financial sectors asset prices.  
The empirical literature on financial crisis and the performance of financial institutions, 
especially banks is voluminous and offers mixed results on the impact of financial crisis and 
on the performance of banks. To a large extent this is a result of the existence of a variety of 
ways in which investigation into these issues is empirically examined, as well as the choice of 
variables selected are particularly sensitive to other important determinants. We find the 
literature progresses through differing modelling techniques, which account for econometric 
issues such as heteroskedasticity or multicollinearity through panel data regression and GMM, 
respectfully through the research of Pasiouras and Kosmidou (2007) and Goddard et al. 
(2004a). Our research in Chapter 3 will take the insights and findings into account and 
incorporate a measure of these variables into the estimating regression equation. We believe 
that this is the most prudent way of approaching the study of the performance of financial 
institutions and its determinants.  
Chapter 4 will address explaining the risk profile of UK financial institutions, which 
will hopefully enrich the literature. Given the literature covered within this chapter we will 
proceed by adopting a mixture of the methodological approaches from relevant papers such as 
Fama and Macbeth (1973). Harvey (1993), Hamilton (1994), Brooks et al. (1998), Faff et al. 
(2000), Engle (2002) and many more. 
Chapters 5 and 6 will predominately be event studies, which will focus upon the impact of 
macroeconomic news and regulatory announcements on equity prices of UK financial 
institutions, respectively. When recalling the event studies covered within this Chapter we note 
the progression of the modelling techniques over time. When referring back to the Latin 
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American debt crisis, the main regression techniques utilised were OLS/SUR/GLS as well as 
event study methodologies utilised from many studies such as Schoder and Vankudre (1986), 
Smirlock and Kaufold (1987), Bruner and Simms (1987), Kyle and Wirick (1990) and many 
others. These are the more traditional regression techniques as opposed to modern econometric 
models. As we progressed to the East Asian crisis, the literature became more focussed towards 
cointegration/VAR/Error correction techniques, in order to understand the relationship of key 
variables in a different light from authors such as Choe et al. (1999), Pan et al. (2007) and 
others. Following the East Asian crisis, we focussed the event study literature upon the 
Japanese banking crisis. From undertaking this we gained new methods of undertaking such 
research, whereby the GARCH methodology from Saparoschenko (2002) was utilised.  
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CHAPTER 3 
Explaining Financial Institutions Performance and the 
Effects of Risk: Panel Evidence from the UK Financial 
Sectors 
 
3.1. Introduction 
It is widely recognized that banks and other financial institutions are an integral part of the 
financial system owing to the specialized role they play in the process of intermediation. The 
financial crisis of the late 2000s demonstrated quite vividly just how important financial 
institutions are to the real economy when the UK government moved fairly swiftly to 
implement measures to rescue failing financial institutions whose very existence was 
threatened as a consequence of their prior risk-taking behaviour, combined with the 
introduction of more robust structures of regulation to impose greater discipline on the 
behaviour of financial institutions – one with the explicit objective of limiting systemic risk 
and in securing the future of the financial system, so as to recapture confidence in the financial 
system.  Indubitably, the financial crisis had important consequences on UK financial 
institutions, not least on their performance. For a number of banks, in particular, that incurred 
substantial financial losses were bailed out or nationalized, resulting in a contagion in equity 
prices as investors fled to high quality assets. To limit such contagion, as well as to stabilize 
the financial system, the UK government introduced a number of measures that included capital 
injections, the strengthening of deposit insurance guarantees, asset purchase scheme (whereby 
bad loans were purchased from banks), and quantitative easing. Since most banks suffered from 
a loss of liquidity, owing to the seizing up of credit markets, they in turn found it increasingly 
difficult to extend finance to the household and corporate sectors. In result, banks reduced 
lending while at the same imposing tighter credit conditions. Consequently, stock market 
values and real investments declined, and the economy entered a period of recession.  
To date, very little research has examined the financial performance of UK financial 
institutions following the financial crisis of the late 2000s. Given the importance of financial 
institutions to the UK economy, understandably their performance has increasingly come under 
the scrutiny of the financial press, shareholders, analysts and regulators. This we suspect is 
because the performance of financial institutions is a crucial part of changes in the process of 
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designing effective structures of regulation to mitigate future transgressions, and because the 
evaluation of their performance serves as a basis for firm specific improvements, as well as a 
benchmark for detecting profound problems. Furthermore, the financial performance of 
nonbank financial institutions has been under researched, save for a selection of studies which 
examine various traits of managers of investment funds, including the impact of managerial 
dexterity on performance, selectivity and market timing, among other pertinent issues; see for 
examples Ward, and Saunders (1976), Black, et al. (1992), Fletcher, (1995), Brown, et al. 
(1997), Leger (1997), Blake and Timmermann (1998), Cuthbertson et al. (2008) and Jans and 
Otten (2008). On balance the studies of Fletcher (1995) and Leger (1997) report mixed results 
on positive average selectivity performance and negative timing performance, while Blake and 
Timmermann (1998) report evidence of risk-adjusted underperformance and persistence of 
performance. What specific research that exist on financial institutions performance has 
primarily focused on the profitability of UK banking firms, often included as part of a wider 
study examining the determinants of European bank profitability using a variety of statistical 
approaches; see for examples Molyneaux and Thornton (1992), Staikouras and Wood (2003), 
and Godard et al. (2004). Of the studies just mentioned, the findings of Molyneaux and 
Thornton (1992) reveal that liquidity is negatively related to bank profitability, while 
Staikouras and Wood (2003), in examining the determinants of profitability in the EU context, 
report that the profitability of European Union banking firms may be influenced by factors 
related to changes in the external macroeconomic environment. In a similar direction, Godard 
et al. (2004) report a tenuous relationship between size and profitability, but also report a 
significant and positive relationship between off-balance sheet business and profitability for 
the UK banking firms examined.  
 As background we note that in the run up to the financial crisis of 2007 that the 
macroeconomic conditions exerted a sustained and positive impact on financial institutions 
profitability which only began to tail off in 2008 as the impact of the global financial crisis 
took hold. One consequence of this was the deleveraging of financial institutions, especially 
the deleveraging of banking firms, which culminated in the deep sell-off of assets in order to 
pay down obligations that could not be financed in closed credit markets. There is no doubting 
that other sectors of the financial industry were affected. For example, the insurance sector 
suffered because the attainment of insurance in highly integrated global markets meant that 
with insurance takers claiming at the same time that insurance firms would experience reduced 
levels of profitability.  In the real estate sector, the failure of rising home values and mortgage 
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payments of homeowners forced banks to acknowledge substantial write-downs and write-offs, 
which resulted in banks themselves having liquidity problems and as a direct consequence the 
reluctance to advance new mortgages at anything but at exorbitant fixed or variable rates which 
ultimately affected the real estate sector. At the same time, the seizing up of credit markets 
limited an important source of finance for finance companies, while investment trust firms 
suffered from the volatility that impacted financial markets.  
Above all, the financial crisis inflicted a very high adjustment costs on the financial 
sector, with the banking sector generally experiencing the highest cost of adjustment. During 
this period of adjustment and uncertainty for the financial sector, not only did the banking 
sector have to adjust to a changing regulatory environment but they also encountered a sharp 
downturn in economic activity which affected balance sheets more generally. The profitability 
of the banking sector and its ability to assume risk were also affected by various other 
developments, such as on-going policy uncertainty about the intended regulatory changes, and 
the dramatic change in the willingness of the corporate and household sectors to increase their 
debt burden. More specifically, the banking sector appears not to have coped very well with 
the challenges cast by this new operating environment. Thus a study of the performance of the 
banking sector and other financial sectors will tell us how well they coped with the changing 
economic conditions prior to, during, and following the financial crisis. The financial 
institutions included in our sample consist of banking firms, insurance companies, unit trust 
companies, finance companies, and real estate firms. We concentrate on these financial 
institutions owing to the availability of historic data and because many of the measures 
introduced impacted the financial sectors included in our sample in different ways. 
Analysing the financial performance of these sectors is particularly interesting, mainly 
due to the following reasons: (i) from a policy perspective, if financial institutions are more 
profitable one might expect lower prices and improved quality of service for consumers, as 
well as greater safety and soundness if some proportion of profits is channelled towards 
strengthening capital buffers that absorb risk;  (ii) the performance of financial institutions is 
particularly important for the recovery of the UK economy in light of the financial crisis of 
2007-2009; (iii) the performance of financial institutions is important for the stability of the 
UK economy and for employment in the financial sector more generally; (iv) considering that 
at present the UK economy has been experiencing its third year of economic growth, adequate 
historical data exists in order to investigate the issue of UK financial institutions performance 
in relation to the post crisis period 2010-2013, which to our knowledge has not been studied. 
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In addition, we attempt to explain why changes in the condition of risk are more pronounced 
for some financial institutions than others. This panel analysis is designed to determine how 
characteristics unique to the corresponding institutions influence performance. From a broader 
perspective, the study should be of interest to investors and policymakers as the financial 
sectors studied are pivotal to the UK economy and have been widely influenced by government 
economic policy over the period represented by the data. In addition, they have been subject to 
increased competition as a result of the globalization of financial markets and to economic 
shocks to the domestic economy. In this process, it would be interesting to observe how these 
financial institutions manage performance when challenged by varying market conditions, 
which thus allows us to make conclusion about how they responded, and whether they 
responded differently to the changing environment.  
This study contributes to the relevant literature in three ways: (a) it covers a period 
which includes some of the most innovative approaches to financial crisis management leading 
to a reshaping of the UK financial environment. Furthermore, and in view of the severity of the 
economic recession, it is important to investigate, at the micro level, the financial indicators in 
an effort to trace possible changes in financial institutions performance measures; (b) it allows 
for the first time a financial sector assessment to be made on the performance of UK financial 
institutions during the same time period; (c) the validity of the findings is enhanced by 
considering specific time periods which are characterized as good and bad times over the 
economic cycle of the UK economy. Thus, the investigation of the performance of UK financial 
institutions during the period of the financial crisis and the post crisis periods offers many 
implications.  The results are also useful for developing investment decisions, as these sectors 
are considered to be relatively attractive to international portfolio investors.  
 The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the empirical method to be 
implemented. Section 3 discusses the data and presents descriptive statistics of the datasets. 
Section 4 provides a brief discussion of the role of the UK financial system. Section 5 reports 
and discusses the empirical results from the performance analysis. Section 6 concludes the 
chapter. 
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3.2 Econometric method 
 
It is well established that the performance of a firm, be they financial institutions or otherwise, 
may be evaluated on the basis of its return on assets (ROA) or its return on equity (ROE). In 
the context of the performance of financial institutions, finance theory instructs us that 
profitability measures should account for the risk and return associated with the financial 
institutions portfolio which therefore suggests that we should adopt the following formulation:  
0 1 2it IN EX                             (3.1) 
where 𝜋 is a profit measure, IN a measure of firm specific internal variables, EX a measure of 
market specific external variables and 𝜀 the stochastic term with the usual classical properties. 
The subscript i denotes the individual sector (i = 1, 2,…, N) and t denotes the year (t = 1, 2,…, 
T). Eq. (1) is similar to the standard specification that is used in the empirical literature to 
evaluate financial performance. Following Demirguc-Kunt (1999), and Goddard et al. (2004), 
we expand Eq. (3.1) to obtaining a measure of the financial performance of banking firms as 
follows: 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6it MS MCON LDEP TAS EQAS MCAP                                       
7 8 9 10 11 tFTSE GDP P NIM CIN                                    (3.2)                                                             
 
where the natural logarithm of it is as previously defined. The two profitability measures used 
in our analysis as the dependent variable in Eq. (3.2) are return on asset (ROA) and return on 
equity (ROE). ROA is defined as the net profit of a financial institution divided by the average 
total assets and thus provides us with a measure of the ability of the management to transform 
an institution’s assets into net earnings, and therefore indicates the efficiency of managers in 
generating net income from all assets or resources committed to realizing the institutions 
objectives. Overall, ROA indicates the relationship between net income and total assets, and 
our decision to utilize this measure is informed by our understanding that using net income for 
funding purposes within the financial structure constitutes an incentive and target for financial 
institutions to augment their return on investment.  At the same time, the capital structure policy 
involves returns trade-offs, for extensive use of debt is more likely than not to enhance the risk 
faced by financial institutions while also amplifying total invested funds and expected returns. 
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As a supplement to the purpose of the present study, we also employ ROE as a measure of 
performance, since it reflects the net return of capital invested by shareholders and thus the 
proficiency of a financial institutions management in utilizing equity in profitable ways. Thus 
ROE approximates the net benefit that shareholders obtain from investing in a financial 
institution. The independent variables in Eq. (3.2) include both firm and market specific 
variables similar to those used in other studies such as Demirguc-Kunt (1999), and Goddard et 
al. (2004) among others. The firm or micro specific independent variables that we include 
represents information about market share (MS), loans to deposit ratio (LDEP), total assets 
(TAS), equity to asset (EQAS), market capitalization (MCAP), net interest margin (NIM), and 
cost to income ratio (CIN), while the market specific variables include concentration ratio 
(MCON), annual percentage change of the FTSE 100 index (FTSE), gross domestic product 
(GDP), and the rate of inflation (P).  
The variable MS is used to measure market share, while the measure for concentration 
(MCON) is calculated as the total assets held by the five largest commercial banks operating 
in the banking sector divided by the total assets of all commercial banks operating in the 
banking sector. According to the SCP hypothesis, banks in highly concentrated markets tend 
to collude and therefore earn monopoly profits (e.g. Short, 1979; Molyneux et al., 1996). 
However, not all studies, have found evidence to support the SCP hypothesis. From the 45 
studies reviewed by Gilbert (1984) only 27 provide evidence that the SCP paradigm hold. 
Berger (1995a) note that the relationship between bank concentration and performance in the 
U.S.A. critically depend on what other factors are held constant. An important decision that 
managers of commercial banks, in particular, must take refers to the liquidity management and 
specifically to the measurement of their needs related to the process of deposits and loans. For 
that reason the ratio of bank’s loans divided by customers plus short-term funding (LDEP) is 
used as a measure of liquidity. Higher figures denote lower liquidity. Without the required 
liquidity and funding to meet obligations, a bank or for that matter a non-bank financial 
institution may fail. Thus, in order to avoid insolvency problems, banking firms and non-bank 
financial institutions often hold liquid assets, mainly money market securities, which can be 
easily converted to cash. However, liquid assets are usually associated with lower rates of 
return. And so it would be expected that higher liquidity would be associated with lower 
profitability. The size of a financial institution is measured as total asset (TAS). In the literature, 
the size of a financial institution is considered to be an important determinant of its 
performance. The reason being that large size may result in economies of scale that will, in the 
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process, reduce the cost of gathering and processing information (Boyd and Runkle, 1993). 
Moreover, large asset size can add financial stability, investment flexibility and thus can reduce 
the cost of financial institution specific activity such as lending promoting overall efficiency. 
In general, large financial institutions, in terms of asset size, have an advantage of providing a 
wider set of financial options to their customers, which translate in more competitive rates, 
fees, and premiums. On this issue, the empirical results are mixed, since some studies found 
economies of scale for large banks (European Commission, 1997; Berger and Humphrey, 1997; 
Altunbas et al., 2001) and other economies of scale for small banks or diseconomies for larger 
banks (e.g. Vander Vennet, 1998; Pallage, 1991). The ratio of equity to total assets (EQAS) is 
used in this study as a measure of capital adequacy which essentially gauges the ability of 
financial institutions to withstand losses. Thus stated, capital adequacy merely refers to the 
sufficiency of the amount of equity capital to absorb any shocks that a financial institution may 
experience. Financial institutions with substantial equity ratios may be deemed over-cautious, 
overlooking profitable investment opportunities as and when they present themselves, while a 
declining ratio may signal capital adequacy problems. Hence the sign of the coefficient could 
be either positive or negative. It is expected that the higher the equity to assets ratio, the lower 
the need for external funding and therefore the higher the financial institutions profitability. As 
this suggests, capital is an important variable in determining financial institutions profitability, 
but it may also proxy risk and regulatory costs. On this issue, the literature instructs us that in 
imperfect capital markets, financial institutions that are adequately capitalized will tend to 
borrow less in order to finance a given level of assets, and thus tend to confront much lower 
cost of funding due to lower prospective bankruptcy costs. Nonetheless, we are mindful that in 
the presence of asymmetric information, a financial institutions that is well capitalized may be 
signalling to the capital markets that a better than average performance can be expected. And 
when viewed from this perspective, a financial institution that is adequately capitalized is likely 
to face much lower risk of encountering financial distress which reduces its costs of funding. 
Such an outcome should translate in lower profits, since the financial institutions would be 
considered to be more secure. And as such, we would expect to see a negative relation between 
capital and profits. However, we are mindful that for some financial institutions, namely 
banking firms, that regulatory capital represents a binding restriction, and is considered as a 
cost. Thus we would expect a positive association to the extent that banking firms will in some 
way seek to pass some of the regulatory costs onto bank customers. Berger (1995), for example, 
finds a positive relation in both direction between capital and profitability. Net interest margin 
(NIM) is a measure of a financial institutions interest spread and thus focus on the profit earned 
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on lending, investing and funding activities. The study utilizes cost-to-income ratio (CIN) as a 
measure of the costs of running a financial institution ‒ the major element of which is salaries. 
The higher the operating costs are relative to a financial institution’s generated incomes, the 
lower the institution’s financial performance. Although the relationship between expenditure 
and income might appear, prima facia, straightforward suggesting therefore that higher 
expenses mean lower profits and the opposite, this may not always be the case. This is because 
higher amounts of expenses may be associated with higher volume of activities (e.g., increase 
in insurance cover, car loans, etc.) and therefore higher revenues. It is expected that this 
variable will have a negative impact on performance because a financial institutions that 
operate its business efficiently can be expected to operate at lower costs.  
The literature tells us that the environment in which financial institutions operate will 
have a large bearing on performance. We take this to include not only the financial market 
structure, but also the prevailing economic condition, as well as the impact of the legal and 
political environment. A change in the FTSE 100 index (FTSE) is expected to be positively 
related to the financial performance of financial institutions, for in a well-developed stock 
market financial institutions can be expected to increase their income(s), which allows them to 
generate higher levels of revenue. A measure of macroeconomic conditions is Gross domestic 
product (GDP) which is calculated as the annual change in GDP for the change in economic 
growth. Thus as GDP growth increase during an upward trend in economic activity, financial 
institutions can be expected to experience a greater demand for services and, in turn,  to increase 
borrowing as they expand their activities accordingly and with a lower risk of default more 
generally. From the perspective of banking firms, GDP growth  can be expected to have an 
effect on numerous factors related to the supply and demand for bank assets, namely loans and 
deposits, while for insurance companies it may result in a rise in demand for insurance related 
premiums, and for estate companies an increase in the demand for commercial property as 
business firms expand their business, as well as an increase in the demand for houses from the 
household sector as their income increases, all of which of course puts upward pressure on 
prices. Thus a positive relationship is expected between the performance of these financial 
institutions and GDP in periods of real GDP growth. We should also note that when the rate of 
GDP growth slows, particularly during periods of recession, credit quality can be expected to 
deteriorate, and defaults increase (on the payments of loans of various kinds, and on premiums), 
thereby reducing returns to financial institutions. Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1998) and 
Bikker and Hu (2002) find a positive correlation between bank profitability and the business 
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cycle. The study accounts for macroeconomic risk by controlling for inflation, as measured by 
the retail price index, since a rise in the price level, P, may impact the costs and profitability of 
financial institutions in direct and indirect ways. For instance inflation may impact costs and 
revenue directly by virtue of a rise in the price of factor inputs, i.e., labour, and indirectly as a 
result of changes in interest rates and asset prices. While we expect a positive effect of the price 
level on the profitability of financial institutions, its impact on financial institutions 
performance does rather depend on whether future movements in inflation are fully anticipated 
or unanticipated, which also depends on how accurately financial institutions are able to 
forecast future movements in the most applicable control variables.  If, for example, inflation 
is anticipated, then interest rates will be adjusted accordingly resulting in revenues, which 
accrue faster than costs, with a positive impact on profitability. If on the other hand inflation is 
unanticipated financial institutions may be slow in adjusting their interest rates which may raise 
financing costs than revenues and, in the process, thus have a negative impact on profitability. 
In their study bank on performance, Bourke (1998), Molyneaux and Thornton (1992), 
Dermiguc-Kunt and Hiuizinga (1998) report a positive relation between inflation and long-
term interest rates with bank performance. It is perhaps worth noting that the Bank of England 
uses interest rates to target inflation. And if the bank anticipates an increase in the price level, 
P, it will raise interest rates so as to restrict expenditure and borrowing by firms and households, 
which, all things considered, could also increase the rate of default. But ultimately, these will 
affect the financial performance of institutions.    
With regard to nonbank financial institutions, that is: insurance companies, finance 
firms, investment trusts and real estate firms, we modify Eq. (3.2) in order to capture more 
closely the economic conditions pertinent to these sectors by including a measure for total 
investment portfolio (TINV) which is a common variable shared within their respective balance 
sheet. The empirical model is formulated as follows: 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6it MS MCON TINV TAS EQAS MCAP                                   
7 8 9 tFTSE GDP P                                                            (3.3) 
where it is as previously defined. From the models outlined above, four different estimation 
periods will be examined thoroughly for the UK financial sector in order to obtain better 
understanding of the determinants of profitability. Equation (3.2) and (3.3) is estimated for 
each performance indicator by pooling the data covering four periods.  
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We chose to utilize a panel data approach, since an advantage of panel data analysis is 
the likely reduction of multicollinearity and, in our case, it will allow us to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity for the time-invariant effects. The independent variables outlined in 
regression equations (3.2) and (3.3), and their hypothesized relationships with profitability are 
outlined in Table 1.  
3.3 Data and Summary Statistics 
Our data base is compiled from Companies House, Bloomberg and DataStream and covers the 
period 1980 to 2012. The data includes both firm specific and market specific data as earlier 
noted. The analysis is broken down into four sub-periods: 1980-2012, 2002-2007, 2007-2010 
and 2010-2012. These periods will enable us to understand not just how the financial 
performance of financial institutions changed but also to identify what were the most influential 
drivers of profitability over periods marked by favourable macroeconomic conditions (2002-
2007) and periods of instability as reflected by the impact of the financial crisis (2007-2019), 
while the period 2010-2012 may be described as the “post-crisis” era which was underpinned 
by the deep recession. 
To estimate the regression models outlined above, we used balanced panel data on a 
sample of FTSE 250 listed financial institutions operating in the UK financial sector with an 
historical listing since 1990. These include: banking firms (6), finance companies (6), insurance 
companies (6), investment trusts (24), and real estate companies (9). We exclude financial 
institution listed on the UK stock exchanges after 1990 due to the paucity of firm level data 
and because it would result not only in fewer observations, but in non-representative results 
also. The main reason for the inclusion of the institutions in our sample has much to do with 
the availability of data, and because privately owned institutions are not required by UK law 
to publicly disclose the financial information required to progress our study.  These financial 
institutions provide an excellent sample for a study of the financial performance of UK 
financial institutions for several reasons. First, they share a number of similarities concerning 
key macroeconomic and financial system features. To begin with, all the financial institutions 
in our sample were affected in some way by the financial crisis of 2008-2009 and by the 
uncertainty surrounding the protracted Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. Further, the UK 
financial sector suffered substantially due to the financial distress of banking firms as a result 
of the lack of liquidity and weakening economic conditions in the real economy as the financial 
crisis deepened. Prior to the financial crisis, when the UK macroeconomic conditions appear 
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to exert a positive impact on the financial performance of institutions, banking firms, in 
particular, targeted growth rather than short-term profits by investing in high risk sectors, in 
increasing the size of loans and deposits, and asset size. However, once the impact of the 
financial crisis had been normalized, the focus of banking firms shifted towards profitability in 
an effort to repair enfeeble balance sheets and blemished reputation for financial stewardship. 
Six micro variables are employed as internal determinants of bank performance, and 5 micro 
variables as internal determinants of the non-bank financial institutions performance.  These 
variables and there hypothesized signs are set out in Table 1.  
Table 1: Variables Description 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Variables Remarks                  Hypothesized direction 
                           
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Dependent 
ROA  Return on assets - used as a proxy of the profitability of financial institutions. A  + 
  positive relationship with profitability is expected 
 
ROE  Return on equity - used as a proxy of the profitability of financial institutions. A  + 
  positive relationship with profitability is expected 
   
Independent  
MS                              Market share – calculated through the net revenue of financial institution divided  
by the sum of sector sample, then converted to a percentage.    § 
 
MCON                        Market concentration ratio - used as a proxy to capture market share   +/- 
 
TAS  Total assets - used as a proxy to capture institutional size    + 
 
LDEP  Loans/deposits - used as a proxy to capture bank behaviour towards lending within  +/- 
its operations and is seen to be a measure of riskiness    
 
TINV                   Total investment portfolio within the financial markets - used as a proxy to capture 
market risk exposure        + 
 
NIM                   Net interest margin - used as a proxy to capture fluctuating cost of borrowed funds  § 
 
CIN  Cost to income ratio        -  
 
EQAS  Equity Asset Ratio – used as a proxy for solvency     +   
External Factors  
FTSE  FTSE100 Index – used as a proxy to capture the UK stock index valuation   + 
MCAP                   Market capitalization - used as a proxy to capture the relationship between market  
financing and profitability       § 
GDP                   Gross Domestic Product - used as a proxy for macroeconomic conditions                    + 
P                   Retail Price Index - used as a proxy for  the price level, i.e., inflation                    +/- 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes: Concentration ratio was measured by the Herfindahl Index obtained by summing the squared totals of the four largest institutions 
market share. +- denotes positive and negative effect; § denotes no indication. 
 
Table 2 reports the summary statistics for the variables used in this study for the five 
financial sectors included in our sample. These include the mean and standard deviation, the 
measures for skewness and kurtosis, and the Jarque-Bera statistic. First, we should mention 
that the unit root test results, not reported, using the approach of Levin et al. (2002), indicate 
the presence of a unit root in log difference level for all variables across the financial sectors. 
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It is observed that for the banking sector, the profitability measures, ROA and ROE, have 
respective mean return of 7.9336 and 2.6207 and standard deviation of 3.75369 and 0.3969, 
while the mean value of total assets (TAS) is 19.5189 and standard deviation of 1.3689. The 
concentration of the banking sector has a mean of 7.6885 and a standard deviation of 0.1410. 
Equity is, on average -3.0494 of total assets but with a standard deviation of 0.2908. Worth 
mentioning is the market share GDP has a mean 13.7839 and a standard deviation of 0.5217, 
while the mean value of inflation (P) is 0.9900 with a variability of 0.6355. Moreover we find; 
ROE, MS, MCON, LDEP, MCAP, FTSE, GDP and CIN experience a leptokurtic distribution 
which suggests a sharper than normal distribution with values namely concentrated towards 
the mean within these variables, which have a high probability for extreme values to prevail. 
Among the previously stated variables the CIN is found to experience the highest kurtosis with 
a value of 5.5620. The following variables; ROA, MCON, TAS, EQAS, P and NIM are found 
to have a platykurtic distribution which have a flatter than normal distribution with shorter tails 
as well as a smaller possibility for extreme outcomes. Among these variables total assets has 
the smallest kurtosis with a value of 2.2279. Following the kurtosis statistics, we find 
interesting features through the skewness whereby ROA, MCON, LDEP and CIN are found to 
be positively skewed, which infers a long right tail with extremely bad scenarios are not as 
likely. All other variables in the banking sector are negatively skewed, which infers a long left 
tail with a greater chance of extremely negative outcomes. Lastly, it worth mentioning the 
Jarque-Bera statistics of the banking sector which reveals the ROA, LDEP, TAS, EQAS, P and 
NIM are found to be normally distributed with all other variables in the sector experiencing 
non-normality.  
Panel B presents the insurance sectors’ descriptive statistics in Table 2, which reveals 
the mean values for ROA and ROE are 2.9684 and 3.5694 with a standard deviation of 0.8665 
and 4.2194, respectively. This suggests the ROE is a more volatile variable in comparison to 
ROA given the higher value of standard deviation. We find; ROE, ROA, MCON, FTSE and P 
experience a leptokurtic distribution which suggests a sharper than normal distributions with 
values namely concentrated towards the mean, which these variables also have a higher 
probability for extreme values to prevail. The following variables; MS, INV, TAS, EQAS, 
MCAP, and GDP are found to have a platykurtic distribution which have a flatter than normal 
distribution with shorter tails as well as a smaller possibility for extreme outcomes. In terms of 
skewness we find the positively skewed variables endure a long right tail with extremely bad 
scenarios are not as likely among the following variables; ROE, MCON and EQAS. 
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Furthermore, a negative skewness is found upon the remaining variables in Panel B, which 
suggests a long left tail with a greater chance of extremely negative outcomes. Further to this, 
we highlight overall the most volatile variables within the insurance sector are the; ROE, MS, 
TAS and TINV with the following values; 4.2194, 2.0653, 2.0478 and 2.9314. We find MCON, 
GDP and P to be the least volatile variables as they experience the smallest standard deviation 
values. It is also worth mentioning that all variables within Panel B are not normally distributed 
via the Jarque-Bera test.  
Panel C reveals the descriptive statistics for the investment trust sector within the UK. 
Firstly, we examine the means of the dependent variables ROA and ROE which indicate values 
of 2.0672 and 0.9612. The descriptive statistics also tells us that all variables bar inflation 
experience a leptokurtic distribution in accordance to their kurtosis value being greater than 3. 
This suggests a sharper than normal distributions with values namely concentrated towards the 
mean are found with these variables and have a higher probability for extreme values to prevail. 
Only the inflation variable experiences a platykurtic distribution which has a flatter than normal 
distribution with shorter tails as well as a smaller possibility for extreme outcomes. 
Furthermore, when we concentrate upon the skewness of the variables we see the only 
positively skewed variable is MCON with a value of 3.9161, which alludes to a long right tail 
with extremely bad scenarios are not as likely. All other variables are found to be negatively 
skewed, which infers a long left tail with a greater chance of extremely negative outcomes. 
Furthermore, we Table 2 demonstrate that ROA is the most volatile variable within this sector 
with a standard deviation value of 6.9265, followed by TINV, TAS and MCAP holding a value 
greater than 1. Lastly, we find that all variables within Panel C experience a non-normality 
distribution. 
Panel D represents the finance company sector in Table 2. The descriptive statistics of 
the sector reveals the means of the ROA and ROE are 2.6526 and 0.7015, respectively. The 
descriptive statistics reveal that ROE, ROA, TAS, EQAS, MCAP, FTSE and P experience a 
leptokurtic distribution which suggests a sharper than normal distributions with values namely 
concentrated towards the mean, which these variables also have a higher probability for 
extreme values to prevail. The following variables; MS, MCON, TINV and GDP are found to 
have a platykurtic distribution which have a flatter than normal distribution with shorter tails 
as well as a smaller possibility for extreme outcomes. In terms of skewness we find the only 
positively skewed variable is concentration, which endures a long right tail with extremely bad 
scenario not as likely outcome. All of other variables in Panel D are found to have negative 
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skewness, which suggests a long left tail with a greater chance of extremely negative outcomes. 
We can also comment on the variables with the highest degree of variance is fond within the 
TINV (2.2275), TAS (2.0258) and MCAP (1.9526). Lastly, we demonstrate all variables bar 
ROE are not normally distributed via the Jarque-Bera test.  
Panel E presents the summary statistics for the real estate sector within Table 2. 
Beginning with the mean values of the ROA and ROE are found to be 2.3939 and 1.4725, 
respectively. The highest mean values are unsurprisingly found within the GDP (13.4753), 
MCAP (13.5284) and TAS (13.7172). The following variables ROA, ROE, EQAS and P 
experience a leptokurtic distribution in accordance to their kurtosis value being greater than 3. 
This suggests a sharper than normal distributions with values namely concentrated towards the 
mean are found with these variables and have a higher probability for extreme values to prevail. 
All the remaining variables in Panel E experience a platykurtic distribution which has a flatter 
than normal distribution with shorter tails as well as a smaller possibility for extreme outcomes. 
Following this we find only the ROA is positively skewed, which endures a long right tail with 
extremely bad scenario not as likely outcome. All of other variables in Panel E are found to 
have negative skewness, which suggests a long left tail with a greater chance of extremely 
negative outcomes. In terms of volatility within the variables we find TINV (2.8473), MCAP 
(1.5124) and TAS (1.7216) are most volatile as well as ROE and MS experiencing standard 
deviation values of greater than 1. Lastly, we see all variables experience non-normality 
distribution as found the Jarque-Bera test.   
Table 3 presents the correlation coefficients of variables employed in the regression 
model. As can be seen, the correlation coefficients among the regressors generally reveal, on 
average, low to moderate correlation, the exception being between and as can be seen, the 
correlation n coefficients among the variables for all financial institutions are not high. Among 
the independent variables, are significantly and positively associated with ROA and ROE. The 
independent variable, FTSE is significantly and negatively associated with ROA and ROE. 
Overall, we found no problem with multicollinearity among the independent variables and can 
therefore conclude that the correlations are not likely to bias our results. Panel B presents the 
immediate correlation results for all selected independent variables. As can be seen, the 
statistics indicate that significant and negative correlation exist between ROA and Loans to 
deposits, since the correlation is equal to -0.0231 at a significance level, since it is less than 
0.05 (0.034). Moreover, a positive (0.995) and strongly significant (0.002) correlation exists 
between NIM and ROA at 1% significance, while no significant correlation is reported for the 
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case of Bank size (TAS) as efficiency indicator of return on assets. Therefore the relevant 
correlation is verified only for GDP and P and not for MCON as predictors of ROA. In addition, 
it is evident from Table 1 that significant and negative correlation exists between FTSE and 
NIM; the correlation is equal to -0.998 at 1% significance level (0.001). However, for the case 
of RPI no significant correlation relationship is traced with NIM (0.448) at any accepted 
significance level. Similar results are reported for GDP, since no significant correlations are 
reported with NIM and therefore the relevant correlation is rejected for this case also, since the 
relevant significance level is greater than 0.05 (.429).  Evidence show that significant and 
negative correlation also exists between ROE and the independent variables considered. In 
general, the distribution properties of the data series appear to be normal. This is also confirmed 
by the Jarque-Bera statistic that rejects the null hypothesis of zero skewness and excess kurtosis 
for all financial institutions.  
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Table 2: Summary statistics  
Panel A: Banking firms 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable Mean Max Min St. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis JB statistics  
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
ROA 7.9336 17.824 0.2675 3.7536 0.05143 2.5481 1.7625 
ROE 2.6207 3.3478 1.5933 0.3969 -0.8933 3.8391 5.8442  
MS 2.8571 3.7620 1.4791 0.5765 -1.2158 3.5376 9.3025  
MCON 7.6885 8.0219 7.5464 0.1410 1.0962 2.7937 7.2734  
LDEP 4.8016 5.5977 4.1737 0.3280 0.7920 3.6820 4.4616  
TAS 19.5189 21.597 16.526 1.3689 -0.4982 2.2279 2.3832  
EQAS -3.0494 -2.6278 -3.6624 0.2908 -0.5128 2.3218 2.2675  
MCAP 16.7814 18.631 13.031 1.5574 -1.2567 3.3858 9.6984  
FTSE 8.1033 8.8436 6.1524 0.7000 -1.0623 3.3823 6.9902  
GDP  13.7839 14.265 12.547 0.5217 -1.3014 3.5293 10.582  
P 0.9900 2.0412 -0.3567 0.6355 -0.7316 2.7675 3.2928  
NIM 0.7124 1.2119 -0.1165 0.3521 -0.6976 2.8144 2.9715  
CIN 4.0264 4.3438 3.8658 0.0975 1.2428 5.5620 19.113  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel B: Insurance companies 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable Mean Max Min St. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis JB statistics  
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
ROA 2.9684 4.4897 -2.2839 0.8665 -1.7399 10.0748 463.62  
ROE 3.5694 14.5685 -4.1709 4.2194 1.2652 4.6740 68.65  
MS 1.7174 4.3673 -2.6832 2.0653 -0.7513 1.8707 29.15  
MCON 7.9832 8.8824 7.8242 0.1656 3.2547 18.0315 2213.64  
TINV 15.2248 19.1738 8.7948 2.9314 -0.5308 1.9131 19.04  
TAS 16.4185 19.6562 11.3129 2.0478 -0.4566 2.5681 8.42  
EQAS  -2.9459 -0.0841 -4.6471 0.9976 0.5545 2.7541 9.62  
MCAP 14.1583 17.0083 10.1887 1.6738 -0.1976 1.9976 9.58  
FTSE 7.9572 8.8436 6.1524 0.7668 -1.0350 3.0588 35.38  
GDP  13.5547 14.2648 12.3596 0.5507 -0.5765 2.2364 15.78  
P 1.2579 2.7147 -0.3567 0.5861 -0.2376 4.0829 11.54  
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel C: Investment trust firms 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable Mean Max Min St. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis JB statistics  
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
ROA 2.0672 51.0412 -85.9462 6.9265 -3.4829 49.8453 71496  
ROE 0.9612 3.8265 -3.2189 0.7900 -0.2201 7.2066 590.4  
MS 1.3336 4.5299 -2.8731 0.8116 -0.6179 6.1171 371.0  
MCON 6.1330 9.8671 5.6740 0.7692 3.9161 18.6153 10071.0  
TINV 12.9109 14.9717 8.1699 1.0685 -0.9056 4.6809 201.5  
TAS 12.9730 14.9952 8.1920 1.0522 -1.0558 5.3976 336.8  
EQAS -0.1711 0.0439 -1.2103 0.1357 -2.7779 16.0216 6355.2  
MCAP 12.6030 14.7859 6.2003 1.2712 -1.4286 6.0326 572.9  
FTSE 7.9572 8.8436 6.1524 0.7654 -1.0350 3.0588 141.5  
GDP  13.4976 14.2648 12.3596 0.5850 -0.3931 1.9060 59.9  
P 1.2787 2.7147 -0.3567 0.6043 -0.2493 3.9917 40.7  
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 2 (Continued)  
Panel D: Finance companies 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable Mean Max Min St. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis JB statistics  
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
ROA 2.6526 3.9096 0.5128 0.6948 -0.6735 3.5145 17.152  
ROE 0.7015 3.6800 -2.3954 1.0048 -0.3566 3.2841 4.371  
MS 2.0529 4.5686 -1.4911 1.6316 -0.4485 2.1224 12.991  
MCON 8.2215 9.1395 7.5308 0.4613 0.6058 2.4165 14.921  
TINV 12.1964 16.2228 6.0591 2.2275 -0.3163 2.4513 5.786  
TAS 13.5410 16.4984 7.2152 2.0258 -0.8683 3.4255 26.372  
EQAS -1.8348 -0.0135 -4.8354 0.7344 -0.5667 4.2717 21.278  
MCAP 12.4230 15.4325 5.4797 1.9526 -1.0367 4.5225 54.589  
FTSE 7.9572 8.8436 6.1524 0.7668 -1.0350 3.0588 35.378  
GDP  13.5708 14.2648 12.3596 0.5338 -0.6153 2.2998 16.538  
P 1.2441 2.7147 -0.3567 0.5579 -0.3365 4.5304 23.059  
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Panel E: Real estate firms 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable Mean Max Min St. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis JB statistics 
__________________________________________________________________________________________  
ROA 2.3939 5.0424 -0.2926 0.9578 1.2597 4.6284 101.62  
ROE 1.4725 3.5216 -4.5995 1.4479 -2.1348 8.7027 570.94  
MS 2.1267 4.0235 -1.3284 1.2006 -0.4640 2.3705 13.36  
MCON 7.8895 8.3476 7.3079 0.2775 -0.3153 2.3874 9.56  
TINV 9.4379 14.9491 2.4849 2.8473 -0.1206 2.3076 6.65  
TAS 13.7172 16.7569 7.3809 1.7216 -0.5572 2.8869 14.17  
EQAS -0.6208 -0.1815 -4.0608 0.4167 -6.1471 47.5955 24074  
MCAP 13.5284 16.1220 9.8498 1.5124 -0.4292 2.4732 12.55  
FTSE 7.9548 8.8436 6.1524 0.7741 -1.0162 2.9780 51.12  
GDP  13.4753 14.2648 12.3596 0.6056 -0.4021 1.8409 24.63  
P 1.1617 2.7147 -0.3567 0.5753 -0.6707 4.1223 37.85  
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 3: Correlation coefficients of independent variables in the empirical model 
Panel A: Banking firms 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 ROE MS MCON LDEP      TAS EQAS CIN NIM MCAP FTSE GDP 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
ROE 1.000           
MS -0.121           
MCON  0.473 -0.024          
LDEP  0.094 0.262 0.070         
TAS -0.433 0.621 -0.415 0.126        
EQAS -0.333 -0.089 -0.195 -0.296       -0.213       
CIN -0.209 0.024 -0.013 0.237        0.007 -0.261      
NIM  0.254 -0.148 0.288 -0.125       -0.714 0.560 -0.198     
MCAP -0.320 0.705 -0.321 -0.042       0.689 0.280 -0.288 -0.148    
FTSE  0.105 0.015 -0.124 -0.023       -0.001 0.009 -0.159 -0.058 0.150   
GDP -0.493 0.002 -0.512 0.062        0.722 -0.024 -0.109 -0.606 0.366 -0.006  
P -0.105 0.005 -0.006 -0.023       0.075 0.089 -0.161 -0.083 0.147   0.245 0.170 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 ROA MS MCON LDEP          TAS EQAS CIN NIM MCAP       FTSE         GDP 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
ROA 1.000           
MS 0.339           
MCON 0.099 -0.028          
LDEP -0.462 0.265 0.065         
TAS 0.026 0.592 -0.460 0.116        
EQAS 0.431 -0.090 -0.195 -0.297 -0.194       
CIN -0.425 0.044 -0.058 0.242 0.048 -0.250      
NIM 0.362 -0.136 0.363 -0.104 -0.741 0.488 -0.228     
MCAP 0.480 0.697 -0.297 -0.048 0.645 0.278 -0.283 -0.122    
FTSE -0.013 0.014 -0.137 -0.027 0.022 0.013 -0.143 -0.083 0.150   
GDP -0.138 0.005 -0.545 0.055 0.743 -0.013 -0.058 -0.640 0.335 0.020  
P 0.013 0.004 -0.050 -0.018 0.116 0.094 -0.123 -0.131 0.131 0.253 0.208 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Panel B: Insurance companies 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 ROE MS MCON TINV TAS EQAS MCAP FTSE GDP        
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
ROE 1.000         
MS -0.561         
MCON 0.050 -0.011        
TINV -0.690 0.910 0.010       
TAS -0.344 0.774 0.126 0.851      
EQAS 0.128 -0.369 0.001 -0.439 -0.572     
MCAP -0.521 0.712 0.078 0.869 0.851 -0.363    
FTSE -0.039 0.045 0.088 0.041 0.014 0.074 0.054   
GDP 0.124 -0.215 0.343 0.063 0.348 -0.031 0.393 0.013  
P -0.063 0.127 -0.210 -0.031 -0.184 -0.012 -0.230 -0.106 -0.539    
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 ROA MS MCON TINV TAS EQAS MCAP FTSE GDP        
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
ROA 1.000         
MS -0.692         
MCON 0.084 -0.011        
TINV -0.746 0.910 0.010       
TAS -0.570 0.774 0.126 0.851      
EQAS 0.502 -0.369 0.001 -0.439 -0.572     
MCAP -0.543 0.712 0.078 0.869 0.851 -0.363    
FTSE 0.015 0.045 0.088 0.041 0.014 0.074 0.054   
GDP 0.152 -0.215 0.343 0.063 0.348 -0.031 0.393 0.013  
P -0.075 0.127 -0.210 -0.031 -0.184 -0.012 -0.230 -0.106 -0.539     
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 3 continued 
Panel C: Investment trust firms 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 ROA   MS MCON     TINV      TAS         EQAS          MCAP              FTSE              GDP        
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
ROA 1.000           
MS 0.164          
MCON 0.268 0.277         
TINV 0.080 0.505 0.164        
TAS 0.084 0.530 0.167 0.990       
EQAS -0.026 -0.085 0.013 0.078 0.068      
MCAP 0.072 0.468 0.167 0.962 0.970 0.125     
FTSE -0.056 0.016 0.003 0.045 0.043 -0.027 0.044    
GDP 0.240 0.025 0.271 0.697 0.702 0.127 0.722 0.047   
P 0.004 -0.086 -0.389 -0.455 -0.467 -0.042 -0.496 -0.096  -0.554 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 ROE MS MCON     TINV      TAS EQAS MCAP      FTSE GDP        
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
ROE 1.000          
MS 0.269          
MCON 0.110 0.229         
TINV -0.036 0.513 0.154        
TAS -0.033 0.541 0.158 0.990       
EQAS -0.137 -0.108 -0.001 0.073 0.066      
MCAP -0.044 0.474 0.154 0.960 0.969     0.120     
FTSE -0.012 0.035 0.051 0.065 0.062    -0.022       0.062    
GDP 0.060 -0.005 0.235 0.696 0.700     0.134       0.721    0.075   
P 0.148 -0.073 -0.374 -0.469 -0.480   -0.060     -0.509   -0.112 -0.560  
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Panel D: Finance companies 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 ROA MS MCON TINV TAS EQAS MCAP FTSE GDP        
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
ROA 1.000          
MS 0.245          
MCON 0.004 -0.207         
TINV 0.071 0.426 -0.324        
TAS -0.016 0.717 -0.385 0.701       
EQAS 0.489 -0.109 0.005 -0.288 -0.265      
MCAP 0.081 0.627 -0.477 0.416 0.730 -0.101     
FTSE 0.010 -0.041 0.057 0.020 -0.007 0.084 -0.007    
GDP 0.011 0.248 -0.779 0.404 0.523 -0.008 0.704 -0.013   
P -0.110 -0.104 0.349 -0.170 -0.219 -0.039 -0.367 -0.070 -0.500  
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 ROE MS MCON TINV TAS EQAS MCAP FTSE GDP        
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
ROE 1.000          
MS 0.206          
MCON -0.029 -0.205         
TINV 0.230 0.424 -0.338        
TAS 0.015 0.719 -0.382 0.717       
EQAS -0.184 -0.116 0.011 -0.290 -0.272      
MCAP -0.006 0.650 -0.485 0.449 0.749 -0.111     
FTSE -0.072 -0.040 0.058 0.011 -0.010 0.106 -0.051    
GDP 0.000 0.248 -0.777 0.427 0.522 -0.017 0.710 -0.008   
P -0.181 -0.109 0.354 -0.175 -0.220 -0.044 -0.392 -0.067 -0.513  
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 3 continued  
Panel E: Real Estate Companies 
 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 ROA MS MCON TINV TAS EQAS MCAP FTSE GDP        
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
ROA 1.00         
MS -0.072         
MCON 0.321 0.048        
TINV -0.261 0.341 -0.190       
TAS -0.286 0.672 0.408 0.272      
EQAS 0.030 -0.061 -0.127 -0.093 -0.041     
MCAP -0.170 0.680 0.430 0.216 0.958 0.080    
FTSE 0.051 -0.036 0.071 -0.050 -0.040 -0.014 -0.053   
GDP 0.459 -0.067 0.831 -0.339 0.344 0.042 0.381 0.062  
P -0.137 0.082 -0.264 0.314 -0.098 -0.028 -0.067 -0.202 -0.438     
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 ROE MS MCON TINV TAS EQAS MCAP FTSE GDP        
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
ROE 1.000          
MS -0.075          
MCON 0.026 0.048         
TINV -0.126 0.341 -0.190        
TAS -0.156 0.672 0.408 0.272       
EQAS -0.009 -0.061 -0.127 -0.093 -0.041      
MCAP -0.129 0.680 0.430 0.216 0.958 0.080     
FTSE 0.224 -0.036 0.071 -0.050 -0.040 -0.014 -0.053    
GDP -0.090 -0.067 0.831 -0.339 0.344 0.042 0.381 0.062   
P 0.050 0.082 -0.264 0.314 -0.098 -0.028 -0.067 -0.202 -0.438  
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
3.4 The UK Financial System 
 
 
The UK financial system serves an important function in the efficient operation of the 
economy. The financial system is the medium that channels funds from saving units to 
investing units and thus when the financial system is disrupted by a shock which severely 
restrict the flow of funds, as occurred during the financial crisis of 2007-2009, this can severely 
affect the savings-investment cycle and, as a consequence, constrain the rate of growth of the 
real economy if financial institutions are unable to provide funds to individuals and corporate 
borrowers in a timely manner. A variety of different financial institutions operate in the U.K. 
financial system to facilitate the flow of funds between savers and users of funds. These include 
commercial banks, investment companies, insurance companies, pension funds, finance 
companies, and real estate firms, amongst others, all of which specialize in the types of deposits 
they accept and the types of investments they secure. As is well known, commercial banks 
accept deposits and lend these funds to individuals, businesses, and governments, while 
investment companies invest funds in debt and equity securities and in money market 
instruments. Pension funds pool the contributions of employees and invest these funds in 
various types of financial assets, and insurance companies receive premiums from individuals 
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which they invest in various financial assets. Finance companies obtain funds by issuing their 
own securities and loans from commercial banks, and then use these sources of funds to make 
loans to individuals and businesses. For these reasons and, more, it is important to have a 
continued understanding of the financial performance of financial institutions.   
 
 
3.5 Analysis 
 
3.5.1 Empirical results and Analysis of the UK financial sector’s performance 
Table 4 reports the regression estimates from fitting the balanced fixed-effects panel regression 
model (1) for the financial institutions in our sample. The results are classified under four 
separate periods. First, we describe the estimates of bank performance over the period defined 
by the data (1980-2012), followed by the pre-crisis period leading up to the financial crisis 
(2002-2007), the period marked by the financial crisis (2007-2010), and the post financial crisis 
period (2010-2012). In the second part of our analysis, we utilise regression Eq. (3) to 
investigate the profitability of nonbank financial institutions for the aforementioned designated 
periods. To offer further related insights on financial institutions performance we evaluate the 
effects of their risk-taking behaviour by including a measure of risk to a set of specific traits in 
the regression specification. The motivation for looking at the risk-taking of banks, in 
particular, is due to the widely held view that the bailout expectations in the banking industry 
create moral hazard and cause banks to engage in more aggressive risk-taking behavior 
(Cordella and Yeyati, 2003; Gorton and Huang, 2004; Dam and Koetter, 2012). Therefore, the 
results will allow us to draw an inference about the effect of UK bank risk-taking behaviour on 
financial performance over the aforementioned periods. 
 The summary results of the panel regression analysis for the performance of the banking 
sector under the four periods are disclosed in Table 4 for our profit rates return on assets (ROA) 
and return equity (ROE). Our discussion indicates when the 1980 to 2012 results differ from 
those of subsequent years. Several observations deserve mention. First, the adjusted R2 for the 
regression suggests a reasonably good fit.  Second, it is apparent that market share has a positive 
and significant (5% and 1% level) relationship with our profit rate, ROE, particularly in the 
period of stable growth (2002-2007) and post crisis (2010-2012), suggesting that  banks’ 
benefitted from their dominance in loan and deposit markets in profitable ways, but only under 
favourable market conditions when the UK economy experienced a rapid increase in credit, 
namely to households and to small and medium sized enterprises, which saw many bank 
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customers choosing to borrow to purchases houses or cars, to expand their business or to 
engage in new start-ups. This association argument has been reported by Smirlock (1985), 
Berger (1995), Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999), and Abreu and Mendes (2001). Tellingly, 
loans-to-deposit ratio is statistically significant, which is not surprising, since the growing 
strength and competitiveness of mortgage banks and foreign banks in banking markets created 
pressure on banks to became more aggressive in loan markets and, in doing so, to relax their 
lending criteria when evaluating and arriving at decisions on loan requests, in preference to 
holding deposits. This result not only supports the risk-return hypothesis but it also 
demonstrates that during normal economic conditions bank managers are motivated to achieve 
higher returns through a declined loan loss rate.  
Although the banking sector is especially dominant in the area of business borrowing 
and lending, it should  be taken into account that the sector competes for much of this business 
with non-bank financial-services firms such as insurance companies, investment trust 
companies, finance companies, and real estate companies. In addition to these financial 
institutions, the banking sector is also faced with increased competition from supermarket firms 
and football clubs in some of its product areas such as, for example, the credit card market. 
Thus it is reasonable to assume that increased competition in retail financial markets offering 
financial services is likely to impact bank profitability over time. Operationally, the objective 
of a bank is to maximize shareholder wealth, which implies maximizing the margin, and 
minimizing costs. The main constraints to this endeavour are the need to incur costs to improve 
the quality of bank services, and to generate sufficient revenue in order to accommodate 
increased capital requirements, required for prudential reasons to support asset growth. A 
bank’s asset includes loans which require twice as much capital support than mortgages. Profits 
are available to bank shareholders via dividends and higher share prices, and one way of 
boosting profits has been through increases in bank assets in the form of various types of loans, 
and mortgages. Here, the influence of LDEP is seen in Table 4. An examination of the estimate 
with our profit rate, ROA, indicates that the coefficient of LDEP has a negative association, 
which is statistically significant over the 32-year period, 1980- 2012. This implies that the 
banking sector were more conservative in their lending practices, at least up until the mid-
1990s, as Figure 1 shows. As might be inferred from Figure 1, there was a continuous increase 
in total loans, this tends to correspond with the period of stable growth up until the crisis of 
2007-2009 when, owing to the inability of banks’ to obtain the necessary short-term liquidity 
to fund new loans as well as the necessity to repair balance sheets affected from the deep sell-
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off of securities declined. It is also clear that the improving trend in deposit taking was not 
enough to prevent banks from needing to bridge the gap between loan advance and deposit 
taking by raising much of what they would need to fund new consumer loans in the wholesale 
money markets, albeit at a higher rate, or from liquidity assistance from the Bank of England. 
Figure 1: Total Loans and Total Deposits UK Banking Sector 1980-2012 
 
    
Regarding the influence of total assets or bank size, the coefficient of 4 indicates a 
negative association with our profit rates (ROE/ROA) during the period of growth, indicating 
a statistically significant association at the 10 per cent level. This is consistent with the reported 
findings of Smirlock (1985), Molyneux and Forbes (1995), Kosmidou et al. (2005), and 
Pasiouras and Kosmidou (2007), which found total assets to be negatively correlated with 
profitability. Moreover, since 4 provides an estimate of the impact of size, it appears that  
banks were unable to profitably exploit their size advantage through their reliance on improved 
bank technology in branches, increased online presence, and or mobile banking services doing 
more business. This may be attributable partly to the banks earning lower margins and thus 
reduced profitability at a time when they diversified their product range and grew more rapidly 
than in the previous period. It may also be due to the banking sector being more highly 
concentrated owing to the progressive reduction in the number of banks and bank branches, 
and an increase in contestability in the banking sector. This finding can be explained by the 
market concentration coefficient 2 which seems to validate the Structure Conduct 
Performance (SCP) hypothesis and indicates, moreover, a statistically significant and positive 
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relationship with the Herfindahl index with our profit rate (ROA). This finding is in line with 
the results reported by Molyneux and Thornton (1992), Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999), 
Goddard et al. (2004 and 2004b), Pasiouras and Kosmidou (2007) which report the limited 
contestability of the UK banking sector where a few major banks are known to have dominant 
presence in bank credit markets.  
Interestingly, the net interest margin coefficient 
10 reveals a statistically significant 
and positive relationship during the period of stable growth, which is not surprising since the 
banking sector would be expected to see an increase in the rate of growth in the demand for 
new loans and other banking products, and thus increased profitability. We also recognize that 
increased profitability may also reflect the effect of sound capital management practices, in 
addition to rising income from interest bearing assets than the cost of interest paid to depositors. 
In general, banks tend to have substantially higher net interest margins, and our results suggest 
a statistically significant negative relationship with NIM during volatile years. The variable 
would appear to be a key driver of bank performance as it defines the traditional operation of 
a bank and of a banks capacity to manage deposits and loans. Figure 1 also suggests a 
divergence in loans and deposits during the years 2005-2008, after which loan advance and 
deposit taking begins to narrow, which explains the negative association with our profit rates 
during the crisis and post-crisis period.  
Looking at the effects of capital strength (EQAS), which is one of the main 
determinants of financial performance. The estimate reported in Table 4 indicate that the 
coefficient, 5 , is statistically significant. In particular, there is a positive association of EQAS 
with our profit rate during the 32-year period, the period of growth, as well as during the 2002-
2007, 2007-2010, and 2010-2012 periods when bank capital came under pressure. This finding 
also suggests that well capitalised UK banks have the capacity to reduce the risk of bankruptcy, 
or were confident in the belief they could rely on the Bank of England, as the lender of last 
resort, for funding support in the event of severe financial distress which, in turn, allowed them 
to take advantage of their position – one that allowed them to keep funding costs low, while at 
the same time maintaining higher margins and higher levels of profitability. Previous research 
reports a positive relationship between equity asset ratio and profitability. For example, Berger 
(1995), Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999), Staikouras and Wood (2003), Goddard et al., 
(2004), Kosmidou et al., (2005) and Pasiouras and Kosmidou (2007) examine the financial 
performance of banks in different markets and report a positive relationship between equity 
asset ratio and profitability.  
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Looking at bank cost to income ratio (CIN), indicates the extent to which improvements 
have been achieved in operational efficiency through reductions in operating costs: personnel, 
information technology and other costs. Our estimation reveals that the coefficient 
11  is 
negative and significantly different from zero during the pre-crisis period, which is consistent 
with the reported findings of Pasiouras and Kosmidou (2007). This decline in bank CIN reflects 
a number of factors. Namely the adoption of new technologies which allowed the banking 
sector to focus on reducing high-cost, low-value operation which resulted in the contraction of 
bank branches, combined with the focus of on online and mobile banking. In addition, the 
restructuring of operations and the gradual upgrading of bank technology more generally, 
allowed the banking sector to provide more time saving banking services to customers, while 
improved back-office processes such as loan approvals, and information processing and 
management, enabled the sector to counteract the effects of increased competition on 
profitability. A further potential explanation for the decline in CIN is that mortgage lending 
represents a high share of a banks’ total lending, and because housing mortgages are more 
homogenous than business loans, the cost of distributing them is likely to have benefited more 
from technological advances than business lending or relationship-based financial services. 
This also suggests that there may be diseconomies of scope for the banks – that is, average 
costs increase as they diversify outside of commercial banking services. 
Concerning the impact of stock market capitalization (MCAP) on bank profitability, it 
is observed that the coefficient is negative over the 32-year period. During the period under 
study it is observed that the impact of stock market capitalization is also negative with bank 
sector profitability during the pre-crisis period, implying that during the pre-crisis period the 
UK stock market provided substitution possibilities to potential borrowers. Figure 2 shows that 
MCAP increased over time. For instance, from 2002-2007 (a period of stable growth without 
a banking crisis), market capitalization increased steadily, before declining during the crisis, 
and rising during the post-crisis period. An important element to take into account also is the 
coefficient of the stock market (FTSE) which has a positive and significant impact on 
profitability over all periods. One interpretation of this is that since banks are listed on the stock 
market, a rise in the FTSE index is likely to strengthen not only their financial position but also 
the financial sector of the economy. Moreover, the increase in banking activities contributes to 
enhance profitability, and this is reflected in the stock price of banks. As we can see from our 
estimation results, the coefficient of this variable is statistically negative and significant with 
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our profit rate, ROE, during the 32-year period, and during the post crisis period. It seems, from 
the estimates, that shareholders were seeking to maximize value. 
 
Figure 2: ROA ROE MCAP Average UK Banking Sector 1980-2012 
 
 
Another factor, which may explain the profitability of the UK banking sector, are the rate of 
growth of national income as reflected by the coefficient GDP, which exhibit a positive 
relationship over the 32-year period and during the pre-crisis period with our profit rates 
ROA/ROE, when the UK economy experienced a period of stable growth.  During this period, 
demand for financial services can be expected to grow as the UK economy expands and society 
at large becomes more prosperous. Thus the finding is not unexpected since the positive 
association between GDP and profitability suggests that higher rates of growth provides an 
incentive for banks to relax their lending criteria so as to be able to profit from the increased 
demand for loanable funds from the business sector in their quest to seize new investment 
opportunities or plant expansion, as well as to be able to offer more reasonable loan rates for 
the household sector to satisfy their demand for loans of various types, the largest of which is 
residential mortgage loans, as competition increase. Such demand, to the extent that they 
provide banks with the opportunity to increase profits, may actually strengthen incentives to 
expand credit at a time when business and consumer confidence is high in the UK economy. 
Furthermore, GDP growth can be expected to reduce the probability of default owing to lower 
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rates of bankruptcies and unemployment, which increase the willingness on the part of banks 
to advance newer business and consumer loans. This finding is consistent with the findings of 
previous studies examining the financial performance of banks such as, for example, Goddard, 
et al. (2004a), Kosmidou, et al. (2005) and Pasiouras and Kosmidou (2007). However, we 
should note that the coefficient indicates a negative relationship with our profit rate during the 
crisis and post crisis period when the UK economy slowed, but most noticeably the coefficient 
exhibits a positive and significant relationship with ROE during the periods under study.  
The inflation coefficient (P),
10 , has a positive and significant effect on our profit rate 
during the 32 year period and during the post-crisis period, suggesting that the level of inflation 
was anticipated over the period.  It also indicates that during the post crisis period, a 1 per cent 
increase in the price level result in an increase in profitability by 0.014 per cent, because when 
inflation is anticipated it therefore offers the banking sector the scope to adjust their interest 
rates, resulting in revenues that increases at a much faster rate than costs, and thus a positive 
effect on profitability. However, the inflation coefficient is negatively related to profitability 
during the pre-crisis and economic and financial crisis period, implying that the levels of 
inflation were unanticipated by the UK banking sector. This implies that banks were slow in 
adjusting their interest rates, which resulted in a faster increase in bank costs than bank 
revenues, with a negative impact on profitability. The negative sign of our inflation coefficient,
9 , also confirms Abreu and Mendes (2001) observation as there is a negative relationship 
with our profit rate. This would seem to suggest that inflation was unanticipated by the UK 
banking sector and, as result, may have led to bank costs being in excess of revenue’s due to 
rates offered being unadjusted for and thus having a negative effect on profitability.   
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Table 4: Balanced fixed-effects panel regression ─ Empirical estimates for banking firms 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8it MS MCON LDEP TAS EQAS MCAP FTSE GDP                   
     9 10 11 tP NIM CIN                                                                     
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Dependent ROA ROA ROA ROE ROE ROE  
Variable 2002-2007 2007-2010 2010-2012 2002-2007 2007-2010 2010-2012 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
MS 0.9519 0.4195 -0.3630 0.2950 0.0259 0.3120 
 (1.9458)* (1.1153) (-0.8153) (1.2231) (0.2631) (1.9212) 
MCON 2.9034 -0.8720 2.1976 -0.5808 -0.1433 0.5337 
 (3.1556)*** (-0.5698) (0.7950) (-1.2802) (-0.3577) (0.5294) 
LDEP -0.6249 -0.7247 -0.0556 0.3530 0.4636 1.1241 
 (-1.0844) (-0.6928) (-0.0340) (1.2426) (1.6939) (1.8874) 
TAS -0.7826 -0.9494 0.1666 -0.3811 -0.2886 -0.9133 
 (-2.2284)** (-1.5361) (0.1692) (-2.2006)** (-1.7842)* (-2.5436) 
EQAS 0.6026 0.1788 2.2474 -0.0194 -0.1287 0.0871 
 (1.2324) (0.2353) (1.4985) (-0.0802) (-0.6473) (0.1592) 
CIN -1.6135 -0.4776 -2.4970 -1.1442 0.0121 -0.4819 
 (-1.2954) (-0.4388) (-0.6363) (-1.8631)* (0.0425) (-0.3367) 
NIM 0.7449 0.7000 -0.0950 -0.2920 -0.6706 -0.4288 
 (1.8698)* (1.1373) (-0.1147) (-1.4865) (-4.1636)*** (-1.4194) 
MCAP 0.6337 1.1439 0.7993 -0.0634 -0.3627 0.3587 
 (2.7040)** (1.7843)* (1.0294) (-0.5486) (-2.1622)* (1.2667) 
FTSE 0.5318 0.1406 0.0776 -0.0819 0.0629 -0.1562 
 (2.8794)*** (0.5093) (0.1760) (-0.8995) (0.8710) (-0.9717) 
GDP 0.6860 -0.7242 -2.9635 0.7172 1.3877 1.0667 
 (0.5264) (-0.4522) (-1.2710) (1.1163) (3.3120)*** (1.2545) 
P -0.1730 0.5805 -0.7092 -0.1430 0.1876 0.8059 
 (-0.8084) (0.8247) (-0.6143) (-1.3556) (1.0186) (1.9141) 
 
R2 0.673 0.504 0.715 0.541 0.851 0.785  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
t-Values in parenthesis. * Coefficient is statistically is significant at the 10% level. ** Coefficient is statistically significant at the 5% level. 
*** Coefficient is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 4 Continued: Balanced fixed-effects panel regression ─ Empirical estimates for 
banking firms 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Dependent ROA ROE 
Variable 1980-2012 1980-2012  
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
MS -0.1769 0.1064  
 (-1.6971)* (2.2758)**  
MCON 0.6212 0.0220  
 (1.6563)* (0.1309)  
LDEP -0.9674 0.3356  
 (-3.5235)*** (2.7431)***  
TAS 0.1142 -0.2590  
 (0.9017) (-4.5583)***  
EQAS 0.2777 -0.1416  
 (1.8146)* (-2.0617)**  
MCAP 0.3367 0.1160  
 (3.4222)*** (2.6274)***  
FTSE 0.1949 0.0349  
 (2.3424)** (0.9466)  
GDP -0.8312 0.2407  
 (-2.4378)** (1.5729)  
P -0.1163 -0.0169  
 (-0.9171) (-0.2978)  
R2 0.238  0.219 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
t-Values in parenthesis. * Coefficient is statistically is significant at the 10% level. ** Coefficient is statistically significant at the 5% level. 
*** Coefficient is statistically significant at the 1% level. We were unable to obtain consistent data from 1980-2012 for variables Cost-to-
income ratio and Net interest margin. 
 
The results of the estimation of Equation (3) are illustrated in Table 5 for non-bank 
financial institutions: insurance companies (Panel A), investment trust companies (Panel B), 
finance companies (Panel C), and real estate companies (Panel D). First, the insurance sector 
plays an important and specialized intermediary role in the UK economy. Therefore, their 
financial performance is very critical to the health and growth of the general economy. Given 
the importance of the insurance sector to the wellbeing of the economy, knowledge of the 
underlying factors that influence the insurance sector’s performance is essential not only for 
the managers of the insurance companies, but for numerous stakeholders such as the central 
banks, the British Association of Insurance Brokers (BAIB), governments, and other financial 
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authorities. Knowledge of these factors would also be helpful to help the regulatory authorities 
and insurance managers formulate going forward policies for improved performance of the 
insurance sector. 
It is observed from Table 5, Panel A, which shows the regression estimates for the 
insurance sector, that the model applied, given the values of R2, was a good fit. If we focus on 
the overall period 1980-2012, it is observed that the coefficient of market share (MS), 
1 , is 
statistically insignificant. This means that over the 32-year period the insurance sector 
experienced a decline in its share of the insurance market which influenced our profit rate, 
ROA, and thus the insurance sector’s profitability. The negative t-value (-0.5707) means that 
the sector’s declining market share impacted profitability negatively. This is due to the 
increased presence of UK commercial banks and other depository institutions in the household 
and motor insurance markets, as well as from the entry of foreign-owned insurers in life 
business, pensions, health, annuities, and other products as the insurance market opened up in 
the wake of deregulation and liberalisation. Regarding the pre-crisis period 2002-2007 when, 
in particular, the UK economy benefitted from stable rates of growth, we find that market share 
is statistically significant and positively related to ROA. This implies that during the 5-year 
period the insurance sector benefited from the expansion of the UK economy, which saw a rise 
in the level of business activity and employment, leading to an increase in the demand for 
business, mortgage, car loans, loans for other high priced ticket items, increased travel, and the 
purchase of insurance cover linked to these products. In addition to employment insurance 
cover. Consequently, these will have contributed to a higher profitability. For the period 
represented by the economic and financial crisis, 2007-2010, which saw the UK economy 
recoiled from its growth path, we see that the coefficient on our profit rate is statistically 
insignificant and negatively related to ROA. This means that the decline in demand for the 
main business lines of commercial banks and other depository institutions and, in turn, a 
reduced demand for insurance products in the insurance markets, as well as the rise in claims, 
on for example, employment protection insurance, payment protection insurance (PPI) and for 
other insured risks; as a result profitability decreased. Further, according to the sign of the 
coefficient for the period following the economic and financial crisis, 2010-2012, market share 
is positively related to our profit rate, ROA, indicating improving UK economic conditions and 
insurance markets from which the insurance sector benefitted profitably., the MS coefficient is 
statistically significant and positive for our profit rate, ROE, during all sample periods.  
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It is interesting to note that the effects of the market concentration (MCON) coefficient,
2 , for the period 1980-2012 is significant in explaining the insurance sectors profitability and 
thus does not support the Structure Conduct Performance (SCP) hypothesis. This is evidence 
that the insurance sector became less concentrated and more competitive over the 32-year 
period as the insurance market opened up, and as the global economy shift towards an ever 
increasing globalized financial market environment. This also demonstrates that the 
competitive pressures from the UK commercial banks that diversified their business by 
establishing their own insurance companies affected the sector in some market segments (e.g. 
household and car insurance markets) in which the increased competitiveness of these business 
organizations brought about an erosion of profitability. It is also worth noting that according to 
the SCP hypothesis, insurance companies in highly concentrated markets tend to collude and 
therefore earn monopoly profits, which is not supported. We also find that the coefficient has 
a negative and significant relationship with our profit rate during the pre and post crisis periods. 
In terms of the impact on ROE, 2 , is observed to have a positive and significant effect on 
profitability during the 32-year period, the period 2007-2010, and 2010-2012, except for the 
period 2002-2007 where the coefficient has a significant and negative impact on profitability. 
The interaction with the investment (TINV) coefficient, 3 , reveals a negative and significant 
relationship with profitability. One possible interpretation of this result is that the investment 
portfolio did not yield sufficient investment income to offset the insurance sectors pay-out 
obligations on claims over the period under study, as both ROA and ROE is consistently 
negative. We should also note the low interest rate environment also helped to contribute to the 
low return on investment and thus profitability. Another interesting and significant observation 
is that the sign of the TAS coefficient, 4 , is positively correlated with profitability over all 
periods, except for the period of stable growth where TAS has a negative and significant impact 
on our profit rate, ROA. This suggests that over the 5 year period a 1 per cent increase in 
company size decreased profitability by 0.07 per cent, mainly for two reasons. First, assets 
yielded increasingly low returns, and secondly, the increasing longevity of policy holders. The 
estimates also shows that the relationship between the equity to asset (EQAS) coefficient, 5 , 
and profitability is positive and statistically significant during all periods. In this vein, it could 
be argued that the insurance sector remained in sound financial condition mainly by reducing 
the drain on capital and by managing their business more efficiently. Moreover, since a strong 
capital structure is essential for the insurance sector, it provides additional strength to 
underwrite risk, and the ability to withstand increased claims as and when unexpected events 
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occur. The coefficient of EQUAS does however indicate a negative and positive consistency 
with ROE during the period of stable growth, as well as during the economic and financial 
crisis, and the post crisis period.  
The statistics also show that market capitalization (MCAP) has a positive and 
significant effect on the insurance sector’s profitability over all periods. The coefficient, 
6 , 
indicate that over the 32-year period a 1 per cent increase in MCAP increased the profitability 
of the sector by 0.03 per cent. It implies that for the period under study it is observed that the 
impact of stock market capitalization is also negative with profitability, implying that during 
the pre-crisis period the London stock market offers substitution possibilities to potential 
buyers of premium. We also find that although the coefficient, 6 , is highly significant and 
positively related to ROA during the period of stable growth, and during the post-crisis period, 
it was negative and positively related to ROA during the economic and financial crisis. The 
negative and significant relationship between MCAP and ROE during the 32-year period, and 
during the period of growth implies that the insurance sector did not utilise its equity fully. 
MCAP does however show a positive and significant relationship with ROE during the 
economic and financial crisis, and post crisis period. In addition, the sign of the FTSE 
coefficient, 7 , is negative and significant during the 32-year period, and the period of stable 
growth indicating there is a negative relationship between stock market strength and insurance 
sector profitability, while the variable is positive and significant with ROA during the period 
of economic and financial crisis, and in the post-crisis period. The positive relationship between 
the UK stock market and insurance sector profitability rather suggests that there are 
complementarities between the recovery of the stock market and the insurance sector’s 
recovery as the stock market and the insurance sector recovered from the impact of the 
economic and financial crisis. According to the sign of the variable our profit rate, ROE, there 
is a negative and positive relationship with ROE during the period under study. 
 Referring to the impact of GDP, 8 , is positively related to the financial performance 
of the insurance sector during the 32-year period and during the period of stable growth, while 
the variable shows a negative and positive relationship with ROA during the crisis and post-
crisis period. We also find that the coefficient of GDP has a positive sign with ROE during all 
periods which suggests the sector was able to expand and maintain its competitive position in 
bank markets where it became increasingly harder to increase profitability. Finally, the 
evidence for the impact of inflation on our profit rate ROA/ROE is irregular and not persistent. 
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For example, the variable indicates a negative and positive consistency with ROA during the 
period of stable growth and during the economic and financial crisis, before returning to be 
positive and significantly related to ROA during the post-crisis period. The results also indicate 
that the price variable has a negative and significant relationship with our profit rate ROE 
during the 32-year period, and during the period of stable growth, positive during the crisis-
period, and positive during the post-crisis period.  
The results of the estimation of the fixed-effects specification for the investment trust 
sector are reported in Table 5, Panel B. Investment trusts are an important medium for enabling 
small UK investors that want to channel their savings into capital market investments, so as to 
benefit from portfolio diversification to reduce risk. It is clear from the low R2 that the model 
constructed is not a perfect fit and that the variables selected are perhaps not the most important 
drivers of investment trust sectors financial performance. The market share coefficient, 1 ,  
has a negative sign with our profit rate over the 32-year period, as well as during the period of 
stable growth and the crisis period,  but is found to be positive related to profitability during 
the post-crisis period. There are several reasons for this finding. First, growth returned to the 
UK economy and with it higher rates of employment. Second, the low interest rate on savings 
product offered by the commercial banks and other depository institutions, induced bank 
customers to place their savings in the hands of money managers rather than to deposit them 
in bank saving products. Third, the capital markets were increasingly regarded as a much better 
performing alternative to bank savings account with the potential for investors to earn higher 
rates of return. Investment trusts are able to offer small investors the opportunity to benefit 
from portfolio diversification and the professional expertise of fund managers was another key 
factor. We also find that the coefficient is negatively associated with ROE for the 32-year 
period, and for the growth period, but is positively correlated with our profit rate during the 
crisis and post-crisis period. As we can see from our estimation results, this variable is negative 
and significant for all periods, indicating that there is a negative relationship between market 
concentration and profitability, which supports the structure conduct performance hypothesis. 
On the other hand, it is plane that the coefficient, 2 , is positively related to ROE for the 32-
year period, and for the period of growth, but there is a negative and positive relationship during 
the crisis and the post-crisis period.   
The return on investments, 3 , has a positive and significant effect on investment trusts 
performance for all designated periods. In particular, the estimates indicate that during the 
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period of growth a 1 per cent increase in investment caused investment trusts performance to 
increase by 0.16 per cent. The possible reason for this positive effect is that the investment 
strategies adopted by fund managers during periods of stable growth, as well as during the time 
of turmoil and the post-crisis period delivered stellar returns in an environment of increasing 
volatility and uncertainty in global markets. For example, during the period 2002-2007 UK 
shares priced in quite a lot of good news about the strength of economic growth and, as a result, 
the London stock market witnessed a continued rise not only in the price of stocks traded, but 
also in the market’s indexes. Over this period the FTSE 100 index powered ahead, ending 2002 
at 3940, 2004 at 4814, and 2005 at 5619. These highs were surpassed in 2006, when the index 
ended the year at 6221 and, after hitting its highest level of almost 7000 in 2007, it ended the 
year at 6457. As a consequence of the global financial and Eurozone debt crisis which created 
downward pressure on economic growth and resulted in declines in various stock market 
indexes, the market ended 2008 at 4434. This was bettered when it ended 2009 at 5413, and 
2010 at 5900. As a result of the infusion of liquidity into the UK banking system and other 
economic stimulus measures applied by the UK government and the Bank of England, which 
led to an improving economy – with low interest rates and low inflation - which provided a 
positive outlook for UK companies, the market ended 2012 at 5898. Therefore, the relationship 
between investment returns and investment trust performance is positive. The investment 
variable is also positively associated with our profit rate ROE for all periods, except for the 
crisis-period, where the coefficient has a significant and negative effect on performance. This 
result might be driven by the steep fall in global stock markets, and the market capitalization 
recession that followed, which ultimately affected the financial performance of investment 
trusts.  
The coefficient of total assets, our size variable, is positive and significantly related to 
our profit rate, ROA, for all periods, except for the post-crisis period. This result shows that 
investment trusts were able to benefit not only from the sizeable fund under management but 
also from diversification possibilities and the gradual strengthening of the economy. For the 
larger the size of the investment portfolio, the more profitable the investment trust sector, which 
supports the risk-return hypothesis. On the other hand, the coefficient is negatively and 
positively related to ROE for all periods, except for the post-crisis period. We also see the effect 
of EQAS on investment trust performance, which indicates a negative and significant 
relationship during the 32-year period with our profit rate, ROA, but is positive and significant 
for all other periods. We interpret this to indicate that since capital is a measure of investment 
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trust risk, which may have a questionable effect on investment trust financial performance, it 
seems that well-capitalized investment trusts are perceived by small investors to be much safer 
havens for their savings, and thus were incline to entrust their savings to managers of funds 
with a strong capital base. In contrast to the estimates for ROA, differences exist related to 
ROE. The coefficient,
5 , has a positive and significant effect on profitability for the 32-year 
period, but reveals a negative and significant relationship with ROE for all remaining periods. 
Our estimates show that the coefficient of market capitalization has a positive and significant 
effect on investment trust performance for all periods, except for the crisis-period for ROA, 
but indicates a negative and significant relationship with ROE for all periods, except for the 
post- crisis period.  
The sign of strong stock market growth and strength is positive and significant for all 
periods for our profit rate ROA/ROE, except for the period 2002-2007 for ROA, indicating a 
positive relationship between stronger stock market growth and investment trust performance. 
This results in an increase in savers putting their savings under the management of investment 
trusts which, as a result, contributed to higher financial performance. The positive relationship 
between strong stock market growth and investment trust performance would seem to suggest 
that there are interrelating benefits between the growth and strength of the stock market and 
investment trust performance. 
On the macroeconomic front which helps to explain how successful the investment 
strategies adopted by fund managers interact with the environment. It is observed that GDP is 
negatively related to the performance of investment trusts over all periods, except for the crisis-
period for ROE. This result is surprising, particularly in view of the strong GDP growth 
experienced by the UK economy during the periods under study, which would be expected to 
have resulted in investment trust seeing an increase in demand for their services, and thus 
improving financial performance. It is observed that inflation is positively related to investment 
trusts performance during the periods under study, except for the 32 year period, with our profit 
rate ROA, implying that during the period of stable growth, the crisis-period, and the post 
crisis-period, the levels of inflation was anticipated by investment trusts.  
Concerning the financial performance of finance companies which also play an 
important role not only in business and household lending and credit, but also in the higher 
purchase market, the market for the leasing of machinery, motor vehicles and various types of 
equipment, their financial performance is of vital importance to the real economy and to policy 
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makers. The empirical results from the fixed effects model are presented in Table 5, Panel C. 
It is evident from the R2 that the model is a good fit overall. The results show that market share 
is significant and positively related to finance company performance for our profit rate, ROA, 
for all periods, suggesting that finance companies benefitted from efficiency gains, particularly 
with regard to the evolution of performance. For example, the economic conditions in credit 
markets and the period over the crisis and post crisis-period created pressure on finance 
companies to drive down cost, and to invest more in IT technologies, which made their products 
more attractive to customers. This trend is also reflected in ROE, except for the post crisis 
period, which indicates a negative and significant relationship with performance. We interpret 
this to indicate a decrease in the share of finance companies in business and household loans 
and credit as a result of the feverish UK economic conditions following the deep recession, the 
indebtedness of UK households, the slow recovery of the UK housing market, in addition to 
tougher market conditions which impacted market share and thus dampened finance companies 
profitability.  The positive and significant impact of MCON on ROA during the periods 
examined, except for the post-crisis period, suggest that the sector experienced some change 
from the point of view of concentration with a decrease in the number of finance companies. 
As is evident from the sign of the coefficient, 2 , there was a clear concentration of business 
and household loans and credits during the post-crisis period, which reflected the credit crunch 
in the UK during this period. Further, the sign of MCON indicates a positive and significant 
relationship with ROE during the 32-year period, and the period of growth, but indicates a 
negative and significant relationship with ROE during the crisis and post-crisis periods.  
Regarding the impact of investment, it is positively related to the profitability of finance 
companies, indicating a positive relationship between ROA and the returns from investments 
in stocks, fixed income securities, and other investments, except for the post-crisis period 
which shows a negative and significant relationship with ROA. One explanation of this result 
is that the decline in economic growth, the low interest rate environment, and lower dividend 
receipts, resulted in the portfolios of insurance companies yielding much lower return. The 
trend reflected in the impact of investment on ROA is also reflected in ROE during the periods 
under study, except for the post-crisis period and reflects the uncertainties concerning whether 
the economic recovery will be sustainable and whether the continued speculation surrounding 
the Eurozone debt crisis will disappear.  
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The relation between the size variable,
4 , and finance company performance is 
negative and significant for all sample periods, while it becomes positive and significant during 
the post-crisis period.  It should be mentioned that the effect of size follows a similar trend for 
ROE. Unsurprisingly, the ratio equity to total assets contributes to the performance of finance 
companies as the relatively positive and significant coefficient shows during all period for 
ROA. Probably, the main reason is that well capitalized finance companies were able to signal 
their capital strength, which enabled them to face lower risks of financial distress and, in doing 
so, to reduce their funding costs. It is notable that the EQAS coefficient,
5 , is positive and 
significant for our profit rate ROE during all periods, except for the 32-year period. The 
coefficient of market capitalization,
6 , is found to have negative and significant effect on 
finance company performance for the periods under study, except for the period of stable 
growth. The estimate shows that a 1 per cent increase in market value will increase profitability 
by 0.12 per cent due to the aggressive expansion of business activity in its main niche markets 
and which helps to enhance firm value. We find that the stock market coefficient, 7 , has a 
negative and significant impact on ROA during the periods examined, while having a positive 
impact on ROE for all periods, except for the post crisis period.   
We further observe that GDP has a negative and significant impact on finance company 
performance during the 32-year and post-crisis period, but the coefficient, 8 , is positive and 
significant during the period of stable growth and during the crisis period. The reason for this 
result is that the demand for business and consumer loans, higher purchase agreements and 
other credit contracts increased during the period of economic growth, as well as during the 
period of the financial crisis, which resulted in an improvement in the financial performance 
of finance companies. With regard to inflation, the sign of the coefficient, 9 , is negative and 
significant for the 32-year and crisis-period, but shows a positive and significant relationship 
with ROA during the period of growth and the post-crisis period. This result indicates that 
during these periods inflation was fully anticipated by finance companies managers who, in 
turn, adjusted lending and credit rates, and rates on higher purchase agreements to reflect 
conditions in these markets.  
We now turn to the performance of real estate firms which, over the period of the 
present study, has been spurred by the stable growth of the UK economy and by the favourable 
conditions in financial markets prior to the onset of the global financial crisis. Before we 
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evaluate the financial performance of real estate firms, a definition of the activities of real estate 
firms is necessary. Broadly speaking, real estate firms are real estate investment trusts that 
allow individual and institutional investors to invest in portfolios of large scale properties. The 
main categories of real estate investment are in industrial, office, and retail properties, although 
funds are sometimes allocated in other categories of the market such as leisure and residential 
properties. The performance of real estate firms is of particular interest to fund managers, 
particularly insurance and pension funds with considerable allocations in commercial real 
estate, as it is to the UK government and the regulatory authorities who closely monitor the 
sector, especially given the sensitivity of participants to changes in interest rates.  
The analysis of real estate firm’s financial performance is reported in Table 5, Panel D, 
which confirms a number of findings with our profit rates ROA/ROE. First we note the 
explanatory power of the model’s R2 is weak. Second in evaluating the estimates of the fixed 
effects model, we find that the relationship between market share, 1 , and real estate firm’s 
performance is positive and significant during the periods studied for our profit rate ROA/ROE. 
The relationship between real estate company financial performance and market concentration,
2 , is negative and significant for all designated periods, except for the crisis period, which 
shows a positive and significant relationship with ROA. The coefficient also shows a negative 
and significant impact on real estate performance during the period of growth and the crisis 
period, except for the 32-year and post crisis period. One of the striking results is the negative 
relationship between investment and our profit rate, ROA, during the periods examined, except 
for the crisis period. For example, we would expect investment to a have positive impact on 
performance during the period of growth, one that was accompanied by a rising equity market. 
Thus a higher share of equity investments coupled with increasing returns on the market would 
be expected to impact performance.  Compared to ROA, we find that the coefficient, 3 , is 
negative and significant for the 32-year period and the crisis period, but shows a positive 
relationship with ROE during the period of growth, and the post crisis period.    
The size variable coefficient, 4 , is significantly and negatively related to our profit 
rate, ROA, during the periods examined, except for the growth period, which is positive and 
significant. We interpret the significance of size as an indication of higher efficiency of larger 
real estate firms operating in a sector, which is dominated by a few large companies. The sign 
of the coefficient also shows a negative a significant relationship with ROE during all periods, 
except for the post crisis period.  
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A positive and significant relationship is observed between the EQAS coefficient, 
5 , 
and ROA during the 32-year and growth period, but is negative and significant during the crisis 
and post crisis period. The positive coefficient does rather suggest that equity to assets is 
positively related to the financial performance of real estate companies and, moreover, that 
well capitalized real estate firms face lower costs of financial distress and, in consequence, 
were able to manage their funding needs without having to rely on external funding.   
Interestingly, the sign of the market capitalization coefficient,
6 , is negative with 
respect to our profit rate, ROA, for all different periods, except for the post-crisis period. Thus 
the level of capitalization per se is not a strong indicator of real estate firm’s performance with 
the overall period and the period of growth. This trend is not reflected in the sign of the 
coefficient, 6 , which shows a negative and significant relationship with our profit rate, ROE, 
during the periods studied. The coefficient of the FTSE, 7 , our stock market measure, is 
negative and significant for the period of growth and the crisis period, but is positive and 
significant during the 32-year and post-crisis period. The findings show that the sign of the 
FTSE coefficient, 7 , is positive and significant during the period of growth and the crisis 
period, but is negative and significant with ROE during the 32-year and the post crisis period. 
The results, somewhat surprisingly, indicate a statistically and economically 
insignificant relation between GDP and our profit rate, ROA, during the periods studied. For 
example, we would expect an increase in demand for commercial and other categories of 
property during the period of economic growth to increase, and to ultimately result in 
improvements in the financial performance of real estate firms. We would also expect the 
results to go in the same direction during the post-crisis period in light of the measures applied 
by the UK government, and the Bank of England to stimulate the economy. The coefficient, 8
, turns out to be positive and significant with ROE during all periods, except for the period of 
growth. We note immediately the positive relationship between inflation and the performance 
of real estate firms during the periods examined, except for the period of the financial crisis. 
We interpret this result as evidence of the ability of real estate companies to forecast inflation 
and, in so doing, to take a view on the future direction of interest rates. The sign of the inflation 
coefficient, 9 , indicate a negative and significant relationship with our profit rate, ROE, 
during all periods, except for the 32-year period. This result is expected, and reaffirms the 
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ability of real estate firms to forecast inflation and to interpret the possible direction of interest 
rates.  
  
 
        
95 
 
Table 5: Balanced fixed-effects panel regression ─ Empirical Estimates non-bank Financial Institutions 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6it MS MCON TINV TAS EQAS MCAP              7 8 9 tFTSE GDP P        
Panel A: Insurance companies 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Dependent ROA ROA ROA ROA ROE ROE ROE  ROE 
Variable 1980-2012 2002-2007 2007-2010 2010-2012 1980-2012 2002-2007 2007-2010 2010-2012 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
MS -0.0861 0.2373 -0.3027 0.1789 0.8664 0.6964 0.2580 1.1535 
 (-0.5707) (0.7116) (-0.9166) (0.6081) (2.1243)** (0.6148) (0.1860) (1.7440) 
MCON 0.0508 -2.4311 -0.6634 -0.6165 1.0092 -0.7967 2.3861 0.0079 
 (0.1246) (-1.3799) (-1.0641) (-1.4128) (0.9152) (-0.1331) (0.9116) (0.0080) 
TINV -0.3192 -0.4177 -0.2635 -1.0443 -1.5162 -1.5706 -0.5013 -2.8085 
 (-2.8360)*** (-1.7761)* (-1.2366) (-4.8180)*** (-4.9842)*** (-1.9657) (-0.5603) (-5.7639)*** 
TAS 0.2531 -0.0697 0.2792 0.3770 1.6576 0.7097 1.9541 2.3490 
 (2.6324)*** (-0.2967) (0.6758) (1.2965) (6.3782)*** (0.8891) (1.1266) (3.5935)*** 
EQAS 0.3875 0.1544 0.5199 0.5639 -0.2601 -2.0762 -0.3890 -0.4287 
 (5.2696)*** (0.6163) (1.7033) (2.7258)** (-1.3089) (-2.4398) (-0.3035) (-0.9217) 
MCAP 0.0267 0.1066 -0.0804 0.5733 -0.0697 -0.2525 1.1857 1.2670 
 (0.3134) (0.4543) (-0.3717) (4.2950)*** (-0.3029) (-0.3168) (1.3065) (4.2221)*** 
FTSE -0.1860 -0.3555 0.0334 0.6096 -2.0487 -1.0227 -3.6005 -0.7512 
 (-1.0927) (-0.8314) (0.0817) (1.7816) (-4.4524)*** (-0.7041) (-2.0975) (-0.9766) 
GDP 0.3489 1.1457 -0.4538 -0.0405 2.8175 4.2951 3.6465 1.1365 
 (1.1456) (1.5740) (-0.4750) (-0.0572) (3.4224)*** (1.7370)* (0.9089) (0.7135) 
P 0.1301 -0.3209 -0.0428 0.1437 -0.4709 -0.4848 1.2295 -1.0985 
 (0.9978) (-1.0824) (-0.1045) (0.4930) (-1.3365) (-0.4813) (0.7149) (-1.6764) 
 
R2 0.650 0.821 0.878 0.972 0.724 0.799 0.867 0.984  
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
t-Values in parenthesis. *     Coefficient is statistically is significant at the 10% level. **   Coefficient is statistically significant at the 5% level. *** Coefficient is statistically significant at the 1% level.
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Table 5 (Continued) 
Panel B: Investment trust firms 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
  
Dependent ROA ROA ROA ROA ROE ROE ROE ROE 
Variable 1980-2012 2002-2007 2007-2010 2010-2012 1980-2012 2002-2007 2007-2010 2010-2012 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
MS -0.0030 -0.1102 -0.0990 0.3013 -0.0061 -0.1051 0.0477 0.0501 
 (-0.0573) (-0.8553) (-0.6284) (1.6611) (-0.1752) (-1.1529) (0.3904) (0.4338) 
MCON -0.0162 -0.0995 -0.1877 -0.1007 0.0064 0.0856 -0.1889 -0.0083 
 (-0.2846) (-0.8995) (-0.8930) (-0.2093) (0.1734) (1.0884) (-1.1523) (-0.0572) 
TINV 0.0083 0.1597 0.0360 0.1213 0.0599 0.2060 -0.0663 0.0764 
 (0.2089) (1.5644) (0.2981) (1.0406) (2.2629)** (2.9114)*** (-0.7060) (0.9621) 
TAS 0.0148 0.1094 0.1474 -0.0749 -0.0693 -0.1109 -0.0793 0.0120 
 (0.3699) (1.2217) (1.3705) (-0.7034) (-2.6032)*** (-1.7435)* (-0.9480) (0.1657) 
EQAS -0.1393 0.3823 0.6692 0.6950 0.3198 -0.7922 -0.0359 -0.2080 
 (-0.4455) (0.6026) (0.8205) (0.9169) (1.4003) (-1.7588)* (-0.0568) (-0.4118) 
MCAP 0.0020 0.0695 -0.0833 0.0074 -0.0020 -0.0692 -0.1884 0.0231 
 (0.0607) (0.7784) (-0.6562) (0.0921) (-0.0924) (-1.0916) (-1.9073)* (0.4285) 
FTSE 0.0229 -0.0904 0.1691 0.2356 0.0472 0.1100 0.2972 0.1119 
 (0.4098) (-0.6183) (1.0791) (1.7023)* (1.2800) (1.0607) (2.4311)** (1.1958) 
GDP -0.2004 -0.4753 -0.5415 -0.2396 -0.0709 0.0453 -0.2289 -0.3777 
 (-2.7194)*** (-2.6105)** (-2.5363) (-1.0066) (-1.4633) (0.3559) (-1.3755) (-2.4292)** 
P -0.0605 0.1030 0.1312 0.3312 -0.0106 -0.0664 -0.1069 -0.0009 
 (-0.8718) (0.6664) (0.7293) (1.5724) (-0.2295) (-0.6068) (-0.7624) (-0.0064) 
 
R2 0.011 0.093 0.133 0.187 0.023 0.149 0.125 0.129 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
t-Values in parenthesis. * Coefficient is statistically is significant at the 10% level. ** Coefficient is statistically significant at the 5% level. *** Coefficient is statistically significant at the 1% level
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Table 5 (Continued) 
Panel C: Finance companies 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
  
Dependent ROA ROA ROA ROA ROE ROE ROE ROE 
Variable 1980-2012 2002-2007 2007-2010 2010-2012 1980-2012 2002-2007 2007-2010 2010-2012 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
MS 0.2714 0.2027 1.1288 0.3060 0.2848 0.5475 0.1055 -0.1741 
 (3.5336)*** (1.0626) (2.7422) (1.0060) (6.0263)*** (3.9032)*** (0.3953) (-0.7569) 
MCON 0.0697 0.9877 1.4937 -2.1542 0.1273 0.0703 -0.7570 -2.0891 
 (0.2621) (1.5402) (0.7028) (-1.2946) (0.7965) (0.1695) (-0.5692) (-1.1335) 
TINV 0.1789 0.2758 0.3658 -0.3995 0.1583 0.2653 0.1084 -0.1664 
 (3.7528)*** (1.3239) (2.2128) (-1.6539) (5.4303)*** (2.2100)** (1.0133) (-0.6694) 
TAS -0.1574 -0.4641 -0.1862 0.8699 -0.3463 -0.6521 -0.2548 0.3684 
 (-1.6746)* (-1.4483) (-0.7151) (1.9149) (-6.1147)*** (-3.4785)*** (-1.4828) (0.9727) 
EQAS 0.4627 0.5056 0.4039 0.2449 -0.1706 0.1039 0.1003 0.2390 
 (4.7146)*** (1.7721)* (1.0809) (0.8227) (-2.9547)*** (0.5316) (0.4288) (1.0753) 
MCAP -0.0750 0.1191 -0.8741 -0.7749 0.0110 -0.0541 0.2432 0.0402 
 (-0.8511) (0.6907) (-2.0250)* (-1.4882) (0.2103) (-0.4518) (0.8479) (0.1298) 
FTSE -0.0082 -0.3469 -0.4060 -0.5115 0.0326 0.1842 0.0136 -0.2151 
 (-0.0908) (-1.4697) (-0.8528) (-1.2251) (0.5998) (1.0756) (0.0520) (-0.6610) 
GDP -0.1109 0.8095 1.6963 -0.5429 0.0806 0.2351 -0.8643 -2.0546 
 (-0.3486) (1.3327) (1.0765) (-0.4596) (0.4178) (0.5553) (-0.8340) (-1.7372) 
P -0.0015 0.2698 -0.4059 0.6125 -0.2348 -0.1044 0.4161 -0.1103 
 (-0.0107) (0.8126) (-0.4547) (1.5351) (-2.6669)*** (-0.4694) (0.7899) (-0.2671) 
 
R2 0.276 0.405 0.783 0.851 0.324 0.518 0.397 0.570  
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
t-Values in parenthesis. *  Coefficient is statistically is significant at the 10% level. **  Coefficient is statistically significant at the 5% level. *** Coefficient is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 5 (Continued) 
Panel D: Real estate firms 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
  
Dependent ROA ROA ROA ROA ROE ROE ROE ROE 
Variable 1980-2012 2002-2007 2007-2010 2010-2012 1980-2012 2002-2007 2007-2010 2010-2012 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
MS 0.2150 0.2638 0.4734 0.8969 0.1542 0.4325 0.4837 0.7621 
 (1.4675) (0.7062) (1.2985) (1.4571) (1.2123) (1.7433)* (1.3497) (2.3842)** 
MCON -0.0089 -1.4278 1.3405 -0.1549 0.3220 -1.1170 -0.6043 2.6038 
 (-0.0231) (-1.5178) (1.0819) (-0.1030) (0.9579) (-1.7881)* (-0.4961) (3.3356)*** 
TINV -0.0035 -0.1211 0.0938 -0.0405 -0.0261 0.1559 -0.0659 0.0737 
 (-0.0813) (-1.0579) (0.7943) (-0.2528) (-0.6999) (2.0504)** (-0.5680) (0.8856) 
TAS -0.0261 0.9644 -0.8273 -0.7477 -0.1387 -0.0221 -0.1887 0.0173 
 (-0.1017) (1.4299) (-1.3584) (-1.0028) (-0.6224) (-0.0492) (-0.3151) (0.0446) 
EQAS 0.3587 0.8905 -1.8114 -4.8052 0.0443 -0.3286 3.1591 1.8031 
 (1.4544) (1.7097)* (-1.1089) (-1.7128) (0.2066) (-0.9499) (1.9673)* (1.2376) 
MCAP -0.0847 -1.1349 0.4410 0.5960 -0.0154 -0.1916 -0.1948 -0.6664 
 (-0.3310) (-1.6887)* (0.6932) (0.7712) (-0.0691) (-0.4293) (-0.3113) (-1.6604) 
FTSE 0.0141 -0.1264 -0.0148 0.0656 -0.0471 0.7683 0.1170 -0.2647 
 (0.1059) (-0.3477) (-0.0422) (0.1860) (-0.4073) (3.1828)*** (0.3394) (-1.4456) 
GDP -0.0059 -0.2246 -0.0089 -1.3339 0.2571 -0.1536 0.3608 0.7323 
 (-0.0345) (-0.4986) (-0.0172) (-2.1805)* (1.7327)* (-0.5135) (0.7131) (2.3050)** 
P 0.0086 0.3001 -1.0249 0.7606 0.0503 -0.4159 -0.8219 -0.3997 
 (0.0426) (0.5765) (-1.3284) (1.0808) (0.2868) (-1.2029) (-1.0835) (-1.0937) 
 
R2 0.018 0.178 0.317 0.436 0.033 0.321 0.271 0.821 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
t-Values in parenthesis. *  Coefficient is statistically is significant at the 10% level.  ** Coefficient is statistically significant at the 5% level. *** Coefficient is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
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3.5.2 Test for the effects of Risk Shifting behaviour on Financial Performance 
 
In this section we complement the previous analysis by investigating the effects of UK 
financial institution risk taking behaviour on performance. This exercise can shed light on the 
link between competition and the changing incentives and opportunities that may affect the 
risk taking behaviour at financial institutions over the economic cycle. This issue of risk taking 
is an important dimension, particularly in view of the highly competitive market environment 
in which the financial institutions in our sample have encountered. This highly competitive 
market for financial services, especially the highly competitive mortgage market, encouraged 
the willingness of some financial institutions to engage in somewhat contentious risk taking 
behaviour, as the commercial banks, insurance companies, and real estate firms regarded the 
boom in the housing market that resulted in the late 1990s and continued well into the 2000s 
as an opportunity to raise potential profits (by reducing lending standards), by speculating that 
the boom in the housing market would continue. We capture the effects of UK financial 
institutions risk taking behaviour on financial performance through the use of a designated risk 
variable. 
The regression-based tests applied is focused on identifying the breaks, as represented 
by beta, utilizing the technique proposed by Bai and Perron (1998, 2003a, and 2003b) which 
will enable us to detect multiple structural breaks at unknown dates. Bai and Perron suggest 
using a linear regression model with m structural breaks (m + 1 regimes) as follows: 
 
' '
t t t j jy x z             1 1,...,j jt T T   (3.4) 
For  1,..., 1j m   and where 0 0T   and 1mT T  . ty  is the observed dependent variable at 
time t, tx  is 1p , and tz is 1q , and  and j ( 1,..., 1)j m  are the corresponding vectors of 
coefficients, and t  is a disturbance term at time t. The break points 1( ,... )mT T are treated as 
unknown, and are estimated simultaneously with the unknown coefficients when T 
observations are available. The objective is to estimate the unknown regression coefficients 
and the break dates 1 1( , ,.... , ,.... )m mT T    when T observations on ( , , )t t ty x z are available. On 
account of the sequential methodology one break point implies estimating n regressions, two 
break points imply estimating 2n regressions, m break points imply estimating mn  regressions, 
and so forth.  
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The methodology of Bai and Perron is particularly well suited for capturing the 
changing risk profile at UK financial institutions over the period represented by the data, as it 
enables us to identify subsequent patterns from which the asset prices of the financial sectors 
in our sample are altered. The data used in this section consists of weekly logged sector index 
returns from which we compute the overall average Beta of the sector indices against the 
benchmark FTSE100 index for the period January 14, 2000 to December 28 2012. The 
estimation process consists of two stages. First, we perform the Bai-Perron multiple breakpoint 
tests and then proceed to estimate the panel-data OLS model from the previous section. Here, 
and, in preference to the use of a risk variable, we measure a financial institution risk taking 
behaviour by means of the “Z-score”, which considers risk of failure to rely on the interaction 
of the income generating capacity, the potential size of return shocks, and the level of capital 
reserves available to absorb sudden shocks. Mathematically, the Z-score is expressed as 
follows: 
2
( )
( )
i it
it
i it it
ROA
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E ROA CAP
 
  
 
  (3.5) 
 
where ROAit is the return on assets of financial institution i in period t,  E .i the expected 
value, (.)i the standard deviation, and itCAP  the averaged ratio of equity capital to total assets 
for financial institution i in period t.  The resulting Z-score should indicate the degree of 
exposure to operating losses, which ultimately has a drain on capital reserves that could be 
otherwise employed to offset adverse shocks. Financial institutions with low capital combined 
with a tenuous financial margin in relation to the volatility of returns will yield a high Z-score. 
Further, since the Z-score measure assigns importance to the solvency and financial strength 
of financial institutions, it is a measure of their relative strength or weakness. Soedarmono et 
al. (2013), for example, applied the foregoing Z-score approach in their study of banking 
competition and bank risk-taking behaviour.  
 
Table 6 displays the return behaviour for the sector index series with the structural break 
points as identified via the Bai-Perron test. As can be seen, all return series, except the series 
for the finance company sector and the real estate company sector, exhibit at least five structural 
breaks over the full sample period. We detect five breaks for the banking, and investment trusts 
return series, 4 breaks for the insurance sector, 0 break for the finance company return series, 
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and 3 breaks for the real estate return series. These identified breaks are linked to either major 
global events such as the 2007 financial crisis and the economic recession that followed, the 
fallout from the 2008 UK banking crisis, and the 2009-2012 Eurozone debt crisis. We observe 
that the banking, insurance, and investment sector return series reveal structural breaks at 
similar time points which coincide with global economic, and domestic political events. In 
addition we provide the standard deviations at each of these structural break points identified.   
 
 
Table 6: Structural breaks in UK Financial Institutions from the Bai-Perron test 
________________________________________________________________ 
Sector Break Time Period Standard Deviation 
________________________________________________________________ 
Banks 1 01/01/00-02/08/02 0.0385 
 2 09/08/02-04/03/05 0.0257 
 3 11/03/05-09/02/07 0.0156 
 4 16/02/07-16/01/09 0.0627 
 5 23/01/09-24/12/10 0.0576 
 6 31/12/10-28/12/12 0.0386 
________________________________________________________________ 
Insurance 1 01/01/00-11/01/02 0.0521 
 2 18/01/02-19/12/03 0.0487 
 3 26/12/02-29/08/08 0.0269 
 4 05/09/08-12/11/10 0.0302 
 5 19/11/10-28/12/12 0.0221 
________________________________________________________________ 
Investment 1 01/01/00-24/05/02 0.0296 
Trust 2 31/05/02-06/08/04 0.0246 
 3 13/08/04-28/07/06 0.0178 
 4 04/08/06-26/12/08 0.0353 
 5 02/01/09-24/12/10 0.0243 
 6 31/12/10-28/12/12 0.0177 
________________________________________________________________ 
Real 1 01/01/00-11/02/05 0.0223 
Estate 2 18/02/05-09/02/07 0.0234 
 3 16/02/07-16/01/09 0.0498 
 4 23/01/09-28/12/12 0.0388 
________________________________________________________________ 
Finance Comp. 0 - 0.0262 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
The first major structural break is associated with the September 11 attack in 2001 and 
the downturn in UK economic activity that followed as investment and consumer spending 
decreased. Moreover, the second point change as defined by the increase volatility during the 
2008-2009 period are correlated with the UK recession which commenced in 2007 and the UK 
banking crisis that occurred in 2008, with the subsequent volatility changes being consistent 
with the Eurozone debt crisis.  In the structural breaks for the return series of each index 
depicted in Figure 3 – 7, the sudden changes highlights and confirms the results in Table 6. 
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Taken as a whole, it is apparent that before the financial crisis of 2007 several strong and 
sudden changes occurred, which impacted UK financial institutions in various ways. For 
example, the financial crisis of 2008-2009 and the subsequent recession that followed, and the 
2009-2012 Eurozone debt crisis, affected the profitability, income and activity mix of the 
banking sector which compelled banks to alter their funding strategies as the financial crisis 
deepened.  
 When referring to Figure 3, we highlight times of when the Bai-Perron multiple break 
point failed to demonstrate structural breaks within the banking sector. We feel these events 
are significant but a casual observation of the data would suggest breaks are present. For 
example in March 2001 it is evident there are levels of volatility beginning with a trough period, 
which can directly linked to the markets expectation of slowed global growth as investors may 
seek greater returns elsewhere away from equities such as bonds. However, at the end of March 
2001 there is a positive shift in the banking sector index, which was associated with a cut in 
the interest rates from the Bank of England making it cheaper to borrow capital, which 
ultimately aids the business model of banks through increased lending. Furthermore, when we 
continue towards September 2001, there is significant levels of volatility relating to the attacks 
of 9/11, which led to the market to panic sell equities and then rebounded a week later as the 
markets calmed down. Following on from this in October 2002, we see from Figure 3 there is 
an evident peak in returns. We feel this can be attributed to an increase in M4 money supply, 
which led to an increase in prices and greater lending from the banking sector enhanced the 
overall performance and therefore witnessed a strong positive return.   
 
Figure 3: UK Banking Sector Bai-Perron Multiple Breaks 
 
Considering the insurance sector from Figure 4, the strong and sudden character of the 
changes in the breaks is well in line with that observed for the banking sector, though clearly 
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the activity mix and funding strategies of insurance companies are affected differently. For 
example, the financial performance of the insurance company sector was affected by the 
increase in claims following 9/11, issues surrounding Lloyds of London, which closed 25 
syndicates in the aftermath of mounting losses associated with asbestos claims, as well as other 
claims related to other underwriting activities that generated losses in an environment of 
increased liabilities and reduced rates. Outside of the identified breaks established by the Bai-
Perron test, there is visible volatility in the insurance sector. In March 2000 it is evident there 
is a rise in returns for the insurance sector. This can be explained by investors shifting their 
profits made from the technology sector to the undervalued traditional banking and insurance 
sectors for greater returns. In September 2001, it is evident 9/11 held a vast impact towards the 
insurance sector within the UK as exemplified by the volatility levels in Figure 4. After the 
first identified break in 2002, there is clear indication of volatility in November 2002, whereby 
concerns for the insurance sector became more apparent as the cost of 9/11 continued to 
increase. This led to solvency issues towards the insurance sector, which was reflected in the 
equity price by the markets. In order to resolve the issues presented towards the sector, vast 
efforts were made to raise capital through equity and bond issues or through capital injections 
from parent companies for subsidiary insurance firms. Lastly, in July 2007 Figure 4 illustrates 
a strong negative return in the insurance sector which is can be correlated by floods, which hit 
the UK and held an estimated cost of at least £2billlion in damage claims. Overall this event 
would have altered the short-term business model to account for such disasters as they would 
be required to increase their premiums to current customers in order to cover the potential 
losses amounted. 
Figure 4: UK Insurance Sector Bai-Perron Multiple Breaks  
 
Looking at Figure 5, the break points for investment trusts are clear and the patterns 
suggest synchronization with the banking and insurance sector and, moreover, are correlated 
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
R
et
u
rn
s
UK Insurance Sector Bai-Perron Multiple Breaks
1st Break 2nd Break 3rd Break 4th Break 5th Break
 
 
104 
 
with external economic and domestic political events. In particular, following the first major 
structural break, associated with the 9/11 New York attack in 2001, the decline in UK economic 
activity, and a major correction in the FTSE 100 from 6700 in 2000 to 5100 in May 2002, 
ultimately affected the portfolio performance of the investment trusts sector. We can also see 
in Figure 5 there is very little volatility outside of the breaks among the investment trust sector, 
which is expected given the nature of their existence. 
Figure 5: UK Investment Trusts Sector Bai-Perron Multiple Breaks 
 
 
We notice that the finance companies index return series, shown in Figure 6, indicate no 
significant break point which we interpret as the market’s response being muted. Finance 
companies are generally a subsidiary of bank holding companies, which may have 
predetermined the equity prices by the market and may have resulted in the failure to produce 
a structural break. When referring to Figure 6 it is evident there was large levels of volatility 
within the pricing of the sector. For example when referring to November 2000, we can see 
there is a large peak value of 9.4% returns, which can be attributed by the strength of the UK 
economy, whereby the cost of raising funds was reduced in terms of bond and or selling stock, 
which overall enhances financial performance of the sector. Following this period of increased 
equity performance, a negative period emerged in March 2001 which can be correlated towards 
the banking sector. This negative performance was reflected by the markets concern of growth, 
which ultimately led to base rate cuts and increased performance by April 2001. Further to this 
in Figure 6 there is a greater presence of volatility relating to the terrorist attacks of 9/11, which 
reached a peak of positive 15% return after the losses exceeded -15%. In October 2002 in the 
finance companies sector, there is a present a positive jump in equity pricing by the markets, 
which is correlated with the banking sector. This was a result of increase in money supply, 
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which increased inflation and overall led to improved financial performance due to increase in 
loans/business activity from the sector.   
Figure 6: UK Finance Companies Sector Bai-Perron Multiple Breaks 
 
 
It is apparent from Figure 7 that the real estate sector experienced 3 structural breaks, 
in 2005, 2007 and 2009, which corresponds to specific time periods of the UK economic cycle. 
For example, the 2005 structural break is associated with the London attack of July 7 2005, the 
economic effects of which were short lived and with the London Stock Exchange general index 
declining for a short period before recovering quickly. The 2005 break may also be explained 
by two additional events. First, worse than expected GDP growth rate forecasted figures of 1.9 
per cent to actually 1.5 per cent, and second increased activity in the housing markets as prices 
began to peak, which enhanced the real estate sector’s financial performance which is reflected 
in the equity price of the sector. Another feature is the rollover of the break into 2007 which 
corresponds with the peak, in monetary value, of the sector and the break in 2009 which 
coincides with the global financial crisis, which impacted the real estate sector causing 
declining real estate prices, as the crisis impacted the UK economy. Outside of the structural 
breaks identified by the Bai-Perron test, Figure 7 reveals an unambiguous pattern of volatility 
within each period. Clearly from about March 2000 there is a direct correlation with the 
insurance/banking sector with the index appreciating in value. The conclusion is that investors 
sought to benefit from an over-inflated technology sector by moving into financials which were 
perceived by the market as being under-valued. The same pattern exist for the real estate sector 
which corresponds with the period of slow growth coupled with increased uncertainty as a 
result of the impending invasion of Iraq, which reduced house prices and the declining 
-0.3
-0.25
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
R
et
u
rn
s
UK Finance Companies Bai-Perron Multiple Breaks
 
 
106 
 
performance of the sector. Following the invasion of Iraq, in the latter part of 2003, confidence 
increased as investors returned to the market and began purchasing equities. At other times 
outside of the identified breaks, there are signs of high levels of volatility, particularly in 2010 
and 2011, which reflects the fact that the volatility in 2010 coincides with the sovereign debt 
crisis, which highlighted the extent to which the UK financial sector was exposed to Eurozone 
sovereign debt, and the fact that in 2011 the government sought to stimulate the housing market 
through the help to buy scheme which induced the prices of housing in the UK market 
considerably, and directly benefits the real estate sector through increased purchases of housing 
which then impact positively on their performance.     
Figure 7: UK Real Estate Sector Bai-Perron Multiple Breaks 
 
 
To examine the effects of financial institutions risk shifting behaviour on performance, we 
obtain a measure of beta which captures the dynamic shifting beta levels within the sectors 
from the pre-determined Bai-Perron tests carried out. Next we estimate the following 
EGARCH model from Nelson (1991):  
 
𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑡[𝜀𝑡−1] + 𝛾𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑡−1 + 𝜖                 (3.6)    
and         
ℎ = 𝛼0 +
𝑨𝑩𝑺(𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒊𝒅[𝜺𝒕−𝟏])
√𝑮𝑨𝑹𝑪𝑯[𝜺𝒕−𝟏]
+
𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒊𝒅[𝜺𝒕−𝟏]
√𝑮𝑨𝑹𝑪𝑯[𝜺𝒕−𝟏]
+ 𝐋𝐎𝐆𝑮𝑨𝑹𝑪𝑯[𝜺𝒕−𝟏]
+ 𝜷
𝟏
+ 𝜷
𝟐
+ 𝜷
𝒏
… + 𝝐             (3.7)   
where 𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑖𝑡 in Equation (3.6) captures the logged weekly returns of the sector index on index 
i at time t, 𝛽𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑡[𝜀𝑡−1]  the market model, and  𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑡−1  the 10 year government bond yield 
which reflects financial market participants expectation of changes in the rate of interest. The 
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term 
𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒊𝒅[𝜺𝒕−𝟏]
√𝑮𝑨𝑹𝑪𝑯[𝜺𝒕−𝟏]
  in Equation (3.7) represents the leverage effect, 𝐋𝐎𝐆𝑮𝑨𝑹𝑪𝑯[𝜺𝒕−𝟏]
 is the GARCH 
element, and 𝜷𝒏 the beta measure for the represented period and  𝝐 an error term.  
To determine the effect a financial institutions risk taking behaviour has on 
performance, we employ the variable derived from the Z-score which examines the default 
probability of an institution. With this standardised measure of risk we are able to then 
determine the causalities of default probability among the variables within our selected sample. 
Before reporting the results of the estimation of the regression model, as defined by Equation 
(3.1) and (3.2), the specification of the model is as follows: 
𝑍𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑅𝑂𝐸 + 𝛼2𝑀𝑆 + 𝛼3𝑇𝐴𝑆 + 𝛼4𝐿𝐷𝐸𝑃 + 𝛼5𝐸𝐴𝑆 + 𝛼6𝐶𝐴𝑃 + 𝜀             (3.8) 
For the nonbank financial institution in our sample, we estimate following: 
𝑍𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑅𝑂𝐸 + 𝛼2𝑀𝑆 + 𝛼3𝑇𝐴𝑆 + 𝛼4𝑇𝐼𝑁𝑉 + 𝛼5𝐸𝑄𝐴𝑆 + 𝛼6𝐶𝐴𝑃 + 𝜀                    (3.9) 
Where 𝑍𝑖𝑡 is the Z-score defined in equation (3.5), 𝐶𝐴𝑃 is the total capital, and all other 
variables as previously defined. 
 
3.5.3 EGARCH Analysis 
 
The estimated EGARCH approach which is used to capture the dynamic shifting beta 
levels within the sectors, reveals the level of risk the financial sectors were exposed to from 
early as 2000 to 2012. In Table 7 the estimates suggest the leverage effect is present and 
indicate a negative relationship between the past returns and future volatility of return, with 
statistical significance found in most sectors. In particular, the banking sector and the finance 
company sector display the highest leveraged, after experiencing greatest significance and 
coefficient levels, and highlights the higher leveraging risks these sectors possessed during the 
period 2000-2012. Clearly, both the real estate sector and investment trust sector are not as 
affected, for the reason that these sectors were less exposed to the global financial crisis, as 
their primary activity is not based on deposit taking or in creating loans.  
With regard to the government bond variable, our results suggest a positive statistical 
significance for both the banking sector and the finance company sector. This relationship is 
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shown between the government bond yield and the returns within the indices, which suggests 
the markets had priced in the expectation of interest rate changes. Therefore, the banking and 
finance company sectors’ asset pricing was induced by the market influenced by macro-
economic factors, which led to the asset price reflecting market conditions rather than 
institutional performance. The results also indicate a positive shock will have less effect on the 
conditional variance compared to negative news events. With the conditional variance being 
the variance of the residuals obtained from Equation (3.7), which may be interpreted as positive 
news. This is found to generate less variance or volatility than the negative shocks for their 
sector, which overall reveals the level of exposures exposed by the onset of the financial crisis. 
Clearly, during times of volatile markets, the equity returns within the model indicate an 
increase in risk levels which induce investors to move out of equities.    
From Table 7 we report the findings upon the changing beta through the EGARCH 
estimation. For the banking sector, from 2000-2002, we observe a positive beta which indicate 
increasing risk levels during this period which indicates a higher risk premium for the investors 
and demonstrates the required higher returns demanded. This period corresponds with a vastly 
volatile political environment with 9/11 and the dot com bubble in 2001. Following, 2002-2005 
beta declined which suggests a rebalancing of risk within investors’ portfolios and that the 
market viewed the banking sector to be a much safer environment than competing sectors, with 
the banking sector holding less risky assets on their balance sheets and thus a reduced beta 
value.  Furthermore from Beta 2 we highlight the UK economy during this period widened its 
trade deficit, which indicates increased spending commenced a period of economic growth 
fuelled by a period of currency appreciation with the Pound Sterling against the US Dollar. 
This overall created a divergence between the two nation’s base interest rates with the UK 
offering higher rates, which increased foreign investment to the UK economy, which resulted 
in greater economic conditions. In Beta 3, which covers the period 2005-2007, we demonstrate 
a strong positive shift in risk which coincides with the favourable conditions in bank credit 
market and the unfolding of the US subprime mortgage crisis. As the build-up of risk was 
incorporated into the beta level from the EGARCH estimate. We also note the positive shift in 
beta can be associated with the need for higher required returns for investors as the base rate 
endured an increasing trend during this period. The break in 2009 (Beta 4) is linked to when 
the crisis fully embedded itself to the UK economy with the banking sector suffering from a 
liquidity crisis due to losses amounted from the housing market, in particular from credit 
default swaps. Beta 5 we detect a gradual increase in the level of risk before Beta 6, which 
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corresponds with the period of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis to which the banking sector 
was heavily exposed to. Overall, the results are highly accurate in terms of debt exposure to 
the sovereign debt crisis, especially since European institutions from Eurozone areas carried 
the highest exposure.  
Regarding the insurance sector we establish 5 breaks within the data, from which the 
sector experienced the largest risk shifts in Beta 1, 4 and 5 from 2000-2002, 2008-2010 and 
2010-2012. These periods correspond with crisis periods, the former being linked to 9/11 with 
the insurance sector paying out claims linked to the terrorist attacks in the US as this was also 
a market induced asset devaluation due to the increased systematic risk. The latter periods 
coincide with the sub-prime crisis and the sovereign debt crisis and highlight their large 
exposure levels, which mean they can be linked to their performance over this period. When 
identifying the breaks in 2008 and 2010, we can link these to the outbreak of the crisis and post 
crisis periods. In particular, the break witnessed in 2008 can be attributed to the beginning of 
the Icelandic financial crisis as well as the sub-prime crisis, to which the UK insurance sector 
held considerable exposure to. The high degree of exposure led underwriters to create losses 
as the level of delinquency subsequently increased with the level of interest rates. Furthermore, 
the witnessed structural break in 2010 can also be associated by the markets signalling the end 
of the sovereign debt crisis, after all the nations accepted bailouts, which restored confidence 
in the markets. Performance impacts can be linked to the crisis periods as the insurance sector 
generated fees in order to insure the mortgages the banking sector created. Therefore, once the 
crisis periods came to light the market priced the risk accordingly within returns and their 
response to the exposure held by the insurance sector is reflected by beta.  
For the real estate sector, we find fluctuating beta which indicates the degree of negative 
shift for all betas’, except beta 2, for the period 2005-2007 – the pre-crisis period. This suggests 
the market viewed the real estate sector as low risk because the housing market bubble was in 
its early formation from 2000-2005, helped by a low interest rate environment in the US. 
However, from Beta 3 and 4 we observe the occurrence of a large negative shift with statistical 
significance (Beta 3) which suggests a rebalancing of risk within the real estate sector and 
increased risk management.  
Considering the investment trust sector, the results highlight a common element of 
continuous risk management within a negative manner. The only periods in which they are 
significant is Beta 4 and 5, which cover the period 2006-2008 and 2008-2010. These critical 
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years capture the pre, during, and post crisis periods that coincides with the sub-prime US 
mortgage crisis, which we interpret as the investment trusts sector being watchful over their 
investment portfolios by applying appropriate investment strategies so as to minimise risk 
exposure. This is represented by the negative shifts in beta in relation to the returns of the sector 
index. Interestingly, there are no identified breaks for the finance company sector, which 
suggest that risk was managed at a constant rate and, as a result, the sector incurred no shifts 
in beta from the market’s perspective.  
Table 7: EGARCH Approach to Identify Changes in Risk. 
________________________________________________________________ 
 Banks Insurance Inv. Trusts Real Estates Finance 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
Intercept  -0.0006 0.0015 0.0005 0.0017 0.0003 
 (-1.0323) (2.0362)** (1.3994) (2.2571)** (0.4591) 
ER 0.8670 0.9770 0.9662 0.9126 1.0000 
 (35.3526)*** (19.5010)*** (44.4146)*** (24.0838)*** (34.4069)*** 
GOV 0.0839 0.0360 0.0013 -0.0259 0.0611 
Variance (3.5444)*** (1.5383) (0.0938) (-0.9425) (2.6132)*** 
Intercept  -0.0175 -0.1813 -0.5650 -0.2841 -0.2402 
 (-0.8609) (-4.6783)*** (-4.0488)*** (-3.7316)*** (-4.3131)*** 
𝑨𝑩𝑺(𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒊𝒅[𝜺𝒕−𝟏])
√𝑮𝑨𝑹𝑪𝑯[𝜺𝒕−𝟏]
 -0.0211 0.0986 0.2297 0.0921 0.1580 
 (-0.8464) (3.8316)*** (4.7619)*** (2.9142)*** (5.1064)*** 
𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒊𝒅[𝜺
𝒕−𝟏
]
√𝑮𝑨𝑹𝑪𝑯[𝜺
𝒕−𝟏
]
 -0.0538 -0.0268 -0.0466 -0.0022 -0.0573 
 (-3.8228)*** (-1.7566)* (-1.4931) (-0.1209) (-3.2967)*** 
𝐋𝐎𝐆𝑮𝑨𝑹𝑪𝑯[𝜺𝒕−𝟏]
 0.9964 0.9860 0.9586 0.9733 0.9851 
 (682000)*** (241.0809)*** (71.8704)*** (116.79)*** (162.59)*** 
β1 2.6531 -7.4819 -10.0765 -4.0547 - 
 (2.9979)*** (-3.0024)*** (-1.5706) (-2.2381)** - 
β 2 -2.0767 -1.0767 -5.0807 0.1676 - 
 (-2.6564)*** (-1.2659) (-1.1031) (0.0844) - 
β 3 4.1698 -3.8312 -3.1581 -5.4809 - 
 (1.8011)* (-2.8566)*** (-0.9111) (-4.0002)*** - 
β 4 -2.2002 -8.9206 -6.2932 -2.3242 - 
 (-5.4905)*** (-3.4145)*** (-3.9438)*** (-1.4445) - 
β 5 -4.0876 -17.7276 -5.8983 - - 
 (-4.8319)*** (-3.2549)*** (-2.7698)*** - - 
β 6 -3.3332 - -3.1446 - - 
 (-1.3048) - (-0.9598) - - 
R2 0.649 0.297 0.759 0.44 0.651 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
Z-Statistic in parenthesis; *** indicates 1% level significance; ** indicates 5% level significance; * indicates 10% 
level significance 
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3.5.4 OLS Methodology Analysis 
 
An important feature of our study is the consideration of the impact of UK financial institutions 
risk on performance. Interestingly when the Z-score value is the dependent variable we observe 
a notable change in our empirical estimates, as Table 8 reports. It is clear from estimates for 
the banking sector that market share is statistically significant and, moreover, indicates the 
existence of an inverse relationship between market share and risk. This means that the higher 
the insolvency risk the banking sector is exposed to the less market share the sector holds. From 
a theoretical perspective we can relate this result by an increase in competition may lead to a 
reduction in market share, consequently banks take excessive risk as managers are under 
increasing pressures to increase revenues, which can lead to increased default probability. The 
loans-to-deposit ratio yields a statistically significant and positive correlation with the risk z-
score value, which is explained by an increased loan book that could potentially lead to an 
increase in loan loss provisions and therefore has the potential to increase probability of default 
risk default.  
Among all other variables within the model for the banking sector, there is no further 
statistical significance which can explain the risk insolvency probability. Nonetheless, we can 
comment on the positive or negative relationships within the model. First, ROE is found to 
have a small positive association with the z-score value and is reflected in improved financial 
performance, due to increased risk-taking activities during the sample period. Second, the 
prospect of default risk probability increased as a result. Third, the total assets variable is found 
to invoke risk insolvency which is explained by institutions taking on more risk exposure, 
which may lead to an increased in the likelihood of default. Table 8 sheds light on the equity-
asset ratio and total capital in determining the z-score value. Regarding the equity-asset ratio’s 
positive result, which indicates when the banking sector is more leveraged, and with the higher 
default probability being as a result of the sector being capitalised by equity. This observation 
shows that during the period 2000-2012 it was beneficial for the sector to be funded by debt, 
which ties in with the build-up of excessive loans being made, and their over-aggressive 
strategy which ultimately resulted in liquidity problems in 2008. The total capital level yields 
a negative relationship with risk insolvency, which is explained as bank managers being subject 
to increased scrutiny to increase profits. Therefore, by holding less capital as their optimal 
level, the sector was able to build up their loan portfolio and as a result increased the likelihood 
 
 
112 
 
of default, which explains why in the post crisis periods there is a much stringent structure of 
imposed regulation.  
 
The generated empirical estimates for the insurance company sector and investment 
trusts sector yield insignificant results for all variables, which would seem to suggest the 
inability of the model to explain the z-score value. The results here may be due to the lack of 
observations, given that our sample covered the period 2000-2012. With regards to the 
insurance sector, ROE is positively correlated with the z-score value, which is similar to the 
banking sector as discussed previously. The ROE contributes to the overall z-score value due 
to the increased performance that creates equity value which is the result of efficiency gains 
within the sector, as represented by the net operations of claims exceeding premiums. In 
addition, market share is observed to yield an inverse relationship with risk insolvency, which 
is an accurate assessment of the UK insurance sector. This is explained by the high 
concentration within the UK market, which is dominated by few insurance firms, as well as 
their size and earnings from premiums, which allow them to reduce their risk insolvency and 
supports the theory of “too big to fail”. The total assets variable suggests otherwise because the 
more assets the insurance sector holds, the more likely is the increase in insolvency. The 
negative relationship associated with the investment portfolio of insurance firms and risk 
insolvency is to be expected given the nature of their business. For instance, insurance firms 
accepted fees for providing insurance cover for mortgage loans advanced by banking firms in 
the build-up to the 2007-2009 financial crisis which, in turn, encouraged them to increase their 
investments in securities such as stocks and bonds, and to reduce their probability of default 
value. However, once the crisis took hold, this resulted in a decline in portfolio value and in a 
negative outlook for insolvency risk as reduced investments led to the availability of less funds 
for meeting known and increasing liabilities. When turning out attention towards the equity-
asset ratio there is a small positive relationship towards the risk insolvency. The ratio would 
seem to suggest that insurance firms were negatively affected as a result of their high holding 
of equity securities, which may be considered wasteful capital in assuming more risk. This is 
enhanced by total capital yielding a positive correlation with risk insolvency probability.  
 The results regarding the investment trusts’ sectors inverse association with ROE with 
our z-score value suggests the strategies employed by fund managers failed to deliver adequate 
investor returns which result in increased probability of default, particularly since investors are 
free to search for alternative investment opportunities with the prospect of obtaining higher 
rates of return. As Table 8 shows, there is no relationship between the variable market share 
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and our z-score value. Total assets is found to have a negative relationship with our z-score 
value, which implies that the investment trust sector is reliant on investors for funding, since a 
reduction in total assets would ultimately increase the prospect of default. Further the 
relationship between total investment portfolio and insolvency risk indicates a positive 
relationship which is expected, as the more investments held by the trusts in securities, exposes 
the trust to a higher degree of market risk. Regarding the equity to asset ratio and total capital 
of the investment trust sector, both variables show a positive relationship with our z-score. And 
although the equity-asset ratio can be defined by as investment trusts holding high levels of 
equity, this suggests that investment trust capital is not utilised to the maximum, as they are 
required to invest in capital market securities in order to generate high shareholder returns. 
Hence the total capital level has a positive influence through the holding of more capital which 
enables the investments trusts to increase their holding of securities and, by doing so, increase 
their default probability.  
The estimates for the real estate sector, shown in Table 8, indicate a positive 
relationship with the total investments variable and with our z-score value. The findings here 
are similar to the reported results for the investment trust sector, as the higher the value of the 
investment portfolio the greater the associated risk. This is because market fluctuations can 
increase the probability of default during times of market instability, as the global financial 
crisis demonstrated, when the number of defaults increased leading the housing market to crash 
and, in consequence, the repossession of houses by the financial sector and ultimately reduced 
property prices and land values.  Estimates for the finance company sector indicate a positive 
and statistically significant relationship with the variable market share, total asset, equity-asset 
ratio and the total capital variables within the model. First, we find a negative relationship 
between market share and risk, which suggests increased competition within the UK finance 
company sector led to the sector making riskier investments, which increased the overall 
probability of default. To support this observation, we find total assets to have a positive impact 
on our z-score value which, suggests the sector took on more assets as a result of increased 
competition. And, as with the other sectors included in our study, the finance company sector 
demonstrates a positive equity-asset ratio with statistical significance and highlights the need 
for the sector to fund their activities through loans so as to present a low default risk profile. 
This observation is similar to the banking sector, since we would expect a negative relationship 
to arise with total capital. Finance company managers were subject to increased pressure to 
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produce higher profits, which they could only do by holding less capital as their optimal level, 
to increase their portfolio and as a result increased the likelihood of default.  
 
Table 8: Balanced panel OLS regressions fixed effects results 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
  Banks Insurance Trusts Real Est. Finance  
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
ROE 0.0125   0.0080 -0.1314 0.1129 0.4953   
 (0.9248)   (0.1185) (-1.3382) (1.4974) (1.4754)  
MS -0.8593   -0.3646 0.0041 0.2108 -0.9252   
 (-1.8465)*   (-0.6585) (0.0247) (1.0664) (-2.6464)**  
TAS 0.4276   0.2742 -3.0037 -1.4846 1.1101  
 (0.5612)   (0.6811) (-1.0934) (-1.2487) (2.4933)** 
LDEP 1.2837   - - - -   
 (1.7233)*   - - - -   
TINV -   -0.0599 0.5017 0.1446 0.0353   
 -   (-0.1841) (0.6135) (2.7879)*** (0.2706)   
EQAS 0.9146   0.0683 2.3014 0.2717 0.9564  
 (1.0214)   (0.1887) (0.8150) (0.4878) (2.1616)**  
CAP -0.0953   0.1096 0.5395 1.1602 -0.8184  
 (-0.1504)   (0.9721) (0.3873) (1.1432) (-2.6175)**  
R2 0.736   0.582 0.027 0.884 0.630   
___________________________________________________________________________ 
t-statistic in parenthesis; *** indicates 1% level significance; ** indicates 5% level significance; * indicates 10% 
level significance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
115 
 
3.6 Conclusions 
The study investigates the performance of UK financial institutions, namely banking firms, 
finance companies, insurance companies, investment trust companies, and real estate 
companies, over the period 1980-2012 which corresponds to good, turbulent, and post turbulent 
years for the UK economy. The purpose was to combine a set of firm specific determinants as 
instructed by the literature on bank profitability and, a measure of investment, that could 
accurately represent a driver of profitability for the non-bank financial institutions included in 
our sample, in order to examine their influence on the profitability of UK financial institutions. 
In so doing, we deliberate several internal ─ firm specific ─ and external ─ market related ─ 
determinants from the extant literature.  
 The performances of UK financial institutions are evaluated by using a balanced fixed-
effects panel regression model. Our estimates showed that the combined set of variables for 
the banking sector demonstrated the overall explanatory power of the model. We conclude 
banking in the UK earn greater profits due to the highly concentrated market from which there 
is evidence of collusion present in the market, which validates the SCP hypothesis. This result 
is a challenge now put forward to the competition regulators within the UK as banks are able 
to earn higher profits due to the monopolistic conditions which they operate within. We come 
to conclude the SCP hypothesis does not hold primarily across all non-bank financial sectors 
examined.  
Additionally, external macroeconomic conditions are found to be a major driver of 
profitability for the financial sectors as a whole. The macroeconomic variables examined 
provide a great insight into the determinants of profitability for the financial sectors of the 
economy as variables such as GDP, inflation and market capitalization essentially underpin the 
overall performance.  
We conclude the risk-return hypothesis is evident across the financial sectors apart from 
the insurance sector. This highlights the overall importance of risk management within the 
financial sectors, which is a pivotal variable in order to determine performance. When we 
examined the risk variable further we were able to demonstrate the changes in risk from the 
equity prices through identifying the structural break. The breaks identified coincide with 
significant political or economic events, which highlights the extent of risk management being 
portrayed by the financial sectors. Moreover, we establish variables such as investment 
portfolio (LDEP for banking sector) and the equity-asset ratio to determine risk across the 
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financial sectors. In addition we find capital endures a negative relationship towards although 
not statistically significant in the banking sector (finance company sector enjoys statistical 
significance). These results can overall aid regulators, central banks and the financial 
institutions themselves in order to gain improved performance for the financial sectors and 
economy as a whole.  
Although the results produced from this study shed a new light towards the UK 
financial sector. I personally call for more research within this field in order to enrich the 
literature and help develop a greater understanding of the financial sector, furthermore to 
confirm or reject the findings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
117 
 
CHAPTER 4 
Explaining the Changing Risk Profile of UK Financial 
Institutions: Non-Crisis and Crisis Related Periods 
4.1 Introduction 
The financial crisis of 2007-2009 revealed that UK financial institutions search for higher 
returns, and coming with it, increasing risk, can sometimes impact negatively on their financial 
performance which ultimately has consequences for the investment and growth prospect of the 
economy if business and the household sector are caught in a credit crunch. For this reason the 
government took steps to reform the failed tripartite regulatory system while at the same time 
stressing the importance of adequate capital and the need to strengthen bank risk management 
processes so as to limit systemic risk. It is for these reasons why the measurement of expected 
returns and risk continues to dominate the finance literature. On the issue of risk and return, 
the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) Mossin (1966) 
remains an important model for quantifying the risk return relationship and argues that the only 
relevant risk measure is the beta coefficient which reflects the systematic risk. Owing to the 
models appeal and strength of predictions, the model continues to be widely used by financial 
practitioners and investors to estimate various kinds of risk, such as, for example, cash flow, 
the cost of capital or the performance of managed funds. Nonetheless, despite the models 
intuitive appeal, the model has come under increasing examination as empirical findings 
suggest that asset returns cannot only be explained by the market beta. This is because a number 
of studies, such as Banz (1981), Bhandari (1988), Jegadeesh (1990), and Fama and French 
(1992) have shown that average returns may be determined not only by firm size, earnings 
yield and leverage, but also book-to-market and prior return.  
A key element of the CAPM is the assumption of constant betas during a rising and 
falling market. But if beta varies with market conditions, then it is likely that deductions based 
on its stable make-up can be found to be misleading. In respect to this, Fabozzi and Francis 
(1977) who were the first to test the stability of betas over the bull and bear markets, found no 
evidence to support the hypothesis that stock market affects betas asymmetrically, while in 
their study Woodward and Anderson (2009) argued that the publication of separate alphas and 
betas over bull and bear markets by investment houses highlights just how significant the 
beta/market condition relationship is. In addition to these studies, Clinebell et al. (1993) report 
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that differences in the beta coefficients they discovered over bull and bear market conditions 
were significant, while Wiggins (1992) note that the dual-beta model of Fama and French 
(1992) better explains portfolio returns formed by size, past beta and historic return 
performance, and Reyes (1999) who studied the relationship between size and time-varying 
betas finds no statistical power for both small and large firm indexes of the UK market.  
As highlighted by Brooks et al., (1998) and Faff et al., (2000) their research provides a 
great insight into the performance of modelling techniques surrounding estimating a time 
varying systemic risk variable, beta. The approaches in which they adopt are namely the M-
GARCH model’s presented by Bollerslev (1990), which utilises conditional variance estimates 
produced by GARCH (1,1), from which are then able to construct a conditional time varying 
beta series. They also apply the time varying heteroskedastic market model produced by 
Schwert and Seguin (1990) as well as the Kalman Filter algorithm, as utilised by Black, Fraser 
and Power (1992), Adrian and Franzoni (2009), Zhou (2013) and Ortas and Moneva (2013). 
Engle and Kroner (1995) produced a more stable GARCH-M model through a BEKK model, 
which is the conditional covariance matrix, there onwards can generate a conditional beta 
series. Since the BEKK introduction from Baba et. al (1990), it has been utilised by many 
authors in their quest to capture the time varying beta studies from Choudhry (2005), Mergner 
and Bulla (2008) and Choudhry and Wu (2009) being examples. Further methods have also 
been implemented from the literature gathered through the rolling regressions technique, which 
was first suggested by Fama and Macbeth (1973) to estimate a time varying beta along with 
Groenewold and Fraser (1999). However, more recently studies have also incorporated the 
rolling regression method through Zhou (2013) and Celik (2013). The aforementioned studies, 
have not the established the differing behaviour of time varying beta across the UK financial 
spectrum, more importantly pre and post crisis period. Given these methods highlighted above 
we will implement five methods within this chapter to capture the time-varying beta of the UK 
financial sectors. We apply the Kalman filter with a random walk as outlined by Harvey (1993) 
and Hamilton (1994), the rolling regression technique as highlighted by Fama and Macbeth 
(1973), the third method we apply is the dynamic conditional correlation GARCH (1,1) (DCC-
GARCH) approach, proposed by Engle (2002). The fourth method is the bivariate diagonal 
BEKK GARCH model as presented by Engle and Kroner (1995) and lastly we apply a GJR-
GARCH model introduced by Glosten et al. (1993). 
The research set forward will aim to answer the question how did beta ultimately vary 
throughout 2000-2012 as well as between the differing UK financial sectors? From which we 
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develop hypotheses in order to aid our attempts to answer the research question set. The 
contribution of this study will enable us to identify how the risk profile of UK financial 
institutions altered at an advanced level over stable and volatile periods as well as how to 
manage risk which can produce greater economic stability. As of yet there is no study that 
solely focusses upon explaining the UK financial sectors time-varying beta across recent 
periods that capture the financial crisis. The findings of our empirical study may be of interest 
to managers of financial institutions, investors and policy makers concerned with the 
movement of the systematic risk of the UK financial sectors. An important concern for policy 
makers in times of crisis is how best to contain and manage risk. This applies even more so as 
the goal of maintaining a stable financial system has received much importance following the 
global financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis. In addition, our empirical 
findings are relevant given the continuous discussions on financial regulation and the focus on 
risk measurement and the management of risk. Importantly, effective policy measures can only 
be based on a firm understanding of the risk that present itself in financial markets of which 
stock price volatility plays a central role, reflecting the uncertainty of market participants.    
In short, our results illustrate that the insurance sector possesses the highest systematic risk 
across all financial sectors and holds greatest variability in terms of time-varying beta. This 
can be explained through the insurance sector underwriting the loans from banking and non-
banking institutions as well as underwriting all forms of insurance to earn premiums and 
manage risk within their business model. We also find the banking sector also possesses a high 
degree of systematic risk following the modelling of the time-varying beta. Naturally, one 
would expect these sectors to present a higher beta due to the size of the UK banking and 
insurance sectors. It highlights these two sectors in particular held a large degree of risk from 
which the market priced accordingly in terms of their beta values as these sectors reacted 
greater than the rest of the market during the crisis period. Our findings also suggest the highest 
precision of in-sample forecasting is most suited to rolling regression technique in accordance 
with the Mean Squared Error (MSE). We also find the Kalman filter approach illustrates its 
superiority over all other methods consistently via the modified Diebold and Mariano test 
statistic in the short-term.  
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature, Section 3 
illustrates the empirical approach of the study. Section 4 highlights the results and Section 5 
concludes the chapter.    
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4.2 Review of the Literature 
As it currently stands there is no literature to our knowledge which is relevant to our study 
in terms of investigating the changing risk profile of UK financial sectors from a beta 
standpoint. There are few studies that even consider UK markets for investigation for the 
stability of beta. So immediately the study we undertake will become a starting point within 
the literature to open a debate upon the nature of risk management among UK financial 
institutions over the economic cycle. Historically, studies within the existing literature hold a 
primary focus towards the stability of beta within the CAPM since its creation by Treynor 
(1961, 1962), Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966) off the framework of 
Markowitz (1952) theory on diversification. To this present day it is still actively used by fund 
managers along with modern portfolio theory. The first strand of literature we introduce is the 
stability of beta within the CAPM model, which is the main criticism of the model. Jacob 
(1971) first identified this issue as time progresses so does the behaviour of markets and 
therefore beta theoretically follows a time-varying nature. Blume (1971) also examined the 
behaviour of risk over time with the results confirming Jacob (1971) that beta is time-varying. 
Additionally, Blume (1971) illustrated that once a time-varying beta was regressed within their 
model, greater accuracy of results prevailed in the forecasting of risk. Following Blume (1971), 
extensive research from the academic community continuously questioned betas’ stability 
within the CAPM with studies from Fabozzi and Francis (1978), Sunder (1980), Alexander and 
Chervany (1980), Bos and Newbold (1984), Collins et al.(1987), Faff et al. (1992) and Kim 
(1993) all deriving beta to be time-varying.  
Following the debate of the stability of beta within the CAPM, the literature disperses into 
the most suitable techniques to capture the time-varying beta. The next strand of literature we 
begin from here is from Brooks et al. (1998), which investigated three different estimation 
techniques of a conditional time-varying beta, the multivariate generalised GARCH, the 
Schwert and Seguin (1990) and the Kalman filter approaches. The aforementioned techniques 
were applied to the Australian industry indices and the Australian stock exchange (ASX). Once 
the conditional betas were calculated Brooks et al. (1998), then estimated in and out of sample 
forecasts in order to derive the most accurate method of conditional time varying beta as well 
as re-apply the estimates into an OLS regression to compute the CAPM. Their research 
highlights the unconditional estimates of systematic risk is not stable over time and such 
information should not be disregarded. Overall the results from Brooks et al. (1998) highlight 
the best approach to calculate returns is to undertake the Kalman filter in both in-sample and 
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out-of-sample forecasting. However, each method does provide a similar parameterisation of 
risk once comparing their mean values. Brooks et al. (1998) further note that the Kalman filter 
and Schwert and Seguin approaches produce a lower level of variation in comparison to the 
GARCH approach, which illustrates a higher varying beta. The mean absolute error (MAE) 
and mean squared error (MSE) were calculated and found to yield similar results, which 
highlights the Kalman filter as the best approach. Faff et al., (2000) follows Brooks et al. (1998) 
by investigating the performance of multiple modelling techniques that estimate time varying 
systematic risk in the UK equity indices. The techniques explored by Faff et al., (2000) include 
many types of GARCH models, specifically utilises the EGARCH approach proposed by 
Nelson (1991) as well as the TARCH model proposed by Glosten, Jagannathan and Runkle 
(1993) and Zakoian (1994). Further to the GARCH models, the Kalman filter algorithm was 
used with three approaches from Harvey (1993) and Hamilton (1994), which account for the 
random walk, random coefficient and auto regressive estimation approaches as well as utilising 
the Schwert and Seguin (1990) approach. Faff et al., (2000) then construct an in-sample 
forecast and utilise the MSE to determine the differences in forecast. Further to this, the 
modified Diebold and Mariano test statistic is applied as arranged by Harvey et al., (1997). The 
overall results suggest that beta is unstable over time and systematic risk is time-varying. 
Furthermore, as Brooks et al., (1998) highlight, the best method is found using the Kalman 
filter with the random walk specification, which consistently out-performs the other methods 
in the study. However, Faff et al., (2000) also mention that each method may capture different 
aspects of the time-varying beta as well as all models under-estimated the size of returns and 
lacked sensitivity. Choudhry (2005) focused his research upon the Asian financial crisis and 
investigates the time-varying nature of beta. Choudhry (2005) applies a BEKK GARCH model 
in order to capture the conditional time-varying beta as proposed by Engle and Kroner (1995). 
The study concentrates on the changing economic conditions countries suffer as a result of 
crisis periods, from which Choundhry (2005) highlights specifically 10 Malaysian and 10 
Taiwanese firms, reaction in beta to such periods. Overall the contribution of the paper 
illustrates Malaysian firms were more affected in terms of beta changes in comparison to those 
in Taiwan. The results collated further illustrate that as the crisis period takes a firm grip, the 
firms experience a higher degree of systematic risk. Whereas countries not as affected by crisis 
periods (Taiwan - experienced the least volatility of Asian financial crisis) show beta to remain 
more stable. Mergner and Bulla (2008) continue to build the recent literature within this field 
of conditional time-varying beta. Mergner and Bulla (2008) estimate the conditional beta via 
two Markov switching models, two Kalman filter approaches, bivariate stochastic volatility 
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model via Monte Carlo likelihood estimation and a bivariate GARCH (1,1) model. Their results 
are in line with previous research as the Kalman filter approach with a random walk is the 
model which yields the most accurate forecasts across European sector betas as well as 
confirming beta is unstable over time. Surprisingly, other results worth of note is that the non-
linear modelling via Markov switching model is found to yield the most inferior results in 
comparison to all other techniques utilised within the study.  
The next strand of literature to be introduced is of high importance due to the recent 
developments made in the debate of systematic risks time-varying nature. Choudhry and Wu 
(2009) focussed their study on UK firms from which they examined the forecast ability of beta 
via four different methods; the bivariate GARCH, bivariate BEKK, bivariate GJR-GARCH as 
well as the Kalman filter. Choudhry and Wu (2009) apply the MSE and MAE as well as 
perform the modified Diebold and Mariano test in order to determine which method is most 
accurate to forecast out-of-sample stock returns. The results found show conclusive evidence, 
from the forecasts errors as well as the Diebold and Mariano tests, further supports the Kalman 
filter as the most desirable method in order to compute beta forecasts as well as fully supporting 
the notion that beta is time-varying. Zhao (2013) further contributes to the literature by 
concentrating on REITs within the US equity indices. The techniques adopted within this study 
include DCC-GARCH model from Engle (2002), rolling regression from Fama and Macbeth 
(1973), Schwert and Seguin (1990), Kalman filter and the Markov switching model following 
the process of Hamilton (1989). Zhou (2013) assessed the techniques like previous work via 
the MAE and MSE, from which the Kalman filter remains consistently the best technique. 
However, the Markov switching model is found to be highly accurate in terms of in-sample 
forecasting along with the DCC and Rolling regression. Once out-of-sample forecast 
accuracies are taken, the Markov switching model results are in line with previous research as 
it being an inferior technique. Further analysis is conducted via the modified Diebold and 
Mariano test, with the results yielding a positive result for the Kalman filter as the superior 
technique in comparison to every other method. Celik (2013) a more recent study investigated 
the behaviour of sector betas in the Turkish stock exchanges utilising the rolling regression and 
recursive regression techniques during the global crisis period of 2007-2009. The results 
illustrate that beta is not stable over time and investors should be wary when making an 
investment decision as well as managing a portfolio.  
Following the literature above we firstly hypothesise and expect beta to be a time-varying 
variable as given by the studies which we have highlighted as given by Jacob (1971), Blume 
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(1971), Fabozzi and Francis (1978), Alexander and Chervany (1980), Bos and Newbold (1984) 
and Faff et al., (1992). Secondly, we hypothesise the banking sector possessed the greatest risk 
profile as determined by the market given the events that followed from 2008 onwards with 
the record bailouts. This hypothesis is given by Choudhry and Wu (2009), which call upon the 
academic community for further research within the time-varying beta concept. Lastly, we 
create a hypothesis concerning the techniques of modelling time-varying beta as there seems 
to be a debate within the literature regarding which method deemed most accurate. However, 
we expect the Kalman filter to be the most accurate method in modelling of time-varying beta 
due to its nature of not being a regression model but rather an algorithm as given by Brooks et 
al., (1998), Mergner and Bulla (2008), Choudhry and Wu (2009) and Zhou (2013).   
 
4.3 Empirical Approach 
4.3.1 Data 
Our empirical analysis relies on weekly return data obtained from Bloomberg for the period 
January 2000 to December 2012 which is restricted to the FTSE 350 Banking index, the FTSE 
350 Insurance index, the FTSE 350 Real Estate index, the FTSE 350 Investment Companies 
index, the FTSE 350 Finance companies index, and the return series of the benchmark market 
portfolio which is the FTSE All-Share Index. The choice of the data range is based on the 
availability of the data and because the range includes periods of economic crisis and political 
events corresponding to various shocks which impacted global markets negatively, including 
the New York attacks in 2001, the London attack in 2005, the global financial crisis of 2007-
2009, and the Eurozone debt crisis of 2010, which allows for a better understanding of market 
volatility. Therefore, the period will allow us to make inferences regarding the link between 
the return series.  The main reason for using weekly returns is that it will allow us to identify 
the shifts in beta across these financial sectors over an extended period of time. Since we 
include the market model in our estimation, it is necessary to use returns rather than excess 
returns as theory suggests. This is because importance is given, more often than not, to absolute 
profit and loss. Thus we define 1ln ln .t it itr P P     
The results for the logarithmic return series over the sample period are shown in Figure 1. We 
observe that banking sector returns volatility increased quite dramatically, in comparison to the 
return series of the other four financial sectors included in our sample, in the period that 
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coincides with the contagion effects of the 2007 financial crisis which started in the United 
States (US), which were widespread and global, and which resulted in a UK banking crisis 
when a loss of investors’ confidence in the value of securitized mortgages resulted in a liquidity 
crisis. As the crisis unfolded it revealed, in the autumn of 2008, the full extent to which 
financially distressed UK banks carried high debt, high-risk investments and, moreover, were 
over reliant on short-term financing, thus leading many banks to insolvency.  As short-term 
credit markets froze, and with the UK financial system on the verge of collapse, the Bank of 
England and the UK government stepped in to rescue financially distressed banks by providing 
liquidity assistance. The crisis not only affected consumer confidence, but also investment and 
economic growth. To maintain liquidity of the banking system, as well as to ensure bank 
lending to the corporate and household sector, the Bank of England applied measures aimed at 
stimulating the UK economy including the reduction in Bank Rate to 0.5 per cent, its effective 
lower bound, and in making large-scale asset purchases or quantitative easing. At the same 
time investors perceived a higher risk to most investments and, in consequence, purchased 
perceived safer investments such as gold and a flight to quality investments such as government 
treasury securities resulted. The figure also shows that insurance sector and finance company 
sector return series display sharp but moderate increase in volatility, particularly in 2001 which 
coincide with the 9/11 New York attacks, and the dot com bubble of 2002, while the investment 
company return series indicate minimal levels of volatility.    
 From a visual inspection of our weekly volatility of the financial sectors, displayed in 
Figure 2, we find that the banking and insurance sectors display quite a dramatic increase in 
the level of volatility which again corresponds with the global financial crisis, after which, in 
early 2009, the global markets experienced a deterioration in macroeconomic outlook which 
caused a further volatility but the increase was not as dramatic, followed by a phase of stability 
and tentative signs of recovery in late 2009. After that, a mild form of volatility erupted due to 
the onset of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis over the period 2010–12. It is noticeable that 
both the real estate company sector and the finance company sector display dramatic levels of 
volatility during stable time periods while the investment company sector display a moderate 
level of volatility. On account of the volatility levels indicated by the return series, we would 
expect changes in beta to coincide with the volatility dynamics displayed in Figures 1 and 2, 
as well as for there to be lower variations in beta (risk) across the UK financial sector during 
periods of growth and stability, particularly for the banking, insurance and finance company 
sectors. 
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Figure 1: Returns of Financial Sector Indices 2000-2012 
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Figure 1 Continued. 
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Figure 2: Volatility of Financial Sector Indices 2000-2012 
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Figure 2 Continued. 
 
 
 
4.3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 below shows us the descriptive statistics of all sector indices returns as well as 
the FTSE returns. Firstly, we can comment that all variables achieve stationarity at level 
through the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (Dickey and Fuller, 1979) and Phillips-Perron unit root 
tests, which means we are able to proceed with modelling without acquiring the 1st difference 
of the data. Secondly, we can note all variables are not normally distributed in accordance to 
the Jarque-Bera test. Thirdly, all variables enjoy a kurtosis value of greater than 3, which 
highlights a leptokurtic distribution. This suggests a sharper than normal distribution with 
values namely concentrated towards the mean, however there is a high probability for extreme 
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values to prevail. The banking sector illustrates the highest kurtosis value of 13.0469, which 
suggests, as expected this is the sector with greatest volatility, given unfolding events impacting 
the banking sector primarily. Skewness of all variables are all left skewed distributed, where 
most values are concentrated on the right of the mean, with the extreme values to the left. The 
most extreme value of skewness between the sectors is found within the investment company 
sector with a value of -1.237, this could be said due to their high exposure to the stock markets. 
In terms of skewness, insurance companies are found to be the most diversified as they the 
least volatile with a value of -0.5611. The standard deviation is another measure of 
volatility/risk from which we can clearly see the banking sector is the most volatile with a value 
of 0.0423 in accordance with the kurtosis. However, the least volatile sector according to the 
standard deviation is said to be the investment companies sector which produces a value of 
0.0262, which is conflicting against the skewness as it suggests they are in fact the most 
diversified sector and closest to the standard deviation of the FTSE. Furthermore, we can also 
highlight within the returns of each sector the banking sector demonstrates the lowest mean of 
-0.0008, which enhances the debate of this sector being deemed the most volatile, which is then 
followed by the insurance sector with a value of -0.0004. We find the real estate sector produces 
the highest mean value of 0.0003. In terms of returns the highest maximum value is 
demonstrated by the insurance sector of 0.1745 with the banking sector produced the lowest 
minimum value of -0.3452. The maximum and minimum value to a certain extent highlights 
the ranges of the sector values. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 FTSE  Banks Insurance Invest. T. Real Ests. Finance C. 
Mean -0.0001 -0.0008 -0.0004 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 
Median 0.0016 0.0005 0.0022 0.0015 0.0032 0.0028 
Maximum 0.1258 0.1712 0.1745 0.1082 0.1297 0.1550 
Minimum -0.2363 -0.3452 -0.2020 -0.2154 -0.1896 -0.2481 
Std. Dev. 0.0263 0.0423 0.0358 0.0262 0.0336 0.0387 
Skewness -1.0998 -1.1136 -0.5611 -1.2370 -1.1515 -0.5897 
Kurtosis 14.5560 13.0469 7.5989 11.6426 8.7998 6.7468 
Jarque-Bera 3903.461 2987.26 632.126 2279.6670 1098.4 435.242 
Aug. D-Fuller -28.1757 -27.300 -25.337 -16.5106 -26.476 -26.179 
Phillips-P -28.1974 -27.2963 -25.418 -26.7477 -26.485 -26.204 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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4.3.3 Methodology 
We employ five different methods in order to compute the conditional time varying beta. 
Firstly, we must estimate the traditional market model in order to gather estimated expected 
returns with the market model estimated as follows: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                  (4.1) 
Where;𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the logged returns of the sector index, 𝑅𝑀𝑡 is denoted as the logged returns of the 
market index, 𝛽𝑖 = COVARIANCE(𝑅𝑖,𝑅𝑀)/VARIANCE(𝑅𝑀), 𝛼𝑖 is denoted as the natural 
logged risk-free asset denoted as the UK 10 year government bond and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 0 as the 
disturbance term.  
The first method we apply in order to capture the time varying beta is the Kalman Filter, 
which is a state space model estimated via a recursive algorithm as proposed by Harvey (1993) 
and Hamilton (1994). The Kalman Filter being a state space model can be applied to 
incorporate unobserved variables into a model and estimate them along with the observed 
variables. We can use this as illustrated by Faff et. al (2000) and Choudhry and Wu (2009), 
whereby the Kalman Filter will recursively forecast conditional betas from an initial stochastic 
process, which will generate a series of conditional intercepts and beta coefficient for the 
CAPM. Furthermore, when following then Kalman Filter approach we must be aware of 
misspecification of the transition equation, whereby a failure of convergence highlights the 
error.  
 We follow Faff et al. (2000) to apply the random walk method due to reliability of 
results, which is estimated by firstly applying equation (1). We then apply the random walk 
process to compute beta which is illustrated as follows: 
𝛽𝑖𝑡
𝐾𝑅𝑊 = 𝛽𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡−1                  (4.2) 
 The second approach we employ is the rolling regression method as firstly utilised by 
Fama and Macbeth (1973) as well as in more recent studies from Zhou (2012) and Celik (2013). 
This method comprises estimating an OLS regression of equation (1), follows by a window 
size of 15 to estimate the market beta, with a rolling size of 1, meaning a time varying beta is 
calculated on a weekly basis, thereafter 15 observations we generate a conditional beta series.  
The third method we apply is the dynamic conditional correlation GARCH (1,1) (DCC-
GARCH) approach, first proposed by Engle (2002).  The advantage of opting for this 
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methodological approach is for the detection of potential alterations within the conditional 
correlations across a time series, which will highlight to us the responses of the market 
interpretations of dynamic changes in risk. Furthermore, Cho and Parhizgari (2008) highlight 
the DCC-GARCH model will enable us to estimate the correlation coefficients of the 
standardised residuals and therefore accounting for heteroskedasticity. The DCC-GARCH 
continuously adjusts the correlations for the time-varying volatility, which provides a superior 
measure for correlation. The DCC-GARCH methodology we apply consists of a two-step 
procedure, the first is the estimation of a univariate GARCH model. Secondly is the estimation 
of the conditional correlations that vary through the time-series. 
The DCC-GARCH design is demonstrated as follows: 
𝐻𝑡 = 𝐷𝑡𝑅𝑡𝐷𝑡                    (4.3) 
Where: 𝐻𝑡 is a matrix of (2×1) containing the natural logged returns of the stock index and 
market index.          
𝐷𝑡 = 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙(√ℎ1,𝑡, √ℎ2,𝑡, … √ℎ𝑛,𝑡)                (4.4) 
𝑅𝑡 = (𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙(𝑄𝑡))
−1/2𝑄𝑡(𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙(𝑄𝑡))
−1/2               (4.5) 
𝑄𝑡 = (1 − 𝜓 − 𝜁)?̅? + 𝜁𝑄𝑡−1 + 𝜓𝛿𝑖,𝑡−1𝛿𝑗,𝑡−1               (4.6) 
Where: 𝐷𝑡 is the diagonal matrix of conditional standard deviations for return series, which is 
obtained from the estimation of the GARCH (1,1) model, where √ℎ𝑛,𝑡 on the diagonal ith term. 
𝑅𝑡 is defined as the conditional correlation matrix of the standardised returns, where 𝑄𝑡 is the 
positive definite matrix containing the conditional variances and covariance of 𝜀𝑡. (𝑄𝑡))
−1/2 is 
defined as the inverted diagonal matrix with the square root of the diagonal elements of 𝑄𝑡. ?̅? 
is the unconditional correlations of 𝛿𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝛿𝑗,𝑡−1, 𝜓 and 𝜁 are nonnegative scalar parameters as 
followed by Engle (2002).  
Where the log-likelihood of the estimators are given as: 
𝐿 = −
1
2
∑ [(𝑛 log(2𝜋) + log |𝐷𝑡|
2 + 𝜀𝑡
′𝐷𝑡
−1𝐷𝑡
−1𝜀𝑡) + (log |𝑅𝑡| + 𝛿𝑡
′𝑅𝑡
−1𝛿𝑡 − 𝛿𝑡
′𝛿𝑡)]
𝑇
𝑡=1    (4.7) 
The dynamic conditional correlations are produced by the following: 
𝜌𝑎𝑏,𝑡 =
(1−𝜓−𝜁)𝑞?̅?+𝜓𝛿𝑖,𝑡−1𝛿𝑗,𝑡−1+𝜁𝑞𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1
[(1−𝜓−𝜁)𝑞𝑖𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ +𝜓𝛿𝑖,𝑡−1
2 +𝜁𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑡−1]
1
2[(1−𝜓−𝜁)𝑞𝑗𝑗̅̅̅̅̅+𝜓𝛿𝑗,𝑡−1
2 +𝜁𝑞𝑗𝑗,𝑡−1]
1
2
             (4.8) 
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Where the time varying beta is capturing by  𝜌𝑎𝑏,𝑡, as𝛽𝑖 can also be defined as the correlation 
between the two series returns of the stock index and market index.  
The forth methodological approach we apply is the bivariate diagonal BEKK GARCH 
model as presented by Engle and Kroner (1995), which follows Choudhry (2005). Multivariate 
GARCH models are suitable to capture the time varying beta, as according to Engle and Kroner 
(1995), they allow the variance and covariance to depend on the information set in a vector 
auto-regressive-moving-average (ARMA) method. The BEKK model enables the conditional 
variance (𝐻𝑡) to be positive for all t according to Bollerslev et al. (1994). 
The Bivariate BEKK GARCH is parameterised as follows: 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝜇 + 𝜀𝑡                    (4.9) 
𝜀𝑡
𝛺𝑡−1
~𝑁(0, 𝐻𝑡)                 (4.10) 
𝑣𝑒𝑐ℎ(𝐻𝑡) = 𝐶
′𝐶 + ∑ +𝐾𝐾=1 ∑ 𝐴′𝐾𝑖𝜀′𝑡−𝑖
𝑞
𝑖=1 𝐴𝑘𝑖 + ∑ +
𝐾
𝐾=1 ∑ 𝐵′𝐾𝑗𝐻𝑡−𝑗𝐵𝑘𝑗
𝑝
𝑖=1          (4.11) 
Where 𝑦𝑡 is a 2×1 vector containing the natural logged returns of the stock index and market 
index and 𝜇 is a 2×1 vector of a constant. 𝐻𝑡 specifies the multivariate GARCH conditional 
variance of both variables, returns on stock index and the returns of market index, which is a 
function of the information set in 𝛺𝑡−1.𝐴′𝐾𝑖, 𝑖 = 1, 𝑞, 𝐾 = 1, 𝐾 and 𝐵′𝐾𝑗, 𝐽 = 1, 𝑝, 𝐾 = 1 and 
𝐾, are all matrices of 𝑁 × 𝑁. Following Engle and Kroner (1995) method we apply the BEKK 
bivariate GARCH(1,1) which will enable us to use less parameters as we apply a diagonal 
restriction to the model, where K=1. 
Where: 
𝐻𝑡 = 𝐶
′𝐶 + 𝐴′𝜀𝑡−1𝜀
′
𝑡−1𝐴 + 𝐵′𝐻𝑡−1𝐵               (4.12) 
𝐶is a 2×2 lower triangular matrix with intercept parameters, A and B are 2×2 square matrices 
of parameters. More specifically, A highlights the volatility linkages element, whilst B 
illustrates the extent to which the conditional variances and covariance are correlated with past 
innovations. Thus then leads us to compute the time varying beta which, is calculated as 
follows: 
𝛽𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐻12,𝑡/𝐻22,𝑡                 (4.13) 
 
 
133 
 
Where: 𝐻12,𝑡 is the estimated conditional covariance between the returns on stock sector index 
and market index and 𝐻22,𝑡 is denoted as the conditional variance of the return on the market 
both given by the BEKK GARCH (1,1) model. 
 For the final approach we employ is a GJR-GARCH approach. The GJR-GARCH 
model introduced by Glosten et al. (1993) allows for positive and negative innovations to 
returns, which ultimately can have a different impact towards the conditional variance. They 
show us how to capture the asymmetry effect or more commonly known as the leverage effect, 
through a dummy variable attached to the original GARCH model. We are able to apply this 
version of GARCH models as we are able to capture the variance and covariance of two 
variables which can be applied.  
ℎ = 𝛼0 + 𝛼𝑏𝑡−1
2 + 𝛼𝑏𝑡−1
2 𝑏𝑡−1<0 + 𝛼𝛿𝑡−1              (4.14) 
Where 𝛼 represents a constant parameter, 𝑏 holds a residual value and 𝛿 denotes the GARCH 
element within the model and 𝛼𝑏𝑡−1
2 𝑏𝑡−1<0 captures the leverage effect, which is the 
conditional variance. In order to then obtain the time varying beta, we then apply equation (13). 
In order to verify how accurate our time varying beta series are for each sector we apply 
an accredited evaluation tool to our generated beta series, the mean squared error (MSE). This 
is calculated as follows: 
𝑀𝑆𝐸𝑖 = ∑(𝑅𝑖𝑡
∗ − 𝑅𝑖𝑡)
2/𝑇                (4.15) 
Where: 𝑅𝑖𝑡
∗  is the generated beta series multiplied by the returns on the FTSE for index I on 
time t. 𝑅𝑖𝑡 are the actual returns and 𝑇 is the number of observations. 
In order to then demonstrate the most accurate method of computing time varying beta, we 
apply the modified Diebold and Mariano test statistic as demonstrated by Harvey, Leybourne 
and Newbold (1997). Diebold and Mariano (1995) originally developed a test of equal forecast 
accuracy to test two different sets of forecast errors, in our case the MSEs (𝐺(𝑒)1 and 𝐺(𝑒)2). 
The test statistic is formulated as follows: 
𝐸[𝑑𝑡] = 0,  Where,𝑑𝑡 = 𝐺(𝑒)1𝑡
2 − 𝐺(𝑒)2𝑡
2               (4.16) 
In order to then test the null hypothesis we firstly have to estimate the original Diebold and 
Mariano test statistic: 
𝐷𝑀1 = [?̂?(?̂?)]
1/2?̂? Where, ?̂? = 𝑛−1 ∑ 𝑑𝑡
𝑛
𝑡=1  and ?̂?(?̂?) is the variance of ?̂?         (4.17) 
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Where n is the number of observations. As we have a large number of observations in our in-
sample forecasts, we apply the modified Diebold and Mariano test as set identified by Harvey 
et al. (1997) with the aim of tackling the issue of dealing with a large set of data, which is 
calculated as follows: 
𝐷𝑀1
∗ = √
𝑛+1−2𝐻+𝑛−1𝐻(𝐻−1)
𝑛
𝐷𝑀1, Where n = 676 and H = 1           (4.18) 
Once we have obtained the 𝐷𝑀1
∗ statistic, we can then apply the student t-test with n-1 as the 
number degrees of freedom, in order to derive whether statistical significance is present.  
 
4.4 Results 
We begin to decipher the results from the study which will answer our research question, 
“How did beta ultimately vary throughout 2000-2012 as well as between differing UK financial 
sectors?” Our first assessment within our results identify that beta was not stable throughout 
the period 2000-2012 (refer to Figures 3-13) among the UK financial sectors, which is in line 
with the existing literature (refer to Brooks et al. (1998), Faff et al. (2000), Choudhry (2005), 
Choudhry and Wu (2009) and many more). From the banking sector we notice in Figure 3 from 
the years 2000 to 2003 a rise in the risk profile, which can be attributed towards the terrorist 
attack of 9/11. This event severely impacted the UK financial markets deeply and ultimately 
crashed the equity prices, with the FTSE reaching a low in March 2003 as well as resulted in a 
decline of GDP growth from 4.8% in 2000 to 2.5% in late 2002. The decline in GDP growth 
may have led the increased risk profile of the sector as a slowdown in the economy caused an 
increase in the unemployment rate from 4.9% to 5.3% by 2003 and therefore increases the 
likelihood of defaults on their loan portfolio. Following a peak in 2003, there is the beginning 
of declining trend till of risk profile to August 2004, which coincides with a period strong 
housing price growth. The reduction in beta illustrates the confidence within the sector during 
this period as the increasing loans being made underpins the strength of the economy and 
therefore reduces outlook of negativity on defaults occurring. However, from 2004 there was 
evidently a steep increase in risk profile, following the increase in interest rates in order to slow 
down economic growth as part of the economic cycle. This led to a slowdown in the rapid rise 
of housing prices from 20% growth to as little as 1.8% rise in 2005, which led to their risk 
profile reducing in the early part of 2005. However, as the UK economy began to pick up 
momentum during 2005-2006, so did the banking sector beta. This coincided with falling 
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unemployment within the UK economy as vast growth was emerging following higher output 
from the rest of the economy leading to lower defaults and increased lending, which 
significantly overshadowed deposits. From 2007-2009 the banking sector beta became very 
volatile as one would have expected during the outbreak of a financial crisis, whereby 
uncertainty was driving the financial markets on a day-to-day basis. From 2010 onwards we 
find the banking sector beta to continue the trend of increasing and decreasing risk profile, 
which coincide with the sovereign debt crisis events in 2010 and again in 2012. This is due to 
the issues surrounding Eurozone sovereign debt crisis as the nations impacted the banking 
sectors’ balance sheets due to their significant exposure levels to Ireland, Greece, Portugal, 
Spain and Italy.   
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Figure 3: UK Banking Sector Time Varying Beta 
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We turn our focus towards Figure 4 and the insurance sector in the UK. It is clear there are 
visible trends within the data, which enables us to link these with events and create a greater 
understanding of the risk profile of the sector. From 2000-2002 we visualise beta to be rising, 
which can be attributed towards 9/11 as the insurance sector was impacted either directly or 
indirectly through financial markets. This event led to the market to price the insurance sector 
at an elevated level due to the damages that would have been required by the sector to pay out. 
In late 2002-2003 it is evident there is a reduction in the risk profile, which is largely attributed 
to a recovery in the economy as the FTSE rebounded sufficiently by the end of 2003. The 
economic expansionary period extended up until September 2005 when there was an increase 
in interest rates, which led the decline in risk profile of the sector from a beta value of 2.47 to 
0.36. The increase of interest rates revised the markets expectation of the risk-free rate, which 
created an upward pressure in the risk-free premium and led to the FTSE to match the market 
expectation as improved performance materialised. When referring to 2005 - August 2006, 
there is an evident increase in the risk profile given beta increased from 0.36 to 2.33 due to the 
build-up of increasing exposure of equity and property markets within their balance sheets. 
Following this peak, the insurance sectors’ beta became relatively stable and in fact declined 
as a result of declining GDP, which led investors to flee the insurance sector due to GDP being 
a positive influence upon financial performance for the sector. After a reduction in beta 
experienced in the insurance sector vast levels of volatility came to fruition from August 2007 
– September 2009 due to the losses created by the financial crisis as asset values suffered a 
correction, which led to the insurance sector to experience losses on their balance sheets. 
Accordingly, after the financial crisis, beta remained relatively stable and followed the market 
with the average level of beta being 0.65 from 2010 onwards as a result of being in a low-
interest rate economy, which declines the yields of short-term assets, which the insurance sector 
has great exposure to given their need to service claims. However, spikes in beta were present, 
which reflected the European sovereign debt crisis as a result of assets losing value within the 
balance sheets of the insurance sector. 
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Figure 4: UK Insurance Sector Time Varying  
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When referring to the investment trust sector and Figure 5 we show how beta has evolved 
over time. We also demonstrate the best modelling method within this sector was the rolling 
regression technique as given by the MSE. The trends that are found within the time-varying 
beta are consistent with their operations as beta does not exceed a value of 2. This is due to 
their business model, which is to pool investment from small investors into a large fund, which 
is then reinvested to equity markets and will follow the trends of the market. We see a change 
in the value of beta at times of heightened volatility, this is evident during 2000-2001 whereby 
market volatility hit the equity markets in the UK due to technology crash, which is associated 
with the dotcom bubble. The only other period in which we experience an increase in beta is 
during 2007-2009, which coincides with the high levels of stock market index volatility that 
the crisis brought. We see the investment trusts sector are able to utilise the skills they possess 
in terms of personnel, which are able to manage risk through strategies adopted by fund 
managers. The strategies adopted may lead to stable returns and maintain beta in comparison 
to other financial sectors due to the diversification of risk they exert in order to produce 
sufficient returns for investors of the fund. 
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Figure 5: UK Investment Companies Sector Time Varying Beta 
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We now refer to the real estate sector and Figure 6 which demonstrates the time-varying 
beta. It is evident there were dynamic shifts in the risk profile of the real estate sector during 
the sample period. From 2000-2002 beta remained fairly stable via the BEKK and GJR-
GARCH techniques with a range of 1.2-0.1 with the average being 0.75. Once 2003 
commences, it is evident there is an increase in the risk profile of the real estate sector, which 
can be linked to a slowdown in the UK economy with increased uncertainty with the impending 
invasion of Iraq. Furthermore, there was a reduction in the housing prices which can lead to 
declined performance by the sector as the banking sector was not lending as much as they were 
prior to this. However, following the invasion of Iraq (end of 2003), there was a restoration of 
confidence to the markets on a global scale, which increased investors purchasing equities as 
well as the improving housing market conditions. This caused the real sector to improve 
financially and therefore reduced the perceived risk profile of the sector in the latter half of 
2004. From 2005 till 2007 we witness a steady increase in beta, which coincides during a period 
when housing prices increased incrementally until the outbreak of the crisis in late 2007, when 
losses from the housing markets began to emerge. The overall volatility in beta that proceeded 
during the crisis years is due to the market pricing the sector at an elevated level of risk due to 
impact their business model withstood as housing prices in the UK suffered a correction. From 
2010-2012 the beta of the sector remained fairly stable with an increasing trend as the housing 
market in particular began to recover as a result of the implementation of “help to buy scheme” 
from the new government formed in 2010, which encourages first time buyers to purchase 
houses. 
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 Figure 6: UK Real Estates Sector Time Varying Beta 
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When turning our attention towards the finance companies sector and Figure 7 we illustrate 
the time-varying beta of this sector. In accordance to Table 2 we demonstrate the DCC-
GARCH modelling technique was the most precise given the MSE value. We find with this 
technique is that beta remained fairly stable throughout our sample period and generally 
followed market trends. This overall highlights the market correctly prices the sector 
accordingly. However, when we turn our attention towards other techniques we do find 
elements of time-varying beta nature. For example, when following the Kalman filter approach 
from 2000-2001 there is a steep rise in beta, which suggests the risk profile increased during 
this period due to the strength of the UK economy, whereby the cost of raising funds was 
reduced in terms of bond and or selling stock, which overall enhances financial performance 
of the sector. Upon reaching its peak value of 1.5 there is a correction in the beta value, which 
was induced by the market as a result of 9/11 and uncertainty of the direction of the economy. 
After this event beta remained below the value of 1 meaning that the sector followed the market 
fluctuations. This can be explained by finance companies generally being subsidiaries of bank 
holding companies and therefore have less of an impact towards the economy in terms of loan 
creation, so overall possess less risk.  
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Figure 7: UK Finance Companies Sector Time Varying Beta 
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
1
/1
4
/2
0
0
0
4
/1
4
/2
0
0
0
7
/1
4
/2
0
0
0
1
0
/1
3
/2
0
0
0
0
1
/1
2
/2
0
0
1
4
/1
3
/2
0
0
1
7
/1
3
/2
0
0
1
1
0
/1
2
/2
0
0
1
0
1
/1
1
/2
0
0
2
0
4
/1
2
/2
0
0
2
0
7
/1
2
/2
0
0
2
1
0
/1
1
/2
0
0
2
0
1
/1
0
/2
0
0
3
0
4
/1
1
/2
0
0
3
0
7
/1
1
/2
0
0
3
1
0
/1
0
/2
0
0
3
0
1
/0
9
/2
0
0
4
0
4
/0
9
/2
0
0
4
0
7
/0
9
/2
0
0
4
1
0
/0
8
/2
0
0
4
0
1
/0
7
/2
0
0
5
0
4
/0
8
/2
0
0
5
0
7
/0
8
/2
0
0
5
1
0
/0
7
/2
0
0
5
0
1
/0
6
/2
0
0
6
0
4
/0
7
/2
0
0
6
0
7
/0
7
/2
0
0
6
1
0
/0
6
/2
0
0
6
0
1
/0
5
/2
0
0
7
0
4
/0
6
/2
0
0
7
0
7
/0
6
/2
0
0
7
1
0
/0
5
/2
0
0
7
0
1
/0
4
/2
0
0
8
0
4
/0
4
/2
0
0
8
0
7
/0
4
/2
0
0
8
1
0
/0
3
/2
0
0
8
0
1
/0
2
/2
0
0
9
0
4
/0
3
/2
0
0
9
0
7
/0
3
/2
0
0
9
1
0
/0
2
/2
0
0
9
0
1
/0
1
/2
0
1
0
0
4
/0
2
/2
0
1
0
0
7
/0
2
/2
0
1
0
1
0
/0
1
/2
0
1
0
1
2
/3
1
/2
0
1
0
0
4
/0
1
/2
0
1
1
0
7
/0
1
/2
0
1
1
9
/3
0
/2
0
1
1
1
2
/3
0
/2
0
1
1
3
/3
0
/2
0
1
2
6
/2
9
/2
0
1
2
9
/2
8
/2
0
1
2
1
2
/2
8
/2
0
1
2
B
e
ta
Finance Companies Time Varying Beta 2000-2012
BEKK KALMAN GJR-GARCH DCC ROLL
 
 
145 
 
We turn our focus towards Figure 8, which demonstrates the best time-varying beta 
techniques of each sector from 2000-2012 and 2007-2012. For 2000-2012, we establish from 
2000-2002 (the period captures 9/11), the sectors most affected in this timely period was the 
insurance sector. The market was able to distinguish higher systematic risk fell towards the 
insurance sector, in particular 9/11, given the costs to which the insurance sector in the UK had 
vast exposure to and therefore is reflected within the beta. Furthermore, the investment trusts 
sector was affected from 2000-2002, which highlights their exposure to equity markets 
following the dot com bubble. The results tell us the market was able to effectively analyse 
their position and as a result increase systematic risk for the investment trust sector. Following 
Figure 2 previously, it was shared the finance companies sector experienced high levels of 
volatility, which can be held true in regards to the Kalman filter approach as beta dramatically 
increased from 0.2 to 1.36 within a short time period. Following 2002, beta among the sectors 
relatively remains stable and on the decreasing trend specifically for the banking sector, which 
experienced stable growth till 2006. From 2002-2006, a period of strong stable economic 
growth for the UK economy, the insurance sectors’ beta remains consistently higher than the 
other sectors as per market valuation of systematic risk. In the pre-crisis period, (2007) we 
notice a strong and significant increase sector indices beta for the insurance and banking sector 
as well as declines in the real estate sector, primarily before the housing bubble burst. We can 
interpret these results as the real estate sector was experiencing strong significant growth and 
as a result beta was reduced by the market. Moreover, the banking and insurance sector follow 
the volatility pattern in Figure 2 as beta subsequently increased before the crisis unleashed its 
effects. During the turbulent period of 2008-2009, we note significant increases in beta of 0.9 
to 1.98 within the real estate sector as the market became fully aware of the financial crisis. 
The finance companies during the same period remained constant throughout the crisis period 
in question, however experienced a dip in 2009 according to the Kalman filter. In the post-
crisis era (2010-2012), our results illustrate a relatively stable UK financial sector in terms of 
systematic risk with little variation between the sectors.  
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Figure 8: UK Time Varying Beta - All Sectors 2000-2012 
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The first examination period utilised in this study was from 2000-2012, from which Table 
2 reports the estimated mean squared errors from the different methods applied in order to 
capture the conditional time varying beta for each respective financial sector. The result most 
surprises us is the Kalman filter not being the most appropriate measure as indicated in the 
literature by Brooks et al, (1998), Faff et al, (2000), Mergner and Bulla (2008), Choudhry and 
Wu (2009) and Zhou (2013) for the period of 2000-2012. The results in Table 2 indicate a 
common theme among the banking, insurance and investment trusts indices, which is the 
rolling regression exhibits the lowest mean squared error and superiority through the Modified 
Mariano and Diebold test. However, among the investment trust sector, we find that the GJR-
GARCH approach is equally superior to the rolling regression method technique. Furthermore, 
with regards to the Real Estate sector we find the bivariate GARCH approaches the most 
accurate for in-sample forecasting. Interestingly enough the results concerning the finance 
company sector, we establish the most accurate method is the DCC-GARCH approach. Table 
3 sheds further light on the in-sample forecasts via the modified Diebold and Mariano test 
statistic, whereby we highlight the insignificant results through a bold font. In Table 3 for the 
banking sector we highlight; Kal vs. DCC and Kal vs. BEKK; insurance sector; Kal vs. DCC, 
BEKK vs. GJR and for the investment trust, real estate and finance company sectors we 
highlight BEKK vs. GJR. The insignificance within these pairs highlight that there is little 
difference between the techniques in terms of in-sample forecast accuracy. Overall this 
highlights the rolling regression is superior consistently towards the DCC, BEKK and GJR 
GARCH techniques across all sectors as statistical significance is achieved.  
 
 
Table 2: Mean Squared Error 2000-2012 
Sector KALMAN ROLL DCC BEKK GJR-GARCH 
Banks 0.00006 0.00001* 0.00052 0.00032 0.00053 
Insurance 0.00038 0.00000* 0.00017 0.00028 0.00001 
Investment T. 0.00040 0.00006* 0.00007 0.00007 0.00006* 
Real Estates 0.00005 0.00011 0.00010 0.00003* 0.00003* 
Finance C. 0.00006 0.00086 0.00005* 0.00023 0.00023 
* Indicates Best Method 
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Table 3: Modified Diebold-Mariano Test Results 2000-2012 
 Banks Insurance Invest. T. Real Est. Finance C. 
Kal-Roll -5.3890 -6.7087 -11.4082 -3.4065 -4.3624 
 (0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0005)*** (0.0000)*** 
Kal-DCC 0.1168 -0.6012 -9.8519 -6.0721 -5.9103 
 (0.907) (0.5487) (0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0000)*** 
Kal-BEKK 0.8275 -5.8632 -9.1193 -5.3590 -5.5256 
 (0.4085) (0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0000)*** 
Kal-GJR 2.2545 -7.0182 -8.7434 -5.3590 -5.6392 
 (0.0241)** (0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0000)*** 
Roll-DCC 2.8134 5.9452 7.9174 3.0267 3.8322 
 (0.0055)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** 0.0025)*** (0.0001)*** 
Roll-BEKK 3.6472 -4.7864 4.5323 2.5525 2.6408 
 (0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** 0.0001)*** 0.0109)** (0.0084)*** 
Roll-GJR 4.5606 4.9935 4.6651 2.2804 2.5608 
 (0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** 0.0229)** (0.0107)** 
DCC-BEKK 1.8020 -3.5358 -3.3067 -4.3136 -4.7206 
 (0.0719)* (0.0004)*** (0.0010)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0000)*** 
DCC-GJR 9.1386 -7.2726 -2.4290 -6.9735 -4.8574 
 (0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0154)** (0.0001)*** (0.0000)*** 
BEKK-GJR 3.7280 1.4970 0.7052 0.8042 0.0826 
 (0.0002)*** (0.1348) (0.4809) (0.4216) (0.9342) 
*** =1% Significance, ** = 5% Significance, * = 10% Significance and bold letters signifies 
insignificance.  
 
We also explored another sub-set period, from 2007-2012. This enabled us to explore the 
short-term changes to beta during a volatile period. Table 4 reports the MSE, which are 
contrasting to Table 3, as we can clearly see the Kalman filter is the most suited technique to 
forecasting beta in the shorter-term in all sectors bar the Finance company sector. Furthermore, 
we see in Table 5 the results of the Diebold and Mariano test, which highlights the Kalman 
filter to be the most dominant method in comparison to all other techniques utilised. After Kal 
vs. Roll, very little significance is achieved in the other sectors apart from the finance company 
sector, which enjoys more statistical significance. The Kalman filter superiority over other 
techniques could be down to its flexibility as the random walk process suggests. The random 
walk process can adapt to innovations in data variations, which allows the state space model to 
capture a more accurate beta as a result.  
 
Table 4: Mean Squared Error Results 2007-2012 
Sector KALMAN ROLL DCC BEKK GJR-GARCH 
Banks 0.002027* 0.003543 0.002859 0.003742 0.003384 
Insurance 0.000099* 0.000654 0.000099* 0.000106 0.000197 
Investment C. 0.000000* 0.000052 0.000019 0.000004 0.000026 
Real Estates 0.002231* 0.003015 0.002583 0.002918 0.002961 
Finance C. 0.000255 0.000021* 0.000458 0.000216 0.000147 
* Indicates Best Method 
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Table 5: Modified Diebold-Mariano Test Results 2007-2012 
 Banks Insurance Invest. T. Real Est. Finance C. 
Kal-Roll 2.1823 -3.7290 -5.5822 3.5680 -3.1678 
 (0.0298)** (0.0002)*** (0.000)*** (0.0004)*** (0.0016)*** 
Kal-DCC -0.4055 -0.5572 0.2289 -0.3442 -4.7843 
 (0.6857) (0.5827) (0.8191) (0.7311) (0.0000)*** 
Kal-BEKK -0.5181 -0.4598 0.1344 -0.3744 -4.7725 
 (0.6048) (0.6465) (0.8931) (0.7087) (0.0000)*** 
Kal-GJR -0.3782 -0.0386 0.3018 -0.3761 -5.1336 
 (0.7056) (0.9697) (0.7631) (0.7071) (0.0001)*** 
Roll-DCC 0.2019 -1.1049 -0.4764 0.1402 2.4064 
 (0.8408) (0.2721) (0.6341) (0.8887) (0.0167)** 
Roll-BEKK -0.0363 -1.1893 -0.7157 0.0235 1.7420 
 (0.9713) (0.2389) (0.4751) (0.9816) (0.0824)* 
Roll-GJR 0.0275 -0.8093 -0.3438 0.0134 1.6293 
 (0.9781) (0.4191) (0.7318) (0.9896) (0.1043) 
DCC-BEKK -0.4329 0.2813 -0.5171 -0.2814 -3.1180 
 (0.6661) (0.7788) (0.6055) (0.7788) (0.0019)*** 
DCC-GJR -0.2064 0.8791 0.1897 -0.2648 0.7759 
 (0.8369) (0.3801) (0.8497) (0.7919) (0.4389) 
BEKK-GJR 0.3973 0.8890 0.7904 -0.0495 -0.0980 
 (0.6916) (0.3752) (0.4299) (0.6244) (0.9219) 
*** =1% Significance, ** = 5% Significance, * = 10% Significance and bold letters signifies 
insignificance. 
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Figure 9: Banking Sector Time Varying Beta 2007-2012 
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Figure 10: UK Insurance Sector Time Varying Beta 2007-2012 
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Figure 11: UK Investment Trusts Time Varying Beta 2007-2012 
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Figure 12: UK Finance Companies Time-Varying Beta 2007-2012 
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Figure 13: UK Real Estate Sector Time-Varying Beta 2007-2012 
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Figure 14: Time-Varying Beta All Sectors 2007-2012 
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4.5 Concluding Remarks 
We set out this chapter to explain the changing risk profile of financial institutions over 
non-crisis and crisis periods. The significance of the study may be of interest to managers of 
financial institutions, investors and policy makers concerned with the movement of the 
systematic risk of the UK financial sectors. An important concern for policy makers in times 
of crisis is how best to contain and manage risk. This applies even more so as the goal of 
maintaining a stable financial system has received much importance following the global 
financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis. In addition, our empirical findings are 
relevant given the continuous discussions on financial regulation and the focus on risk 
measurement and the management of risk. For the perspective of policy makers, they gain a 
greater understanding of sector systemic risks that are prevalent in the economy, from which 
they can safeguard the economy through implementing effective regulatory policies. 
Furthermore, investors are able to have a greater understanding of their risk exposure to the 
financial sectors and will be able to possess greater power in terms of managing their portfolio 
and achieve improved diversification/returns. In order to carry this out we set testable 
hypotheses to determine the following; (i) to determine beta as a time-varying variable as given 
by the rich literature within this area; (ii) the banking sector possessed the greatest risk profile 
as given by the market; (iii) the Kalman filter to be the most accurate method in modelling 
time-varying beta. We applied five different methodologies using weekly data to determine the 
time-varying beta against the UK financial sectors which included the following; Kalman 
Filter; rolling regression; DCC-GARCH model; Bivariate BEKK model; GJR-GARCH.  
To respond to our first hypothesis, we determine that beta is time-varying among the UK 
financial sectors, which is in line with Jacob (1971), Blume (1971), Fabozzi and Francis (1978), 
Alexander and Chervany (1980), Bos and Newbold (1984), Faff et al., (1992) and many more. 
However, we do conclude that the time-varying beta is less volatile among the financial 
company sector within the UK and remains fairly stable as derived by the MSE within the 
DCC-GARCH methodology. This can be attributed towards their impact on the financial 
system within the UK as the banking sector has a significant presence within the market. The 
second finding is the insurance sector was the riskiest in the UK as perceived by the market via 
the systematic risk profile, beta. Beta is consistently held at a higher level within the insurance 
sector in comparison to all other financial sectors including banking. This can be aligned to the 
fact for every loan created, it is underwritten by an insurer, which covers the banking 
institutions in the case of default. Further to this the insurance sector also underwrites a wide 
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variety of insurance products, which again creates greater liability within their balance sheets 
and it’s the sector ability to manage these risks appropriately, which determines their risk 
profile. We also demonstrate the banking sector adopts a large degree of systematic risk, 
specifically surrounding the build-up of the financial crisis as well as the variability during the 
crisis years. Other major findings include most accurate in-sample technique is the rolling 
regression technique as adopted by Fama and MacBeth (1973) in accordance to the MSE. 
However, the Kalman filter demonstrates its superiority over other techniques investigated as 
given by the modified Mariano and Diebold test, which is in line with by Brooks et al., (1998), 
Mergner and Bulla (2008), Choudhry and Wu (2009) and Zhou (2012). Overall, all techniques 
are highly accurate and suitable to compute time-varying beta. We also mention that in the 
short-term the most suitable forecasting technique is the Kalman filter as our results 
demonstrate and is highly correlated to the literature. Furthermore, this research conducted will 
aid financial institutions, investors and portfolio managers in their valuation of systematic risk 
as well as financial decision making among the UK financial sectors.  
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CHAPTER 5 
A Multivariate Analysis of the Effects of Macroeconomic 
News on the Equity Prices of UK Financial Institutions 
 
5.1. Introduction 
In recent years the global economy (spanning from the US to Western Europe and the Euro-
Zone as a whole) have been wrestling a ‘Financial Crisis’, which has been the deepest since 
the 1930s. Countries from the developed and emerging world have been severely impacted by 
the crisis. This paved way for a sovereign debt crisis among some Euro-Zone countries, which 
relied on the debt markets to roll over national debt as means of policy responses from the 
concerned governments. On a daily basis most forms of media outlets have been dominated by 
financial headlines relating to the crisis. This in turn induced further volatility among the 
financial markets across the developed world, as investors learned to pull their investments as 
the crisis came into fruition. In order to restore confidence in the advanced economies, vast 
macroeconomic policy responses were implemented by respective governments and central 
banks from the US and Western Europe. The large scale initiatives were able to restore 
confidence to an extent and avert financial collapse. The global economy is still suffering from 
the consequences in terms of global demand as the world economy is lagging and not reached 
pre-crisis economic output levels. The UK has remained in a low interest rate environment in 
their bid to establish sufficient inflation as well as economic growth. Furthermore, other 
competitive economies such as the Euro-zone have exhausting all powers in order to attempt 
to avoid deflationary/disinflation issues and combat economic stagnation. These are the lasting 
effects of the financial crisis which are still present in today’s economy, where several nations 
from Europe have now embarked upon negative interest rates. This is within their bid to 
regenerate demand and economic prosperity as the austerity measures implemented from 
European nations have successfully ruined prospects of any real growth in the EU as a whole 
including the UK. Youth unemployment across the UK and Europe has been severely 
fragmented since the outbreak of the crisis, from which has been on an increasing trend along 
with the debt-to-GDP ratio of the respective nations, most of which are above the 100% 
threshold. Despite the strong austerity measures undertaken by the majority of European 
nations, stock indices are nearing all-time highs, without the necessary economic growth to 
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coincide with such stock market activity. All these issues give rise to conducting research upon 
the effects of macroeconomic news impacting the financial markets and hopefully enrich the 
literature further.       
To date there has been very little literature which has delved into researching the impact 
of macroeconomic news events within the UK financial sectors from the recent financial crisis. 
The relevant research within the literature has not covered all UK financial sectors with the 
focus being held towards banking institutions across many nations with also a different focus. 
The prime examples can be found from studies such as King (2009), Aїt-Sahalia et al. (2012), 
Fratianni and Marchionne (2013), Dumontaux and Pop (2013), Klomp (2013) and 
Grammatikos et al. (2015).  We aim to focus solely upon all UK financial sectors as the crisis 
impacted each sector in one form or another as they had to navigate through such volatility and 
challenging circumstances as unprecedented losses from institutions were surfacing to the 
public eye. By analysing the impact of news events we will be able to make accurate judgement 
upon how the UK financial market reacted to the interventions of the Bank of England, 
European Central Bank, Federal Reserve, International Monetary Fund, UK Government, US 
Government, European Governments and significant announcements from UK banking 
institutions. In order to conduct said research we will implement three regression modelling 
techniques to capture the markets’ reaction to the unfolding events. The first method we apply 
is the traditional event study methodology as given by MacKinlay (1997). The second method 
we apply a multivariate regression model in a SUR model as introduced by Zellner (1962) and 
lastly we apply the GJR-GARCH approach as stated by Glosten et al. (1993).  
From analysing the impact of macroeconomic news events towards the UK financial 
sectors is particularly interesting, mainly due to the following reasons. Firstly, from a policy 
perspective, if financial markets are found to hold inefficiencies in the pricing, whereby 
investors may have prior knowledge to the news events materialising this may present unfair 
market conditions and becomes a challenge for policy makers to produce further clarity to the 
markets. Secondly, we will be able to understand how integrated modern financial markets are 
today through including announcements from other western economies such as the USA and 
the EU. Thirdly, we will be able to determine how significant the actions from the respective 
central banks, governments and institutions were in such detrimental times. 
This study contributes to the relevant literature in several ways; firstly it covers all UK 
financial sectors during a period which was the deepest financial crisis since the great 
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depression; Secondly, it enhances our knowledge for future reference when crisis periods arise 
and understand how the markets react from particular institutions. Lastly, it will provide an 
analysis into how successful each body were in regaining market confidence through the 
interventions and measures taken.  
The chapter is organised as follows, Section 2 reviews the literature and hypotheses, 
Section 3 illustrating the data and methodology. Section 4 reviews the empirical results and 
Section 5 draws the chapter to a conclusion.  
 
5.2. Review of Literature 
 The wealth of event-study literature surrounding the sub-prime financial crisis is one 
that is consistently growing and holds high importance for understanding future financial crisis 
periods. King (2009) examined the market reaction to government rescue packages across six 
nations through utilising Mackinlay’s (1997) event study methodology and illustrated that bank 
stock prices continued to underperform in all nations bar the US. Also government 
interventions were found to benefit creditors at the expense of shareholders as bank CDS 
spreads were found to narrow around the announcement in all cases examined. Other additional 
contributions to the literature include as expected, the stock price of banks receiving support 
perform worse than banks which did not receive support. The drawback of this study was 
highlighted by Grammatikos et al. (2015), which indicates King (2009) did not consider serial 
heteroskedasticity, event induced volatility and overlapping events, from which can introduce 
biasness within the results and are not completely robust. Grammatikos et al. (2015) undertook 
an EGARCH (Nelson (1991)) approach in order to resolve the issues from King (2009), as the 
EGARCH model allows one to effectively model positive and negative shifts within the data 
and therefore will be able to identify shocks that the market received. Their results illustrated 
that US policy announcements had a stronger impact on European and US banking sectors than 
European policy announcements. Aїt-Sahalia et al. (2012) constructed a detailed database of 
events relating to the unfolding crisis, which will be utilised within this study. However the 
paper focussed on interbank credit and liquidity risk premia during the crisis and found the 
policy interventions were associated with a reduction in interbank risk premia. As the market 
responded most effectively towards the cutting of interest rates and the bank recapitalization 
towards the restoring of confidence and reduced volatility. Furthermore Aїt-Sahalia et al. 
(2012) highlights international spill-overs of policy announcements increased as the crisis 
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deepened and policy makers did their utmost to restore stability. Once central banks began to 
coordinate their policy responses, market confidence globally was able to be restored.  Fratianni 
and Marchionne (2013) examined the impact of government interventions through the market 
responses in bank equity values, by undertaking traditional even-study methodology followed 
by robust modern econometric techniques to control for heteroskedasticity and auto-
correlation. Once time-series effects issues have been corrected, virtually all announcement 
impacts vanish in Europe, whereas they weaken in the US. This suggests that the policies 
introduced were not credible in the eyes of market participants. Further, results suggest general 
announcements generate positive abnormal returns and lower market risk, whereas specific 
announcements generate negative abnormal returns and higher market risk, as the market are 
able to identify the risk levels between institutions. Fratianni and Marchionne (2013) did 
acknowledge the limitations of their study to the financial markets and to short-term reactions. 
Actual government interventions, as opposed to announcements of interventions, may exert 
positive effects on corporate borrowers’ stock returns (Norden et al., 2011) or banks’ loan 
supply (Li, 2013). Black and Hazelwood (2013) considered the effects of the Troubled Asset 
Relief Programme (TARP) capital injections on banks that received funding, which were 
advised to then create additional loans to economy in order to restore confidence at a time 
where borrower default risk was running high, through analysing the risk ratings of the bank’s 
loan originations during the crisis. Their results highlighted that relative to non-TARP banks, 
the risk of loan originations increased at large TARP banks but decreased at small TARP banks. 
Furthermore, their results indicate the inverse relationship between loans and size of bank 
highlights an issue of moral hazard, whereby large banks increased in risk-taking activity 
without an increase with lending. Dumontaux and Pop (2013) extended literature within this 
field by focussing on the failure of Lehman Brothers in September, 2008. The study included 
modelling stock market data and credit default swap (CDS) spreads through event in order to 
identify any spill over effect on the surviving institutions through the SUR multivariate 
regression framework combined with the event study methodological approach. The overall 
empirical analysis indicated that the collateral damage was limited to the largest financial 
institutions, with the non-bank financial service firms being the most affected. Furthermore 
there were signals suggesting a significant abnormal jump in CDS spreads that are interpreted 
as evidence of sudden upward revisions, suggesting possible systemic market failure was 
perceived by investors. This study is consistent with the work from Merton (1974) which states 
the decline of stock prices results in an increase of leverage, contributing to a rise of default 
risk, which can be evident within CDS spreads. Klomp (2013) further enriched the literature 
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strand concerning the effectiveness of financial sector rescue packages provided by 
governments during the crisis.  Klomp (2013) highlights issues with previous research, which 
undertook panel regression models, as exposure levels were different among institution, which 
ultimately leads to a heterogeneity problem and may cause biased results. This problem was 
rectified through quantile regression models on an individual institution basis by estimating the 
relationship between the CDS spreads and announcements of rescue packages. Interventions 
aimed at specific financial institutions were found to be more effective in preventing banking 
risk as opposed to broader interventions to stabilize financial markets. The main contribution 
towards the literature was finding a statistically negative relationship between the 
announcement of the financial sector rescue packages and the daily change of the credit default 
premium. However, through using the quantile regression method Klomp (2013) was able to 
distinguish that most interventions do not decrease the risk of intermediate to low-risk banks, 
but did overall stress the need for continued research behind the reaction of markets towards 
policy announcements.   
 Given the literature examined above we will set four hypotheses in order to direct our 
research specifically against. The first hypothesis states investors within banking sector were 
able to distinguish the risk exposure levels among UK banking institutions via the CDS. This 
hypothesis is drawn upon from the efficient market hypothesis, whereby we examine whether 
market inefficiencies arise within the CDS market. The theory being that markets are efficient 
and therefore all relevant information is correctly priced into the asset. We expect the outcome 
to be that investors were able to distinguish risk levels among the differing banks as given by 
the size of each institution during the outbreak of the crisis. The second hypothesis will 
examine importance of the central banks during periods of instability. The theory states the 
central banks are known as the lender of last resort, which highlights their significant role 
within financial markets. Therefore, the monetary policy initiatives of the Bank of England 
were more effective than the measures applied by the UK Government to restore confidence in 
the banking sector. We expect this theory to be exemplified during the crisis period as the 
efforts made by the BoE were more significant than the UK Government. However, the element 
of surprise by the government’s actions may prove to be equally significant. The third 
hypothesis we introduce is as follows; announcements from Western economies such as the 
USA, Europe and International Monetary Fund (IMF) had a more significant effect on non-
banking institutions than the combined announcements of the UK Government and the Bank 
of England. The underlying theory behind this testable hypothesis highlights the new integrated 
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global financial world. Whereby, financial institutions in the UK hold exposure to other 
Western economies such as USA and Europe. This was evident among certain banks in the UK 
and we wish to extend this to non-banking institutions. Lastly, we hypothesise announcements 
from the major central banks (Federal Reserve, European Central Bank) and the IMF had a 
positive effect on the UK banking sector. This will examine the exposure levels UK banks held 
to other nations. From this hypothesis we expect a positive outcome as these major international 
central banks have a key role in global economics/financial markets and that their 
announcements should have a positive impact upon equity prices.   
 
5.3. Empirical Approach 
5.3.1 Data 
Our dataset consists of logged daily returns of all listed UK financial institution’s and the 
FTSE100 index over the period from January 3rd 2006 to December 31st 2012. These dates 
enable us to capture the unfolding pre-crisis, during the crisis and post-crisis events. For all 
institutions we will collect daily returns of 10-year UK Government bonds as a rise in the bond 
rates would suggest the perception of a crisis was upon as investors seek to safe haven assets 
and reduce as much exposure to the sub-prime collapse as possible. In order to capture the risk 
element of relevant institution’s, daily CDS spread data throughout the same period is collected 
for the banking and insurance sector opting for 5 year CDS spread data as this is the most liquid 
in the market. The data is collected from financial databases Bloomberg and Thomson Reuters 
Datastream with the event list illustrated in Appendix 1, with a list of the companies and their 
total assets in Appendix 2.  
5.3.2 Methodology  
5.3.2.1 Event Study 
The unfolding financial events that we witnessed collectively within the developed world from 
2007 onwards were an immediate consequence of liquidity within the interbank markets 
freezing and gave entry to the UK government and Bank of England (BoE) as a lender of last 
resort to intervene, in order to estimate the markets’ reaction we employ a an event-study led 
methodology firstly following the approach of Mackinlay (1997). Firstly, we estimate the 
abnormal returns (ARs) through the market model with an estimation period of 295 days prior 
to the first event window, which in this instance will be 5 days prior to the first event. Event 
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windows of -/+5 days before and after event date as well as -/+1 day is opted in order to reduce 
event clustering as much as possible. This is implemented as follows: 
Market model is estimated as: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                   (5.1) 
Where; 𝛽𝑖 = COV(𝑅𝑖, 𝑅𝑀)/VAR(𝑅𝑀) and E(𝜀𝑖𝑡) = 0 
Once the market model is computed for respective institution, the ARs are then obtained 
through the differences within actual stock return and the predicted by the market model, which 
is as follows: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑡)                   (5.2) 
The ARs are then cumulated (CARs) over specified time periods concerning the events, 
through considering 10-day (-5, +5) and 3-day (-1, +1) event windows, with the CARs 
computed as follows:  
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑡1, 𝑡2) = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑡2
𝑡=𝑡1
 
                                                                                                      (5.3)              
Where t1 and t2 are the start and end date of considered window periods.  The CARs for each 
event are then aggregated on a cross-section basis for a portfolio of N observations as well 
accommodate for type of event, with the Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs) 
calculated as follows:          
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅(𝑡1, 𝑡2) =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝐶𝐴𝑅
𝑁
𝑖=1
(𝑡1, 𝑡2) 
                                                                                            (5.4) 
We employ non-parametric hypothesis tests from Boehmer, Musumeci and Poulsen (1991) and 
Cowan (1992) due to their robustness. As the issues in parametric tests, witness too frequently 
a rejection in the null hypothesis as increased variance in the stock returns close to the event 
days may cause unreliable and/or distorted results according to Boehmer, Musumeci and 
Poulsen (1991) which is also demonstrated in Campbell and Wasley (1993), which provide 
evidence that nonparametric rank tests provide more reliable inferences in comparison to 
parametric tests.  
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We apply the standardised cross-sectional test by Boehmer, Musumeci and Poulsen (1991), 
which is an extension of Patell (1976) and is a robust approach to event induced variance 
increase in stock returns, from which we suspect the financial crisis caused.  The test statistic 
produced from the standardised cross-sectional test is examined against a null hypothesis where 
the cumulative abnormal returns are set to zero. The calculation to gain the test statistic is as 
follows: 
First the abnormal returns are standardised through the estimated standard deviation by; 
𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝜏 =
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝜏
𝑆(𝐴𝑅𝑖)
                   (5.5) 
Where: 𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝜏 represents the estimated standard deviation,  𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝜏 the abnormal returns of 
security i during time  𝜏 and 𝑆(𝐴𝑅𝑖) represents the standard error of day i.  
We then need to estimate the standard deviation of the time series of abnormal returns 
throughout the event window period to produce an unbiased estimate of the standard deviation, 
which is as follows: 
?̂?𝐴𝑅𝑖
2 =
∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝜏
𝑇−𝑑
                                              (5.6) 
Where: 𝑇 Represents the number of days outside of estimation period, 𝑑 represents the degrees 
of freedom and in our case since the market model is utilised 𝑑 = 2.  
In order to address the event window abnormal returns is an out of sample prediction, the 
standard error is corrected by the forecast error as follows: 
𝑆(𝐴𝑅𝑖) = ?̂?𝐴𝑅𝑖√1 +
1
𝑇
+
(𝑅𝑚,𝜏−𝑅𝑀,𝐸𝑠𝑡 ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )2
∑ (𝑅𝑚,𝜏−𝑅𝑀,𝐸𝑠𝑡 ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )2
𝐸𝑠𝑡 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝐸𝑠𝑡 𝑚𝑖𝑛
               (5.7) 
Where: 𝑅𝑚,𝜏 represents the return on the market and  𝑅𝑀,𝐸𝑠𝑡  ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ is the average of the market return 
during the estimation period. 
The standardised abnormal returns are then cumulated over time which is as follows: 
𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝜏1, 𝜏2) = ∑
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝜏
𝑆(𝐴𝑅𝑖)
                  (5.8) 
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Where: 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝜏1, 𝜏2) Symbolizes the cumulated standardised abnormal returns throughout 
time period. 
The average of the cumulated standardised abnormal returns is then computed in relation 
towards number of events: 
𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅(𝜏1,𝜏2) =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝜏1, 𝜏2)                  (5.9) 
Where: 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅(𝜏1,𝜏2) is the average of the cumulated standardised abnormal returns throughout 
time period with N signified as the number of events. 
The standard deviation of the averaged cumulated standardised abnormal returns is then 
estimated of the event window: 
𝑆(𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) = √
1
𝑁(𝑁−1)
∑(𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝜏1, 𝜏2) − 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅(𝜏1,𝜏2))
2            (5.10) 
Where: 𝑆(𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) Represents the standard deviation of the averaged cumulated abnormal 
returns. 
The test statistic of the standardised cross-sectional is calculated as follows: 
𝑇𝐵 =
𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (𝜏1,𝜏2)
𝑆(𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )
                 (5.11) 
Where: 𝑇𝐵 Signifies the Test statistic of Boehmer et al (1991). 
Further to the standardised cross-sectional test we also employ the nonparametric test of Cowan 
(1992) generalized sign test. This is based on the ratio of cumulative abnormal returns across 
the event period window, with the proportion of positive abnormal returns are the null 
hypothesis of 0.5. The generalized sign test statistic is calculated as follows: 
𝑇𝐺𝑆 =
𝑝0
+−𝑝𝐸𝑠𝑡
+
√𝑝𝐸𝑠𝑡
+ (1−𝑝𝐸𝑠𝑡
+ )/𝑁
                 (5.12) 
Where: 𝑇𝐺𝑆 Signifies the test statistic of the generalised sign test, 𝑝0
+ illustrates the ratio of 
positive CARs over the event window, 𝑝𝐸𝑠𝑡
+  is the estimated positive CARs over the event 
window period and 𝑁 denotes the number of events considered.  
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5.3.2.2 SUR Methodology  
In order to derive a more accurate understanding of the financial crisis we apply a multivariate 
regression model (MVRM), which is based on a system of seemingly unrelated regressions 
(SUR) as introduced by Zellner (1962). This approach has been utilised by many event based 
studies such as Cornett and Tehranian (1990), Madura, Tucker and Zarruk (1991) and Kabir 
and Hassan (2005). The approach is aimed to reduce the event clustering that was evident 
during the height of the financial crisis, where we witnessed significant news event filtering 
through within days apart of each other, which induced vast levels of volatility. All the 
variables are to be transformed into their natural log form as well achieve stationarity via 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests, this will enable us to reduce the noise 
within the data as much as possible. The SUR approach takes into account the 
heteroskedasticity across the equation and contemporaneous correlations between the 
disturbances and takes the following form: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵𝑂𝑁𝐷𝑡 + 𝐿𝐼𝐵𝑂𝑅𝑡 + 𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑂𝑡 + ∑ 𝜃𝑖𝑡𝐷_𝐵𝑂𝐸𝑡
𝑛
𝑛=1
+ 𝜃𝑖𝑡𝐷_𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑡
+ +𝜃𝑖𝑡𝐷_𝑈𝑆𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖𝑡𝐷_𝐹𝐸𝐷𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖𝑡𝐷_𝐸𝑈𝑅𝑂𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖𝑡𝐷_𝐸𝐶𝐵𝑡
+ 𝜃𝑖𝑡𝐷_𝐼𝑀𝐹𝑂𝑡 + 𝜀 
                                                 (5.13) 
Where: 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is denoted as the daily logged returns of institution i on day t, 𝛽𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑡 denoted as the 
market model for institution i on day t. 𝐵𝑂𝑁𝐷𝑡 captures the daily return of UK 10-year 
Government Bond on day t, 𝐿𝐼𝐵𝑂𝑅𝑡 capture the one month LIBOR rate on day t, 𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑂𝑡 
represents the one month repurchase rate by the BoE on day t. 𝜃𝑖𝑡 represents the abnormal 
returns of institution i on day t 𝐷_𝐵𝑂𝐸𝑡,  𝐷_𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑡,  𝐷_𝑈𝑆𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑡, 𝐷_𝐹𝐸𝐷𝑡,  𝐷_𝐸𝑈𝑅𝑂𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑡, 
 𝐷_𝐸𝐶𝐵𝑡 and 𝐷_𝐼𝑀𝐹𝑂𝑡 represent the dummy variables to capture announcements made by the 
BoE, UK Government, US Government, Federal Reserve, European Governments, European 
Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund combined with other major announcements 
on day t with a value of 1 to represent day of announcement, otherwise a value of 0. 𝜀 Is denoted 
as the error disturbance term. 
In order to gain a greater understanding of the impact of news on the UK financial sector, more 
specifically the banking and insurance sectors, we expand equation (13) and include the logged 
daily CDS spreads as follows: 
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𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵𝑂𝑁𝐷𝑡 + 𝐿𝐼𝐵𝑂𝑅𝑡 + 𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑂𝑡 + ∑ 𝜃𝑖𝑡𝐷_𝐵𝑂𝐸𝑡
𝑛
𝑛=1
+ 𝜃𝑖𝑡𝐷_𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑡
+ 𝜃𝑖𝑡𝐷_𝑈𝑆𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖𝑡𝐷_𝐹𝐸𝐷𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖𝑡𝐷_𝐸𝑈𝑅𝑂𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖𝑡𝐷_𝐸𝐶𝐵𝑡
+ 𝜃𝑖𝑡𝐷_𝐼𝑀𝐹𝑂𝑡 + 𝜀 
                   (5.14) 
Where: 𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡 represents the credit default swap spread of institution i on day t.  
 
5.3.2.3 Further Examination  
To confirm the strength of results generated, we apply the generalised auto-regressive 
conditional heteroskedastic (GARCH) models as proposed by Bollerslev (1986). Firstly, we 
assess whether the banking institutions daily logged stock returns hold ARCH effects, once 
this is proven, we utilise the GJR-GARCH model proposed by Glosten, Jagannathan and 
Runkle (1993). The model allows positive and negative fluctuations in returns to impact 
differing conditional volatility, which enables us to examine the leverage effect, whereby we 
are able to measure shocks such as news as volatility increases with the announcement of 
“good” and “bad” events. The methodology for this section follows that of Kim and In (2002), 
via the adoption of the GJR-GARCH with the addition of a new variable for robustness 
purposes: 
Mean: 
 𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑡[𝜀𝑡−1] + 𝐿𝐼𝐵𝑂𝑅𝑡 + 𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑂𝑡 + 𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡[𝜀𝑡−1] + 𝜖           (5.15) 
Variance:  
ℎ = 𝛼0 + 𝛼𝑏𝑡−1
2 + 𝛼𝑏𝑡−1
2 𝑏𝑡−1<0 + 𝛼𝛿𝑡−1 + 𝜆1|𝜃𝑖𝑡𝐷_𝐵𝑂𝐸[𝜀𝑡−1]|+𝜆2|𝜃𝑖𝑡𝐷_𝐺𝑂𝑉[𝜀𝑡−1]| +
𝜆3|𝜃𝑖𝑡𝐷_𝑈𝑆𝐺𝑂𝑉[𝜀𝑡−1]| + 𝜆4|𝜃𝑖𝑡𝐷_𝐹𝐸𝐷[𝜀𝑡−1] + 𝜆5|𝜃𝑖𝑡𝐷_𝐸𝑈𝑅𝑂𝐺𝑂𝑉[𝜀𝑡−1] +
𝜆6|𝜃𝑖𝑡𝐷_𝐸𝐶𝐵[𝜀𝑡−1]+𝜆7|𝜃𝑖𝑡𝐷_𝐼𝑀𝐹𝑂[𝜀𝑡−1] + 𝜆7|𝜃𝑖𝑡𝐷_𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑆[𝜀𝑡−1] + 𝜖                       (5.16) 
Where: ln 𝑅𝑖𝑡 represents the logged daily stock returns of institution i on day t, 𝛽𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑡 denotes 
the market model for institution i on day t. 𝛼 Represents a constant parameter, 𝑏 holds a residual 
value and 𝛿 denotes the GARCH element within the model. 𝛼𝑏𝑡−1
2 𝑏𝑡−1<0 Captures the leverage 
effect.  𝐷_𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑆 Is a dummy variable to capture the abnormal returns concerning the banking 
sector announcements. 
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5.3.3 Descriptive Statistics 
5.3.3.1 UK Banks Descriptive Statistics 
 When examining the standard deviation within Table 1 with respect to the UK banking 
sector, we exhibit the abnormal returns on Government and BoE announcements deemed to be 
most volatile among the dummy variables. This in turn may lead to speculation from the data 
that announcements concerning government and the BoE news had the greatest impact towards 
the financial markets causing the greatest shocks. Conversely, from a glance we can expect the 
dummy variables concerning ECB and IMF/Other announcements deemed to be less volatile 
and therefore have a lesser impact towards the stock prices against the UK banking sector, 
suggesting investors anticipated such events. The greatest volatility is found within the Libor 
and Repo rates as well as Government Bond prices and CDS swaps. This is to be expected due 
to the volatility/uncertainty experienced during the outbreak of the financial crisis, however 
further analysis will confirm this. Negative Skewness in all dummy variables bar the Federal 
Reserve, which exhibit a positive Skewness and therefore naturally suggest a positive impact 
is expected, however all dummy variables are leptokurtic. Positive Skewness is found within 
the Libor and Repo rates which exemplify a platykurtic distribution. Finally, we must note 
Jarque-Bera test suggest all variables considered are not normally distributed. 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics UK Banking Sector 
 Mean     Max       Min St. Dev.  Skew. Kurtosis    J-B  PP ADF    
RET -0.0011   0.5495     -1.0957 0.0373 -2.4877 85.2642   3763981 -106 -23.389  
ER -0.0003   0.1262     -0.1246 0.0147 -0.1324 10.8967   34595.28 -125 -17.555  
BOND 1.2631   1.7134     0.3639 0.3328 -0.9789 2.9478   2824.284 -132 -39.193  
LIBOR 0.4509   1.9095     -0.7070 1.0638 0.2363 1.1543   2672.584 -132 -131.54  
REPO 0.2888   1.7830     -0.8916 1.1298 0.2913 1.1496   2770.85 -146 -30.813  
CDS 0.0020   4.0351     -4.0291 0.2745 -0.5550 92.0941   4396217 -327 -25.176  
BANKS -0.0001   0.0682     -0.5399 0.0068 -68.9083 5242.1100  1.52E+10 -115 -115.3  
BOE -0.0002   0.2731     -1.0858 0.0120 -60.8961 5193.3190  1.49E+10 -115 -115.32  
ECB 0.0000   0.0677     -0.1549 0.0025 -39.2085 2583.7110  3.69E+9 -115 -115.3  
EUGOV -0.0002   0.0761     -0.5399 0.0089 -43.0235 2233.8750  2.76E+9 -107 -28.173  
FED 0.0001   0.1916     -0.2091 0.0039 8.4749 1593.4810  1.40E+9 -117 -78.67  
GOV -0.0002   0.2731     -1.0858 0.0132 -48.3099 3758.8070  7.82E+9 -116 -26.622  
IMFO 0.0000   0.0709     -0.0791 0.0018 -4.5314 1098.8790  6.66E+8 -115 -115.33  
USGOV 0.0000   0.1423     -0.1726 0.0041 -5.5184 698.4361   2.68E+8 -115 -24.587  
 
 
5.3.3.2 Insurance Companies Descriptive Statistics 
When examining the standard deviation within Table 2 with respect to the UK insurance sector, 
we exhibit the abnormal returns on Government and BoE announcements deemed to be most 
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volatile among the dummy variables. This may suggest that announcements concerning 
government and the BoE news had the greatest impact towards the financial markets causing 
the greatest shocks. The greatest volatility is found within the Libor and Repo rates and CDS 
swaps, which also produces negative Skewness and therefore expect negative results.  
Platykutic distribution is also found within Libor, Repo and Bond with CDS spreads 
experiencing a mesokurtic distribution. Positive Skewness in all dummy variables bar the BoE 
and US Government announcements, which exhibit a negative Skewness and therefore 
naturally suggest a negative impact, is expected within those two dummies. The commonalities 
within all variables are found to be non-normally distributed, which is accredited to the Jarque-
Bera results as well as all variables enjoying stationarity via Augmented Dickey-Fuller and 
Phillips-Perron tests.    
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics UK Insurance Sector  
 Mean Max Min St. Dev. Skew. Kurtosis J-B Prob. PP Prob. ADF    Prob. 
RET 0.0001 0.2643 -0.4060 0.0253 -0.2363 18.62 1.80E+5 0.00 -144.202 0.00 -60.69 0.00 
ER 0.0001 0.1567 -0.1543 0.0158 -0.1505 15.29 1.11E+5 0.00 -141.84 0.00 -20.67 0.00 
BOND 1.2631 1.7134 0.3639 0.3328 -0.9789 2.95 2.82E+3 0.00 -4.66 0.00 -4.74 0.00 
CDS 4.4131 7.9015 1.7492 1.1391 -0.3368 3.08 1.57E+2 0.00 -89.93 0.00 -59.34 0.00 
LIBOR 0.4509 1.9095 -0.7070 1.0638 0.2363 1.15 2.67E+3 0.00 -132.01 0.00 -131.54 0.00 
REPO 0.2888 1.7830 -0.8916 1.1298 0.2913 1.15 2.77E+3 0.00 -146.23 0.00 -30.81 0.00 
BOE 0.0000 0.1256 -0.3550 0.0044 -44.0284 3577.28 9.41E+9 0.00 -132.92 0.00 20.033 0.00 
ECB 0.0000 0.0940 -0.0254 0.0010 53.9795 4426.30 1.44E+10 0.00 -132.96 0.00 -132.96 0.00 
EUGOV 0.0000 0.1051 -0.1023 0.0025 2.7328 851.84 5.31E+8 0.00 -133.46 0.00 -69.67 0.00 
FED 0.0000 0.0873 -0.0315 0.0018 31.4579 1300.33 1.24E+9 0.00 -133.47 0.00 -36.51 0.00 
GOV 0.0000 0.2185 -0.1025 0.0036 14.5008 1158.32 9.83E+8 0.00 -136.35 0.00 -27.09 0.00 
IMFO 0.0000 0.0667 -0.0335 0.0010 32.1760 2044.29 3.07E+9 0.00 -132.96 0.00 -132.96 0.00 
USGOV 0.0000 0.1914 -0.1505 0.0030 -0.0522 1592.21 1.86E+9 0.00 -132.98 0.00 -34.594 0.00 
5.3.3.3 Finance Companies Descriptive Statistics 
Turning our attention towards the standard deviation within Table 3 with respect to the UK 
finance companies sector, we find the most volatile variables are found to be Libor, Repo and 
Bond prices, which are all platykurtic. With Libor and Repo rates deemed to be positive, while 
bond prices are negative due to casual observations from Skewness. With respect to the dummy 
variables positive Skewness is found in all bar BoE announcements, which indicates that a 
negative result is expected. However, the commonality is leptokurtic distribution is found in 
all dummy variables. Furthermore, with respect to governmental news it is found to be the most 
volatile among the dummy variables as they experience greatest standard deviation. One 
commonality within all variables is the non-normality distribution, which is accredited to the 
Jarque-Bera results as well as all variables enjoying stationarity via Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
and Phillips-Perron tests.   
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics UK Finance Companies 
 Mean Max Min St. Dev. Skew. Kurtosis   J-B Prob. PP Prob. ADF   Prob. 
RET -0.0002 0.1680 -0.2746 0.0241 -0.1589 9.17 22460 0.00 -149.45 0.00 -65.04 0.00 
ER -0.0002 0.0965 -0.0971 0.0125 -0.1289 10.41 32403 0.00 -155.58 0.00 -21.56 0.00 
BOND 1.2631 1.7134 0.3639 0.3328 -0.9789 2.95 2259 0.00 -5.33 0.00 -5.63 0.00 
LIBOR 0.4509 1.9095 -0.7070 1.0638 0.2363 1.15 2138 0.00 -3.94 0.00 -3.55 0.01 
REPO 0.2888 1.7830 -0.8916 1.1298 0.2913 1.15 2217 0.00 -3.95 0.00 -3.99 0.00 
BOE 0.0000 0.0800 -0.1139 0.0033 -0.9835 388.42 8.75E+7 0.00 -145.71 0.00 -145.61 0.00 
ECB 0.0000 0.0398 -0.1139 0.0015 -30.2316 2557.22 3.84E+9 0.00 -145.61 0.00 -145.61 0.00 
EUGOV -0.0001 0.0498 -0.1216 0.0027 -22.6774 872.20 4.46E+8 0.00 -150.34 0.00 -38.64 0.00 
FED 0.0000 0.0849 -0.0454 0.0016 16.0361 1123.66 7.40E+8 0.00 -147.36 0.00 -38.83 0.00 
GOV -0.0001 0.0828 -0.1216 0.0037 -14.2351 499.68 1.46E+8 0.00 -145.65 0.00 -29.56 0.00 
IMFO 0.0000 0.0469 -0.0430 0.0010 5.4227 1158.97 7.87E+8 0.00 -145.65 0.00 -145.65 0.00 
USGOV -0.0001 0.0644 -0.1145 0.0025 -17.8709 756.90 3.36E+8 0.00 -145.75 0.00 -51.93 0.00 
 
 
5.3.3.4 Investment Trusts Descriptive Statistics 
From casual observations of Table 4, it is evident within the dependent variable (RET) a 
negative outcome may occur due to the Skewness illustrating such result, with little volatility 
experienced. Following this,  greatest volatility within the variables is found within the Libor 
and Repo rates as they experience highest standard deviations. With reference to Bonds, Libor 
and Repo rates are found to be platykurtic distributed, whereas all other variables are 
leptokurtic. With regards to the dummy variables, it is clear to see that announcements from 
the BoE, Federal Reserve and IMF/others are deemed to hold a positive result, whereby all 
other dummy variables are more likely to produce a negative result as their Skewness sign 
suggests. Standard deviations within the dummy variables are fairly stable with BoE highest.  
The commonalities within all variables are found to be non-normally distributed, which is 
accredited to the Jarque-Bera results as well as all variables enjoying stationarity via 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests. 
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics UK Investment Trusts 
 Mean Max Min St. Dev. Skew. Kurtosis J-B Prob. PP Prob. ADF   Prob. 
RET 0.0002  0.171 -0.168  0.0163 -0.091  9.018 9.34E+4 0.00 -266.38 0.00 -36.63 0.00 
ER 0.0002  0.124 -0.122  0.0117 -0.121  11.500 1.86E+5 0.00 -267.20 0.00 -41.75 0.00 
BOND 1.2631  1.713  0.363  0.3327 -0.979  2.947 9.88E+3 0.00 -9.51 0.00 -10.54 0.00 
LIBOR 0.4509  1.909 -0.707  1.0638  0.236  1.154 9.35E+3 0.00 -248.44 0.00 -246.33 0.00 
REPO 0.2888  1.782 -0.892  1.1297  0.291  1.149 9.70E+3 0.00 -272.33 0.00 -36.88 0.00 
BOE 0.0000  0.076 -0.069  0.0018  7.914  574 8.43E+8 0.00 -248.75 0.00 -57.19 0.00 
ECB 0.0000  0.043 -0.051  0.0007 -11.239  1900 9.28E+9 0.00 -248.68 0.00 -50.10 0.00 
EUGOV 0.0000  0.099 -0.084  0.0017 -3.376  799 1.63E+9 0.00 -254.30 0.00 -29.76 0.00 
FED 0.0000  0.078 -0.078  0.0012  19.029  1453 5.42E+9 0.00 -248.76 0.00 -248.74 0.00 
GOV 0.0000  0.052 -0.106  0.0017 -19.422  839 1.81E+9 0.00 -249.53 0.00 -42.75 0.00 
IMFO 0.0000  0.040 -0.051  0.0006  14.101  1660 7.08E+9 0.00 -248.81 0.00 -248.80 0.00 
USGOV 0.0000  0.058 -0.101  0.0015 -7.325  874 1.96E+9 0.00 -248.68 0.00 -248.68 0.00 
 
5.3.3.5 Real Estates Descriptive Statistics 
From casual observations within Table 5 it is evident within the dependent variable (RET) a 
negative outcome may occur due to the Skewness illustrating such result, with little volatility 
experienced. Following this, greatest volatility within the variables is found within the Libor 
and Repo rates as they experience highest standard deviations. With reference to Bonds, Libor 
and Repo rates are found to be platykurtic distributed, whereas all other variables are 
leptokurtic. With regards to the dummy variables, it is clear to see that announcements from 
the Federal Reserve and IMF/others are deemed to hold a positive result, whereby all other 
dummy variables are more likely to produce a negative result as their Skewness sign suggests. 
The most reactive Skewness is sought to be ECB announcements which experience the highest 
negative Skewness, suggesting that real estates were most reactive to said news. The 
commonalities within all variables are found to be non-normally distributed, which is 
accredited to the Jarque-Bera results as well as all variables enjoying stationarity via 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests. 
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics UK Real Estates  
 Mean Max Min St. Dev. Skew. Kurtosis J-B Prob. PP Prob. ADF    Prob. 
RET -0.0002 0.1680 -0.2746 0.0241 -0.1589 9.17 2.25E+4 0.00 -123.07 0.00 -122.343 0.00 
ER -0.0002 0.0965 -0.0971 0.0125 -0.1289 10.41 3.24E+4 0.00 -126.357 0.00 -18.164 0.00 
BOND 1.2631 1.7134 0.3639 0.3328 -0.9789 2.95 2.26E+3 0.00 -4.09212 0.00 -4.1624 0.00 
LIBOR 0.4509 1.9095 -0.7070 1.0638 0.2363 1.15 2.14E+3 0.00 -118.02 0.00 -117.6 0.00 
REPO 0.2888 1.7830 -0.8916 1.1298 0.2913 1.15 2.22E+3 0.00 -131.04 0.00 -27.518 0.00 
BOE 0.0000 0.0800 -0.1139 0.0033 -0.9835 388.42 8.75E+7 0.00 -118.8 0.00 -118.8 0.00 
ECB 0.0000 0.0398 -0.1139 0.0015 -30.2316 2557.22 3.84E+9 0.00 -118.88 0.00 -118.88 0.00 
EUGOV -0.0001 0.0498 -0.1216 0.0027 -22.6774 872.20 4.46E+8 0.00 -119.54 0.00 -31.136 0.00 
FED 0.0000 0.0849 -0.0454 0.0016 16.0361 1123.66 7.40E+8 0.00 -120.41 0.00 -40.804 0.00 
GOV -0.0001 0.0828 -0.1216 0.0037 -14.2351 499.68 1.46E+8 0.00 -119.15 0.00 -15.99 0.00 
IMFO 0.0000 0.0469 -0.0430 0.0010 5.4227 1158.97 7.87E+8 0.00 -118.88 0.00 -118.88 0.00 
USGOV -0.0001 0.0644 -0.1145 0.0025 -17.8709 756.90 3.36E+8 0.00 -119.21 0.00 -34.329 0.00 
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5.4. Results 
5.4.1 Event Study Methodology  
5.4.1.1 Banks 
When assessing the event study methodology applied to the UK banking sector within Table 6 
we can quickly draw upon many announcements were prevalent of producing positive and 
negative effects towards the CAAR. It is evident for the positive effects across a (-5…5) 
window as this is where we experience greatest significance within the results, that IMF/others 
announcements yielding a positive statistical significant market shift, as expectedly so via the 
Boehmer et al (1991) test and t-test. Since the IMF is the lender of last resort on a global level, 
we can only assume once the news has flooded to the markets that such a bailout will take 
place, investors can only respond positively to this news. As confidence is restored due to the 
uncertainty that was present within the markets, ultimately the IMF/others were able to reduce 
overall volatility. Other positive announcements include UK Government European 
Government with the US government and ECB incurring positive reaction on the day and (-
1...1) event windows, However, no statistical significance materialised within the (-5…5) event 
window. In regards to the UK Government results, we reject the claims of King (2009), which 
suggested that the announcements did not benefit shareholders. As our results to a certain extent 
demonstrate government announcements held a positive impact to the market through positive 
CAAR with statistical significance via the Boehmer et al (1991) test. On the basis of these 
announcements being positive it again may reflect IMF/other announcements in terms of 
restoring confidence within the financial markets during volatile periods in order to bring 
financial stability.  
Conversely, when referring to Table 6 we report negative CAARs from the 
announcements examined. In particular this is evident across the BoE, FED and US 
Government through achieving statistical significance within the (-5…5) event window. The 
respective central banking announcements may have caused greater volatility by confirming 
the underlying fiscal issues surrounding the financial institutions via injecting liquidity into the 
system for example. In the case of the US Government across the (-5…5) window, may have 
caused such a reaction through changes in US law which may have confirmed the deepness of 
the crisis. Furthermore, through the length of the event window the results suggest the 
uncertainty was prolonged, which led the markets to price these events negatively on the whole. 
It also infers that the UK banks did not have enough capital to sustain the financial system 
given the sizeable actions taken by respective bodies from the UK and US. Other negative 
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impacted results include the ECB and European Government through (-5…5) and (-1…1) 
windows, respectively. The negative reaction regarding these results could be due to the UK 
banks examined having further exposure to European assets, which deteriorated following the 
sovereign debt crisis of 2010. It is possible investors had confirming news of the faltering 
positions of institutions as well as respective Euro-area governments as the sovereign debt 
crisis gained momentum.    
 
Table 6: Banks Overall CAAR Results 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Window CAAR Pos:Neg t-test  Prob. B test. Prob. Sign test Prob.    
Bank of England 
(-5...5) -0.1077 46:54 -0.4943 0.6211 -0.4968 0.6193 -3.4843 0.0005*** 
(0...0) 0.0772 72:28 1.1746 0.2402 0.9524 0.3409 1.8961 0.0579* 
(-1...1) 0.0001 62:38 0.0006 0.9995 -0.0275 0.9781 -0.1733 0.8624 
Government 
(-5...5) 0.2589 46:33 1.0815 0.2795 1.0887 0.2763 -1.0039 0.3154 
(0...0) 0.1016 51:28 1.4072 0.1594 2.1217 0.0339** 0.1657 0.8684 
(-1...1) 0.1093 47:32 0.874 0.3821 1.035 0.3007 -0.7699 0.4413 
US Government 
(-5...5) -0.1683 45:46 -0.7993 0.4241 -1.04 0.2984 -1.7563 0.079* 
(0...0) 0.1837 65:26 2.8934 0.0038*** 2.2914 0.0219** 2.4991 0.0124** 
(-1...1) 0.0805 54:37 0.7321 0.4641 0.7151 0.4745 0.1587 0.8739 
Federal Reserve 
(-5...5) -0.0497 24:26 -0.171 0.8642 -0.4078 0.6834 -1.8914 0.0586* 
(0...0) 0.1802 31:19 2.0578 0.0396** 1.9525 0.0509* 0.1386 0.8898 
(-1...1) 0.0546 27:23 0.3602 0.7187 0.2354 0.8139 -1.0214 0.3071 
European Governments 
(-5...5) 0.1862 30:20 0.6356 0.5251 0.6894 0.4906 -0.8147 0.4152 
(0...0) -0.0887 34:16 -1.0039 0.3154 -1.0398 0.2984 0.3751 0.7076 
(-1...1) -0.1168 29:21 -0.7633 0.4453 -0.7876 0.4309 -1.1122 0.2661 
European Central Bank 
(-5...5) -0.1431 18:20 -0.417 0.6767 -0.5759 0.5647 -1.0216 0.307 
(-1...1) 0.0347 22:16 0.1934 0.8467 0.3693 0.7119 0.2844 0.7761 
(0...0) 0.0567 25:13 0.5479 0.5837 0.5789 0.5627 1.2639 0.2063 
IMF/Other Announcements 
(-5...5) 0.5089 29:22 1.6777 0.0934* 1.7766 0.0756* -0.475 0.6348 
(0...0) -0.1662 26:25 -1.8172 0.0692* -0.8183 0.4132 -1.3329 0.1826 
(-1...1) -0.128 21:30 -0.8079 0.4191 -0.6441 0.5195 -2.7628 0.0057*** 
*** indicates 1% level significance; ** indicates 5% level significance; * indicates 10% level significance 
 
 
5.4.1.2 Insurance 
When assessing Table 7 we can distinguish swiftly the majority of the grouped 
announcements had an impact of a negative nature. It is clear announcements from the BoE 
suggest that the measures taken impacted investors outlook towards insurance companies 
business model. The basis rate cuts and quantitative easing announcements suggest the market 
reacts to insurance company’s investment portfolio, which generally hold long-term assets as 
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well as high liquid assets such as money market securities. So the market predicted a short-
coming within the asset values of long-term bonds, which may be deemed to not yield sufficient 
returns given, the base rate cuts and the inverse relationship between bond yields and interest 
rates, therefore generating a negative CAAR. In terms of the UK government impacting the 
insurance sector, we exhibit positive and negative statistically significant results. The reason 
may be for this may further validate the announcements of the BoE and investors being aware 
of the potential losses incurred from their business models as well as their investment portfolios 
were heavily linked to the banking sector, which received bailouts. However, these results may 
be due in part because of the event windows as on the day of the announcement for government 
action the market responded positively. This highlights the government has a strong impact 
towards restoring confidence during volatile periods through announcements such as 
nationalizing Northern Rock. There is also negative and positive statistical significance within 
US announcements in regards to Federal Reserve and Government, which highlights the extent 
of exposure to the US sub-prime market, UK insurance companies held. When referring to 
Table 7 our results of USGOV announcements mirrors the UK government announcements in 
terms of the window lengths and CAAR. We find there is evidence of a positive CAAR on the 
day of announcements made by the USGOV, which restores confidence into the financial 
system, securing the future business of insurance firms. When referring to the Federal Reserve 
we establish a negative CAAR for event window -5 to 5, which mirrors announcement from 
the Bank of England. Whereby the asset purchasing programme introduced led to a negative 
reaction by the market as this impacts the investment portfolio due to insurance firms heavily 
invested within financial markets. Furthermore, European government as well the IMF had 
negative impact towards the insurance sector, which suggests the high degree of exposure to 
the sovereign debt crisis were known to shareholders. Furthermore, it highlights the impact of 
business to insurers with the likelihood of increased claims which may impact their 
performance and therefore is priced negatively by the marker. However, on a positive note, the 
ECB’s announcement had a favourable effect with statistical significance which, signifies the 
policy initiatives taken by the ECB assured investors within the insurance sector that their 
investment portfolio linked to Europe would sustain adequate returns with Mario Draghi 
prepared to do whatever it takes to keep the Euro. Ultimately, this drove down government 
yields as well as increased European equity values to which insurance companies investing in 
such assets have their interests fulfilled by such measures.  
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Table 7: Insurance Companies Overall CAAR results 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Window CAAR Pos:Neg t-test  Prob. B test. Prob. Sign test Prob.     
Bank of England 
(-5...5) -0.2828 61:69 -1.4935 0.1353 -2.1069 0.0351** -2.1235 0.0337** 
(0...0) -0.0015 69:61 -0.0269 0.9785 -0.2351 0.8142 -0.7094 0.4781 
(-1...1) -0.0533 67:63 -0.5392 0.5898 -0.7322 0.464 -1.063 0.2878 
Government 
(-5...5) -0.2898 43:56 -1.3592 0.1741 -1.8642 0.0623* -1.5198 0.1286 
(0...0) 0.1323 47:52 2.0581 0.0396** 1.5837 0.1133 -0.7156 0.4742 
(-1...1) 0.034 44:55 0.3054 0.7601 0.316 0.752 -1.3188 0.1872 
US Government 
(-5...5) -0.3629 43:67 -1.8238 0.0682* -2.5926 0.0095*** -1.6931 0.0904* 
(0...0) 0.1557 57:53 2.5954 0.0094*** 2.0459 0.0408** 0.9809 0.3266 
(-1...1) -0.1193 48:62 -1.1478 0.251 -1.3311 0.1832 -0.7381 0.4604 
Federal Reserve 
(-5...5) -0.5742 21:39 -2.1123 0.0347** -2.4033 0.0162** -2.1249 0.0336** 
(0...0) 0.0845 31:29 1.0307 0.3027 0.859 0.3903 0.4579 0.647 
(-1...1) -0.0343 29:31 -0.2415 0.8092 -0.2775 0.7814 -0.0587 0.9532 
European Governments 
(-5...5) -0.3429 29:41 -1.3634 0.1728 -1.8849 0.0594* -0.9416 0.3464 
(0...0) -0.0773 30:40 -1.019 0.3082 -1.4709 0.1413 -0.7022 0.4826 
(-1...1) -0.1101 32:38 -0.8382 0.4019 -1.1141 0.2652 -0.2232 0.8234 
European Central Bank 
(-5...5) 0.2588 25:25 0.8583 0.3908 1.2137 0.2249 -0.4544 0.6495 
(0...0) 0.2835 31:19 3.1183 0.0018*** 1.8537 0.0638* 1.2461 0.2127 
(-1...1) 0.1584 27:23 1.0061 0.3144 0.9282 0.3533 0.1124 0.9105 
IMF/Other Announcements 
(-5...5) -0.2332 37:43 -0.9493 0.3425 -1.1382 0.255 -0.7163 0.4738 
(0...0) -0.0093 36:44 -0.1257 0.8999 -0.2366 0.813 -0.9399 0.3473 
(-1...1) -0.2978 27:53 -2.3208 0.0203** -2.8183 0.0048*** -2.9524 0.0032*** 
*** indicates 1% level significance; ** indicates 5% level significance; * indicates 10% level significance 
 
 
5.4.1.3 Finance Companies 
From assessing Table 8 we can attempt to understand the reaction of UK finance companies 
stock prices to announcements, with the vast majority are of a positive nature. Notably, the 
European government along with specific event windows for BoE, UK government and 
IMF/others news announcements are however received by finance companies in a negative 
light, with statistical significance provided within UK government announcements as well as 
the IMF/others. When referring to the statistically significant negative CAARs we highlight 
the GOV announcements and IMF. The UK government announcements were received by the 
market in a negative light possibly due to the economy entering a recessionary period, which 
may impact the business model of finance companies as they specialise in consumer loans. The 
reasoning behind this could be as recessionary periods emerged within the economy, 
productivity declined in the UK, which resulted in higher unemployment and increased the 
probabilities of default. Therefore, economic conditions impact the performance of the sector, 
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which investors priced accordingly. With regards to the IMF/others announcements yielding 
negative results this could suggest the finance companies had exposure to nations which 
received bailout funding from the IMF and therefore caused the shareholders to seek greater 
returns elsewhere. This is also enhanced by the announcements made by the European 
governments, which does suggest they may have been large unknown exposures to the Euro 
area, possibly in the form of a loan portfolio. 
 Turning our attention towards the positive changes towards stock prices with BoE 
announcements, which in turn suggests the market made positive decisions in regards to the 
finance companies. This may be because the monetary policy utilised by the BoE making credit 
a cheaper source of finance via reduced rate cuts as well as through high scale quantitative 
easing. This may in turn have improved the business model of finance companies as cost of 
finance is reduced, competitive rates can be applied against the banking sector as well as 
improved earnings within their investment portfolio. This result can be mirrored through the 
CAAR of the ECB, which also implemented vast measures in order to stimulate economic 
activity. Furthermore, the positive CAAR result suggests the UK enjoys a close trading 
relationship with the EU and Eurozone as a whole. Our results also in Table 8 also demonstrates 
the US government announcements held a statistically significant positive CAAR reaction of 
11% for UK finance companies. Announcements such as TARP from the US government 
signalled to the financial markets with required action in order to restore confidence and 
prevent the financial system from meltdown. Furthermore, the Federal Reserve also provides 
a positive reaction towards the finance companies, which also highlights an active presence 
within the US market, however with no statistical significance. 
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Table 8: Finance Companies Overall CAAR results 
Window CAAR Pos:Neg t-test  Prob. B test. Prob. Sign test Prob.      
Bank of England 
(-5...5) 0.0214 83:85 0.1282 0.898 0.2775        0.7814        -1.911       0.056* 
(0...0) 0.1264 109:59 2.5082 0.0121** 2.0506        0.0403**    2.1372      0.0326** 
(-1...1) 0.0963 102:66 1.1032 0.2699 1.023          0.3063        1.0472      0.295 
Government 
(-5...5) -0.2972 54:66 -1.5099 0.1311 -2.1799 0.0293** -2.7654 0.0057*** 
(0...0) 0.0348 65:55 0.5866 0.5575 0.4545 0.6495 -0.7342 0.4628 
(-1...1) 0.0952 68:52 0.9264 0.3542 0.9809 0.3267 -0.1803 0.8569 
US Government 
(-5...5) -0.0076 67:65 -0.041 0.9673 -0.3476 0.7282 -1.2523 0.2105 
(0...0) 0.1186 83:49 2.1065 0.0352** 1.9245 0.0543* 1.5544 0.1201 
(-1...1) 0.09 74:58 0.9225 0.3563 1.0618 0.2883 -0.0244 0.9805 
Federal Reserve 
(-5...5) 0.0984 33:39 0.3883 0.6978 0.4827 0.6293 -1.5202 0.1285 
(0...0) 0.1169 43:29 1.5308 0.1258 1.5355 0.1247 0.8476 0.3967 
(-1...1) 0.083 40:32 0.627 0.5307 0.6191 0.5359 0.1372 0.8908 
European Governments 
(-5...5) -0.0919 46:38 -0.3928 0.6945 -0.647 0.5177 -0.4432 0.6576 
(0...0) -0.0345 51:33 -0.4893 0.6246 -0.9424 0.346 0.6592 0.5098 
(-1...1) -0.1131 47:37 -0.9255 0.3547 -1.2428 0.214 -0.2227 0.8237 
European Central Bank 
(-5...5) 0.4917 37:23 1.7526 0.0797* 2.1966 0.028** 0.9364 0.3491 
(0...0) 0.0351 38:22 0.4145 0.6785 0.2297 0.8183 1.1963 0.2316 
(-1...1) 0.1128 36:24 0.7697 0.4415 0.8243 0.4098 0.6765 0.4987 
IMF/Other Announcements 
(-5...5) 0.0035 53:43 0.0155 0.9876 0.0486 0.9612 1.2285 0.2193 
(0...0) -0.0836 41:55 -1.2329 0.2176 -0.9129 0.3613 -1.2216 0.2219 
(-1...1) -0.2292 41:55 -1.952 0.0509* -2.2124 0.0269** -1.2216 0.2219 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
*** indicates 1% level significance; ** indicates 5% level significance; * indicates 10% level significance 
 
 
 
 
5.4.1.4 Real Estates 
 
When turning our attention towards the results of the real estate sector, we can quickly 
establish the results were interpreted by the shareholders/market in a negative light. This may 
be due to the overall exposure the realtors hold within the housing market that subsequently 
experienced large losses off the back of the sub-prime collapse. We see in Table 9 
announcements from the BoE have a negative impact, which suggests the business model 
concerning the realtor sector is closely related to the banking sector, in terms of their assets 
held within their investment portfolio. In terms of other central banks having a similar impact, 
particularly from the IMF as well as the ECB further highlights the exposure the real estate 
sector held towards other nations in terms of asset holdings, with which the market were able 
to understand and position themselves accordingly. In regards to the IMF we demonstrate 
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statistically significance in the -5, 5 event window, which highlights the extent to which the 
market negatively interpreted the announcements of the European debt crisis to endure an 
adverse on the UK economy as a whole. In regards to UK Government announcement suggests 
the investors were aware of the worsening position that the realtors held with their natural 
attachment to the housing market. As governmental announcements from Europe and USA 
came to light to the UK markets further confirmed the deepness of the crisis to investors in 
regards to the realtor sector. With the housing markets crashing simultaneously within Western 
economies investors sought to reduce their asset holdings within the sector deemed to be 
attached to these markets. Despite the largely negative outlook for the real estate sector within 
the UK there was a positive reaction towards the Federal Reserve announcements, which 
overall suggests the linkages between the US and UK stock markets. It demonstrates the 
measures implemented by the Federal Reserve to restore confidence, improved the markets 
outlook on the UK real estate sector.  
 
 
 
Table 9: Real Estate Companies Overall CAAR results 
 
Window CAAR Pos:Neg t-test  Prob. B test. Prob. Sign test Prob.     
Bank of England 
(-5...5) -0.3075 53:59 -1.4965 0.1345 -1.4237 0.1545 -0.724 0.4691 
(0...0) -0.0358 58:54 -0.5778 0.5634 -0.4976 0.6187 0.221 0.8251 
(-1...1) -0.0018 62:50 -0.0167 0.9866 0.1726 0.863 0.977 0.3285 
Government 
(-5...5) -0.3216 34:46 -1.3204 0.1867 -1.7672 0.0772* -1.7896 0.0735* 
(0...0) -0.061 39:41 -0.8306 0.4062 -1.4239 0.1545 -0.6701 0.5028 
(-1...1) -0.0417 41:39 -0.3275 0.7433 -0.6699 0.5029 -0.2224 0.824 
US Government 
(-5...5) 0.1236 45:43 0.5334 0.5937 0.7018 0.4828 -0.4994 0.6175 
(0...0) -0.0487 51:37 -0.6969 0.4858 -0.7594 0.4476 0.7835 0.4333 
(-1...1) -0.0329 48:40 -0.2719 0.7857 -0.4481 0.6541 0.1421 0.887 
Federal Reserve 
(-5...5) -0.1723 24:24 -0.5525 0.5806 -0.8708 0.3838 -1.3333 0.1824 
(0...0) 0.1112 31:17 1.1829 0.2369 2.047 0.0407** 0.7245 0.4688 
(-1...1) 0.1781 32:16 1.0935 0.2742 1.4271 0.1535 1.0184 0.3085 
European Governments 
(-5...5) -0.3747 26:30 -1.2696 0.2042 -1.5155 0.1296 0.0018 0.9986 
(0...0) 0.0196 25:31 0.22 0.8259 1.35 0.177 -0.2661 0.7901 
(-1...1) -0.0759 28:28 -0.4925 0.6224 -0.6453 0.5188 0.5377 0.5908 
European Central Bank 
(-5...5) -0.1055 22:18 -0.305 0.7603 -0.4076 0.6836 -1.3248 0.1852 
(0...0) -0.0869 27:13 -0.8328 0.405 -1.0943 0.2738 0.3326 0.7394 
(-1...1) 0.148 30:10 0.8189 0.4128 0.8472 0.3969 1.327 0.1845 
IMF/Other Announcements 
(-5...5) -0.3656 26:38 -1.2696 0.2042 -2.0814 0.0374** -2.8078 0.005*** 
(0...0) -0.0124 36:28 -0.1431 0.8862 -0.9566 0.3388 -0.2755 0.7829 
(-1...1) -0.0499 31:33 -0.3315 0.7403 -0.4044 0.6859 -1.5416 0.1232 
*** indicates 1% level significance; ** indicates 5% level significance; * indicates 10% level significance 
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5.4.1.5 Investment Trusts 
From casual observation within Table 10 we begin to understand the reaction investors 
alleged towards investment trust sector, with the results seemingly illustrating this sector is not 
held to the same degree as other sectors. Given the nature of investment trusts function within 
the financial sector, this is to be expected as they are less regulated in comparison to other 
institutions and therefore have a greater obligation to operate within the best interest of the 
shareholders. In regards to central banking announcements (BoE, Federal Reserve, IMF and to 
a certain extent the ECB) we exhibit a positive reaction. This can be plausible as the monetary 
measures taken such as quantitative easing and decreased base rates, suggest to the investors 
within trust funds that stocks will be forecasted to increase, which is evident in the stock prices 
post-crisis era. It also highlights the contagion factor that trusts are exposed to within their 
investment portfolio as they are holding such funds in different markets which may hold 
linkages. However, we must note the negative CAAR reactions of the FED, ECB and IMF for 
event windows -5,5 (and -1,1 for the IMF). This suggests the volatility prior to the 
announcements had a greater impact towards the performance of investment trusts during 
periods of heightened volatility, which may have caused investors to relinquish their capital 
from the investment trust funds, which resulted in negative CAAR. Moreover, we witness a 
negative reaction in the governmental announcements examined, which suggest the investment 
trusts were not entirely free from shareholders scrutiny as the losses accumulated by the 
financial crisis, investors opted to reduce exposure to financial equities. In terms of UK 
government responses, we find a positive CAAR emerged on the day of the announcements, 
which demonstrates the importance of government action during periods of heightened 
volatility to reduce systematic risk. We also provide evidence of a no reaction from the US 
government announcement towards the investment trusts in the UK, which suggests the high 
efficiency of the market to digest information and respond appropriately. The same however 
cannot be said for EU government announcements, whereby we produce a negative CAAR 
response, which may overall suggest the funds examined had difficulties in their risk 
management operations. We do however examine frequent statistical significance and rejection 
of the null hypothesis, which is an issue highlighted within Mackinlay (1997) as the downfall 
of opting to utilise event study methodology, so the results in Table 10 could very well be 
interpreted in a negative light and we will get further clarification with the seemingly unrelated 
regression approach in order to confirm the results.  
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Table 10: Investment Trusts Overall CAAR results 
 
Window CAAR Pos:Neg t-test  Prob. B test. Prob. Sign test Prob.       
Bank of England 
(-5...5) 0.0115 277:213 5.2088 0*** 4.1802 0*** 2.9231 0.0035*** 
(-1...1) 0.0072 288:202 6.2383 0*** 4.776 0*** 3.9169 0.0001*** 
(0...0) 0.0038 272:218 5.787 0*** 4.7289 0*** 2.4713 0.0135*** 
Government 
(-5...5) 0 183:167 0.004 0.9968 -1.1478 0.2511 0.861 0.3892 
(-1...1) -0.0078 132:218 -6.189 0*** -3.8657 0.0001*** -4.5911 0*** 
(0...0) -0.0066 143:207 -9.0187 0*** -4.2192 0*** -3.4151 0.0006*** 
US Government 
(-5...5) -0.0004 201:184 -0.1981 0.843 -0.5435 0.5868 0.8476 0.3967 
(-1...1) -0.0017 188:197 -1.6371 0.1016 0.0305 0.9757 -0.4775 0.633 
(0...0) 0.0007 204:181 1.131 0.258 1.8421 0.0655* 1.1534 0.2488 
Federal Reserve 
(-5...5) -0.008 94:116 -2.6744 0.0075*** -3.5553 0.0004*** -1.513 0.1303 
(-1...1) 0.0046 119:91 2.9631 0.003*** 1.5785 0.1144 1.9373 0.0527* 
(0...0) 0.0065 121:89 7.2033 0*** 3.2794 0.001*** 2.2134 0.0269** 
European Governments 
(-5...5) -0.006 118:127 -2.1215 0.0339** -2.209 0.0272** -0.5761 0.5646 
(-1...1) -0.0091 99:146 -6.1591 0*** -3.7824 0.0002*** -3.0038 0.0027*** 
(0...0) -0.0031 106:139 -3.6356 0.0003*** -2.3222 0.0202** -2.1094 0.0349** 
European Central Bank 
(-5...5) -0.0181 60:115 -5.8607 0*** -6.0577 0*** -4.1389 0*** 
(-1...1) 0.0033 92:83 2.034 0.0419** 1.3751 0.1691 0.699 0.4845 
(0...0) 0.0003 87:88 0.3057 0.7598 -0.8096 0.4182 -0.0569 0.9546 
IMF/Other Announcements 
(-5...5) -0.0009 159:121 -0.4137 0.6791 0.7018 0.4828 2.2786 0.0227** 
(-1...1) -0.0004 157:123 -0.3182 0.7503 0.0423 0.9663 2.0396 0.0414** 
(0...0) 0.0003 171:109 0.4623 0.6438 0.9871 0.3236 3.7129 0.0002*** 
*** indicates 1% level significance; ** indicates 5% level significance; * indicates 10% level significance 
 
 
5.4.2 SUR Methodology 
5.4.2.1 Banks 
Upon undertaking the SUR approach we can establish a significantly improved method 
of modelling returns surrounding the event announcements. When understanding the dummy 
variables reacting towards the announcements examined, all banking institutions experience a 
positive return with the majority of institutions demonstrating statistical significance. The 
transpiring results aid our understanding of the unfolding news events that gives evidence to 
investors reacting in a positive manner given the transcendent volatile period. The 
announcements from the Bank of England and UK Government are found to have restored 
confidence to the system through the divisive actions demonstrated whether it be from capital 
injections into the interbank market to ensure lending continues from bank to bank or from the 
Government nationalising Northern Rock. All of these actions signalled positive moves to 
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ensure the market was safe and encouraged investment. From casual observation within Table 
11, we can quickly establish from the coefficient values that the IMF experienced a highly 
positive reactive relationship towards the stock prices of the banking sector. In particular this 
announcement type highlights how the banking sector is operating on a global level with 
financial markets highly integrated, as bank managers within the UK operating in Western 
economies, in order to gain sufficient returns for UK banking sector investors. The very fact 
statistical significance is achieved with high accuracy levels with international announcements 
i.e. ECB, Federal Reserve, European Governments, US Government and IMF only further 
enhance the argument of globalisation is present on a banking industrial level. Furthermore, 
when observing the UK government announcement, all institutions bar Alliance & Leicester 
experience a positive relationship in terms of explaining the stock price valuation, which is 
deemed to have positive effects upon the market being made aware of the initiatives taken 
forward. However, with Alliance & Leicester investors may have anticipated such negative 
news in the future in regards to the survival of the bank which eventually witnessed a taken-
over by Santander. With these relationships established we can further analyse the level of 
exposures these institutions experienced towards Europe from the perspective of investors via 
the dummy variable for European Governments are most effective in the smaller banking 
institutions within the UK (i.e. HBOS, RBS, Alliance & Leicester, Bradford & Bingley).  
To fully incorporate institutional exposure to bad debts we must look into the variable 
of CDS spreads. Within Northern Rock it is evident CDS spreads were incorporated within the 
stock price as they experience a positive relationship, which highlights investors were able to 
distinguish between institutions which held bad assets. As Northern Rock’s results are not 
consistent with the theory from Merton (1974), through experiencing a positive relationship 
between stock returns and CDS spreads, with the result suggesting the CDS spread dictated the 
stock price. Moreover, we can establish similar relationships among all other institutions 
experiencing a negative relationship against stock returns. Statistical significance is found 
among Barclays, RBS, Standard Chartered, Banco Santander and HBOS. This highlights a 
positive change in equity price reduces the cost of debt through greater financing being led 
through greater equity value and therefore reduces the reliance on debt financing as given by 
the CDS. Alliance & Leicester, Bradford & Bingley and to a certain extent HSBC, with their 
non-significant relationships between CDS spreads and stock prices suggest the former 
institutions held great exposures to the sub-prime crisis and eventually required bailouts. 
However, with the latter HSBC this is not true but due to the size of the institution, being an 
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international bank it was able to cover losses incurred and not require any external bailout 
funding. Turning our attention towards the Government bond variable we can quickly establish 
Standard Chartered and Bradford & Bingley experienced a negative correlation to the stock 
returns. Overall this highlights that their portfolio holdings may not have held as many risk-
free assets such as the UK government bond and suggests these institutions held assets with 
greater risk attached to them.  
The repo rate is a rate set by the central bank from which banks borrow in the short-
term. It is evident from Table 11 the correlation between repo rates and stock prices is namely 
negative, which suggests those institutions experiencing such relationships as the repo rates 
have not contributed towards the pricing of said institutions stock price. Therefore, with the 
cost of tier 1 capital declining from the BoE for short-term funding, it can be argued these 
institutions have sourced their funding via other outlets. Conversely, Lloyds Banking Group, 
Standard Chartered and Alliance & Leicester experience a positive correlation between repo 
rates and stock prices, which suggests as the repo rates declined these institutions seized the 
opportunity to increase their funding of repo rates to their capital base. More importantly, the 
result suggests these institutions possibly experienced short-term liquidity issues within their 
balance sheets and may not have held adequate levels of capital in order to cover the demand 
for their deposits, particularly within Lloyds banking group illustrating statistical significance.  
In terms of Libor relationships against the stock prices within the banking sector, it is 
evidently based on an institutional basis, with no generalised relationships arising. Positive 
association with Libor and stock prices arise within HSBC, RBS, HBOS, Alliance & Leicester 
and Northern Rock, with negative correlations determined in the rest. In the positive group of 
institutions, HSBC was the only institution to not receive bailout funding or merged/taken-over 
by another institution, as the results may be interpreted as the Libor rates contributed towards 
the pricing of their stock prices. Furthermore, it suggests these institutions were active in the 
London Interbank market with HSBC suggestively providing liquidity to the other troubled 
banks. Conversely, with the negatively associated banks, it suggests they were not active within 
the interbank market, which ultimately led to the infamous credit crunch within the UK, 
whereby liquidity between institutions were not as active, which led to confidence within the 
financial system come into question and ultimately led the Bank of England to intervene and 
provide liquidity to the financial sector and ultimately restore confidence.     
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Table 11: SUR Banks Results 
 
Variable HSBC          BARC     LLOY               RBS            STAN      BNC       
Intercept 0.0004          0.0004     -0.0003 0.0005            0.0001      -6.45E-05   
  (1.3812)          (0.7375)     (-0.4626) (0.8379)            (0.3693)      (-0.1436)  
ER  1.4283          1.2643     1.5344 1.5044             1.1168      1.0002 
  (39.3665)*** (29.437)***    (23.478)*** (27.909)***     (41.563)***    (26.21)***  
Bond  0.0394          0.1767     0.0564 0.1265              -0.0015      0.1488  
  (2.1287)**     (4.5445)***     (1.2931) (3.2062)***     (-0.0587)      (5.5524)*** 
Libor  0.0088          -0.075     -0.0926 0.0436            -0.0498      -0.032 
  (0.2721)          (-1.1098)     (-1.217) (0.6341)            (-1.0892)      (-0.6843) 
Repo  -0.0004          -0.0036     0.0408 -0.0182             0.0154      -0.0127 
  (-0.0495)         (-0.1977)     (1.9781)** (-0.9754)          (1.2487)      (-1.005) 
CDS  -0.0087          -0.0766     -0.1006 -0.0779            -0.0241      -0.0974 
  (-1.1575)         (-5.2808)***  (-5.8304) (-5.4313)***    (-2.4356)**    (-9.6019)*** 
D_BOE  0.5879             0.8274     0.4982 0.3828            0.8833      0.3651  
  (3.6295)***    (8.3745)***   (5.1673)*** (4.2397)***     (5.3149)***    (2.0134)** 
D_GOV  0.5893          0.2522     0.5502 0.614                0.1854      0.4849 
  (3.9239)***    (1.4672)     (6.3482)*** (6.9573)***     (1.2911)      (2.9868)*** 
D_ECB  0.3325          0.588     0.6006 0.7369            0.9426      0.941  
  (0.7287)          (1.0726)     (2.8679)*** (2.7348)***     (1.257)      (3.5049)*** 
D_EUGO 0.7664          0.9107     0.7929 0.9649            0.806       0.8045 
  (4.7121)***    (5.4761)***   (6.5542)*** (19.771)***     (4.603)***      (4.1617)*** 
D_FED  0.7286          0.747     0.6103 0.7065           1.034      1.0738 
  (5.2928)***    (4.6342)***   (2.6178)*** (5.4452)***     (7.4641)***    (3.9868)*** 
D_USGO 1.2232          0.9811     0.6413 1.0253           0.9263       0.7276 
  (4.7237)***    (11.966)***   (3.8252)*** (6.7612)***     (6.2879)***    (4.277)*** 
D_IMF  0.7767          0.0017     0.5793 1.2351           1.1145             0.7894 
  (3.7261)***    (0.1612)     (1.6728)* (3.6379)***     (4.8162)***    (3.5031)*** 
D_HSBC 0.7643          -       -  -            -        - 
  (0.7054)          -         -  -                        -        - 
D_BARC -          1.0522      -  -                        -         - 
  -          (6.6653)***     -  -            -         -               
R2 Within 0.59           0.52     0.44  0.67                   0.59         0.49 
t-Statistic in parenthesis; *** indicates 1% level significance; ** indicates 5% level significance; * indicates 10% 
level significance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
185 
 
Table 11 Continued 
Variable HBOS  AL  BB  NRK       
Intercept -0.0006  -0.0009  -0.0032  -0.0029 
  (-0.5412) (-0.7983) (-2.4449)** (-1.3712) 
ER  1.3401  1.3277  1.1133  0.6952 
  (15.936)*** (13.464)*** (10.796)*** (4.249)*** 
Bond  0.0438  0.0055  -0.0273  0.5413 
  (0.3625)  (0.0389)  (-0.1697) (1.8678)* 
Libor  0.1094  0.1152  -0.2038  0.3536 
  (1.2301)  (0.5787)  (-0.948)  (1.1123) 
Repo  -0.0019  0.1269  -0.0385  -0.218 
  (-0.0286) (1.1258)  (-0.2834) (-1.0633) 
CDS  -0.0857  -0.0003  -0.0001  0.0014 
  (-4.2342)*** (-0.2414) (-0.0465) (0.4897) 
D_BOE  0.7808  0.8926  0.9309  0.938 
  (5.8868)*** (1.1653)  (2.1322)** (4.1636)*** 
D_GOV  0.1615  -0.5364  0.7412  1.038 
  (1.643)  (-0.6062) (0.757)  (4.2912)*** 
D_ECB  0.917  0.479  1.0096  0.2828 
  (1.7232)* (0.5604)  (1.7164)  (0.2697) 
D_EUGO 1.0005  1.1186  1.1273  - 
  (18.346)*** (2.3633)** (1.1376)  - 
D_FED  0.6652  0.7775  0.0513  0.9319 
  (5.023)  (1.1446)  (0.0296)  (1.7245)* 
D_USGO 0.4806  0.8038  0.9385  1.0073 
  (3.0547)*** (1.7217)* (0.7916)  (2.0325)** 
D_IMF  1.3499  -  -  - 
  (2.9216)*** -  -  -    
R2 Within 0.58  0.25  0.19  0.13 
t-Statistic in parenthesis; *** indicates 1% level significance; ** indicates 5% level significance; * indicates 10% 
level significance. 
 
 
5.4.2.2 Insurance Companies 
When turning our attention towards Table 12, we can begin to establish positive 
reactions are found within the announcements among all insurance firms bar Prudential which 
experiences negative reaction to BoE, European Government and US government 
announcements, with Legal and General having adverse effect to ECB. The strong positive 
associations found through the announcements suggest investors found confidence from the 
respective central banks/governments in order to reduce overall volatility and therefore was 
priced accordingly by the market. In regards to Prudential, possible reasons for them to be 
experiencing negative reactions towards certain announcements may be correlated to the scale 
of which Prudential were exposed to the crisis in many nations. Prudential is by far the most 
diverse in terms asset portfolio with great market presence globally, which may have led to the 
negative reactions from which, their investors may have anticipated their declining position as 
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the crisis unfolded. Overall, in terms of the financial crisis, insurance companies played a big 
part by facilitating the actions of banks from receiving fees in return to insure the mortgages, 
from which the results suggest Prudential’s investors alleged there to be exposure within UK, 
Europe and the US. Regarding Legal and General’s negative reaction to the ECB suggests the 
investors were aware to the exposure Legal and General may have possessed towards the Euro-
zone.  
When delving further into Table 12 we note differing relationships between the CDS 
spreads among the institutions are exemplified as all the institutions bar RSA endure a negative 
relationship towards stock prices. This suggests the CDS spreads held an inverse relationship 
to stock prices toward the majority and therefore did not account for being priced within the 
asset price by investors. However, the results are consistent with Merton (1974), which could 
be argued the spreads widened as the stocks prices declined and therefore was priced 
accordingly by the market. On the contrary to RSA, it experiences a positive relationship to 
stock prices, which suggests through the market understood the varying levels of risk RSA had 
undertaken and therefore was a contributor towards the pricing.  
Moreover, when investigating the level of government financing effects towards the 
stock prices of insurance firms, it is clear to see that the majority of insurance firms enjoy a 
positive relationship towards the pricing bar Old Mutual. The positive associated insurance 
firms can be interpreted as enjoying a large holding of government bonds with Aviva and RSA 
enjoying statistically significant relationships. As the price of government bonds declined these 
institutions in particular invested into such assets, which is a given as insurance firms tend to 
invest in long-term assets due to the nature of life insurance firms. However in regards to Old 
Mutual, the slightly inverse relationship suggests the opposite. The decline in government 
yields was not incorporated within their stock price, which suggests investors were aware of 
the portfolio holdings of government bonds was not a reason for their stock price to be affected 
in a slight negative manner.  
With regards to Libor and Repo rates there are no distinguished prevalent relationships 
against the determination of the stock price for insurance firms. When looking closely towards 
the positive Libor impacts we can speculate, that as lending between the institutions increased, 
the provided liquidity enabled the insurance companies to earn higher returns on assets within 
their portfolio, by which investors capitalised upon. However, an inverse relationship suggests 
the concerning insurance firms, did not affiliate themselves with the inter-bank market and/or 
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engaged in other longer-term markets by which investors were aware of their portfolio 
holdings. After establishing the Repo rates relationship, in regards to the positive associations 
determined, it suggests that Prudential, Old Mutual and Legal & General increased their short-
term funding for improved liquidity combined as the markets priced it accordingly. Conversely, 
Aviva and RSA experienced a negative association in Repo rates to stock prices, which 
suggests the markets understood these insurance firms, raised finances via other means and not 
in the short-term.   
 
Table 12: SUR Insurance Companies Results  
__________________________________________________________________ 
Variable PRU  AV          OML   LGEN  RSA   
Intercept 0.0004 0.0004          -6.47E-05   -9.07E-5 -5.55E-5 
  (0.853)  (0.8621)         (-0.1256)   (-0.185) (-0.1231) 
ER  0.99  0.9187          1.0068   0.9798  0.8543 
  (40.475)*** (36.139)***   (40.01)***   (35.068)*** (22.681)*** 
Bond  0.0192  0.1236          -0.0004   0.0348  0.0624 
  (0.6424)  (4.281)***     (-0.0158)   (1.1988) (2.8084)*** 
Libor  0.1105  0.0976          -0.0467   -0.168  -0.0006 
  (2.0997)** (1.9462)*       (-0.8669)   (-3.274)*** (-0.0149) 
Repo  0.0325  -0.007          0.009   0.0077  -0.0028 
  (2.2888)** (-0.5191)        (0.6203)   (0.5609) (-0.2728) 
CDS  -0.0306  -0.0605          -0.0431   -0.0369 0.0019 
  (-2.2054)** (-5.0968)***  (-3.41)***   (-2.5465)** (0.1268) 
D_BOE   -1.4935  0.9403           0.7664   0.9224   0.5617 
  (-3.0065)*** (17.3)***        (4.517)***   (14.39)*** (3.4685)*** 
D_GOV  1.9363  0.5893           0.76363   0.8051  0.8398 
  (3.2502)*** (4.4826)***    (4.959)***   (10.29)*** (7.133)*** 
D_ECB  0.7645  0.9271           0.1263   -0.0492 0.5587 
  (0.9681)  (1.5115)           (0.2494)   (-0.2161) (1.0214) 
D_EUGO -0.939  0.6415           0.9834   0.8598  0.9574 
  (-1.4256) (3.4444)***    (6.098)***   (5.8255)*** (4.5854)*** 
D_FED  0.4419  0.8962           0.98   0.9786  1.1868 
  (0.6156)  (1.8126)*        (4.617)***   (5.3374)*** (2.2059)** 
D_USGO -3.1686  0.6844            0.9551   0.9008  0.8878 
  (-5.9516)*** (3.1673)***   (6.3003)***   (7.229)*** (3.9046)*** 
D_IMF  0.8975  0.8899          1.021   1.054  0.9177 
  (1.2738)  (0.9658)          (2.7472)   (1.9376)* (1.5004)   
R2 Within 0.55  0.59           0.54   0.55  0.42 
t-Statistic in parenthesis; *** indicates 1% level significance; ** indicates 5% level significance; * indicates 10% 
level significance. 
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5.4.2.3 Finance Companies 
 From Table 13 when referring to the dummy variables to capture the different types of 
announcements, all finance companies illustrate a positive response. This suggests all the 
measures applied succeeded in restoring confidence and was evidently perceived by investors 
in a fruitful manner, which overall reduced the increased volatility. To breakdown the different 
types of announcements, similar to the banking sector, the IMF announcements proved to be 
very effective in restoring confidence as expected by the perception of investors. With the 
international lender of last resort essentially acting in a responsive manner, the overall 
heightened volatility within financial markets ultimately improved confidence to investors and 
liquidity into the system. Collectively, the central banking announcements held great 
importance in restoring confidence on a global scale with their swift responses to combat the 
seeming losses being generated by the finance company sector with which the crisis brought 
about.  
 When interpreting the government bond variable within the model, among the finance 
companies the correlation towards the stock returns is namely a positive one. This overall 
suggests the cost of tier 1 capital via government bonds aiding the stock pricing of the majority 
finance companies, which highlights these institutions holdings of finance companies were not 
of great concern within their investment portfolio. With the few finance companies that 
experienced a negative association between government bond yields and stock returns, 
illustrate the great level of exposure these finance companies held within their investment 
portfolios and also suggest their funding is based around government assets.  
 With regards to Libor rates interacting towards the stock prices of the finance 
companies, we can establish from casual observation that namely a positive association arises. 
In terms of the positively related finance companies, it suggests the decline in Libor aided 
investors to price those firms with the perceived cost of capital reducing for the banking sector. 
Therefore may spill-over into the finance company sector in order to maximise performance, 
as the rhetoric of finance companies is essentially to earn greater margins on issued loans i.e. 
consumer loans for cars. Conversely, for the negatively associated finance firms in respect to 
Libor, one may interpret such results as these financial companies seeking to raise finances 
through other means, possibly through equity capital or competing central banks such as the 
ECB or Federal Reserve. In terms of repo rates there is a mixed interpretation between the 
finance companies and ultimately investors will be able to differentiate the costs to respective 
finance companies. A positive relationship may result due to the costs of short-term funding 
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being reduced, capital is more readily available than previously, therefore may have a direct 
relationship towards performance and therefore is priced in by investors, leading to the repo 
rates dictating a market price. However, many institutions enjoy a negative relationship of repo 
rates towards the pricing of their stock prices, which may represent the market has 
distinguished these institutions as not requiring the funding in the short-term basis, which may 
be deemed as a good indicator of performance as they have a reluctance with utilising credit 
within the repo market.   
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Table 13: SUR Finance Companies Results 
Variable    ADN  BRW         CBG  EMG         FCAM     IAP        INVP        
Intercept   3.65E-7 0.0001         -0.0001  -6.52E-5       -9.88E-5    -0.0001 5.09E-5 
      (0.0008) (0.2271)         (-0.29)  (-0.1037)      (-0.1614)    (-0.2046) (0.0981 
ER      1.0348 1.0648         1.0201  0.9901          1.0343    0.9939  0.9977 
      (32.411)*** (16.744)***   (22.294)*** (31.089)***   (17.307)***    (33.348)*** (33.717)*** 
Bond      -0.0078 0.0430         0.0579  0.0619         -0.0126      0.0607  0.0638 
      (-0.3092) (1.4706)        (2.2688)**  (1.6711)*      (-0.3491)    (2.0163)** (2.0867)** 
Libor      0.0172 -0.0168          -0.1057  -0.0492          0.0055    0.0404  -0.1088 
      (0.3848) (-0.324)         (-2.3431)**  (-0.7506)      (0.0868)    (0.7597) (-2.0098)** 
Repo      0.0044 0.0067         -0.0051  0.0333          -0.0084    0.0172  -0.0053 
      (0.3694) (0.4817)         (-0.4182)  (1.8786)*      (-0.4898)    (1.2008) (-0.3625) 
D_BOE      0.861 5 0.9117         0.866  0.8119           0.6836    0.6735  0.8529 
      (3.0382)*** (4.0158)***  (6.978)***  (2.7712)*** (3.1528)***    (2.5774)*** (5.0819)*** 
D_GOV      0.152  0.5109         0.2913  0.2182         0.5733    0.2974  0.1606 
      (0.8496) (2.3647)**    (2.2372)**  (0.6482)       (2.5498)**   (0.9968) (0.8711) 
D_ECB      0.8505 0.9153         0.3999  0.7166          0.3376    0.4532  0.3386 
      (1.2117) (2.689)***    (0.3374)  (1.3434)       (0.9961)   (1.2936) (0.818) 
D_EUGO   0.9295 0.7582         0.8218  0.9773         1.004   0.9982  0.939 
      (5.4666)*** (3.0108)***  (4.9514)*** (5.5205)***  (6.481)***   (9.4724)*** (4.6262)*** 
D_FED      1.0392 0.8137         0.973  0.9943         0.9827   0.9256  0.9771 
      (4.8312)*** (1.6361)         (5.4537)*** (2.031)**      (2.2086)**   (3.4802)*** (5.2281)*** 
D_USGO   0.9465 0.8115         0.7929  0.9124         0.8528   0.968  0.9639 
      (5.9893)*** (3.4846)***  (4.8527)***  (3.9487)*** (3.5606)***   (8.4239)*** (7.2474)*** 
D_IMF      1.0131 1.0295         1.043  0.9985          1.0284   1.0087  0.9869 
      (4.0439)*** (2.9916)***  (1.422)  (4.7724)*** (1.5914)   (6.2067)*** (4.3316)*** 
R2 Within  0.44  0.18          0.32  0.42          0.20   0.47  0.47 
Variable    LSE  PAG          PFG  RAT          SDR         _  
Intercept   0.0001 -0.0003  -4.27E-5              0.0002  -0.0001 
      (0.2237) (-0.4083)  (-0.1109) (0.4979)         (-0.3899) 
ER      0.9826 0.9285  1.0317  1.0824          0.9968 
      (28.469)*** (14.438)***    (19.564)*** (16.715)          (41.497)*** 
Bond      0.0428 0.0683   -0.0162  0.0319          0.0324 
      (1.3957) (1.385)       (-0.7153)              (1.0935)   (1.3435)  
Libor      0.0478 -0.2724   -0.0352  -0.0049  0.1095 
      (0.8777) (-3.1169)***   (-0.8778) (-0.0952) (2.5607)** 
Repo      0.0092 -0.017  -0.0016  0.0021            -0.0179 
      (0.632) (-0.7183)  (-0.1507) (0.1527)          (-1.5462) 
D_BOE      0.253  0.8715  0.9183               0.8858  1.0014  
      (1.0381) (2.6074)***    (3.2881)*** (4.5839)***   (4.8809)*** 
D_GOV      0.7235 0.4725              0.6978  0.4647             0.0293 
      (3.8053)*** (2.6446)***     (1.4715)  (2.8963)***    (0.187) 
D_ECB      0.7849 0.9402   0.9368  0.6214            0.8429  
      (1.405) (2.0978)**      (1.4026)  (1.4019)          (2.4741)** 
D_EUGO   0.9807 0.7493  1.0015  0.9778           0.9604 
      (4.2077)*** (4.0544)***    (5.6766)*** (3.3974)***    (5.7582)*** 
D_FED      0.9582 0.9005  1.0012  0.9343          0.98 
      (3.8791)*** (1.6631)*  (4.3694)*** (3.0979)***    (4.8121)*** 
D_USGO   0.8642 0.5853  0.9824  0.8892            0.9887 
      (6.0208)*** (2.8154)***    (6.668)*** (7.3007)***    (8.5286)*** 
D_IMF      0.9868 1.0361   1.0097  1.0808          1.0532 
      (1.1992) (5.2707)***    (3.2557)*** (1.3905)***    (1.7694)*       _  
R2 Within  0.38  0.20   0.24  0.19          0.57 
t-Statistic in parenthesis; *** indicates 1% level significance; ** indicates 5% level significance; * indicates 10% 
level significance. 
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5.4.2.4 Investment Trusts 
All institutions enjoy a positive reaction to the announcements with a high degree of 
statistical significance among the vast majority of investment trusts, with the exception of 
Alliance Trust and Templeton Emerging Markets Investment Trust, which experience negative 
reactions to certain announcements as evident within Table 14. Ultimately, one can suggest a 
key reason for the vast majority of investment trusts experiencing positive reactions towards 
the news events examined, is namely due to the restoring of confidence within the financial 
system, which was the aim of the given initiatives. As given the nature of investment trusts 
business model, which essentially operate in the best interests of enriching shareholders 
through gaining higher returns from their investment portfolio, which is namely within stock 
holdings. One can formulate the opinion for Alliance Trust to experience negative returns on 
UK and European government/central banking announcements based upon their risk 
management position, whereby their investors possibly understood the higher levels of risk 
undertaken and therefore priced accordingly. Templeton Emerging Markets Investment Trust 
negative reaction towards the UK government’s policy initiatives suggests there may have been 
a high degree of exposure to the financial crisis or were not able to manage the induced 
volatility.  
When turning our attention towards the government bond largely a positive relationship 
is established among the majority of investment trusts. The positive relationship suggests that 
as the cost of capital has declined the performance aspect of trusts have contributed to the stock 
prices considerably.  By which, the market has been able to price trusts accordingly, as the cost 
of finance is reduced towards the economy, growth prospects are increased for firms operating 
from which, investment trusts may hold within their investment portfolio and also benefit from 
their reduced costs of raising finances. However for those institutions experiencing negative 
reactions towards declining government yields, one may speculate those institutions are raising 
finances via other means, which is not accounted for within the stock price. In regards to Libor 
rates impacting the determined stock prices of the investment trusts, is namely a positive one. 
This suggests the decreasing Libor rates, overall increased liquidity in the short-term for other 
sectors of the economy, which can be may be viewed by those shareholders as a positive 
movement, due to the interest of held by the trusts. Conversely, a negative relationship may 
arise as a result possibly due to the lesser extent of exposure to UK Libor rates and therefore 
were not a contributing factor in terms of pricing the investment trust. Repo rates are generally 
found to have a mixed reaction with investment trusts experiencing positive and negative 
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relationships towards determining the pricing of their company. One may argue for the 
positively correlated investment trusts, the relationship arises due to reduced cost of financing 
in the short-term whereby, banks are then in-turn able to lend further funds to companies, which 
may drive stock price performance and therefore those investment trust funds benefited from 
indirectly after holding interest with firms in the economy. However an inverse correlation may 
arise as the investment fund may hold interests elsewhere, for example investing in other 
countries and therefore are not impacted by the changes in Repo rates and did not overall 
contribute the market to price those funds within that light.       
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Table 14: SUR Investment Trusts Results 
Variable    ATST ASL        BNKR  BRWM         BSET BTEM       CLDN     
Intercept   -0.0005 -0.0001 -5.39E-5 0.0003         7.63E-6 -5.05E-5      -0.0001  
      (-0.7287) (-0.4354) (-0.2266) (1.0789)         (0.0312) (-0.212)       (-0.488) 
ER      1.7363 1.0184 1.0075 1.0024          1.0303 1.011       1.006 
      (31.337)*** (35.992)*** (45.662)*** (47.069)***  (50.477)*** (42.298)*** (35.984)*** 
Bond      0.2019 0.0217         0.005 0.0364          0.0075 0.0104       0.0196  
      (4.8037)*** (1.3655) (0.3592)      (1.7247)*  (0.5222) (0.7464)       (1.2652) 
Libor      0.157  -0.0724         0.0589 -0.0748          0.0254 0.0492        -0.0218  
      (1.0801) (-2.5638)**   (2.3746)** (-1.0144)  (0.9989) (1.9829)**   (-0.7963) 
Repo      -0.0321 0.0032            0.0024 -0.0057          -0.0018 0.0059        -0.0032  
      (-0.9298) (0.4299)        (0.3715) (-0.5645)        (-0.2688) (0.889)       (-0.4437)  
D_BOE      -0.3834 0.8053 0.8606 0.9676 0.9886 0.9696        0.9424 
      (-0.4032) (5.3985)***   (6.7652) (4.9607)***   (6.7088)*** (8.1761)*** (6.8442)*** 
D_GOV      0.2139 0.2638 0.5767 0.2268         0.1197  0.6454       0.9406  
      (0.3052) (1.3362) (3.6171)*** (1.0306)         (0.5486) (2.7152)*** (6.5549)*** 
D_ECB      -1.2481 0.9142 0.7337 0.9232         0.8896 0.1606       0.0555  
      (-0.4532) (4.1061)***   (1.1479) (1.7479)*       (2.4196)** (0.3861)       (0.1338) 
D_EUGO   -4.0776 1.026 0.9613 0.9609         1.0061 0.961       1.0106  
      (-5.1103)*** (4.4668)***   (5.0991)*** (7.7621)***   (7.9774)*** (4.6641)*** (5.4976)***  
D_FED      1.8199 0.7674 0.9751 1.0306         0.7791 0.9912       0.9999 
      (1.3768) (1.8074)* (3.7799)*** (4.7041)***   (1.1995) (3.2042)*** (3.8319)*** 
D_USGO   -1.2996 0.7399 0.8464 0.9962         0.9653 0.9753       0.9057  
      (-2.7757)*** (3.8479)***   (4.5194)*** (3.8558)***   (3.586)*** (5.9554)*** (5.5419)*** 
D_IMF      2.4772 1.0369  1.0237 1.0017         1.0473 1.0489       1.017  
     (1.4672) (1.8801)*       (4.3033)*** (1.7759)*       (3.4939)*** (2.6364)*** (1.3339)              
R2 Within  0.43  0.49         0.59 0.61         0.64 0.56       0.49  
Variable    CTY  EDIN        EFM  ELTA         FEV FRCL       GSS      
Intercept   -7.64E-6 -0.0001 5.04E-5 0.0002         -5.57E-5 -6.92E-5      0.0001  
      (-0.0367) (-0.6315) (0.169) (0.6556)         (-0.2318) (-0.411)       (0.3634) 
ER      0.9932 1.0152 1.0028 0.9942         0.9931 0.9932       0.9638 
      (59.231)*** (60.116)*** (33.963)*** (20.112)***   (50.398)*** (67.811)*** (16.685)*** 
Bond      0.0139 -0.0084         0.0037 0.0278         0.0355 0.0037       0.0708  
     (1.1415) (-0.7587) (0.2148)       (1.308) (2.5132)** (0.3786)       (4.3299)*** 
Libor      0.036  0.0185         0.0045 0.0701         0.0044 0.03       -0.053  
      (1.66)* (0.9331)         (0.1465) (1.8611)* (0.1776) (1.7133)*     (-1.8307)* 
Repo      0.0007 -0.0022          -0.004 0.016         -0.0021 0.0074        -0.0031  
      (0.1322) (-0.4204)       (-0.476) (1.5785)         (-0.3221) (1.5575)       (-0.4071)  
D_BOE      0.8438 0.8865  0.6879 0.868             0.8548  0.8128       0.7752              
(5.5442)*** (6.2437)***  (5.0071)*** (5.6)***         (5.403)*** (8.4843)*** (4.6252)*** 
D_GOV      0.1035 0.2772            0.6015 0.8301         0.5028 0.0195       0.2302  
      (0.5872) (1.8951)*      (4.3574)*** (6.9884)         (2.3179)** (0.1583)       (1.2156) 
D_ECB      0.5102 0.6208 0.6  0.1907         0.8233 0.4606       0.4572  
      (0.9798) (0.6747)        (1.0659) (0.4707)        (1.6674)*      (2.0348)**  (1.2038) 
D_EUGO   0.973 0.8926 0.9934 0.9372         0.8788  1.0056       0.9723  
      (9.2345)*** (6.9486)***   (7.2823)*** (5.625)***    (3.4278)*** (10.467)*** (3.5861)***  
D_FED      0.975  0.984 0.9727 1.0717        0.9811 0.9447       0.9864 
      (5.5233)*** (7.349)*** (5.1425)*** (2.0573)**   (3.9341)*** (2.9904)*** (3.3112)*** 
D_USGO   0.5659 0.786 0.6411 0.5601        0.74  0.4485       0.7324  
      (2.6633)*** (2.6258)***   (3.5004)*** (2.3273)**   (3.3193)*** (3.1651)*** (3.5252)*** 
D_IMF      0.9994 1.0238  1.7516 1.011        1.0083 1.0097       0.9636  
     (2.0279)** (5.7799)***   (1.7516)* (1.8614)*      (1.625) (2.2116)**   (0.8822)    
R2 Within  0.71  0.72 0.47 0.27        0.64  0.77        0.23 
t-Statistic in parenthesis; *** indicates 1% level significance; ** indicates 5% level significance; * indicates 10% 
level significance. 
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Table 14 SUR Investment Trusts Continued 
Variable    HRI  JAM        JII   JMG         LWDB MNKS       MRC    
Intercept   1.23E-5 4.04E-5 -2.06E-6 4.18E-5         0.0001 6.72E-5       -8.07E-5  
      (0.0463) (0.173)  (-0.0049) (0.1476)         (0.6067) (0.2813)       (-0.3253) 
ER      0.9876 0.9861 1.0249 1.0015         0.9931 1.0184       1.0152 
      (30.56)*** (36.23)*** (31.95)*** (41.801)***   (50.398)*** (45.72)***   (45.289)*** 
Bond     -0.0231  0.0155         0.0048 0.0107         0.0355 -0.0221       0.0333   
     (-1.4837) (1.1254) (0.1977)       (0.6472) (1.3634) (-1.5691)     (2.2761)** 
Libor      0.0541 0.0412         -0.0117 0.0281         0.039 0.085       -0.005  
      (1.9447)* (1.6812)*      (-0.2693)      (0.9544)  (1.3116) (3.4117)*** (-0.1962) 
Repo      0.0033 0.0069           -0.0067 -0.0005         0.0007 -0.0008       -0.0003  
      (0.4513) (1.0468)        (-0.5765) (-0.0706)       (0.0927) (-0.1203)     (-0.044)  
D_BOE      0.904  0.8517  0.5213 0.9539           0.4023 0.7911          0.931              
(4.712)*** (4.5712)***  (2.0838)**  (6.7211)***  (2.5278)** (5.9433)*** (5.5349)*** 
D_GOV      0.586  0.177             0.5986 0.1414         0.7121 0.4589       0.3137  
      (2.1515)** (0.7021)        (3.1671)*** (0.5773)         (5.0565)*** (3.1344)*** (1.6066) 
D_ECB      0.9057 0.7492           0.9316 0.6495         0.681 0.4317       0.3431  
      (4.829)*** (3.1957)***  (2.0445)** (0.7674)        (3.0047)***  (0.8776)**  (0.4276) 
D_EUGO   0.9854 1.0122 0.9683 0.9992         0.9754  0.9784       0.9686  
      (10.745)*** (6.1451)***  (7.037)*** (5.3597)***  (6.0778)*** (7.9444)*** (6.1745)***  
D_FED      0.9286 0.7169 0.9729 0.9948        0.945 1.0117       0.9477 
      (3.5648)*** (1.8837)*      (4.24)*** (4.9422)**    (6.5023)*** (4.5786)*** (4.6254)*** 
D_USGO   0.9832 0.8576 0.9049 0.979        0.7373 0.9638       0.8101  
      (5.0129)*** (3.6539)***  (6.7348)*** (6.648)***   (4.3316)*** (6.9993)*** (3.1325)*** 
D_IMF      0.9926 0.9769  1.0311 1.0062        1.036 0.9707       1.0306 
     (4.8978)*** (1.8641)*     (2.2171)** (2.3493)**    (2.001)** (2.4108)**   (3.6179)***           
R2 Within  0.44  0.49              0.43  0.56        0.50  0.60       0.60   
Variable    MRCH MUT        MYI              PCT         PLI PNL         RCP     
Intercept   4.01E-5 1.28E-6 -5.38E-5 2.62E-5         -5.94E-5 -0.0001         6.13E-5  
      (0.1612) (0.0051)  (-0.2267) (0.1028)         (-0.2465) (-0.6982)       (0.183) 
ER      1.0291 1.0061 0.9959 1.0146         1.0362 1.0397         1.064 
      (50.96)*** (44.52)*** (40.79)*** (37.28)***    (46.89)*** (26.98)***     (27.39)*** 
Bond     0.0183  0.0232         0.0102 -0.0047         0.0018 -0.0358          0.0062  
     (1.2524) (1.5689) (0.7347)      (-0.3134) (0.1292) (-3.8451)*** (0.3178) 
Libor     0.044   0.0401         0.0403 0.0278         0.006 -0.0015          0.088 
     (1.695)* (1.5326)        (1.632)        (1.0488)  (0.2389) (-0.0958)       (2.5218)** 
Repo     -0.0032 -0.0019          -0.0058        0.004         -0.0001 -0.0015          0.0026  
      (-0.4572) (-0.273)        (-0.8737) (0.5685)        (-0.0224) (-0.3387)       (0.2784)  
D_BOE      0.9559 0.8402  0.9482 0.8119           0.826 0.7602          0.9709               
(6.644)*** (7.1159)***  (7.2421)***  (3.3564)***  (4.26)*** (2.9717)***   (5.2968)*** 
D_GOV      0.4421 0.6087           0.3631 0.6924        0.343 0.2247          0.2716  
      (2.9686)*** (4.544)***    (1.5717) (1.9678)**   (1.8129)* (1.482)          (1.2139) 
D_ECB      0.7628 0.4509           0.9624 0.4023        0.3492 0.6387          0.217 
      (1.399) (0.961)        (0.988) (1.4794)       (0.6018) (2.1363)**     (0.1755) 
D_EUGO   0.8249 0.9377 0.992 1.0065       0.9906    0.8192          1.0425  
      (5.7131)*** (6.4899)***  (7.3518)*** (5)***         (7.8169)*** (5.2533)***   (4.54)***  
D_FED      0.954  0.9822 0.9966 0.8215       0.9641 0.9346          1.0402 
      (5.6249)*** (7.6383)***  (8.255)*** (2.789)**    (4.2064)*** (5.1752)***   (2.964)*** 
D_USGO   0.655  0.619 0.9471 0.967        0.9308  0.9752 0.9066 
      (3.2137)*** (2.7378)***  (4.4592)*** (5.863)***  (5.1)*** (12.85)***      (5.849)*** 
D_IMF      1.0652 1.037   1.012 0.9998       1.071  0.9779           1.098 
     (2.4987)** (2.7944)***  (1.67)*    (3.519)***  (2.75)*** (1.4763)           (1.5)   
R2 Within  0.65  0.60 0.56 0.49        0.60  0.40            0.34  
t-Statistic in parenthesis; *** indicates 1% level significance; ** indicates 5% level significance; * indicates 10% 
level significance. 
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Table 14 SUR Investment Trusts Continued 
Variable    SCIN  SMT         TEM            TMPL         TRY WTAN         WWH     
Intercept   1.95E-5 0.0001  5.28E-7 6.80E-7         1.05E-5 6.97E-6          -8.91E-5  
      (0.0937) (0.7025)  (0.0019) (0.0027)         (0.0343) (0.0409)         (-0.4037) 
ER      1.0085 1.0072 0.9835 1.0197         1.0484 1.0098          1.06 
      (50.46)*** (49.21)*** (51.16)*** (48.23)***    (36.83)*** (59.63)***      (26.97)*** 
Bond      0.0158  0.022          0.0114 0.0069         -0.0036 0.0153          -0.0053  
     (1.2889)     (1.4841)  (0.7195)     (0.477) (-0.202) (1.5236)         (-4.118)*** 
Libor     0.0853 0.0826          0.046 0.0407         0.0508 0.0588          0.0308 
     (3.9325)*** (3.1358)***   (1.65)*        (1.5879)  (1.5965) (3.3087)***   (1.3401) 
Repo     -0.0027 0.0092 0.0035          0.0016           -0.0021 -0.0001          -0.0097  
     (-0.4606) (1.29)             (0.4696) (0.2335)         (-0.2534) (-0.029)          (-1.564)  
D_BOE     0.8795 0.8575   0.9479 0.6574           0.8705  0.8464          0.9723               
(6.0597)*** (5.8413)***   (6.366)*** (4.043)***    (6.8212)*** (5.3525)***   (4.333)*** 
D_GOV     0.4885 0.2489 -0.228 0.5779         0.745 0.3058          0.075 
      (2.7015)*** (1.4616)        (-0.993) (3.9824)***  (6.417)*** (1.8071)*      (0.3313) 
D_ECB      0.6176 0.7923           0.6897 0.7101           0.197 0.9593          0.9784 
      (1.0348) (2.0013)**    (1.5787) (1.7)*            (0.649) (0.54)             (2.33)** 
D_EUGO   1.0013 0.9797 1.0099 0.893         0.457    0.9635          1.011  
      (5.887)*** (6.9727)***  (6.816)*** (4.823)***    (2.619)*** (5.2524)***   (8.674)***  
D_FED      0.9767 1.0252 0.9904 0.9859         0.9707 1.0179            1.002 
      (4.3973)*** (4.1983)***  (7.8367)*** (6.667)***    (5.176)*** (11.27)***     (3.474)*** 
D_USGO   0.9337 0.9995  0.8563 0.6537         0.9614 0.8976            0.9829 
      (4.9687)*** (6.7147)***  (5.9893)*** (2.9)***       (4.29)*** (7.54)***       (7.375)*** 
D_IMF      1.0894 0.9572   1.0018  1.0662        0.9814  1.0796          0.9945 
     (2.1382)** (1.7511)*     (2.6304)***  (2.2852)**   (1.524) (2.479)**       (3.052)*** 
R2 Within  0.64  0.63 0.66              0.62 0.49 0.72          0.36 
t-Statistic in parenthesis; *** indicates 1% level significance; ** indicates 5% level significance; * indicates 10% 
level significance. 
 
5.4.2.5 Real Estates 
 Turning our attention towards Table 15, we can quickly establish all the real estate firms 
experienced positive reactions in terms of announcements made. Overall this enables us to 
determine the announcements fulfilled their purpose in the eyes of investors within the real 
estate sector, as investors sought after stability following vast levels of volatility. Similar to 
other financial sectors, where the interpretation from the market highly sought the IMF to be 
most effective in reducing volatility and restoring confidence to the financial system as the 
model suggests greatest responsiveness is illustrated.  
 In terms of the government bond yields, overall the model suggests there is a positive 
relationship among the vast majority of real estate companies within our sample. In regards to 
the realtors, which enjoy a positive relationship towards government bonds, suggests the 
pricing of government funds has a contribution towards the pricing of their stock. From this 
knowledge, the results suggests the market is aware of their financial portfolio positions as 
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holding increasing amounts of risk-free assets, highlights further stability and therefore reduced 
value at risk. Conversely, a negative relationship can suggest that the government bonds did 
not in fact contribute towards the pricing of their stock pricing. It also highlights as the yields 
decreased of the government, in particular British Land Company and Shaftesbury sought after 
higher yielding investments as determined by the market.  
When interpreting Libor reactions from the realtor sector it is evident that a positive 
relationship arises towards the pricing of these companies, with the exception found in Savills, 
which highlights an inverse relationship. The induced positive relationship may arise as lending 
within the inter-bank market increased as the rates declined, led to increased liquidity for the 
banks to in-turn provide liquidity to other financial sectors such as the real estate sector, which 
may have led enriching their investment portfolios. Conversely, for Savills this is not the case, 
which suggests finances may have been raised by other means possibly through equity and 
therefore experienced an inverse relationship towards Libor rates.  
 The Repo Rates within Table 15 suggest the majority of realtors experience an inverse 
relationship towards the contributing factors of their stock price, with the exception of Building 
Land Company and Hammerson. The interpretation of the inverse relationship suggests the 
Repo-rates did not contribute towards the market valuation of their stocks, furthermore 
confirming the notion as short-term rates declined, the real estate sector largely invested in 
longer-term maturity assets. Conversely, for Building Land Company and Hammerson took 
advantage of the decreased repo rates with their investors highlighting such relationship within 
their valuation of asset pricing. 
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Table 15: SUR Real Estates Results 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable    LAND           BLND    HMSO          SHB  SGRO         DLN SVS         DJAN 
Intercept   0.0004           0.0001         0.0003           0.0001 0.0003           0.0002          1.01E-5         0.0002 
     (1.076)           (0.435)        (0.782)          (0.275) (0.707)          (0.503)          (0.0184)       (0.434) 
ER     1.0583            1.066          1.0556           1.1221  1.067        1.036             1.0699          0.9731  
     (33.4)***       (33.4)***    (30.7)***      (26.1)***  (26.9)***      (27.3)***      (18.5)***     (13)*** 
Bond     0.0207            -0.0041    0.0159           -0.0308 0.0371           0.0046          0.0199           0.075 
     (0.9171)         (-0.171)      (0.64)            (-1.248)     (1.223)          (0.1792)        (0.6155)        (2)** 
Libor     0.1077            0.0918    0.144             0.057  0.061        0.0088           -0.0256         0.245 
     (2.692)***     (2.12)**      (3.28)*          (1.318)  (1.14)            (0.193)         (-0.448)         (3.6)*** 
Repo     -0.0085          0.0017         0.002             -0.0212 -0.0137         -0.0061          -0.0059         -0.023 
     (-0.789)         (0.145)         (0.173)         (-1.796)*    (-0.946)        (-0.496)        (-0.3835)      (-1.31) 
D_BOE     0.8099            0.9368         0.939            0.861          0.8826          0.626             0.7113          0.5937 
     (5.121)***     (7.81)***    (7.53)***      (4.22)***  (6.59)***      (3.73)***      (3.8)***       (2.54)** 
D_GOV     0.6952    0.813          0.2705           0.3896 0.3407           0.2164           0.6207          0.513  
     (6.0764)***  (6.75)***     (1.65)*          (2.375) (2.34)**        (1.273)          (3.55)***     (2.18)** 
D_ECB     0.4878            0.6304         0.5221          0.577 0.3218           0.3775          0.8847           0.46 
  (0.451)          (1.784)*      (1.35)***      (1.257)      (0.771)          (1.151)          (1.825)*        (1.561) 
D_EUGO  0.5672           0.645            0.882            0.7822 0.8271           0.903            1.0106           0.9421 
     (3.07)***      (3.19)***     (5.4)***        (4.64)***  (4.39)***      (5.4)***        (2.86)**        (3.4)*** 
D_FED     0.9171           1.0329          0.923            1.028 0.9895           0.938            0.8151           1.0345 
     (1.4956)        (3.53)***     (3.75)***      (3.204)**  (2.92)***      (4.99)***      (2.29)**        (2.45)** 
D_USGO  0.6842           0.9341          0.784             0.9283 0.7961           0.547            0.7596           0.9386 
     (3.948)***    (3.88)***     (4.06)***      (4.45)***  (4.55)***      (2.953)***    (2.6)***        (3.5)*** 
D_IMF     1.1036            0.8874         0.8974           1.1462 0.9        1.0152           1.026            1.0258 
    (2.664)***     (1.349)         (2.36)**        (1.676)*    (1.66)***      (1.82)***      (2.92)***     (1.5)***                         
R2 Within  0.44              0.44              0.41            0.31           0.35              0.36               0.20              0.15 
t-Statistic in parenthesis; *** indicates 1% level significance; ** indicates 5% level significance; * indicates 10% 
level significance. 
 
5.4.3 GJR-GARCH Methodology 
It was found after extensive ARCH-effects testing on Royal Bank of Scotland that there 
were no signs of ARCH-effects present within the data and no heteroskedasticity, therefore 
cannot proceed with GJR-GARCH modelling methodology. A reason for this may be because 
markets fully understood Royal Bank of Scotland’s position following the part-nationalization 
from the UK government and therefore was priced accordingly, therefore leading to no ARCH-
effects and a homoscedastic dataset. 
From Table 16 when interpreting the results upon the UK banking sector, a clear picture 
is depicted, in terms of the leverage effect. We experience large statistical significance within 
many of the institutions interpreting the overall announcements as “good” news bar HSBC and 
Lloyds Banking Group interpreting as “bad” news. One could argue HSBC may have 
interpreted the news announcements in a negative manner due to the institution not requiring 
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any assistance but possibly due to the market and levels of uncertainty they were operating 
within leading investors to interpret the negativity towards HSBC as they provided further 
liquidity to financially distressed institutions. On the other hand Lloyds’ shareholders may have 
responded overall in a negative manner due to various factors such as being part-nationalized 
the market may have scrutinised Lloyds Banking Group further as a result.  
When interpreting the dummy variables reactions in comparison to the previous 
methodologies applied, we notice significant differing outcomes. To begin with our new 
variable (Banks) witnesses significant negative reactions towards all banks bar HSBC, which 
can be largely considered as the unaffected bank due to the size of their operations. The 
negative reaction highlights investors traded on the knowledge of increased borrowing costs as 
downgrades were implemented by rating agency bodies, as well as respond negatively towards 
the fines, respectively.  Moreover, there are discrepancies with the interpretation of the news 
announcements in regards to the SUR technique and GJR-GARCH, from which to a certain 
extent can be said towards all announcements. Stronger results are heavily evident within the 
SUR approach. However, it can be said the GJR-GARCH approach may be more accurate as 
the BoE announcements brought a decline in the asset prices of the banking sector with 
statistical significance as the market interpreted the induced volatility as the central bank 
confirmed the underlying issues to the market. When investigating the other key 
announcements such as the IMF which, according to the GJR-GARCH methodology, had 
relatively no effect and therefore may have been already foreseen by the market and priced 
accordingly. The same could also be said towards the Government announcement, which 
suggests there was no surprise to the market that the government implemented such policy 
initiatives in order to save the financial system. With respect to announcements from the EU 
and US, we generally see a positive reaction by the UK market which, further enhances the 
evident linkages between the banking system in the UK, EU and US.  
When interpreting the CDS variable we establish quickly the results are conflicting 
again with the SUR approach undertaken previously, from which we can suggest the market 
predicting the fallout of Northern Rock and Bradford & Bingley. Since their CDS spread 
variable is positively correlated against their respective stock returns. On the other side of the 
spectrum, all the other institutions experience a negative correlation towards their stock returns 
with a high degree of significance. Ultimately, this highlights the inverse relationship the other 
institutions held regarding the widening of spreads and a declining stock price which is an 
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accurate assessment for the turbulent period under examination. Therefore, we can suggest the 
market was able to distinguish their exposure levels to sub-prime debt. 
In regards to the Government bond variable, all institutions enjoy a positive correlation 
towards their stock returns, which conflicts earlier results of before and highlights the 
negatively correlated institutions in the SUR technique did in fact hold a sufficient sum of 
government bonds within their portfolio. In regards to the Libor rates, we can note the 
positively correlated institutions are all that received funding, merged with another bank and 
Barclays whom were found guilty of manipulating Libor rates, in order to portray a better 
picture of the health of their balance sheet. The positive relationship establishes the extensive 
use of the inter-bank market for those concerned institutions, whereby the market was able to 
price that information into their stock returns. The repo rates suggest a negative relationship 
arises, namely to the troubled institutions and Banco Santander (which took over Alliance & 
Leicester and Bradford & Bingley). This highlights their need for capital on the short-term 
basis, which was required in order to meet reserve ratio requirements to cover depositor’s 
money and prevent bank run.       
Furthermore, unfortunately heteroskedasticity is found within Standard Chartered 
modelling using the GJR-GARCH technique. When using other techniques such as ARCH 
(1,0), GARCH (1,1) and EGARCH techniques the outcomes are the same in regards to 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation present within the model and also affecting other 
institutions when placing them under similar ARCH family models. A rational explanation for 
such an occurrence is it’s possible the financial markets priced Standard Chartered accordingly. 
As the financial crisis took a firm grip losses from Standard Chartered institution were limited 
due to low exposure levels to the US sub-prime market and therefore markets, more importantly 
investors held little concern towards Standard Chartered.    
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Table 16: GJR-GARCH UK Banks Results 
 
Variable          HSBC BARC           LLOY BNC STAN*          HBOS AL 
Intercept 0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001 0.0002 -0.0003 
 (1.49) (-0.563) (-0.86) (-0.618) (-0.509) (0.596) (-0.567) 
ER 1.2849 1.1265 1.197 1.0227 0.942 1.1278 1.0256 
 (49.59)*** (35.86)*** (29.86)*** (29.21)*** (45.73)*** (31)***        (19.83)*** 
Bond 0.0616 0.1996 0.1896 0.1272 0.0456 0.0251 0.1163 
 (5.204)*** (8.0278)*** (7.161)*** (5.351)*** (2.607)*** (0.4959) (1.4968) 
CDS -0.0003 -0.055 -0.034 -0.0644 -0.026 -0.0173 -0.0001 
 (-0.0703) (-6.704)*** (-4.376)*** (-9.975)*** (-3.29)*** (-2.236)** (-0.2618) 
Libor -0.0359 0.0271 0.134 -0.0772 -0.026 0.0414 0.2 
 (-0.824) (0.3741) (1.977)** (-1.066) (-0.444) (0.4262)       (2.0134)** 
Repo 0.0025 0.0254 0.0169 -0.0043 0.0105 -0.0516 -0.088 
 (0.335) (1.8977)* (1.081) (-0.4048) (1.0527) (-1.127)       (-2.663)*** 
Variance            1.63E-06 2.54E-06 2.19E-06 2.73E-06 1.74E-05 5.10E-0 4.25E-06 
 (4.08)***        (4.137)*** (4.7779)*** (3.834)***  (7.947)*** (3.701)***   (7.835)*** 
𝒃𝒕−𝟏
𝟐  0.089 0.0392 0.1092 0.0551 0.1481 0.2409 -0.0217 
 (7.082)***    (3.938)*** (8.398)*** (4.964)***    (6.581)*** (6.538)***  (-16.33)*** 
𝒃𝒕−𝟏
𝟐 𝒃𝒕−𝟏<𝟎        -0.0349        0.0443   -0.0171            0.0336     0.096             0.0502      0.0513 
 (-2.5436)**     (3.585)*** (-1.0344)*** (2.677)*** (3.264)*** (1.0575) (7.75)*** 
GARCH-1 0.9122 0.9319 0.8984 0.9154 0.7425 0.765 0.9728 
 (76.25)*** (127.6)*** (116)*** (95.12)*** (39.34)*** (38.1)***     (223.7)*** 
BOE -0.0011 -0.0013 -0.0016 0.0025 -0.0017 -0.0119 -0.1289 
 (-1.4323) (-0.4489) (-0.7892) (1.0312) (-0.478) (-0.741)       (-12.17)*** 
ECB -0.0078 0.016 -0.0025 0.0077 0.0079 0.0271 0.129 
 (-1.959)** (1.3014) (-0.409) (1.206) (0.3216) (1.108)         (9.622)*** 
EURGOV    -0.0127 -0.012 -0.0618 -0.026 0.0127 0.0176 -0.008 
 (-2.215)** (-1.0037) (-2.918)***   (-2.862)*** (1.127) (1.219) (-0.478) 
FED 0.0128 0.0054 0.0559 0.0295 0.0288 -0.0066 -0.0067 
 (1.6193) (1.0753) (3.589)*** (3.48)*** (1.802)* (-0.306) (-0.7288) 
GOV 0.0053 0.0126 0.0009 0.0062 0.0014 0.0105 0.1136 
 (3.1828)*** (1.179) (0.4428) (1.395) (0.512) (0.631)         (5.614)*** 
USGOV -0.0087 -0.0204 -0.0086 0.0007 -0.017 -0.0045 0.0124 
 (-1.98)** (-3.192)***     (-2.337)** (0.2045) (-3.091)*** (-0.6) (1.811)* 
IMF 0.0008 6.01E-05 -0.0059 -0.011 0.0021 0.2763 - 
 (0.4919) (0.9342) (-2.087)** (-2.44)*** (1.147) (1.158) - 
HSBC -0.1036 - - - - - - 
 (-2.307)** - - - - - - 
BARC - 0.0034 - - - - -  
 - (0.3841) - - - - - 
BANKS 0.0017 -0.0041 -0.0015 -0.0003 -0.0007 -0.1605 0.0138 
 (0.9729) (-1.47) (-5.06)*** (-0.165) (-0.159) (-0.9786) (0.2306) 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
R2  0.54 0.42 0.28 0.44 0.51 0.18 0.22 
Z-Statistic in parenthesis; *** indicates 1% level significance; ** indicates 5% level significance; * indicates 10% 
level significance. 
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Table 16 GJR-GARCH UK BANKS Continued 
Variable BB  NRK  RBS*        
Intercept -0.0003     6.66E-6  NA 
  (-0.6375) (0.0084)  NA 
ER  1.1754  0.8741  NA 
  (23.04)*** (14.64)*** NA 
Bond  0.1346   0.134  NA 
        (1.748)*  (1.4072)  NA 
CDS     0.0004   0.0012  NA 
  (0.4653)        (1.3937)  NA 
Libor  -0.1518  0.0705  NA 
        (-1.4048) (0.4004)  NA 
Repo  -0.0203                -0.0512  NA    
  (0.3814)   (-0.9646) NA  
Variance     1.4E-5  1.85E-5  NA  
     (3.7662)*** (8.18)*** NA 
𝒃𝒕−𝟏
𝟐    0.2217  0.0172  NA  
  (5.251)*** (0.9433)  NA  
𝒃𝒕−𝟏
𝟐 𝒃𝒕−𝟏<𝟎  0.3376  0.0825  NA 
  (4.334)*** (4.1705)*** NA 
GARCH-1   0.7109  0.8503  NA  
        (29.5)*** (50.03)*** NA 
BOE  -0.065  -0.428   NA     
  (-1.284)  (-2.887)*** NA  
ECB        0.0504                0.0395 NA      
        (1.0136)  (0.4127) NA  
EURGOV   0.1086               -   NA  
        (0.2616)               -  NA  
FED        -0.08               -0.0634 NA  
  (-1.5633) (-1.8183)* NA 
GOV  0.015               -0.0731  NA 
  (0.4725)               (-1.9066)* NA 
USGOV 0.0173  0.5472  NA 
        (1.8993)* (5.6325)*** NA 
BANKS  - - NA   
  -               -   NA         _ 
R2   0.17                0.04   NA 
Z-Statistic in parenthesis; *** indicates 1% level significance; ** indicates 5% level significance; * indicates 10% 
level significance. 
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5.5. Conclusion 
 When referring back to our set hypotheses in Section 2, extensive hypothesis testing is 
carried with the summary of results depicted in Table 17. Regarding the first hypothesis, which 
aimed to understand whether market participants were able to distinguish the risk exposure 
between banking institutions, overall we cannot reject the null hypothesis. We interpret the 
result whereby, investors were able to distinguish the risk exposure between institutions 
according to both the SUR and GJR-GARCH methodologies. Whether the CDS spreads were 
widening against the financially distressed banks or narrowed for the low-exposure banks, 
investors were able to determine the future outcomes. Referring to the second hypothesis, 
whereby Bank of England initiatives had a greater impact than UK Government 
announcements towards the banking sector can be rejected. Therefore, the Government 
reactions to the unfolding crisis were just as pivotal to the banking sector as much as the 
monetary policy responses.  When referring back to the third hypothesis which concerned the 
non-banking institutions, across all sectors there is a collective acceptance of the null 
hypothesis. Whereby, announcements from Western economies and IMF had a more 
significant effect on non-banking institutions than the combined announcements of the UK 
Government and the Bank of England. This acceptance of hypothesis overall highlights the 
how integrated financial systems are in the modern age, where the presence of globalisation is 
prevalent. In regards to the last hypothesis, we established a conflicted results in terms of 
different methodologies producing differing outcomes. Whereby, the SUR approach enabled 
us to not rejecting the null hypothesis as it stands, which also would reaffirm the major central 
bank’s main aim of reducing market volatility via the markets lender of last resort. Conversely, 
with the GJR-GARCH approach we reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative where 
the major central banks did not induce a positive effect towards the banking sector. This 
possibly highlights the market investor of the banking sector did anticipate the news from the 
respective international central banks and therefore as news came into fruition, there was no 
effect on the stock returns.  
To conclude, we found investors were able to distinguish risk levels between 
institutions and that government announcements were just as significant as monetary policy 
actions to the market. Furthermore, we discovered the non-banking institutions are highly 
integrated to global markets as the announcements from Western economies and the IMF have 
a stronger effect within the UK than combined with announcements from the Bank of England 
and Government. We also contribute to the literature through suggesting the banking sector is 
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impacted by announcements from other central banks such as the Federal Reserve, ECB and 
the IMF. We do however call upon the academic community to further the research in order to 
confirm or reject our findings and gain greater understanding of the UK financial system.  
Table 17: Hypotheses Summary 
Hypotheses Banks Finance Insurance Trusts Real Estate 
H1: SUR-DNR - - - - 
 GJR-DNR - - - - 
  
H2: SUR-Reject - - - - 
 GJR-Reject - - - - 
H3: - DNR DNR DNR DNR 
 -    
H4: SUR-DNR - - - - 
 GJR-Reject - - - -           
 *DNR- Do not reject Null hypothesis, SUR- SUR method, GJR- GJR-GARCH method 
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CHAPTER 6 
Assessing The Effect of Regulation Changes On The Stock 
Price and Volatility of UK Financial Institutions 
6.1. Introduction 
 Following the deepest financial crisis since the great depression, governments, 
regulators and central bankers have attempted to restore shattered trust through increasing 
regulation in order to bring confidence to the financial markets. The deterioration in the 
financial system from the crisis of 2008 in the UK has hindered economic prosperity and is yet 
to fully recover from the losses amassed. The initial monetary response from the Bank of 
England and government sought short-term stability, however these measures do not cure the 
long standing underlying issues from which the financial institutions created essentially. What 
the financial crisis highlighted more so than anything, is how reliant the real economy is on 
financial markets operating efficiently and effectively. This is in order to oversee the 
continuous transfer of funds from surplus to deficit units to access capital. When funds flowing 
within the inter-bank markets steeply declined as uncertainty over the future existence of 
certain financial institutions increased as losses amassed from certain institutions. Overall, this 
caused a large disruption to the flow of funds within the financial system as businesses/users 
of funds suffered liquidity issues in operating on a day-to-day basis. With all the events that 
unfolded during the crisis period, the public’s perception of the financial institutions naturally 
declined along with their integrity, which gave rise to the Turner Review in 2009. The overall 
recommendation supported the concept of increasing regulation within the financial sector due 
to the significant role they play in modern society. Recent research from committee’s and 
academics alike have given rise to reform acts such as the Turner review and Vicker’s report 
in the UK, Dodd-Frank Act in the US, reforms and levy’s in Germany, the concept of “too big 
to fail” in Switzerland as well as the creation of European Stability Mechanism from the 
Eurozone. All of these reforms in their respective nations have arisen in order to produce 
greater stability as Moshirian (2011) has pointed to reduction in excessive risk taking by 
financial managers through global regulatory standards through such bodies such as the Bank 
for International Settlement (BIS) and to become an internationally integrated financial system, 
which may produce further stability going forward.   
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Schwert (1981) identified the practical use of using financial market data to capture the effects 
of regulatory changes towards the market as all new information is relevant and therefore 
priced into assets upon its release. This study paved the way for further studies to embody this 
approach, with Binder (1985) expanding the methodological approaches set out by Schwert 
(1981). Most papers we have come across since illustrate the impact of regulatory changes in 
different light for example Ediz et, al (1998) and Mora and Logan (2012) studied the impact of 
regulation held towards the banking sector’s capital requirements. Furthermore, other studies 
such as Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) investigate the impact regulatory changes concerning 
insider trading laws has towards the markets. Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) came to the 
conclusion enforcement of insider trading laws decreased the cost of equity. Spiegel and 
Yamori (2003) measure the effect of two regulatory reforms in Japan on bank equity values, 
the Stabilization laws (1998) of the Financial Reconstruction Act and the Rapid 
Recapitalization Act. Larcker et, al (2011) investigated the market reaction to regulatory 
changes pertaining to corporate governance. To their contribution, they discover an 
insignificant reaction to events correlating to the regulation of executive pay. However, on 
average they did find a negative relation between abnormal returns on the days of these events, 
with the higher the CEO compensation leading to a higher negative reaction. Cumming, Johan 
and Li (2011) contributed to the literature by showing the impact of the Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive (MiFID) ruling for insider trading. Whilst utilising a multivariate 
regression model, they are able to conclude trading rules are positively associated with velocity 
and negatively associated with volatility and bid-ask spreads, which contribute towards greater 
liquidity. Schäfer et, al (2015) shed light towards the reforms taken place in 4 major financial 
systems, through analysing the reaction of stock market returns as well as CDS spreads of 
banks during the post crisis period solely. Schäfer et, al (2015) come to the conclusion the 
Vicker’s reform produced a strong positive impact towards the CDS spreads but only modest 
changes in the equity prices of the banking sector in the UK. Following this discussion towards 
the literature we identify the gap, which does not entail the impact of regulatory change towards 
the financial sector within the UK. We hope to contribute to the literature through extending a 
more vigorous regulation change event study towards the UK financial sector equity prices. 
The contribution would be of great concern to the UK regulators as well as other international 
bodies the research covers. This is due to regulatory bodies understanding their power they 
possess to impact equity markets, which can be detrimental in maintaining stability within the 
financial markets. Moreover, the research would be of interest to investors as they navigate 
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their financial decisions around times of regulatory change in particular of equity market 
participants.    
 
Naturally, this gives rise to our main aim, which is to identify the impact regulatory 
changes held towards the UK financial sectors indices from pre-crisis to post-crises. Further to 
this we aim to discover which regulatory bodies have the greatest impact to the market as well 
as if it is welcomed due to the stability/transparency regulation aims to achieve. In order to 
answer the above we utilise the event study methodology (MacKinlay (1992)) and EGARCH 
methodology Nelson (1991), which will determine the initial impact towards the market. One 
would expect that increased regulation post crisis period would aid the theory the market 
welcomes such stances and therefore would be reflected within a positive reaction from the 
market. The reforms taken place are to help bring a healthier financial system, which can in 
turn lead to an enhanced economic activity as financial markets are able to operate at an 
efficient level. Additionally, we wish to understand if the market is efficient in terms of pricing 
new information. We implement a VAR GJR-GARCH model we wish to comprehend if there 
is evidence illustrating a transmission of information from the regulatory bodies to the stock 
market prior to the regulation change.  
This then fulfils the necessity to carry out this research as it is vital to understand how 
the UK financial system operates in terms of how the market reacts to such measures taking 
place. For example, if the public perception towards the financial sector is deemed to be acting 
over-aggressively within their operations. This then can in-turn lead to the demise of the 
financial system as we witnessed back in 2008, as a means to avert such scenarios repeating 
increased regulation announcements should be exhibited through a positive return on equities. 
Conversely, if the market does not agree with the measures taken by the respective regulatory 
bodies, then a negative return in the equity markets will prevail naturally.  
The results obtained from this study highlight three key findings whereby, firstly there 
is a negative response towards the banking equity prices from the Vickers Report. This was a 
key reform introduced by the Independent Committee in order to aid economic stability within 
the UK as well as avert future financial crisis periods. Furthermore, to aid this finding we also 
found that the market had prior knowledge of regulatory announcements surfacing through 
pricing their positions accordingly. Lastly, we find evidence of announcements relating to 
capital standards within the banking and insurance sectors held a negative equity return for 
investors. This suggests the risk-return hypothesis is ever-present within the market as the 
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capital standard requirement reforms restrict the overall performance from taking excessive 
risk, which brings stability but may alter future revenues.  
The layout of this chapter is as follows; Section 2 reviews the literature, 3 details the hypotheses 
set, 4 illustrates the methodological approach, 5 analyses the results and Section 6 concludes 
the chapter.   
 
6.2. Review of the Literature 
 Determining the effects of regulatory changes has towards asset prices in financial 
markets can be traced back as far as Schwert (1981) and Binder (1985). In particular Schwert 
(1981) argues that utilizing stock market data is the most appropriate measurement to capture 
the impact regulation has on markets. As stock markets are efficient in terms of pricing in all 
relevant information as soon as it is available, this therefore provides an accurate platform to 
capture the perception of regulatory changes. Moreover, when addressing the issue of volatility 
spill-overs we go back to the original work of Engle (1982). Through the introduction of the 
ARCH model, this takes into consideration several features of financial data, such as 
disturbances, which may be serially uncorrelated and show volatility clustering. The ARCH 
approaches also take into consideration the heavily tailed distribution exhibited by the 
unconditional distribution. Further to the ARCH methodology there comes the introduction of 
the generalized version by Bollerslev (1986, 87), which enabled further variations of 
ARCH/GARCH models. This gave rise to the formulation of the leverage effect included 
within the EGARCH model by Nelson (1991) as well as the GJR-GARCH model including the 
leverage effect by Glosten et, al (1993). Susmel and Engle (1994) delved into the linkages 
between financial markets from New York and London by utilising financial news on an hourly 
basis to capture whether there were effects or causalities between the two markets.   
The next strand of literature we introduce, which is of relevance is Wagster (1996), which 
aimed to measure the wealth effect of shareholders of international banks with the introduction 
of the Basle Accord. The Basle Accord primary objectives were to reduce the risk of 
international banking system and to minimize competitive inequality that arises from 
differences in domestic-level regulation standards. Further to this, Japan was experiencing a 
funding-cost advantage, which enabled the Japanese banking sector to lend more than 33% of 
global lending during the 1980s, which eventually led to their banking crisis due to their high 
degree of risk-taking. Wagster (1996) examined the weekly rate of return against both domestic 
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market indexes and the MSCI World Index for large internationally active banks in 7 countries 
in relation to the Basel I announcements. This was applied through a multivariate regression 
model as per Cornett and Tehranian (1990). Wagster (1996) found that Japanese bank 
shareholders gained an additional 31.63% of wealth as compared to their developed 
counterparts and further concluded that the new regulations were to adequate to control such 
large banks.   
Most papers we have come across since illustrate the impact of regulatory changes in 
different light for example Ediz et, al (1998), Mora and Logan (2012) and Tapia (2012) studied 
the impact of regulation held towards the banking (utilities for Tapia (2012))  sector’s capital 
requirements. Whilst these research articles have some relevance, they take a different focus 
more toward the impact on the balance sheet rather than the market reaction towards the 
regulatory changes. Furthermore, other studies such as Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) 
investigate the impact regulatory changes concerning insider trading laws has towards the 
markets. Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) examined 103 countries all over the world but took a 
strong focal point towards Europe as the investigation period includes a time where the 
European Union was formed. In order to bring the monetary union, regulation had to be 
developed which applies to all member nations and must implement the European Community 
Insider Trading Directive. Furthermore, the purpose of their research questioned whether the 
existence and enforcement insider trading laws impacts the cost of equity. The theory behind 
the research is that with regulations in place to control white-collar crimes such as insider 
trading the cost of equity should decline as investors participation should be increased, which 
can create market depth. Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) utilise the international capital asset 
pricing model (ICAPM) in order to capture the insider trading laws impact. Bhattacharya and 
Daouk (2002) go on to find that the establishment of insider trading laws do not account for a 
reduction in the cost of equity. However, it not until the law is enforced whereby the cost of 
equity declines, with the developed nations enforcing the law on more occasions.  
Spiegel and Yamori (2003) focussed on the Japanese banking sector in regards to 
regulatory changes occurred in Japan. Spiegel and Yamori (2003) in terms of methodological 
approach utilised the OLS regression estimation of bank portfolio returns. They found that 
large banks regulatory advantages were diminished by the Financial Reconstruction Act and 
the Rapid Recapitalization Act (1998), which affected large banks and trust bank groups 
portfolios significantly and priced negatively on announcements studied by the market. 
However, following these announcements, it benefited smaller regional banks as abnormal 
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returns on these events proved to be significantly negatively related to bank size, as measured 
by total assets. As well as the Rapid Recapitalisation Act (1998) was perceived by investors to 
benefit the weaker banks within the Japanese system and thus improved their performance as 
a result of regulation implemented.  
The next strand of literature looks into the market reaction to corporate governance 
regulation Larcker, Ormazabal and Taylor (2011). The aim of the paper was to consolidate all 
the regulatory announcements by the SEC, state of Delaware and government officials towards 
limiting executive pay and capture the reaction to such statements/laws passed. Their desired 
method proceeded with an event study methodology, utilising the abnormal returns and 
regressing against the announcements in study. They find an insignificant reaction to events 
relating to regulation of executive pay. Once examining cross-sectional variation in the markets 
reaction, there is evidence of a negative relation between abnormal returns on the days of 
regulation change. Furthermore, the higher the CEO’s compensation package, the more 
negative the reaction. The results are conclusive and consistent with the literature in terms of a 
value maximizing view of current pay practices and with the argument of capping executive 
pay results in less efficient contracts whilst negatively impact shareholder wealth. Other results 
collected from the cross-sectional variation in the markets reaction there is strong evidence that 
abnormal returns are increasingly negative for firms larger institutional block-holders.  
 Cumming, Johan and Li (2011) examined the impact of market integrity rules on the 
performance of equity market places. Their main focus differs in many ways as they examined 
the effect regulation changes held towards liquidity as represented by velocity, volatility and 
bid-ask spread. However, they recognised the importance of the MiFID regulation, which they 
expanded upon within their paper through utilising a multivariate analyses to examine the 
impact held towards liquidity. Cumming, Johan and Li (2011) isolated the regulation change 
through examining pre and post announcement impact, from which they discover an 
incremental increase of 8.7% in velocity. This highlights the convertibility of assets into cash 
is good for the market as it encourages trading as well as increasing efficiency through 
regulation. Their results also report a statistically significant decline in volatility at the 5% and 
1% level as well as decreasing the bid-ask spreads in Europe significantly by 6 basis points. 
Essentially, Cumming, Johan and Li (2011) demonstrate within their study the positive impact 
increased regulation has towards financial markets, which ties in with the theory that market 
participants are more willing to trade as information is increased and prices are fair.  
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 Schäfer et, al (2015) study is the closest to our study and therefore give more focus to 
this paper. Schäfer et, al (2015) address the issue of whether reforms have had any measureable 
effects towards the market. Their study analyses the changes in equity prices as well as CDS 
spreads in order to capture the market reaction to news of regulation changes from the US, UK, 
Germany and Switzerland. In particular the Volcker law reforms, the Vickers report, Germany 
reforms and the too big to fail regulation in Switzerland were examined through a SUR capacity 
as stated by Zellner (1962). Schäfer et, al (2015) results reveal that the public perception of no 
changes have occurred after the crisis does not do justice to the various efforts of regulators to 
create a stable environment. After all, their results highlight at the national level financial 
markets did react to the structural reforms. For the Volcker rule in the US exhibited a decrease 
in the US investment banks and an increase in CDS spreads towards the commercial banks. 
Schäfer et, al (2015) come to the conclusion the Vicker’s reform produced a strong positive 
impact towards the CDS spreads but only modest changes in the equity prices of the banking 
sector in the UK. Overall the study illustrates the reforms and regulatory changes reduced bail-
out expectations, specifically for the banking sector and lowered equity returns in many cases. 
Therefore, regulatory bodies were successful in their attempts to reduce overall systemic risk 
and produce a stable economic environment for the financial sector to operate within.  
However, Schäfer et, al (2015) do come to the conclusion further that their results are not fully 
supportive to answer the question “did enough happen?” Therefore we identify a gap within 
the literature to proceed with our research which will fulfil the question – how did the UK 
financial sectors react to regulation change and did the market efficiently price the information 
beforehand?  
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6.3. Hypotheses 
 Following the literature we propose testable hypotheses in which to give our research a 
baseline to draw upon. We focus on three areas; the Vickers’ report brought stability to 
financial sector as via a reduction in volatility, whether the announcements spilled-over into 
the pricing of their assets prior to the regulation reforms and which type of regulations impacted 
the financial sectors collectively.  
 To delve deeper into the Vickers Report, we create a testable hypothesis by which we 
are determined to confirm or reject results by Schäfer et, al (2015) in terms of the market 
responding in a similar fashion. It can be hypothesised we will expect to witness a decline in 
volatility particularly from the banking sector as we take the view; reforms seek to improve 
widespread stability and reduce systemic risk. Furthermore, we expect with greater stability 
sought by the Vickers report and with such announcements one can only assume a negative 
response in the equity market due to the risk-return hypothesis. As the banking sector becomes 
less risky within their business model, investors and the market alike may process and price 
this information as negative for future returns.  
 We also examine whether or not volatility spill-over effects were present from the 
regulatory bodies prior to the regulation announcements. We therefore examine the market 
efficiency hypothesis, as markets in theory are efficient, which we expect to yield no spill-
overs result prior to the announcement date. As the stocks are correctly priced given the 
information available to the public, this would confirm the notion markets are efficient. 
However, if a statistically significant result yields prior, this would suggest that the market has 
expected regulatory change to be implemented. Therefore, the expectation has been priced into 
the asset prior to the announcement, which overall highlights inefficiency within the market.  
 We create a testable hypothesis regarding regulatory changes to higher capital level 
requirements which includes Solvency II. The expecting result of this change is to witness a 
decline in the equity prices of the indices concerned by such announcement due to the theory 
of risk-return. As the market may perceive the financial institutions less risky and therefore is 
priced into their asset valuation. Furthermore, these announcements heavily impact the sectors 
on an operational level as shareholders wish to earn greater returns. This poses an issue for 
managers to deliver such returns whilst respecting the new regulatory requirements of holding 
excess capital.  
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6.4. Empirical Approach 
6.4.1 Data 
The data utilised in this chapter comprises of FTSE 350 index data from the respective 
financial sectors within the UK; FTSE 350 Banking index, FTSE 350 Insurance index, FTSE 
350 Real Estate index, FTSE 350 Investment Companies index, FTSE 350 Finance companies 
index and the FTSE 100 as a benchmark. We have opted to use daily return data from 
01/01/2000 to 31/12/2014 in order to capture the effects of the regulatory changes in a precise 
manner. All the variables will take the natural log in order to achieve stationarity at level, as 
well as reduce noise implications produced by trading. Data has been sourced from Bloomberg 
database, Bankscope and from UK/EU/International regulatory bodies. Table 2 located within 
the appendix 3 highlights the significant regulatory events we have identified, which will be 
examined.  
Figure 1 below highlights the capital ratios for the banking sector within the UK and 
their average holdings of capital from 2006-2014. We can see that prior to the financial crisis 
of 2008, from 2006-2008 we report a decline in the capital held by the banking sector. This 
was also prior to the increased capital requirements regulations implemented by respective 
regulators, which have sought to bring stability to the financial sector as they hold the great 
responsibility of keeping depositors money safe. The increased regulation on the face of it has 
provided a strong argument to examine the impact this held towards the initial stock market 
reaction to regulation changes. As Figure 1 demonstrates in the post crisis era, the banking 
sector exemplifies greater capital being held within their balance sheets. Figure 2 highlights 
the time series data of the average CDS spreads of UK banks. From figure 2 we gather a 
coherent image of the banking sectors probability of default via the CDS spreads widening 
from 2008 onwards. The widening of spreads suggest there is a greater probability of the bank 
defaulting, hence the sudden increase in 2008 at a time where the banking sectors future was 
highly uncertain due to the losses the banks were producing at the time. As we can see further, 
since the height of the crisis period we are now experiencing much tighter spreads, which may 
have been as a result of the increased minimum capital levels imposed.  
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Figure 1: Capital Ratios in UK Banking Sector 
 
Figure 2: UK Banking Sector CDS Spread Average 
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6.4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 1 below sheds light on the descriptive statistics from which, we identify all 
variables achieve stationarity at level via the Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron 
unit root tests. The Jarque-Bera test illustrates the normality of each variable, with all variables 
being non-normally distributed as expected with time-series data. All variables enjoy a kurtosis 
value of greater than 3, which highlights a leptokurtic distribution. This suggests a sharper than 
normal distribution with values namely concentrated towards the mean, however there is a high 
probability for extreme values to prevail. The banking sector illustrates the highest kurtosis 
value of 14.2604, which suggests greatest volatility, as confirmed by the standard deviation 
value of 0.0186. This can be explained through excessive volatility periods the crisis caused as 
well as due to the regulatory changes firmly aimed directly at the banking sector. This 
corresponds with the volatility time series data we calculate, which further reiterates the notion 
the banking sector experiences the greatest volatility in comparison to the other sectors. The 
insurance sector follows with a kurtosis value of 12.4603, which suggests, this sector endures 
high levels of volatility also. However in terms of standard deviation (0.0154) it ranks third. 
Given our data analysis in the previous section, unfolding regulatory events is evidently 
impacting the insurance sector via Solvency II. Furthermore, the insurance sector fulfils the 
view of Skewness of stock price variables are all left skewed distributed, where most values 
are concentrated on the right of the mean, with the extreme values to the left. Vice versa is 
found with all dummy variables, which are right skewed distributed. Whereby, most values are 
concentrated on the left of the mean with the extreme values to the right. Finally, we can also 
note the banking sector exhibits the greatest range in the maximum and minimum figures.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
215 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 Mean Max Min St. D. Skew. Kurt. J-B ADF    PP 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
BANK -0.0002 0.1882 -0.1698 0.0186 -0.0117 14.2604 20668 -61.714 -61.751 
BANK ER -0.0002 0.1165 -0.1153 0.0152 -0.1563 9.4978 6898 -30.233 -65.845 
INSU 0.0000 0.1066 -0.1538 0.0154 -0.5128 12.4603 14760 -60.933 -60.917 
INSU ER 0.0000 0.0735 -0.0726 0.0095 -0.1563 9.4978 6898 -30.234 -65.844 
INVC 0.0001 0.0884 -0.0843 0.0112 -0.2858 8.7158 5379 -62.601 -62.603 
INVC ER 0.0001 0.0730 -0.0719 0.0095 -0.1563 9.4978 6898 -30.234 -65.844 
REAL 0.0001 0.0910 -0.1011 0.0142 -0.2002 9.1476 6186 -60.635 -60.607 
REAL ER 0.0001 0.0689 -0.0677 0.0089 -0.1563 9.4978 6898 -30.234 -65.844 
FIN 0.0001 0.1212 -0.1441 0.0168 -0.3521 9.7799 7573 -60.659 -60.641 
FIN ER 0.0001 0.1028 -0.1012 0.0133 -0.1563 9.4978 6898 -30.234 -65.844 
BIS 0.0008 1 0 0.0277 36.0694 1302 2.76E+08 -62.570 -62.570 
EU 0.0020 1 0 0.0452 22.0455 487 3.85E+07 -65.650 -62.651 
FCA 0.0005 1 0 0.0226 44.1928 1954 6.22E+08 -62.554 -62.554 
FSA 0.0026 1 0 0.0505 19.7029 389 2.46E+07 -62.682 -62.684 
GOV 0.0020 1 0 0.0452 22.0455 487 3.85E+07 -62.650 -62.651 
PRA 0.0013 1 0 0.0357 27.9178 780 9.90E+07 -62.602 -62.602 
IC 0.0005 1 0 0.0226 44.1928 1954 6.22E+08 -62.554 -62.554 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
6.4.3 Empirical Methodology 
The first approach we undertake follows Mackinlay’s (1997) event study methodology 
approach. Firstly, we estimate the abnormal returns (ARs) through the market model with an 
estimation period of 100 days prior to the first event window, which will be 20 days prior to 
the announcement. We use events windows of -/+ 20 days, -/+ 10 days, -/+ 5 days and on the 
day, this is to examine whether investors knew in advance and priced in the information 
accordingly prior to the regulation change. This is implemented as follows:    
Market model is estimated as: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                   (6.1) 
Where; 𝛽𝑖 = COV(𝑅𝑖, 𝑅𝑀)/VAR(𝑅𝑀) and E(𝜀𝑖𝑡) = 0 
Once the market model is computed for respective institution, the ARs are then obtained 
through the differences within actual stock return and the predicted by the market model, which 
is as follows: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑡)                   (6.2) 
The ARs are then cumulated (CARs) over specified time periods concerning the event windows 
utilised, with the CARs computed as follows:  
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𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑡1, 𝑡2) = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑡2
𝑡=𝑡1
 
                                                                                                      (6.3)              
Where t1 and t2 are the start and end date of considered window periods.  The CARs for each 
event are then aggregated on a cross-section basis for a portfolio of N observations as well 
accommodate for type of event, with the Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs) 
calculated as follows:          
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅(𝑡1, 𝑡2) =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝐶𝐴𝑅
𝑁
𝑖=1
(𝑡1, 𝑡2) 
                                                                                            (6.4) 
We employ non-parametric hypothesis tests from Boehmer, Musumeci and Poulsen (1991) and 
Cowan (1992) due to their robustness. As the issues in parametric tests, witness too frequently 
a rejection in the null hypothesis as increased variance in the stock returns close to the event 
days may cause unreliable and/or distorted results according to Boehmer, Musumeci and 
Poulsen (1991) which is also demonstrated in Campbell and Wasley (1993), which provide 
evidence that nonparametric rank tests provide more reliable inferences in comparison to 
parametric tests.  
We apply the standardised cross-sectional test by Boehmer, Musumeci and Poulsen (1991), 
which is an extension of Patell (1976) and is a robust approach to event induced variance 
increase in stock returns. The test statistic produced from the standardised cross-sectional test 
is examined against a null hypothesis where the cumulative abnormal returns are set to zero. 
The calculation to gain the test statistic is as follows: 
First the abnormal returns are standardised through the estimated standard deviation by; 
𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝜏 =
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝜏
𝑆(𝐴𝑅𝑖)
                   (6.5) 
Where: 𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝜏 represents the estimated standard deviation,  𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝜏 the abnormal returns of 
security i during time  𝜏 and 𝑆(𝐴𝑅𝑖) represents the standard error of day i.  
We then need to estimate the standard deviation of the time series of abnormal returns 
throughout the event window period to produce an unbiased estimate of the standard deviation, 
which is as follows: 
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?̂?𝐴𝑅𝑖
2 =
∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝜏
𝑇−𝑑
                                              (6.6) 
Where: 𝑇 Represents the number of days outside of estimation period, 𝑑 represents the degrees 
of freedom and in our case since the market model is utilised 𝑑 = 2.  
In order to address the event window abnormal returns is an out of sample prediction, the 
standard error is corrected by the forecast error as follows: 
𝑆(𝐴𝑅𝑖) = ?̂?𝐴𝑅𝑖√1 +
1
𝑇
+
(𝑅𝑚,𝜏−𝑅𝑀,𝐸𝑠𝑡 ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )2
∑ (𝑅𝑚,𝜏−𝑅𝑀,𝐸𝑠𝑡 ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )2
𝐸𝑠𝑡 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝐸𝑠𝑡 𝑚𝑖𝑛
               (6.7) 
Where: 𝑅𝑚,𝜏 represents the return on the market and  𝑅𝑀,𝐸𝑠𝑡  ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ is the average of the market return 
during the estimation period. 
The standardised abnormal returns are then cumulated over time which is as follows: 
𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝜏1, 𝜏2) = ∑
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝜏
𝑆(𝐴𝑅𝑖)
                  (6.8) 
Where: 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝜏1, 𝜏2) Symbolizes the cumulated standardised abnormal returns throughout 
time period. 
The average of the cumulated standardised abnormal returns is then computed in relation 
towards number of events: 
𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅(𝜏1,𝜏2) =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝜏1, 𝜏2)                  (6.9) 
Where: 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅(𝜏1,𝜏2) is the average of the cumulated standardised abnormal returns throughout 
time period with N signified as the number of events. 
The standard deviation of the averaged cumulated standardised abnormal returns is then 
estimated of the event window: 
𝑆(𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) = √
1
𝑁(𝑁−1)
∑(𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝜏1, 𝜏2) − 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅(𝜏1,𝜏2))
2            (6.10) 
Where: 𝑆(𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) Represents the standard deviation of the averaged cumulated abnormal 
returns. 
The test statistic of the standardised cross-sectional is calculated as follows: 
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𝑇𝐵 =
𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (𝜏1,𝜏2)
𝑆(𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )
                 (6.11) 
Where: 𝑇𝐵 Signifies the Test statistic of Boehmer et al (1991). 
Further to the standardised cross-sectional test we also employ the nonparametric test of Cowan 
(1992) generalized sign test. This is based on the ratio of cumulative abnormal returns across 
the event period window, with the proportion of positive abnormal returns are the null 
hypothesis of 0.5. The generalized sign test statistic is calculated as follows: 
𝑇𝐺𝑆 =
𝑝0
+−𝑝𝐸𝑠𝑡
+
√𝑝𝐸𝑠𝑡
+ (1−𝑝𝐸𝑠𝑡
+ )/𝑁
                 (6.12) 
Where: 𝑇𝐺𝑆 Signifies the test statistic of the generalised sign test, 𝑝0
+ illustrates the ratio of 
positive CARs over the event window, 𝑝𝐸𝑠𝑡
+  is the estimated positive CARs over the event 
window period and 𝑁 denotes the number of events considered.  
We delve further into analysing the UK financial spectrum through applying generalised auto-
regressive conditional heteroskedastic (GARCH) models proposed by Bollerslev (1986). In 
order to fully address the issue of heteroskedastic volatility, this originated from the ARCH 
modelling technique proposed by Engle (1982). Firstly, we assess whether the financial 
institutions logged index returns hold ARCH effects, once this is proven, we utilise the 
EGARCH model proposed by Nelson (1991). This model accounts for positive and negative 
shocks of equal size to have different impacts on volatility (the leverage effect), also EGARCH 
places no restrictions upon the parameters. This is an important differential in comparison to 
the traditional GARCH model, as clarity results are produced. The model is implemented as 
follows: 
Mean: 
 𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑡[𝜀𝑡−1] + 𝜖                                 (6.13) 
Variance:  
ln ℎ𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1(𝜖𝑡−1/ℎ𝑡−1
0.5 )  + 𝛼2(𝜆1|
𝜖𝑡−1
ℎ𝑡−1
0.5 ) + 𝛽1 ln ℎ𝑡−1 + 𝐷𝐺𝑂𝑉[𝜀𝑡−1] + 𝐷𝐹𝑆𝐴[𝜀𝑡−1] +
𝐷𝐹𝐶𝐴[𝜀𝑡−1] + 𝐷𝐸𝑈[𝜀𝑡−1] + 𝐷𝑃𝑅𝐴[𝜀𝑡−1] + 𝐷𝐼𝐶[𝜀𝑡−1] + 𝐷𝐵𝐼𝑆[𝜀𝑡−1] + 𝜖                                (6.14) 
Following Bollerslev’s (1987) Log-likelihood function, we apply as follows: 
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ln 𝐿 = −
𝑇
2
ln(2𝜋) − 0.5 ∑ ln ℎ𝑡 − 0.5
𝑇
𝑡=1 ∑ 𝜖𝑡
2𝑇
𝑡=1 /ℎ𝑡
2             (6.15) 
Where: ln 𝑅𝑖𝑡 represents the logged daily index returns of sector i on day t, 𝛽𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑡 denotes the 
market model for sector i on day t. 𝛼𝑛 Represents coefficient parameter. The leverage effect is 
accounted within the EGARCH model. If  
𝜖𝑡−1
ℎ𝑡−1
0.5 , is positive, the effect of the shock on the log 
conditional variance is 𝛼1 + 𝜆1. If 𝜖𝑡−1/ℎ𝑡−1
0.5  is negative, the effect of the shock on the log 
conditional variance is−𝛼1 + 𝜆1.  The following dummy variables take the value of 1 to 
represent regulation announcement, otherwise remain 0. 𝐷𝐺𝑂𝑉[𝜀𝑡−1] captures the effects of 
government (GOV) regulation, 𝐷𝐹𝑆𝐴[𝜀𝑡−1] the Financial Services Authority (FSA) regulation, 
𝐷𝐹𝐶𝐴[𝜀𝑡−1] highlights the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) regulation announcements, 
𝐷𝐸𝑈[𝜀𝑡−1] from the European Union (EU), 𝐷𝑃𝑅𝐴[𝜀𝑡−1] from the Prudential Regulation Authority 
(PRA),  𝐷𝐼𝐶[𝜀𝑡−1] captures the Independent Commission (IC), 𝐷𝐵𝐼𝑆[𝜀𝑡−1] gathers the effects of 
the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and 𝜖 is the error term.   
In order to determine whether investors were able to predict in-coming regulation 
changes beforehand we apply a multivariate vector autoregressive (VAR) GJR-GARCH, 
which has been utilised in more recent studies such as Rahim et, al (2009). The multivariate 
VAR GJR-GARCH model is a combination of the VAR methodology popularized by Sims 
(1980) and the GJR-GARCH was introduced by Glosten et, al (1993), which is an extension of 
Bollerslev (1986). This methodology will highlight whether there was evidence of transmission 
of information in the trading days leading up to regulation changes implemented. We follow 
Binder (1985) in the sense of using dummy variables with a value of 1, 10 days prior to the 
announcement up until the day of announcement, otherwise 0 is allocated. If we find 
significance within the lags of the dummy variables, essentially this informs us the market 
priced in the announcement on day n in the lead up to the regulation change and highlights a 
transmission of information within the financial markets. We apply the multivariate VAR GJR-
GARCH model through a diagonal vech process, which enables us to account for 
heteroskedasticity as well as autocorrelation. The model utilised in this study utilises equation 
15 in the previous model and is demonstrated as follows: 
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𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽𝑖,0 + 𝛽𝑖,1𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑖,2𝑅𝑖,𝑡−2 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑖,10𝑅𝑖,𝑡−10 + 𝛽𝑖,11𝛽𝑅𝑚,𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑖,12𝛽𝑅𝑚,𝑡−2 + ⋯ +
𝛽𝑖,20𝛽𝑅𝑚,𝑡−10 + 𝛽𝑖,21𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐵𝐼𝑆 + 𝛽𝑖,22𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡−2
𝐵𝐼𝑆 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑖,30𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡−10
𝐵𝐼𝑆 + 𝛽𝑖,31𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐸𝑈 +
𝛽𝑖,32𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡−2
𝐸𝑈 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑖,40𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡−10
𝐸𝑈 + 𝛽𝑖,41𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐹𝐶𝐴 + 𝛽𝑖,42𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡−2
𝐹𝐶𝐴 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑖,50𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡−10
𝐹𝐶𝐴 +
𝛽𝑖,51𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐹𝑆𝐴 + 𝛽𝑖,52𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡−2
𝐹𝑆𝐴 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑖,60𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡−10
𝐹𝑆𝐴 + 𝛽𝑖,61𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐺𝑂𝑉 + 𝛽𝑖,62𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡−2
𝐺𝑂𝑉 + ⋯ +
𝛽𝑖,70𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡−10
𝐺𝑂𝑉 + 𝛽𝑖,71𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐼𝐶 + 𝛽𝑖,72𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡−2
𝐼𝐶 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑖,80𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡−10
𝐼𝐶 + 𝛽𝑖,81𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑃𝑅𝐴 +
𝛽𝑖,82𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡−2
𝑃𝑅𝐴 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑖,90𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡−10
𝑃𝑅𝐴 + 𝜀                            (6.16) 
 
𝑉𝑒𝑐ℎ(ℎ𝑡) = 𝛼1 + 𝛼2𝜀𝑡−1𝜀𝑡−1 + 𝛼3𝜀𝑡−1𝜆1,𝑡−1 + 𝛼4𝜏𝑡−1                       (6.17) 
 
Equation (16) illustrates the VAR where: 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 represents the daily returns on index i at time t, 
𝛽𝑖,0 is the coefficient parameter, 𝑅𝑖,𝑡−𝑛 is the lagged returns of index i at lag –n. 𝛽𝑅𝑚,𝑡−𝑛 
illustrates the lagged market model expected returns. 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡−𝑛
𝐵𝐼𝑆  is a dummy variable to capture 
the announcement from the Bank for International Settlements Committee, 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡−𝑛
𝐸𝑈  is a 
dummy variable to capture EU regulatory changes, 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡−𝑛
𝐹𝐶𝐴  captures the regulatory 
announcements from the Financial Conduct Authority, 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡−𝑛
𝐹𝑆𝐴  is for the Financial Services 
Authority, 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡−𝑛
𝐺𝑂𝑉  is from the Government, 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡−𝑛
𝐼𝐶  captures the Independent Committee, 
𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡−𝑛
𝑃𝑅𝐴  highlights the Prudential Regulation Authority changes and 𝜀 is an error term. In 
equation 17, the 𝑉𝑒𝑐ℎ(ℎ𝑡) can be described as the conditional covariance variance equation 
for the index at time t, 𝛼1 is a constant parameter, 𝛼𝑛 is a coefficient, 𝜀𝑡−1𝜀𝑡−1 captures the 
product of lagged errors. 𝜀𝑡−1𝜆1,𝑡−1 confirms whether imminent regulation changes incur 
asymmetric spill-over effects or not, and 𝜏𝑡−1 capture the GARCH effects.  
We perform the model again however, convert the dependent variable of returns on the index 
to the volatility of the index sector, which is as follows in equation 18. 
 
𝜎𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽𝑖,0 + 𝛽𝑖,1𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑖,2𝑅𝑖,𝑡−2 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑖,10𝑅𝑖,𝑡−10 + 𝛽𝑖,11𝛽𝑅𝑚,𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑖,12𝛽𝑅𝑚,𝑡−2 + ⋯ +
𝛽𝑖,20𝛽𝑅𝑚,𝑡−10 + 𝛽𝑖,21𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐵𝐼𝑆 + 𝛽𝑖,22𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡−2
𝐵𝐼𝑆 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑖,30𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡−10
𝐵𝐼𝑆 + 𝛽𝑖,31𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐸𝑈 +
𝛽𝑖,32𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡−2
𝐸𝑈 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑖,40𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡−10
𝐸𝑈 + 𝛽𝑖,41𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐹𝐶𝐴 + 𝛽𝑖,42𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡−2
𝐹𝐶𝐴 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑖,50𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡−10
𝐹𝐶𝐴 +
𝛽𝑖,51𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐹𝑆𝐴 + 𝛽𝑖,52𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡−2
𝐹𝑆𝐴 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑖,60𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡−10
𝐹𝑆𝐴 + 𝛽𝑖,61𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐺𝑂𝑉 + 𝛽𝑖,62𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡−2
𝐺𝑂𝑉 + ⋯ +
𝛽𝑖,70𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡−10
𝐺𝑂𝑉 + 𝛽𝑖,71𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐼𝐶 + 𝛽𝑖,72𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡−2
𝐼𝐶 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑖,80𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡−10
𝐼𝐶 + 𝛽𝑖,81𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑃𝑅𝐴 +
𝛽𝑖,82𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡−2
𝑃𝑅𝐴 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑖,90𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡−10
𝑃𝑅𝐴 + 𝜀                            (6.18) 
 
Where; 𝜎𝑖,𝑡 denotes the standard deviation of the index sector i at time t, which captures the 
volatility and all other variables are kept the same in equation 16 and 17.  
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6.5. Analysis 
6.5.1 Event Study Methodology 
We begin to decipher the results by referring to Table 3, which highlight the event study 
methodology. In relation towards the banking sector in the UK, Table 3 signifies namely 
negative responses from the various regulatory bodies examined. The CAAR found within the 
FSA regulatory announcements is firstly negative and a statistically significant result via the 
Boehmer test statistic and sign test. We note the statistical significance is found on the day of 
the announcement and the banking sector index reportedly declined, which suggests overall the 
market did not welcome intervention from the FSA and therefore deterred investors from the 
banking sector. With the regulatory impact on the day suggests also there is a further safety 
buffer, which may hinder future profits, therefore is reflected with a decline in index value. 
Moreover, announcements from the FSA also negatively impacted the finance company sector 
with statistical significance achieved in all other financial sectors.  
The market responses from FCA regulation were mainly negative as Table 3 advocates. 
Statistical significance is found within the finance companies and investment trust sectors, 
which experienced negative and positive associations respectively via the t-test. The response 
towards reform of the FSA into the FCA was found to be a positive change in regards to the 
finance company sector by the market given their operations. The change in governing body 
conformed to public opinion at a timely manner, which would bring further clarity to the market 
in particular for finance companies and as a result the market welcomed this reform. On the 
other hand with respect to the investment trust sector, Table 3 reports a heavy negative reaction 
from the market. The market was able to distinguish interestingly between sector and their 
market operation, which for investment trusts is investing within financial markets, primarily 
in equities. This suggests the market foresaw induced future volatility as reforms are likely to 
hit the equity market and overall profitability for investment trusts.    
EU announcements are found to have mixed reactions from different sectors as Table 
3 highlights statistical significance with the insurance and real estate sectors found to yield 
negative reactions, whereas the investment trusts sector is a positive one. The EU 
announcements towards the insurance and real estate sectors signalled to the market reduced 
risk and overall volatility, which investors sought that would affect their overall profitability 
and therefore led to a declined risk premia. Conversely, with investment trusts we find a 
positive reaction by the market, which led to an increased demand for their equity index and 
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therefore pushed an appreciation in the asset value. The market reacted within this manner as 
a result of improved regulation by the EU towards this sector as well as improved market 
conditions, which are favourable for investors i.e. MiFiD. Therefore the performance of 
investment trusts is directly impacted by such regulation as equity appreciation is likely to 
improve. 
When interpreting the results concerning government announcements, referring to 
Table 3, we see a mixture of statistically significant reactions. Positive responses are 
exemplified within the investment trusts, real estate and finance company sectors. Whereas, 
negative reactions are found within the banking and finance company sector. The market 
perceived there to be a negative reaction from the banking sector index as the announcements 
primarily attack their increase in levy taxes as well as banking reforms acts. From which can 
be interpreted by the market to impact their overall profitability as future forecasted returns are 
to be decreasing as their tax bill rises, which declines demand for investors to hold banking 
stocks. In terms of the investment trust and real estate sectors, there is an evident appreciation 
in the value of their indices, which may be attributed to the reforms targeted to improve 
regulation. This then signals to the market further clarity to these sectors, which encourages 
investment and increases demand for purchasing equity within the sectors concerned and 
therefore creates an upward pressure on asset value.  
With respect to the Prudential Regulation Authority, all sectors enjoy a dominant 
positive reaction towards their regulation announcements as Table 3 highlights. The 
announcement all sectors share with the PRA is regarding their creation and to be regulated by 
the Bank of England. This regulation impact caused the market to welcome the new 
development, which brought the expectation of further clarity and as a result demand to 
purchasing equities within the UK. Furthermore, statistical significance is achieved within all 
sectors via the Boehmer test statistic and sign test. In regards to the banking and insurance 
sectors we closely review their results, as they are monitored more closely due to their 
significant impact on the economy. The PRA announcements towards the banking sector are 
namely aimed towards the credit requirement directive, which aims to reduce failure within the 
banking sector through requiring institutions’ to be able to cover their risk exposure. Overall, 
the response from the banking sector is a positive one, which enhances the notion that the 
market welcomed the news as the increased stability towards the banking sector enables the 
overall economy to function securely, which increases future growth prospects as a result. 
Regarding the insurance sector, the PRA announcements are concentrated towards Solvency 
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II, which aims to harmonise insurance regulation as well as alleviate concerns of risk through 
implementing higher minimum capital levels. The overall positive response towards these 
announcements suggests the market welcomed the regulations, which generated greater 
demand and confidence within the insurance sector and therefore caused an upward pressure 
on the index values of the insurance sector.  
Results surrounding the Independent Committee from Table 3 report all sectors produce 
a statistically significant negative reaction from the Vickers Report. The ring-fencing reforms 
against the banking sector in particular reduces their risk exposure by separating the investment 
management side from the traditional banking services they provide, which essentially reduces 
their size and overall performance. Overall, the Independent Committee were successful in 
their attempts to reduce volatility, which is reflected in the equity prices of the index as the 
market learned their future fate. In turn, the result accepts the hypothesis set and confirms the 
results of Schäfer et, al. (2013). Moreover, with regards to announcements from the BIS we 
gather negative statistical significance towards the banking sector. This highlights the markets’ 
negative reception of this information due to issues shareholders hold with the operation within 
banking, whereby the preference is to as little capital as possible for shareholders – in theory.  
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Table 3: Event Study Methodology Results 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Banks Window CAAR Pos:Neg t-test Prob.  Boehmer et,al  Prob.    Sign test Prob. 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
FSA (-20...20) -0.1898 03:07 -0.097 0.9227 -0.5119 0.6087 -0.0258 0.9794 
 (-10...10) -0.0939 05:05 -0.0671 0.9465 -0.6256 0.5315 1.3495 0.1772 
 (-5...5) -0.3681 02:08 -0.3635 0.7163 -0.3191 0.7497 -0.7134 0.4756
 (0...0) -0.3185 00:10 -1.0429 0.297 -1.8508 0.0642 -2.0887 0.0367 
FCA (-20...20) -0.2343 01:01 NA NA NA NA NA NA 
 (-10...10) 2.438 02:00 NA NA NA NA NA NA 
 (-5...5) 0.5511 02:00 NA NA NA NA NA NA 
 (0...0) 0.9223 02:00 NA NA NA NA NA NA 
EU (-20...20) 2.424 06:02 1.3915 0.1641 1.4381 0.1504 0.9076 0.3641 
 (-10...10) 0.9654 06:02 0.7743 0.4387 1.0267 0.3046 0.9076 0.3641 
 (-5...5) 0.2547 05:03 0.2822 0.7778 0.8688 0.385 0.1882 0.8507 
 (0...0) -0.0136 04:04 -0.0499 0.9602 0.0257 0.9795 -0.5313 0.5952 
PRA (-20...20) 0.0043 02:03 0.212 0.8321 0.2197 0.8261 -0.5093 0.6105 
 (-10...10) 0.018 04:01 1.2388 0.2154 1.6391 0.1012 1.2802 0.2005 
 (-5...5) 0.0147 03:02 1.3964 0.1626 1.6586 0.0972 0.3854 0.6999 
 (0...0) 0.0039 03:02 1.2326 0.2177 1.6339 0.1023 0.3854 0.6999 
BIS (-20...20) 0.6232 02:01 0.2038 0.8385 0.3562 0.7217 -0.9177 0.3588 
 (-10...10) -0.1532 01:02 -0.07 0.9442 -0.1018 0.919 -2.5521 0.0107 
 (-5...5) 0.0229 01:02 0.0145 0.9884 -0.0173 0.9862 -2.5521 0.0107 
 (0...0) -0.2274 02:01 -0.4762 0.6339 -0.8002 0.4236 -0.9177 0.3588 
GOV (-20...20) -1.5998 02:06 -0.9416 0.3464 -0.868 0.3854 -1.9291 0.0537 
 (-10...10) -0.3801 03:05 -0.3126 0.7546 -0.2605 0.7945 -1.2113 0.2258 
 (-5...5) -1.534 02:06 -1.7431 0.0813 -1.4702 0.1415 -1.9291 0.0537 
 (0...0) -0.3997 04:04 -1.5065 0.1319 -0.7059 0.4802 -0.4935 0.6217 
IC (-20...20) -0.011 00:02 -0.2591 0.7956 -4.1462 0 -1.4683 0.142 
 (-10...10) 0.031 02:00 1.0192 0.3081 1.4385 0.1503 1.3621 0.1732 
 (-5...5) -0.0013 01:01 -0.0581 0.9537 -0.4063 0.6845 -0.0531 0.9577 
 (0...0) 0.0058 02:00 0.8724 0.383 47.6871 0 1.3621 0.1732 
Insurance Window CAAR Pos:Neg t-test Prob.  Boehmer et,al  Prob.    Sign test Prob. 
 
FSA (-20...20) -0.0409 03:07 -1.8727 0.0611 -0.7927 0.4279 -1.2746 0.2024 
 (-10...10) -0.0092 05:05 -0.5878 0.5567 0.1456 0.8842 -0.0097 0.9922 
 (-5...5) -0.0258 04:06 -2.283 0.0224 -0.8597 0.39 -0.6422 0.5208 
 (0...0) -0.0009 04:06 -0.2535 0.7999 -0.1951 0.8453 -0.6422 0.5208 
FCA (-20...20) -0.0123 00:01 -0.3234 0.7464 NaN NaN -1.0313 0.3024 
 (-10...10) -0.0146 00:01 -0.5362 0.5919 NaN NaN -1.0313 0.3024 
 (-5...5) 0.0082 01:00 0.414 0.6789 NaN NaN 0.9697 0.3322 
 (0...0) -0.0023 00:01 -0.3914 0.6955 NaN NaN -1.0313 0.3024 
EU (-20...20) -0.4866 03:03 -0.1945 0.8458 -0.2713 0.7861 -1.2124 0.2254 
 (-10...10) 0.3899 04:02 0.2178 0.8276 0.4726 0.6365 -0.3013 0.7632 
 (-5...5) 0.3429 04:02 0.2646 0.7913 0.6289 0.5294 -0.3013 0.7632 
 (0...0) -0.6467 03:03 -1.6552 0.0979 -1.0644 0.2872 -1.2124 0.2254 
PRA (-20...20) 0.9659 05:02 0.4463 0.6554 0.7331 0.4635 0.377 0.7062 
 (-10...10) 0.5068 04:03 0.3272 0.7435 0.6459 0.5183 -0.4135 0.6793 
 (-5...5) 1.2957 04:03 1.2332 0.2175 2.1119 0.0347 -0.223 0.8235 
 (0...0) 0.0517 05:02 0.1528 0.8785 2.4217 0.0154 0.377 0.7062 
IC (-20...20) 0.0106 01:01 0.3523 0.7246 0.2865 0.7745 0 1 
 (-10...10) 0.0432 02:00 1.9967 0.0459 2.7337 0.0063 1.4142 0.1573 
 (-5...5) 0.0154 01:01 0.9853 0.3245 0.7196 0.4718 0 1 
 (0...0) -0.0046 00:02 -0.9739 0.3301 -1.8467 0.0648 -1.4142 0.1573 
GOV (-20...20) 3.0156 02:01 0.8345 0.404 0.9 0.3681 0.0455 0.9637 
 (-10...10) 2.0432 02:01 0.7901 0.4295 0.9602 0.337 0.0455 0.9637 
 (-5…5) 1.5271 02:01 0.8159 0.4146 1.2931 0.196 1.2594 0.2079 
 (0...0) 0.0498 02:01 0.0883 0.9296 0.9666 0.3338 0.0455 0.9637 
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Table 3 Continued. 
 
Investment Trusts  
 Window CAAR Pos:Neg t-test Prob.  Boehmer et,al  Prob.    Sign test Prob. 
FSA (-20...20) -1.2668 06:08 -0.9868 0.3238 -1.175 0.24 -1.3183 0.1874 
 (-10...10) -0.7014 07:07 -0.7634 0.4452 -0.9663 0.3339 -0.7725 0.4398 
 (-5...5) -0.8721 04:10 -1.3115 0.1897 -1.595 0.1107 -2.4099 0.016 
 (0...0) 0.396 10:04 1.9753 0.0482 1.468 0.1421 0.8649 0.3871 
FCA (-20...20) -8.6935 00:01 -1.2402 0.2149 NaN NaN -0.3993 0.6897 
 (-10...10) -6.1818 00:01 -1.2322 0.2179 NaN NaN -0.3993 0.6897 
 (-5...5) -7.6332 00:01 -2.1023 0.0355 NaN NaN -0.3993 0.6897 
 (0...0) -0.1735 00:01 -0.1585 0.8741 NaN NaN -0.3993 0.6897 
EU (-20...20) 0.0065 04:03 0.4473 0.6547 -0.0867 0.9309 0.3547 0.7228 
 (-10...10) -0.0008 02:05 -0.0795 0.9366 -0.4781 0.6326 -1.1572 0.2472 
 (-5...5) 0.0072 06:01 0.9647 0.3347 1.2877 0.1979 1.8666 0.062 
 (0...0) 0.0011 04:03 0.4792 0.6318 1.2778 0.2013 0.3547 0.7228 
PRA (-20...20) 4.0518 01:00 0.9779 0.3281 NaN NaN 2.6458 0.0082 
 (-10...10) 1.9462 01:00 0.6563 0.5116 NaN NaN 2.6458 0.0082 
 (-5...5) 2.1044 01:00 0.9806 0.3268 NaN NaN 2.6458 0.0082 
 (0...0) -0.0276 00:01 -0.0427 0.9659 NaN NaN -0.378 0.7055 
GOV (-20...20) -0.6492 01:02 -0.2313 0.8171 -0.4586 0.6465 -0.1345 0.893 
 (-10...10) 1.3652 01:02 0.6796 0.4967 0.2603 0.7947 -0.1345 0.893 
 (-5...5) 1.1763 03:00 0.8091 0.4185 5.2907 0 2.2561 0.0241 
 (0...0) 0.0949 02:01 0.2165 0.8286 1.5424 0.123 1.0608 0.2888 
IC (-20...20) -0.0456 00:02 -2.69 0.0071 -6.0266 0 -1.3452 0.1786 
 (-10...10) -0.012 01:01 -0.9864 0.3239 -0.6771 0.4983 0.0708 0.9436 
 (-5...5) -0.0052 00:02 -0.5958 0.5513 -1.0898 0.2758 -1.3452 0.1786 
 (0...0) -0.0022 01:01 -0.815 0.4151 -0.6797 0.4967 0.0708 0.9436 
Real Estates  
FSA (-20...20) -0.2972 07:06 -0.2209 0.8252 -0.5427 0.5874 -0.5565 0.5779 
 (-10...10) 0.0498 07:06 0.0517 0.9587 0.1142 0.9091 -0.5565 0.5779
 (-5...5) -0.2703 05:08 -0.3879 0.6981 -0.062 0.9506 -1.6957 0.09 
 (0...0) -0.3062 07:06 -1.4572 0.1451 -0.9906 0.3219 -0.5565 0.5779 
FCA (-20...20) -4.6245 00:01 -0.8686 0.385 NaN NaN -0.4389 0.6607 
 (-10...10) -2.895 00:01 -0.7598 0.4474 NaN NaN -0.4389 0.6607 
 (-5...5) -1.5183 00:01 -0.5506 0.5819 NaN NaN -0.4389 0.6607 
 (0...0) -0.0204 00:01 -0.0246 0.9804 NaN NaN -0.4389 0.6607 
EU (-20...20) 0.6832 03:02 0.2972 0.7663 0.3957 0.6923 0.1105 0.912 
 (-10...10) -1.4522 02:03 -0.8827 0.3774 -1.3654 0.1721 -0.7943 0.427 
 (-5...5) -0.7106 02:03 -0.5968 0.5506 -0.5303 0.5959 -0.7943 0.427 
 (0...0) -0.7517 02:03 -2.0939 0.0363 -1.0137 0.3107 -0.7943 0.427 
PRA (-20...20) -0.2189 00:01 -0.0468 0.9627 NaN NaN -0.3879 0.6981 
 (-10...10) 1.4234 01:00 0.4254 0.6706 NaN NaN 2.5782 0.0099 
 (-5...5) 2.0894 01:00 0.8627 0.3883 NaN NaN 2.5782 0.0099 
 (0...0) -0.0104 00:01 -0.0143 0.9886 NaN NaN -0.3879 0.6981 
GOV (-20...20) 4.4208 05:00 2.1017 0.0356 2.2117 0.027 1.012 0.3115 
 (-10...10) 2.1176 04:01 1.4067 0.1595 1.8576 0.0632 -0.1786 0.8583 
 (-5...5) 2.0345 05:00 1.8674 0.0618 3.6452 0.0003 1.012 0.3115 
 (0...0) 0.1153 04:01 0.3511 0.7255 1.573 0.1157 -0.1786 0.8583 
IC (-20...20) -0.0667 00:02 -1.7037 0.0884 -1.0161 0.3096 -1.45 0.1471 
 (-10...10) -0.0432 00:02 -1.5434 0.1227 -1.4475 0.1478 -1.45 0.1471 
 (-5...5) -0.0228 00:02 -1.1247 0.2607 -1.1505 0.2499 -1.45 0.1471 
 (0...0) -0.01 00:02 -1.6279 0.1036 -2.1963 0.0281 -1.45 0.1471 
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Table 3 Continued 
 
Finance  Window CAAR Pos:Neg t-test Prob.  Boehmer et,al  Prob.    Sign test Prob. 
Companies   
FSA (-20...20) -0.0136 05:04 -0.5919 0.5539 -0.7963 0.4259 0.3641 0.7158 
 (-10...10) -0.0195 04:05 -1.1838 0.2365 -0.6584 0.5103 -0.3026 0.7622 
 (-5...5) -0.0039 04:05 -0.329 0.7422 -0.0269 0.9785 -0.3026 0.7622 
 (0...0) -0.0007 04:05 -0.1935 0.8465 -0.212 0.8321 -0.3026 0.7622 
FCA (-20...20) 0.0281 01:00 0.7595 0.4476 NaN NaN 1.0473 0.295 
 (-10...10) 0.0305 01:00 1.1524 0.2492 NaN NaN 1.0473 0.295 
 (-5...5) 0.0316 01:00 1.6478 0.0994 NaN NaN 1.0473 0.295 
 (0...0) 0.0052 01:00 0.895 0.3708 NaN NaN 1.0473 0.295 
EU (-20...20) 0.0133 04:01 0.692 0.4889 0.4878 0.6257 1.4322 0.1521 
 (-10...10) -0.0002 04:01 -0.0118 0.9906 -0.1494 0.8812 1.4322 0.1521 
 (-5...5) 0.0001 04:01 0.0103 0.9917 -0.1406 0.8882 1.4322 0.1521 
 (0...0) 0.0005 02:03 0.1781 0.8586 0.337 0.7361 -0.3581 0.7203 
PRA (-20...20) -0.7463 00:01 -0.1526 0.8787 NaN NaN -0.4264 0.6698 
 (-10...10) 0.6064 01:00 0.1732 0.8625 NaN NaN 2.3452 0.019 
 (-5...5) 0.1086 01:00 0.0429 0.9658 NaN NaN 2.3452 0.019 
 (0...0) 0.7894 01:00 1.0334 0.3014 NaN NaN 2.3452 0.019 
GOV (-20...20) -0.0489 01:02 -2.0145 0.044 -1.846 0.0649 -0.4914 0.6232 
 (-10...10) -0.0347 00:03 -1.9988 0.0456 -8.2326 0 -1.6475 0.0995 
 (-5...5) -0.0072 01:02 -0.5733 0.5664 -1.8691 0.0616 -0.4914 0.6232 
 (0...0) 0.0066 03:00 1.7455 0.0809 4.1593 0 1.8209 0.0686 
IC (-20...20) -0.0427 00:02 -1.2042 0.2285 -1.9534 0.0508 -1.3966 0.1625 
 (-10...10) -0.0165 00:02 -0.6484 0.5167 -1.7276 0.0841 -1.3966 0.1625 
 (-5...5) -0.013 01:01 -0.7092 0.4782 -0.6924 0.4887 0.0177 0.9859 
 (0...0) -0.0011 01:01 -0.1922 0.8476 -0.5964 0.5509 0.0177 0.9859 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Numbers in bold achieved statistical significance at either 1%, 5% or 10% level 
 
 
6.5.2 EGARCH Methodology Analysis 
The EGARCH methodology will enable us to comprehend the results further, due to 
the greater accuracy it possesses. We can see all sectors share a common element of the 
leverage effect, whereby there is an overall negative asymmetry effect. This implies all sectors 
index prices reacted negatively to regulatory news examined, which led to an increase in 
leverage of the indices due to the reduction in asset value. Consequently, this increases the 
debt-to-equity ratio which implies the volatility level increased within the sectors as priced by 
the market, Black (1976). Moreover, we find that all sectors remove ARCH effects, which we 
can interpret there to be no heteroskedasitcity within the model. Furthermore, we find that there 
are no signs of autocorrelation, which indicates the effectiveness of modelling time series data 
we utilised in the study.   
Instantly with regards to the banking sector, the prevailing results highlight statistical 
significance against regulatory announcements from the FSA, FCA and the government. All 
three bodies indicate the market responded positively, which on the whole suggests the reforms 
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brought further demand to the banking stocks in particular. It also supports the notion the 
market wanted regulatory change and increased transparency, which would bring further 
stability and improved market conditions for investors. With regards to the announcements 
made from the FSA and FCA in our sample namely focussed on establishing clarity to investors 
through their acts to prevent insider trading as well as maintaining market integrity. 
Conversely, we find negative associations with announcements from the BIS, EU, PRA and 
IC. The announcements were aimed at imposing much stricter regulation such as higher capital 
levels, separating banking from investment banking, banker’s remuneration and many more in 
order to prevent future crisis periods. The negative returns arise as a result of a declined level 
of risk to investors due to increased regulation. For example announcements from the BIS, EU 
and PRA with banks being more capitalised, although brings stability to the wider economy, it 
reduces the potential future returns for the shareholders of said banks. The perception from the 
shareholders may be excess capital held has its opportunity cost rather than being converted 
into assets such as loans. Announcement of the Vickers’ report suggests the reforms were to 
break up the banks operation activities into investment banking and traditional banking 
otherwise known as ring-fencing regulation. The negative reaction is perceived by the market 
as a reduction in activities performed by the UK banks will lead to decline in performance and 
profitability, therefore is priced accordingly. The announcements from the EU (bankers bonus 
cap) induced a negative reaction from the markets could be due to the banking sector not being 
able to retain talented staff.  
The results from the insurance firms demonstrate statistical significance against all 
announcements bar the Independent Committee. Announcements from the EU were received 
by the market in an adverse manner, from which were aimed at namely establishing market 
standards and implementing CRD towards the insurance sector. The market interpreted the 
established regulation to adversely affect future profits and therefore participants relinquished 
their holdings of insurance stocks. This is due to requirement of insurance firms to hold certain 
levels of capital, which similar to the banking sector may be perceived as an opportunity cost 
by shareholders. The increased regulation impacts their business operations from limiting the 
amount of insurance policies they can issue and is also deemed by the sector as less risky and 
therefore less return for the shareholders. The results concerning the FCA and FSA illustrate 
negative and positive reactions respectively, which mainly concentrated towards maintaining 
market integrity as well as stability. With regards to the creation of the FCA, the market 
implicated the insurance sector due to the instability period of a new regulator would 
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potentially alter operations for the sector as witnessed by the EU regulations. However, positive 
associations found within the FSA announcements are found similar to the banking sector. The 
clarity brought by the FSA to the markets signalled an increased demand for insurance stocks’, 
which ultimately led to their asset value to appreciate. With regards to the government 
regulation announcements, there is a positive reaction by the market towards the insurance 
sector. The government introduced financial acts, which brought new standards and overall 
increased demand for holding stocks, therefore placing an upward pressure on price. The PRA 
is found to have impacted the insurance sector index price in a negative manner as the market 
interpreted the new regulations of Solvency II to effect the business operations of insurance 
firms. The reason for this is due to the insurance firms role in the financial crisis of 2008 as 
they took considerable risks by insuring the mortgages made by the banks in return for 
premiums earned. Ultimately, the build-up of exposure to the sub-prime market led to the 
insurance companies posting losses as a result. Therefore the new regulation imposed towards 
the insurance is aimed to bring stability as well as clarity to investors, in order to avert future 
issues with the financial sector. As AIG in the US illustrated how detrimental insurance firms 
can be to the economy with their bailout being the largest in history. The negative reaction is 
associated with reducing their risk insolvency level through holding certain levels of capital, 
which impacts the freedom to which they were able to operate previously. The Independent 
Committee’s announcement did not have any statistical significance towards the insurance 
sector, which therefore means the market although reacted negatively, did not cause 
widespread concern towards the sector. 
Table 4 reports the results of the investment trust and real estate sectors, from which 
we can see solely the government announcements held statistical significance. The government 
announcements that related towards to these sectors were general regulation changes which 
also reformed the taxation of investment trusts and real estate companies. Overall, the reaction 
that was witnessed by both sectors was as negatively interpreted by the markets. This is namely 
due to the nature of increased regulation in sectors that were generally not highly regulated as 
their responsibility towards the economy is not as high as banks or insurance firms. Therefore 
once the market learned about the tax regulation reforms against the investment trusts and 
realtors, this ultimately impaired their future profitability, which led to a sell-off in these stocks 
by the market.  
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We now turn our attention towards the finance companies, whereby we the regulatory 
announcements from EU, FSA and IC yield statistically significant results. Regulatory changes 
by the EU adversely impacted the stock prices of the finance company sector. We establish the 
reason for this may be due to MiFID II, which may have led to the market to believe this 
impacts their operations in funding as they primarily raise funds in the capital markets. 
Therefore this signalled to the market negative future returns is plausible, which led to a greater 
supply in the finance sector stocks and eventually placed a downward pressure on asset value. 
The regulatory announcements from the FSA and the IC indicate a positive response by the 
market. The underlying message this sent was that prices grew as increases in demand towards 
the finance company sector, which resulted in the stability sought by the FSA and IC.   
 
 
Table 4: EGARCH Methodology Results 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 Banks Insurance Trusts Finance Real Estates 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Constant -0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0003 
 (-1.3125) (1.2088) (1.278) (1.1355) (2.6093)*** 
ER 0.7197 0.9724 0.9718 1.0014 0.8364 
 (103.5366)*** (64.5811)*** (123.994)*** (96.101)*** (62.521)*** 
Intercept -0.0839 -0.2224 -0.1703 -0.1145 -0.1395 
 (-9.4435)*** (-13.0901)*** (-10.358)*** (-8.3935)*** (-10.332)*** 
𝝐𝒕−𝟏/𝒉𝒕−𝟏
𝟎.𝟓  0.0844 0.1504 0.1114 0.0881 0.1060 
 (12.8444)*** (19.958)*** (13.149)*** (11.7666)*** (12.792)*** 
𝝀𝟏|
𝝐𝒕−𝟏
𝒉𝒕−𝟏
𝟎.𝟓  -0.0223 -0.0252 -0.0406 -0.0171 -0.0171 
 (-5.2709)*** (-4.6732)*** (-6.451)*** (-3.3804)*** (-3.3604)*** 
GARCH 0.9980 0.9880 0.9920 0.9952 0.9935 
 (1539.304)*** (624.2563)*** (721.182)*** (875.313)*** (844.93)*** 
BIS -0.0631 - - - - 
 (-0.3472) - - - - 
EU -0.0069 -0.3879 -0.2102 -0.2747 0.1048 
 (-0.0546) (-1.9197)* (-1.4668) (-1.7922)* (0.9873) 
FCA 0.3616 -1.7093 -0.6049 0.4079 -0.5048 
 (2.0241)** (-2.5032)** (-1.3522) (1.1692) (-0.9835) 
FSA 0.2419 0.7371 0.1363 0.7173 0.0561 
 (3.5474)*** (7.9502)*** (1.1875) (7.7217)*** (0.7071) 
GOV 0.3689 0.5413 -0.5644 -0.1711 -0.4149 
 (3.6318)*** (3.1241)*** (-2.397)** (-0.7026) (-3.1018)*** 
IC -0.1562 -0.4527 0.0595 0.4474 -0.4627 
 (-0.5591) (-1.4426) (0.2096) (3.4596)*** (-1.2379) 
PRA -0.0407 -0.3434 -0.5144 -0.4843 -0.4144 
 (-0.2471) (-2.3144)** (-0.5724) (-1.2427) (-1.0746) 
R2 0.611 0.385 0.718 0.629 0.384 
_________________________________________________________________ 
Z-Statistic in parenthesis; *** indicates 1% level significance; ** indicates 5% level significance; * indicates 10% 
level significance 
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6.5.3 VAR-GJR-GARCH Methodology Analysis 
Within this methodological approach we begin to understand if the market was able to 
price in the information prior to its release. The model utilised has no ARCH effects and 
therefore controls for heteroskedasitcity as well as there being no presence of autocorrelation. 
Automatically from Table 5 we find statistically significant evidence from all sectors that the 
markets had prior knowledge of regulatory changes observed within our sample. We find that 
volatility spill-over effects are present within all sectors as well as against most announcement 
types. Overall, the results from Table 5 suggest we reject null hypothesis and accept the 
alternative. Seeing as there is evidence of volatility spill-over effects highlights inefficiencies 
within the market and therefore rejects the theoretical perspective that the stock prices reflect 
all knowledge. We can comment further upon the results in Table 5 as we find there is a positive 
leverage effect with statistical significance among the insurance, investment trust and finance 
company sectors. This overall suggests that news is positively received by the stock markets, 
which we elaborate further by mentioning the positive leverage effect is associated with the 
past return and future volatility return. This overall implies there will be an appreciation in the 
value of stock, which then corresponds to a declined debt-to-equity ratio. However, with the 
results concerning the finance company sector we find that announcements from the FSA, 
GOV and PRA we can elaborate further as there is no prior significant results. This suggests 
the market did not anticipate changes from these bodies towards the finance company sector. 
This analogy also applies towards the insurance sector in relation towards the IC, investment 
trust with regards towards the FSA and PRA as well as the realtor sector with the GOV, IC and 
PRA.  
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Table 5: VAR-GJR-GARCH Methodology Stock returns Results 
_________________________________________________________________ 
Variable Banks Insurance Trusts Finance Realtors 
_________________________________________________________________ 
Returns -1 0.0682*** 0.0276 -0.1063*** 0.0437* 0.0056 
Returns -2 -0.0861*** 0.0104 -0.0121 0.0302 0.0025 
Returns -3 0.0358 -0.0085 0.0218 0.0214 0.0319 
Returns -4 -0.0326 0.0142 -0.0222 -0.0218 -0.0535*** 
Returns -5 -0.0204 -0.0082 0.0114 0.0228 -0.0099 
Returns -6 -0.0534** 0.0089 0.0394 -0.0170 0.0074 
Returns -7 -0.0681** -0.0038 -0.0433 0.0186 -0.073*** 
Returns -8 -0.0142 0.0241 0.0324 0.0087 -0.0278 
Returns -9 0.05** -0.0201 0.0037 0.0564** 0.0393* 
Returns -10 -0.0072 0.0269 -0.0410 -0.0182 -0.0315 
ER -1 -0.0653*** -0.0281 0.1627*** 0.0179 0.0691*** 
ER -2 0.0496** -0.0435 0.0322 -0.0259 0.0424* 
ER -3 -0.0956*** -0.0681** -0.0116 -0.0410 -0.0756*** 
ER -4 0.0688*** -0.0081 0.0564 0.0359 0.1099*** 
ER -5 -0.0281 -0.0229 -0.0202 -0.0515* -0.0083 
ER -6 0.0125 -0.0132 -0.0409 -0.0041 -0.0606** 
ER -7 0.1017*** 0.0241 0.0452 -0.0004 0.0993*** 
ER -8 0.0397* -0.0478 -0.0204 -0.0200 0.0391 
ER -9 -0.0249 0.0185 -0.0013 -0.0432 -0.0495** 
ER -10 -0.0185 -0.0260 0.0412 0.0045 0.0272 
BIS -1 0.0019 - - - - 
BIS -2 0.0033 - - - - 
BIS -3 -0.0026 - - - - 
BIS -4 -0.0110 - - - - 
BIS -5 0.0171** - - - - 
BIS -6 -0.0129* - - - - 
BIS -7 0.0060 - - - - 
BIS -8 -0.0002 - - - - 
BIS -9 -0.0010 - - - - 
BIS -10 0.0023 - - - - 
EU -1 -0.0017 0.0007 0.0016 0.0006 -0.0013 
EU -2 0.0012 0.0058 -0.0017 0.0029 0.0027 
EU -3 0.0022 -0.0096** 0.0014 0.0015 0.0030 
EU -4 -0.0097*** 0.0005 -0.0052*** -0.0127** -0.0067** 
EU -5 0.0015 0.0036 0.0028 0.0046 -0.0041 
EU -6 0.007* 0.0001 0.0018 0.0066 0.0076 
EU -7 -0.0060 -0.0049 0.0023 -0.0027 0.0046 
EU -8 0.0054 -0.0012 -0.0044 -0.0052 -0.0077* 
EU -9 -0.0024 0.0052 -0.0020 -0.0020 -0.0022 
EU -10 0.0020 0.0007 0.0035** 0.0069** 0.0049 
FCA -1 -0.0037 -0.0040 0.0019 0.0089 0.0059 
FCA -2 0.0071 0.0020 0.0003 -0.0081 -0.0021 
FCA -3 -0.0047 0.0012 -0.0008 0.0026 -0.0018 
FCA -4 0.0018 0.0101 0.0015 0.0001 0.0005 
FCA -5 -0.0062 -0.0028 -0.0019 0.0033 -0.0065 
FCA -6 0.0037 -0.0067 -0.0005 0.0001 0.0095 
FCA -7 0.0022 0.0013 0.0018 -0.0026 0.0022 
FCA -8 0.0093 -0.0107 -0.0035 0.0014 -0.0074 
FCA -9 -0.0232*** 0.0203*** -0.0036 -0.0120 -0.0058 
FCA -10 0.0149*** -0.0103*** 0.0067*** 0.0114*** 0.0088*** 
FSA -1 0.0035 0.0052** -0.0017 -0.0016 -0.0018 
FSA -2 0.0016 -0.0043 0.0021 0.0015 0.0021 
FSA -3 0.0032 -0.0023 -0.0007 0.0014 0.0010 
_________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 5 Continued 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Variable Banks Insurance Trusts Finance Realtors 
__________________________________________________________________ 
FSA -4 -0.0156*** 0.0031 0.0008 0.0017 -0.005** 
FSA -5 0.0094*** 0.0041 -0.0023 -0.0047 0.0079*** 
FSA -6 -0.0029 -0.0068** 0.0031 0.0049 0.0000 
FSA -7 0.0029 0.0027 -0.0030 -0.0056 -0.0054 
FSA -8 0.0016 0.0002 0.0030 0.0074 0.0048** 
FSA -9 0.0010 0.0052 -0.0009 -0.0014 0.0004 
FSA -10 -0.0047 -0.0052** 0.0005 -0.0018 -0.0036** 
GOV -1 -0.0028 -0.0014 -0.0038 0.0002 -0.0013 
GOV -2 0.0042 -0.0006 0.0027 0.0059 0.0014 
GOV -3 -0.0107* -0.0008 -0.0017 -0.0126 -0.0054 
GOV -4 0.0092 0.0062 0.0022 0.0069 0.0043 
GOV -5 0.0124* -0.0063 -0.0024 -0.0027 0.0000 
GOV -6 -0.0178*** 0.0105 -0.0004 0.0102 -0.0002 
GOV -7 0.0048 -0.0067 0.0080 -0.0040 0.0047 
GOV -8 -0.0016 0.0078** -0.0104 -0.0052 -0.0068 
GOV -9 -0.0102* -0.0003 0.011* 0.0042 0.0070 
GOV -10 0.0121*** -0.0084*** -0.0079 0.0001 -0.0052 
IC -1 0.0056 -0.0014 -0.0081 -0.0081 0.0008 
IC -2 -0.0155 0.0003 0.0098 0.0052 -0.0122 
IC -3 0.0207 0.0111 0.0032 0.0121 0.0127 
IC -4 -0.0009 -0.0053 -0.0035 -0.0024 0.0049 
IC -5 -0.0273 0.0042 -0.0071 -0.0101 -0.0197 
IC -6 0.0233 -0.0076 0.0054 -0.0011 0.0119 
IC -7 0.0284 0.0123 0.0136 0.0216 0.0264 
IC -8 -0.041** -0.0122 -0.0181 -0.0172 -0.0249 
IC -9 0.0054 0.0007 0.0094 0.0071 -0.0078 
IC -10 -0.0010 -0.0019 -0.008957 -0.0124** 0.0010 
PRA -1 0.0002 0.0037 -0.0014 -0.0042 0.0015 
PRA -2 -0.0002 -0.0066* 0.0015 0.0073 0.0029 
PRA -3 0.0111* -0.0014 0.0018 -0.0007 -0.0048 
PRA -4 -0.0098* 0.0014 0.0038 0.0048 0.0071 
PRA -5 -0.0001 0.0004 -0.0037 -0.0049 -0.0026 
PRA -6 0.0013 0.0023 -0.0040 -0.0011 -0.0071 
PRA -7 0.0006 -0.0001 -0.0022 -0.0085 0.0047 
PRA -8 -0.0035 0.0038 0.0067 0.0121 0.0052 
PRA -9 0.0073 -0.0043 -0.0050 -0.0018 -0.0083 
PRA -10 -0.0055 -0.0008 0.0014 -0.0029 0.0055 
C -0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 
Intercept 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 
𝜺𝒕−𝟏𝜺𝒕−𝟏 0.0902*** 0.0349*** 0.0142* 0.0157** 0.0773*** 
𝜺𝒕−𝟏𝝀𝟏,𝒕−𝟏 0.0001 0.0745*** 0.1389*** 0.1205*** 0.0001 
GARCH 0.9091*** 0.9178*** 0.8992*** 0.9067*** 0.9172*** 
R2 0.041 0.013 0.019 0.013 0.027 
______________________________________________________ 
Coefficients in bold achieved statistical significance with *** indicating 1% level significance; ** indicating 5% 
level significance; * indicating 10% level significance 
 
In Table 6 we report the volatility of regulation responses, which further confirm the results in 
the previous section from Table 5. We find in Table 6 there is prior announcement volatility 
within the markets present surrounding the financial sectors. Our results suggest there was a 
presence of prior volatility in respect of impending regulatory news as the statistical 
significance found within each of the sectors against respective bodies. We do however, have 
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conflicted results within the volatility of the sectors, which does suggest the market priced the 
information correctly at the time and raises arguments. The insurance sector shows evidence 
of prior volatility against all regulatory body announcements within the index. Furthermore, 
the results from the trusts, finance company and realtor sectors all confirm prior results against 
the PRA as well as the finance companies and trusts confirming the GOV and IC also. The 
additional results show no statistical significance found by the FCA as well as EU from the real 
estate sector, finance companies and investment trust sector respectively. This raises the 
arguments against the previous results, which does suggest the market accurately priced the 
information and did not anticipate regulatory changes. Another argument one could highlight 
is the announcement window lags utilised within the study may have not been large enough to 
capture the changes of when the markets priced the information. However, by lengthening the 
windows this simultaneously increases the chances of event clustering.  
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Table 6: VAR-GJR-GARCH Methodology Volatility Results 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Variable Banks Insurance Trusts Finance Realtors 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Volatility -1 0.3008*** 0.3317*** 0.3191*** 0.2951*** 0.3638*** 
Volatility -2 0.0168 -0.0149 0.0013 0.0195 -0.0452** 
Volatility -3 0.0365** 0.0542*** 0.0616*** 0.0431** 0.0961*** 
Volatility -4 0.0892*** 0.0601*** 0.0602*** 0.0356* 0.0269 
Volatility -5 0.0598*** 0.0531*** 0.0621*** 0.0821*** 0.0815*** 
Volatility -6 0.0098 0.0195 -0.0037 0.0169 0.0795*** 
Volatility -7 0.0745*** 0.0755*** 0.0581*** 0.0547*** 0.0318* 
Volatility -8 0.0758*** 0.0358** 0.0293* 0.0296 0.0383** 
Volatility -9 0.0167 0.0087 0.0502*** 0.0459*** 0.0522*** 
Volatility -10 0.0917*** 0.0898*** 0.053*** 0.0568*** 0.0311* 
ER -1 -0.7981*** -0.553*** -1.1759*** -1.7552*** -1.1765*** 
ER -2 -0.6904*** -0.6936*** -0.9696*** -1.2612*** -0.9147*** 
ER -3 -0.5842*** -0.3421* -1.0442*** -0.9566*** -1.1108*** 
ER -4 -0.4962*** -0.8739*** -0.5871*** -0.7352*** -0.2426 
ER -5 -0.4964*** -0.4621*** -0.2938* -0.6621*** -0.2689 
ER -6 -0.2545* -0.4166** -0.2181 -0.3676** -0.5863*** 
ER -7 -0.2059 0.1582 -0.3063* -0.1287 0.1273 
ER -8 -0.4009*** -0.5361*** -0.4711*** -0.5575*** -0.2002 
ER -9 -0.1013 -0.1087 -0.1716 -0.1814 -0.3239* 
ER -10 -0.2020 0.0387 -0.1912 0.2299 -0.1098 
BIS -1 -0.0256 - - - - 
BIS -2 0.0181 - - - - 
BIS -3 0.0506 - - - - 
BIS -4 -0.1796 - - - - 
BIS -5 0.1592 - - - - 
BIS -6 0.0417 - - - - 
BIS -7 0.1085 - - - - 
BIS -8 -0.1654** - - - - 
BIS -9 -0.0618 - - - - 
BIS -10 0.0643 - - - - 
EU -1 0.0167 -0.0090 0.0066 -0.0103 -0.0128 
EU -2 -0.0536 0.0489 -0.0128 -0.0144 0.0322 
EU -3 0.0453 -0.0226 0.0312 0.0493 0.0099 
EU -4 -0.0682** -0.0498 -0.0106 -0.0249 0.0089 
EU -5 0.0777*** 0.0239 -0.0084 -0.0135 -0.0349 
EU -6 -0.0379 -0.0114 -0.0095 -0.0225 -0.0040 
EU -7 0.0231 0.0051 -0.0044 0.0111 0.0651 
EU -8 0.0091 -0.0089 0.0098 0.0646 -0.0018 
EU -9 0.0012 -0.0040 -0.0267 -0.0572 -0.0816* 
EU -10 -0.0141 0.0143 0.0252 0.0136 0.0355 
FCA -1 -0.0356 -0.0320 0.0132 -0.0859 -0.0570 
FCA -2 -0.0433 0.0157 -0.0183 0.0675 0.0553 
FCA -3 0.1187** 0.0417 0.0050 -0.0059 0.0193 
FCA -4 -0.0221 0.0435 0.0020 0.0186 -0.0235 
FCA -5 -0.0070 -0.0449 -0.0201 0.0019 0.0032 
FCA -6 -0.0340 -0.0214 0.0148 -0.0244 0.0105 
FCA -7 -0.0550 0.0212 0.0086 0.0131 -0.0396 
FCA -8 0.1909*** -0.0637 0.0045 0.0182 0.0263 
FCA -9 -0.1078** 0.0937 -0.0622 -0.1414 -0.0316 
FCA -10 -0.0266 -0.0536 0.0337* 0.0971** 0.0285 
FSA -1 -0.0083 0.0248 0.0147 0.0144 -0.0148 
FSA -2 -0.0078 -0.0482 -0.0196 0.0162 -0.0043 
FSA -3 -0.0056 0.0643** -0.0130 -0.1019** -0.0152 
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Table 6 Continued 
___________________________________________________________________ 
Variable Banks Insurance Trusts Finance Realtors 
___________________________________________________________________ 
FSA -4 0.0353 -0.0342 0.0094 0.0864** 0.0311** 
FSA -5 -0.0423* -0.0375 0.0097 -0.0332 0.0149 
FSA -6 0.0137 -0.0083 0.0073 0.0149 -0.0090 
FSA -7 0.0242 0.0385 -0.0046 -0.0073 -0.0109 
FSA -8 -0.0429 0.0276 -0.0259 -0.0473 -0.0236 
FSA -9 0.0365 -0.0883** -0.0001 0.0393 0.0218 
FSA -10 -0.0137 0.0873*** 0.0166 0.0190 0.0059 
GOV -1 -0.0081 -0.0413 0.0734** 0.0058 0.0213 
GOV -2 -0.0025 -0.0851 -0.0997* 0.0499 -0.0517 
GOV -3 -0.0029 0.1063** -0.0269 -0.0535 0.0409 
GOV -4 0.0122 0.0680 0.0727 0.0335 -0.0623 
GOV -5 -0.0549 -0.0776 0.0300 -0.0390 0.0671 
GOV -6 0.0399 -0.0396 -0.0110 0.0502 -0.0434 
GOV -7 0.0066 0.0502 -0.0205 -0.0620 0.0803 
GOV -8 0.0390 -0.0344 0.0179 0.0230 -0.0472 
GOV -9 0.0421 0.0787 0.0054 0.0272 -0.0379 
GOV -10 -0.0686** -0.0138 -0.0370 -0.0115 0.0322 
IC -1 0.1027 0.0207 0.0537 0.0420 0.1089 
IC -2 -0.1548 -0.1027 -0.0950 -0.1340 -0.1681 
IC -3 0.1585 0.0905 0.1515 0.1219 0.0673 
IC -4 -0.0798 -0.0804 -0.1277 -0.0050 -0.0347 
IC -5 -0.1349 0.1625* -0.0082 -0.0660 -0.0336 
IC -6 0.3152 -0.0300 0.0894 0.0245 0.0911 
IC -7 -0.3284* -0.1604 -0.1666** -0.0569 -0.1060 
IC -8 0.0356 0.0465 0.0709 0.1544** 0.1585 
IC -9 0.1792 0.0704 0.0434 -0.0247 -0.0677 
IC -10 -0.0419 -0.0186 0.0230 -0.0573 0.0058 
PRA -1 -0.0110 -0.0344 -0.0061 -0.0187 -0.0331 
PRA -2 0.0551 0.0388 -0.0473 -0.0329 0.0009 
PRA -3 0.0231 -0.0335 0.0538 0.0170 -0.0351 
PRA -4 -0.0949* 0.0530 -0.0094 0.0533 0.0709 
PRA -5 0.0371 -0.0045 0.0246 -0.0301 0.0126 
PRA -6 -0.0105 -0.0040 -0.0801 -0.0470 -0.1082 
PRA -7 0.0144 -0.0389 0.0278 -0.0586 0.1231 
PRA -8 0.0559 0.0176 0.0128 0.0555 0.0083 
PRA -9 -0.0661 -0.0267 0.0209 0.0457 -0.0164 
PRA -10 0.0040 0.0428** -0.0275 -0.0323 -0.0429 
C 0.0348*** 0.0387*** 0.0331*** 0.0507*** 0.0271*** 
Intercept 0.0002*** 0.0003*** 0.0002*** 0.0004*** 0.0002*** 
𝜺𝒕−𝟏𝜺𝒕−𝟏 0.1334*** 0.1536*** 0.1675*** 0.1363*** 0.1589*** 
𝜺𝒕−𝟏𝝀𝟏,𝒕−𝟏 -0.0474** -0.0534** -0.0584*** -0.0145 0.0265 
GARCH 0.8841*** 0.8481*** 0.8438*** 0.8587*** 0.8365*** 
R2 0.341 0.284 0.282 0.258 0.317 
________________________________________________________ 
Coefficients in bold achieved statistical significance with *** indicating 1% level significance; ** indicating 5% 
level significance; * indicating 10% level significance 
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6.5.4. Robustness 
In order to achieve a comprehensive study, we perform further analysis towards the banking 
and insurance sectors as we investigate the impact regulatory news held against the CDS 
spreads. We adopt the same approach as Schäfer et, al (2015) by implementing a SUR 
regression model in order to confirm or reject their results with respect to the Vickers’ report 
held towards UK commercial banks as well as insurance firms. The SUR model, which was 
first introduced by Zellner (1962) enables us to simultaneously estimate all the regressions of 
all banks within our sample, which is efficient as well as accounting for heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation within the system. It also enables us to remove the issue of event clustering, 
through the cross-sectional estimation the model provides us with as expressed by Campbell, 
Lo and MacKinlay (1998). We use a different set of announcements for the banking sector (can 
be found in appendix 4 under Table 7) to capture rumours or calls for regulation changes rather 
actual changes to envision the market response. Furthermore, we include a variable to capture 
the importance of the Turner’s Review, which may be revered by viewers as important factor 
in calling for regulatory change. We capture the impact of regulatory news events towards the 
cost of tier 1 capital through the change in CDS spread for the banking and insurance sectors. 
A widening of the spread would demonstrate the cost of debt increased and would highlight 
the added risk attached towards the institutions business model. Furthermore, the indication of 
a widening spread gives rise to an increase in the probability of default as the institution is 
perceived by the market to be a riskier investment. However a tightening of the spread would 
indicate the market welcomed the regulatory proposals, which created a stable environment for 
the banks as well as insurers, which then leads to a lower cost of raising capital. The data we 
utilise within this section is daily CDS spreads of 7 UK banks and 5 UK insurance firms 
commencing from 01/01/2009 till 30/10/2015. We take the first difference within all the CDS 
spreads in order to achieve stationarity, which enables us to make sure the data is not biased 
and reduces the white noise that may be present in time-series data. The estimation of the SUR 
methodology towards the banks is proposed as follows: 
∆𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝐼𝐶 + 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑉𝐼𝐶 + 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝐶𝑂𝑁 + 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑇𝑈𝑅 + 𝜖  
…  
∆𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝐼𝐶 + 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑉𝐼𝐶 + 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝐶𝑂𝑁 + 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑇𝑈𝑅 + 𝜖           (6.19) 
…  
∆𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝐼𝐶 + 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑉𝐼𝐶 + 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝐶𝑂𝑁 + 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑇𝑈𝑅 + 𝜖  
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The estimation of the insurance firms’ SUR methodology is proposed as follows with slight 
changes from equation 19: 
∆𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝐼𝐶 + 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑃𝑅𝐴 + 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑇𝑈𝑅 + 𝜖  
… 
∆𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝐼𝐶 + 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑃𝑅𝐴 + 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑇𝑈𝑅 + 𝜖             (6.20) 
… 
∆𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝐼𝐶 + 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑃𝑅𝐴 + 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑇𝑈𝑅 + 𝜖  
Where: ∆𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡 is the CDS spread of bank i on day t with ∆ being the change in the spread, 𝛼0 
is the constant parameter within the model with 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑃𝑅𝐴 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝐼𝐶, 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑉𝐼𝐶 and 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝐶𝑂𝑁 are 
dummy variables to capture the news announcements of the Prudential Regulatory Authority, 
Independent Committee, Vickers’ statements, concession statements surrounding ring-fencing 
and the Turner’s Review. 𝜖 is an error term.  
 
6.5.4.1 Robustness Results 
 Below in Table 8 we report the results of the SUR regressions, from which we can 
confirm the results of Schäfer et, al (2015). We find there is a positive reaction from the UK 
banks in regards to the independent committee with the announcement of the Vickers report. 
We interpret this result through the tightening of the CDS spreads, as the announcements came 
to light regarding the Vickers’ report. The tightening of the spreads can be linked to a more 
stable banking sector, which the Vickers’ report outlined and is to be implemented by the 
Government as standard practice. The reaction highlights the market priced into the spreads 
the new impending regulation changes, will create a stable environment against the banking 
sector, which cannot attach traditional banking with investment banking. By separating the 
different banking divisions from one another the theory is that there will be less risk exposure 
on the balance sheets of the large institutions and therefore will essentially become more stable 
institutions with the likelihood of default being reduced. In other announcements regarding Sir 
John Vickers in relation towards the banking sector raised fears of their future positions as it is 
evident there is a negative association. Although no statistical significance is achieved, all 
banks still react negatively, which overall highlights the power Sir John Vickers possesses in 
relation towards the banking sector as well as the market recognising negative noise. With 
regards to the concession announcements surrounding the ring-fencing of the banking sector, 
a positive response is the majority of institutions. This highlights the reduced levels of risk 
these banking institutions face in light of the news, which led to their spreads to tighten. 
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However, with respect to HBOS (part of Lloyds Banking Group) we find there is statistical 
significance with the widening of spread. This suggests that the announcement surrounding the 
ring fencing concessions negatively impacts their ability to raise capital. Moreover, when 
interpreting our results concerning the Turner Review we find mixed responses among the 
banks whereby Banco Santander, HBOS, Lloyds Banking Group and Royal Bank of Scotland 
are found to have a positive response towards the calls for regulation change. The 
announcements aided these institutions ability to raise funds at a lower cost, which is in line 
with previous results of increased capital adequacy tightens the spread due to the increased 
stability sought through regulation. In regards to the other institutions (Barclays, SBC and 
Standard Chartered) these are namely international banks with exposures worldwide from 
which, increased calls for regulations aims to reduce the size of these banks along with their 
risk exposures to global markets. Overall, these claims from the Turners’ Review led to the 
market to widen their CDS spreads possibly due to the increased future uncertainty of the bank, 
which led to an increased in raising of funds.      
Table 9 below highlights the results concerning the insurance sector. We gather strong evidence 
to confirm previous results in the view of announcements impact the CDS spreads from 
tightening or a widening. In relation towards the announcements from the IC we find all 
insurance companies experienced a positive response with RSA being statistically significant 
in the tightening of CDS spread. This overall, confirms our results in the previous section 
whereby the equity price response of the IC is a result of reduced risk and therefore reduced 
expected return. As the CDS spread tightens, this highlights the ability to raise capital at a 
lower cost and therefore illustrate the positive impact held by the IC. With regards towards the 
PRA results, we yield mixed responses between the insurance firms in terms of the reaction of 
CDS spread widening or tightening. Old Mutual Plc (OML) and Legal and General Plc (LGEN) 
are found to tighten with the positive response of Solvency II. This overall suggests they are 
already fulfil the regulatory requirements as they are well capitalised and have sound risk 
management. However, in terms of Aviva Plc (AV), Prudential Plc (PRU) and RSA there is a 
negative impact, which overall highlights the widening of their CDS spreads. The widening of 
their spreads suggests that these institutions are not well capitalised as Solvency II comes closer 
into implementation. Since there is a newly found need for raising capital levels to match risk 
exposure, this placed an upward pressure towards their cost of financing and overall led to a 
widening of CDS spreads among these institutions. We shed light upon the announcement of 
the Turners Review, whereby all insurance firms we examine experience a tightening shift 
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within their CDS spreads. The tightening of the spread materialised as a result of the conducted 
review aims to bring clarity to the financial sector. The increased regulation call indicates the 
future to be increasingly stable and does not jeopardise the economy in any way, which overall 
restricts the financial sector to absorb less risk and hold more capital. As increasing capital 
levels are met, this ultimately reduces the default probabilities of the financials and therefore 
reduces cost of financing.  
 
 
Table 8: SUR Results Banking Sector 
____________________________________ 
BANK Variable Coefficient t-Statistic 
___________________________________________ 
BARC Intercept -0.0651 -0.4975 
 IC 5.0391 1.2920 
 VIC -0.8921 -0.3233 
 CON 0.3336 0.0855 
 TUR -2.4793 -0.4496 
BNC Intercept 0.0153 0.0766 
 IC 0.1667 0.0279 
 VIC -3.5526 -0.8412 
 CON 0.8797 0.1474 
 TUR 1.3684 0.1622 
HBOS Intercept -0.0399 -0.3302 
 IC 6.6929 1.8603* 
 VIC -0.4886 -0.1920 
 CON -8.1076 -2.2535** 
 TUR 0.7073 0.1390 
HSBA Intercept -0.0172 -0.2073 
 IC 0.9992 0.4032 
 VIC -1.6200 -0.9239 
 CON -0.0948 -0.0382 
 TUR -0.6531 -0.1864 
LLOY Intercept -0.0428 -0.2921 
 IC 14.0758 3.2267*** 
 VIC -2.4587 -0.7967 
 CON -0.1447 -0.0332 
 TUR 0.7292 0.1182 
RBS Intercept -0.0418 -0.2758 
 IC 3.0763 0.6814 
 VIC -1.2752 -0.3992 
 CON 0.0403 0.0089 
 TUR 0.8733 0.1368 
STAN Intercept -0.0334 -0.3259 
 IC 4.4959 1.4719 
 VIC -1.9861 -0.9190 
 CON 0.6064 0.1985 
 TUR -4.1940 -0.9714 
___________________________________ 
*** indicates 1% level significance; ** indicates 5% level significance; * indicates 10% level significance 
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Table 9: SUR Results Insurance Sector 
_______________________________________ 
Insurance Firm Variable Coefficient t-Statistic 
_______________________________________________ 
AV Intercept -0.0387 -0.6485 
 IC 1.4102 0.7762 
 PRA -1.0395 -0.9898 
 TUR 1.1453 0.4459 
LGEN Intercept -0.0503 -1.0784 
 IC 1.4993 1.0750 
 PRA 0.1856 0.2302 
 TUR 0.4525 0.2295 
OML Intercept -0.0530 -1.3631 
 IC 0.4630 0.3991 
 PRA 0.1540 0.2296 
 TUR 0.1891 0.1153 
PRU Intercept -0.0492 -1.5623 
 IC 0.9207 0.9733 
 PRA -0.0308 -0.0563 
 TUR 0.4194 0.3136 
RSA Intercept -0.0201 -0.3379 
 IC 2.7751 1.8216* 
 PRA -0.5246 -0.5955 
 TUR 1.8455 0.8572 
__________________________________________ 
*** indicates 1% level significance; ** indicates 5% level significance; * indicates 10% level significance 
 
 
6.6. Conclusion 
 The significance this study carries is important to many observers, such as central 
bankers, regulatory bodies, market participants and academics alike. To bring this study to a 
close, we have enriched the literature through establishing research towards all UK financial 
sectors in relation to recent regulatory changes, which were introduced due to the losses 
sustained from the crisis of 2007/8. The financial crisis highlighted widespread issues within 
the financial sectors to which the public suffered the consequences through large government 
bailout packages that were required in order to keep the financial system afloat and restore 
stability. Furthermore, this led to the government and other respective regulatory bodies to take 
stern action towards the financial sector in terms of increasing regulation from which the public 
largely demanded. The concluding arguments we provide support the findings by Schäfer et, 
al (2015) whereby there was a negative response in equity markets from the Vickers report 
announcement by the Independent Committee. We therefore do not reject our first hypothesis. 
Our results find a decline in equity prices among the banking sector, which highlights the 
stability brought by the new reforms and overall reduces the future returns for shareholders and 
therefore reduces the risk incentive. The future returns of the business are impacted by the 
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newly imposed reforms as it directly impacts their business model of reducing their investment 
banking activities, which is a highly profitable area of banking collectively. Furthermore, we 
enhanced the literature through illustrating the CDS spreads to tighten once the Vickers Report 
was announced. This also confirms Schäfer et, al (2015) as the reforms restricts the level of 
risk banks are exposed to.  
With regards to our second hypothesis concerning prior volatility spill-overs 
surrounding impending regulatory change we find there is evidence of prior knowledge of 
regulatory change and highlights market inefficiency. We find the market priced information 
of regulatory announcements from every governing body by at least one sector prior to its 
release. However, we do provide evidence of conflicting results, which overall will require 
further research into this niche area. Our results are conflicted through the volatility of returns 
whereby, we discover respective governing announcements are not foreseen by the market and 
therefore the market maintains a level of efficiency as prices are fair and true.  
 Finally we conclude our study with the notion that announcements surrounding 
Solvency II and higher capital level requirements resulted in negative equity returns towards 
the banking and insurance sectors. The overall interpretation from the reaction is founded from 
the impact these regulatory reforms hold towards the operations of the banking and insurance 
sectors. With regards towards the banks this inherently controls their risk exposure levels and 
therefore restricts their performance as the greater risks taking theoretically lead to greater 
returns. The same can be argued towards the insurance sector also, as Solvency II has a similar 
theme to restrict risk taking exposure. These two sectors are seen as the most pivotal to ensuring 
economic stability and to avert future crisis periods in the future.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
242 
 
CHAPTER 7 
Concluding Remarks 
7.1 Summary of findings 
The current thesis examined the overall performance of UK financial institutions over 
stable and unstable market conditions. Research aims addressed were set as follows. First, we 
assessed the determinants of financial performance of UK financial institutions and examined 
the risk-shifting behaviour patterns of the UK financial institutions over time. Second, we 
measure the risk profile of UK financial institutions from 2000-2012, and illustrated how the 
build-up of risk was portrayed through examining beta in comparison to general market 
movements. Third, we investigated stock price performance of the UK financial institutions 
during volatile periods and examined market movements in the context of macroeconomic 
events. Fourth, we assessed the impact regulation held towards various financial sub-sectors. 
Last, but not least, we objectified to detect whether transmission of information was present 
within the financial markets surrounding impending regulatory changes.  
 The current study, is the first study of its kind to set a precedent on determining the key 
drivers of financial performance among all sectors of UK financial institutions. Previous 
studies from Smirlock (1985), Molyneux and Thornton (1992), Molyneux and Forbes (1995), 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999), Goddard et al. (2004 and 2004b), Kosmidou et al. 
(2005), and Pasiouras and Kosmidou (2007) and many more concentrated upon the drivers of 
performance solely on the banking sector. The contribution of our study provides the literature 
to understand the performance of all UK specific financial institutions during specific periods 
of the economic cycle and more importantly during periods of financial instability. 
Furthermore, it provides a baseline for financial institutions to manage financial crisis periods 
appropriately, through dedicating financial resources to the areas which provide a positive 
impact towards profitability. This study can be useful for developing investment decisions, as 
these sectors are considered to be relatively attractive to international portfolio investors, as 
seen by the works of Fletcher (1995), Leger (1997), Bangassa (1999) and Elyasiani and Jia 
(2011). The results from Chapter 3 identifies the factors and shows how they drive performance 
among the UK financial institutions. We find risk-return hypothesis is evident across all sectors 
bar the insurance sector, which highlights the importance of the risk element undertaken by 
financial institutions being a key determinant of profitability. In regards to the banking sector 
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this contribution is in line with Smirlock (1985), Berger (1995), Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga 
(1999), and Abreu and Mendes (2001), which demonstrates a positive and significant 
relationship with our risk variable (loan-to-deposit ratio).  
With regards to the Investment trusts, Real Estate and Finance company sectors, this is a new 
contribution to the literature, whereby we demonstrated the risk-return hypothesis. We identify 
the banking sector benefits from operating within a highly concentrated market, which 
attributes towards overall profitability, this result is in line with Molyneux and Thornton 
(1992), Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999), Goddard et al. (2004 and 2004b), Pasiouras and 
Kosmidou (2007). This creates an issue for regulators as essentially perfect competition is not 
present within UK banking sector, whereby the banks will lower costs in order to gain market 
share from one another, instead the opposite occurs as the banks are essentially colluding with 
one another to take advantage of the monopolistic conditions that are present in the UK market 
– This is a further contribution of our study.  
Moreover, we find efficiency is present among the insurance, real estate and finance companies 
sectors. These sectors are able to convert a higher market share into direct contributors towards 
profitability, which suggests competition has led to greater performance through reducing 
costs. This is an example of a new contribution to the literature as no study before has 
considered this aspect from the UK market previously. Our study finds that size does not 
enhance profitability across the banking, investment trust, real estate and finance companies 
sectors, which highlights financial companies inability to benefit from economies of scope, 
with the only exception being the insurance sector, which suggests the insurance sector has 
been able optimise financial products they offer and benefit from economies of scope. 
Additionally, we concluded economic conditions do have a vast impact towards determining 
profitability for the UK financial sectors, as one would expect once economic growth occurs 
this coincides with greater confidence within the economy with lenders willing to lend and 
borrowers are encouraged to borrow as the likelihood of default is minimised as growth is 
present. these findings are in line and complement those from Goddard, et al. (2004a), 
Kosmidou, et al. (2005) and Pasiouras and Kosmidou (2007).  
We further addressed the risk variable in Chapter 3 to assess the risk shifting behaviour patterns 
from 2000-2012 to capture the pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods. We conclude the 
banking, insurance and investment trust sectors as expected follow economic growth trends, 
whereby risk increases during times of prosperity and shifts negatively through economic times 
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of uncertainty. We found few structural breaks in the real estate sector, however the breaks 
identified did coincide with the growth and slowdown in the housing markets. Lastly, with 
regards to the finance company sector, we conclude the market was able to distinguish the risk 
levels and priced in the information accordingly.  
By examining, in Chapter 4, the in-sample and out-sample performance of different approaches 
(DCC-GARCH, BEKK,GJR-GARCH, Kalman filter etc) we were able to determine and 
explain the behaviour of risk profile exhibited by each UK financial sector across our sample 
years, providing so a unique contribution to literature. The literature demonstrates that the beta 
variable in the CAPM to be time-varying, which we confirmed within our results as every 
sector does not produce a constant beta. This is in line with research such as Jacob (1971), 
Blume (1971) Fabozzi and Francis (1978), Alexander and Chervany (1980), Bos and Newbold 
(1984) and many more. Further to determining the time-varying risk profile of the financial 
sectors, the results showed the market held the insurance sector to possess the most systemic 
risk, with the banking sector ranking second overall. This confirms these sectors’ held central 
roles in the build-up to the financial crisis of 2007/8 as given by their increase in risk profile. 
The rise demonstrates the inability of the sectors being able to manage their risk portfolio as 
given by the steep rise in systemic risk. Furthermore, we demonstrated over the sample years 
how the risk profiles of each sector evolved over time. Whether it was linked to an event or 
underlying economic conditions that the market priced the systemic risk at that given level in 
time. For example spikes in risk profile linked to 9/11 in all sectors is found as this event 
induced high levels of uncertainty in financial markets, especially towards the insurance sector 
due to the exposure held to American markets. Our last finding within this empirical chapter 
concludes with the most accurate in-sample technique is the rolling regression technique as 
adopted by Fama and MacBeth (1973) in accordance to the MSE. However, the Kalman filter 
demonstrates its superiority over other techniques investigated as given by the modified 
Mariano and Diebold test, which is in line within the literature by Brooks et al., (1998), 
Mergner and Bulla (2008), Choudhry and Wu (2009) and Zhou (2013). 
In Chapter 5 we examined the impact of macroeconomic news events towards the equity prices 
of all UK financial institutions. By undertaking this research theme we were able to measure 
the markets reactions to the major events that occurred throughout the crisis. Furthermore, we 
can understand which initiatives were most impactful in restoring confidence to the markets 
during periods of heightened distress. Prior to this study there was no study that incorporated 
all UK financial sectors this research niche, therefore enriching the literature, through utilising 
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existing event study methodology techniques. Previous studies from literature such as King 
(2009), Aїt-Sahalia et al. (2012), Fratianni and Marchionne (2013), Dumontaux and Pop 
(2013), Klomp (2013) and Grammatikos et al. (2015) all considered many nations rather than 
exploring the UK market solely. The first key finding was found was market participants were 
able to distinguish risk levels among the differing banks. This was exemplified through the 
CDS spreads as given by the SUR empirical framework applied (from Zellner (1962)), which 
identified investors priced the CDS spreads differently to Northern Rock in comparison to the 
rest of the banking institutions. In addition to this we found that the actions of the UK 
government during the crisis period were just as effective as the Bank of England in restoring 
confidence to the financial system. This highlights their underlying powers they can exert 
during times of economic fragility and heightened volatility. Moreover, we were able to 
demonstrate how integrated the financial markets are through examining the news events from 
other Western economies and comparing them against domestic announcements events. In the 
non-bank financial sectors we found an overall greater impact from the Western economies 
and IMF in comparison to domestic announcements. Furthermore, we provided evidence that 
the UK banking sector also experiences a positive reaction to other major central banking and 
IMF announcements. This also reinforces the notion that today’s financial markets are 
globalised.  
In Chapter 6, we assessed the effects of regulation changes against the equity prices of the UK 
financial sectors from utilising existing methods (Event study methodology, MacKinlay 
(1997), SUR by Zellner (1962) and others). This is the first study of its kind in terms of utilising 
all UK financial sectors impact of regulatory news events, with which we can gain a greater 
understanding of how regulation news impacts financial markets, therefore enriching the 
literature. The only study we can truly gain comparison from is the paper by Schäfer et, al 
(2015) (concentrated solely on Banks and considered other nations regulatory changes in wake 
of the financial crisis). We conclude the increased capital requirement regulations from the 
Bank of International Settlements (Basel Tier III) and Solvency II directly produced negative 
effect on the returns of equity prices. The regulations directly impact the business models of 
these particular sectors as it restricts them from taking excessive risk, which is seen by 
shareholders as reducing the bank or insurance firm from reaching its full potential. This is due 
to maximising the use of capital to creating loans or underwriting insurance, which overall is 
related to the risk-return hypothesis. The shareholders interpreted the regulation as a restriction 
upon risk-taking behaviour and priced it accordingly to their expectation of reduced future 
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returns. Given the circumstances of which the Vickers report was commissioned to overhaul 
the current regulation with strong recommendations to which should be implemented, was a 
significant event and is in line with Schäfer et, al (2015). Once the Vickers report was officially 
released, the equity prices of the banking sector was found to have negative impact on equity 
prices. This allowed to confirm the notion shareholders perceived this increased regulation as 
negative, due to the restriction it places upon the business model of banking and ring fence 
banking operations. This overall reduces the risk-taking behaviour and creates a more stable 
atmosphere to avert future crisis periods from materialising. We additional demonstrated a 
positive effect in the CDS spreads from the Vickers report for robustness purposes. This overall 
provides sufficient evidence as the CDS spreads tightened as a result of increased regulation, 
therefore reducing the cost of tier 1 capital. Lastly, we find evidence of transmission of 
information in regards to impending regulatory changes, whereby the market priced the 
expectation of regulatory prior to its release. As overall this suggests the market had prior 
knowledge of impending regulation action to be taken and priced the information into the asset 
prices somewhat as a result. This can provide evidence of an inefficiency within the market, 
which may have been exploited. However, we feel this requires additional research from the 
academic community in order to confirm or reject or results. 
 
 
7.2 Policy Implications 
The current study shows the key variables that are required to be in place to present 
financial institutions with the opportunity to optimise performance. Whereby, the allocation of 
resources can be utilised in a manner that creates the financial sectors to prosper and by doing 
so can aid economic development within the UK. Our findings can aid policy makers’ 
understanding of what determines profitability among the financial sectors of the economy and 
may be able to develop appropriate and fair regulations to ensure monetary stability is met but 
also enables the financial sector to optimise performance.  
This study also helped to determine the level of systemic risk each sector contains. As 
a result, this enables us to monitor the risk profile attached to each sector and from the research 
policy makers and regulators are should directly be able to monitor the risk contained within 
each sector. By being more informed they are able to enforce tighter restrictions to ensure 
financial stability is met when heightened beta is experienced and vice versa for when risk is 
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too low. For the financial institutions’ perspective as a result of research conducted, they will 
be able to manage risk at a more advanced level, which will aid their decision making when 
pondering upon riskier investment opportunities.   
The current thesis also measured the impact of announcements from the Government, 
Bank of England and other respective organisations/governments to the UK financial sectors’ 
equity prices, namely in a positive manner. The stabilising measures implemented enabled 
investors of all backgrounds in the market to potentially experience abnormal positive returns. 
These measures creates an attractive investment environment for investors as the necessary 
steps to maintain investment within the economy are being exerted in order to reduce 
systematic risk. From the injections of capital into the banking system, lowering interest rates, 
nationalising institutions and quantitative easing programs, this portrayed positive news to the 
market, which enabled the UK to exit official recession by last quarter 2009. It demonstrates 
the effective policy initiatives undertaken aided the stability of the equity markets in the UK 
through reducing systematic risk as the respective bodies took necessary action to maintain the 
financial system.  
Last, but not least, we examined how increased regulation reduces risk and therefore 
reduces return from the markets’ perspective. A policy implication brought from increased 
regulation concerning increased capital requirements as well as ring-fencing banking 
institutions, is that these regulations impair the business models of the banking and insurance 
sectors. This causes these sectors increased cost of equity financing as the share prices are 
reduced as a result because the market has priced the declined future returns into the assets. 
However, conversely there may be an increased reliance in the future on debt financing for the 
banking and insurance sector as the resulting actions tightened the CDS spreads, which reduces 
the cost of tier 1 capital.  
 
7.3 Limitations and other considerations 
The research conducted within this thesis presents limitations throughout each 
empirical chapter. On the overall picture of the thesis we have only covered the surface of 
financial institutional performance within the UK. We have not concentrated upon other 
historical financial crisis periods outside of the most recent crisis extensively. This is purely 
down to relevance and to conduct such research this would require vast resources as well as a 
much longer time period. A common limitation that occurs throughout the thesis is we were 
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unable to gather data from private financial institutions due to financial restrictions; private 
entities are not legally required to make their financial data public. Therefore in order to 
overcome this obstacle, we excluded all private financial institutions and concentrated on 
publically listed financial institutions.  
Also, a limitation may be we were unable to exhaust more regression modelling 
techniques due to financial restrictions in gathering data, which may have produced alternative 
results. However, we produced the best results we could with the resources that were available 
to us. Moreover, a limitation that we accept was being unable to identify net interest margin 
and cost-to-income data spanning for the full sample period of 1980-2012, again which was 
due the limited resources available to gather the data, especially to gather private institutional 
data.    
7.4 Directions for future research 
The issues this thesis has covered across the UK financial sectors is only the beginning 
within the literature concerning such topic in a recent context. Further research could confirm 
or reject our results/policy implications that have arisen as a result of conducting this thesis. 
The issue of investigating financial performance can be enhanced from the academic world 
through including private institutions within the data sample, which may produce further clarity 
and add another dimension to the field of financial performance. This may present a great 
opportunity for enriching the existing literature as well as make a contribution to knowledge. 
With greater understanding of what the determinants of financial institution performance, we 
can adapt policies implemented which will in theory create greater stability as well as maximise 
institutional performance. Furthermore, the concept of investigating financial institution 
performance can be applied to other economies as an opportunity for further research as well 
as conducting a comparative study. Additionally, the research can be furthered through 
undertaking different methodologies to what we have applied within this thesis. The additional 
research may create a different outcome and cause a debate within the context of financial 
performance literature.  
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Appendix 1 - Announcements 
Type   Date    Announcement             
Bank of England  13/9/2007, 19/9/2007  Bank of England Capital Injection 
   21/4/2008, 17/9/2008  Special Liquidity Scheme 
   3/10/2008   UK long-term repo agreement 
   08/10/2008   Co-ordinated central bank rate cut 
   5/11/2008, 8/1/2009, 5/2/2009 Monetary policy rate cut 
   6/8/2009, 7/5/2009, 5/11/2009 Quantitative Easing Extended  
   19/01/2009   Bank of England Asset Purchase Program 
   5/3/2009   UK Corporation bond market purchases           
UK Government  24/11/2008   UK Stimulus Package 
   8/10/2008   UK Credit Guarantee Scheme 
   3/10/2008   Depositor Insurance 
   8/10/2008   UK Bank recapitalization program 
   13/10/2008, 26/2/2009, 7/3/2009 Capital injections from UK Government 
   19/11/2007, 17/2/2008  Northern Rock nationalization 
   19/1/2009   Further injections to RBS 
   17/09/2008   Lloyds TSB and HBOS merged into LBG          
US Government  18/1/2008, 24/1/2008, 29/1/2008 US Economic Stimulus Act 
   14/3/2008, 6/2/2008,10/11/2008 Maiden Lane special purpose vehicles (SPVs) 
    buying impaired assets: Bear Stearns, SPV, AIG 
3/10/2008   US Troubled Asset Relief Programme (TARP)
 14/10/2008   US temporary liquidity guarantee scheme 
28/10/2008   TARP capitalization of nine US banks 
23/11/2008,    Asset guarantees to Citi bank, 
                                           16/1/2009    Asset guarantee to Bank of America         
Federal Reserve  12/12/2007, 21/12/2007  U.S. Term auction facility 
   16/9/2008   Federal Reserve maintain interest rates 
9/9/2008 Asset-Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP)  
3/3/2009 Term asset backed securities loan facility(TALF)  
                                         18/3/2009    Purchases long-term treasuries and agency debt      
European Governments 20/9/2008   Ireland Depositor Insurance 
   30/9/2008   Irish Government Guarantee Scheme 
   5/10/2008   German Depositor Insurance 
   7/10/2008   Spain to buy impaired assets 
   13/10/2008   French loans guaranteed 
   4/12/2008   French stimulus plan 
   14/1/2009   German pact for stability and employment            
ECB   12/12//2007   ECB offer dollar funding 
   3/7/2008   Policy rates increased 
   15/10/2008   ECB’s expansion of the collateral framework 
   7/5/2009   ECB purchases covered bonds 
   26/7/2012   Mario Draghi “Whatever it takes” Speech         
IMFO   9/10/2008   HSBC transfer £750m from HK to  UK base 
   13/10/2008   Barclays reject Government bailout   
31/10/2008   Barclays raise £7.5bn from Abu Dhabi and Qatar 
   19/11/2008   Iceland receive $2.1bn bailout from IMF 
   2/5/2010   Greece receive €110bn bailout from EU and IMF 
   29/11/2010   Ireland receive €22.5bn bailout from IMF 
   4/5/2011   Portugal receive €78bn bailout package  
   21/02/2012   Greece receive second bailout €130bn 
   11/6/2012   Spain receive €100bn bailout from Eurozone        
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Appendix 1 Continued 
 
Type   Date    Announcement 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Banks   7/10/2008   Alliance & Leicester fined £7m for PPI 
   5/5/2011   Lloyds set aside £3.2bn for PPI 
   5/8/2011   US downgraded by S&P to AA+ 
   7/10/2011   Lloyds, Santander and RBS downgraded 
   19/4/2012   UK downgraded by Fitch 
   1/5/2012   Extra £375m and £950m for PPI set aside by 
Lloyds and RBS 
   8/5/2012   HSBC put aside £745m for PPI  
   18/5/2012   Santander rating cut   
   21/6/2012   RBS, HSBC and Barclays rating cut 
   27/6/2012   Barclays admit Libor scandal, fined £290m 
   3/7/2012   Bob Diamond resigns Barclays CEO 
   5/7/2012   Barclays downgraded           
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Appendix 2 – Stock Abbreviations and Total Assets 
 
Sector  Stock Listing  Company   Total Assets (As of 2012, £m) 
Banking  AL   Alliance & Leicester Plc              111,456 (2009)
  BARC   Barclays Plc           1,488,335 
  BB   Bradford & Bingley Plc             49,394.6 (2009)
  BNC    Banco Santander Plc        1,031,579.3 
  HBOS   HBOS Plc                719,183(2009) 
  HSBA   HSBC Holdings Plc        1,657,762.6 
LLOY   Lloyds Banking Group Plc            934,221 
  NRK   Northern Rock Plc              109,321 (2007) 
  RBS   Royal Bank of Scotland          1,312,295 
  STAN   Standard Chartered Plc          388,156.2 
Finance  ADN   Aberdeen Asset Management Plc             4,071.4 
Companies BRW   Brewin Dolphin Holdings Plc                446.2 
  CBG   Close Brothers Group Plc              6,355.8 
  EMG   Man Group Plc               2,829.1 
  FCAM   F&C Asset Management Plc             1,138.8
  IAP   ICAP Plc                81,297 
  INVP   Investec Plc             51,550.4 
  LSE   London Stock Exchange Group Plc            102,430 
  PAG   Paragon Group of Companies Plc           10,037.1 
  PFG   Provident Financial Plc              1,686.5 
  RAT   Rathbone Brothers Plc              1,137.7 
  SDR   Schroders Plc             14,675.1 
Insurance AV   Aviva Plc              314,467 
  LGEN   Legal & General Plc             346,301 
  OML   Old Mutual Plc               146,962 
  PRU   Prudential Plc              307,644 
  RSA   Royal Sun Alliance Group Plc              22,785 
Investment ATST   Alliance Trust Plc            3,211.49 
Trusts  ASL   Aberforth Smaller Companies Trust Plc                                   815.4 
  BNKR   Bankers Investment Trust Plc                553.2 
  BRWM   BlackRock World Mining Trust Plc            1,336.2 
  BSET   British Asset Trust Plc                 463.1 
  BTEM   British Empire Sec. & Gen. Trust Plc                                       820.7
  CLDN   Caledonia Investments Plc                                                     1,269.7
  CTY   City of London Investment Trust Plc                                        772.8 
  EDIN   Edinburgh Investment Trust Plc                                             1,186.6 
  ELTA   Electra Private Equity Plc                                                       1,248.7 
  FEV   Fidelity European Values Plc                                                    622.8 
  FRCL   Foreign & Colonial Investment Trust Plc                              2,404.2
  GSS   Genesis Emerging Market Fund Limited                                  691.4 
  HRI   Herald Investment Trust Plc                                                         574 
  JAM   JPMorgan American Investment Trust Plc                               514.9
  JII   JPMorgan Indian Investment Trust Plc                                     493.1
  JMG   JPMorgan Emerging Markets Inv Trust Plc                              694.1
  LWDB   Law Debenture Corporation Plc                                                514.7 
  MNKS   Monks Investment Trust Plc                                                   1,185.5 
  MRC   Mercantile Investment Trust Plc                                            1,297.4
  MRCH   Merchants Trust Plc                                                                   528.5
  MUT   Murray Income Trust Plc                                                          466.3
  MYI   Murray International Trust Plc                                               1,358.6
  PCT   Polar Capital Technology Trust Plc                   539 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix 2 Continued. 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Sector  Stock Listing  Company   Total Assets (As of 2012, £m) 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Investment PLI   Perpetual Income & Growth Invest. Trust Plc                             687 
Trusts  PNL   Personal Assets Trusts Plc                                                        464.5 
Continued RCP   RIT Capital Partners Plc                                     2,032 
  SCIN    Scottish Investment Trusts Plc     748
  SMT   Scottish Mortgage Investment Trust Plc               2,390 
  TEM   Templeton Emerging Market Inv Trust Plc                           2,100.9
  TMPL   Temple Bar Investment Trust Plc                   665 
  TRY   TR Property Investment Trust Plc     651
  WTAN   Witan Investment Trust Plc                1,243 
  WWH   Worldwide Healthcare Trust Plc                   471 
Real Estate BLND   British Land Company Plc                 8,158 
  DJAN   Daejan Holdings Plc              1,364.9 
  DLN   Derwent London Plc              2,936.4 
  HMSO   Hammerson Plc               6,406.2 
  LAND   Land Securities Group Plc                      10,819.6 
  SGRO   SEGRO Plc                 4,647.4 
  SHB   Shaftesbury Plc                  1,855 
  SVS   Savills Plc                  550.7 
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Appendix 3 
Table 2: Regulation Changes 
Regulation Changes 
   
15/06/2000 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 GOV All 
01/03/2001 Prudential Regime for Investment Firms FSA 
Investment 
Trusts 
01/04/2001 Code of Market Conduct FSA All 
01/09/2001 Financial Services Compensation Scheme FSA All 
13/02/2002 Product Directive Implementation  FSA 
Investment 
Trusts/Real 
Estates 
01/01/2003 
Investment companies listing and business 
conduct rules change 
FSA 
Investment 
Trusts/Real 
Estates 
01/08/2003 
Implementation of the UCITS Management 
Directive 
FSA 
Investment 
Trusts/Real 
Estates 
01/09/2003 
Implementation of Solvency I Directives For 
Insurers 
FSA Insurance 
01/11/2003 Tier 1 Capital for banks BIS Banks 
01/04/2004 
Market Abuse Pre-Hedging Convertible and 
Exchangeable Bond Issues 
FSA All 
01/03/2005 Market Abuse Directive FSA All 
01/05/2005 Regulatory fees and levies 2005-06 GOV Banks 
01/06/2005 Implementation of Prospectus Directive FSA All 
01/07/2006 Strengthening Capital Standards 2 FSA Banks 
02/10/2006 Implementation of Transparency Directive FSA All 
01/12/2006 Prudential Changes For Insurers PRA Insurance 
01/01/2007 
Implementation of the Markets in Financial 
instruments Directive (MiFID) 
EU All 
01/01/2007 
Implementation of integrated regulatory 
reporting (IRR) 
FSA All 
21/02/2008 The Banking (Special Provisions) Act GOV Banks 
01/03/2008 Regulation of Covered Bonds FSA All 
12/09/2008 FSA Introduction to short-selling ban FSA All 
12/02/2009 The Banking Act 2009 GOV Banks 
29/04/2009 
Alternative investment fund managers 
directive proposal 
EU 
Investment 
Trusts 
13/07/2009 UCITS VI Directive FSA 
Investment 
Trusts/Real 
Estates 
16/09/2009 
Credit Requirements Directive (CRD) II 
Package Adopted By the EU 
EU Banks/Insurance 
 
 
269 
 
25/11/2009 Solvency II PRA Insurance 
17/06/2010 
22/06/2010 
Independent Commission creation (Vicker’s) 
Bank Levy Increase 
IC 
GOV 
All 
Banks 
26/07/2010 Basle Committee agree Leverage ratio BIS Banks 
27/07/2010 Finance Act 2010 GOV All 
12/09/2010 Basle Tier III BIS Banks 
29/09/2010 
Establishment of the European Systemic Risk 
Board 
EU All 
24/11/2010 
Establishment of European Insurance and 
Occupational Pensions Authority, the EBA 
and the ESMA – Stress Testing 
EU All 
24/11/2010 CRD III Package Adopted PRA Banks/Insurance 
08/06/2011 
Alternative Investment fund managers 
directive 
EU 
Investment 
Trusts 
19/07/2011 
12/09/2011 
Finance Act 2011 
Vicker’s Report calling for financial reforms 
GOV 
IC 
All 
All 
 
14/12/2011 
 
The Investment Trust Tax Regulation 
 
GOV 
Investment 
Trusts/Real 
Estates 
16/11/2011 Solvency II PRA Insurance 
27/01/2012 UK Bank Regulation Overhaul GOV Banks 
14/05/2012 EU Bankers’ Bonus Cap Proposal EU Banks 
17/07/2012 The Finance Act 2012 (REITs) GOV Real Estates 
16/08/2012 European Market Infrastructure Regulation EU All 
12/09/2012 Solvency II PRA Insurance 
15/10/2012 
Bank of England announce the creation of the 
Prudential Regulation Authority via Financial 
Services Act 
PRA All 
19/12/2012 
FSA gets abolished and replaced by the 
Financial Conduct Authority 
FCA All 
27/06/2013 
EU finance ministers reach agreement on the 
Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive 
EU Banks 
01/08/2013 Implementing CRD IV PRA Banks/Insurance 
12/12/2013 
Agreement of Bank Recovery Resolution 
Directive (BRRD) 
FCA Banks 
15/04/2014 
MiFID II/MiFIR was adopted by the 
European Parliament 
EU All 
15/05/2014 Recovery Resolution Directive (RRD) PRA Banks 
28/11/2014 CRD IV Liquidity  PRA Banks 
GOV – Government 
FSA – Financial Services Authority 
FCA – Finance Conduct Authority 
EU – European Union Law 
PRA – Prudential Regulation Authority 
BIS – Bank for International Settlements 
IC – Independent Commission 
 
 
270 
 
Appendix 4 
 
Table 7: Announcements for Banking Sector Robustness 
_____________________________________________________ 
Date Announcement     Type 
_____________________________________________________ 
18/03/2009 The Turner’s Review   TUR 
17/06/2010 Appointing Commission      IC 
18/01/2011 Vickers to break big banks     VIC 
12/09/2011 Vickers Report     IC 
12/11/2012 Bank reform from Vickers ring-fence    VIC 
09/09/2013 Vickers call to double capital standards VIC 
13/01/2014 Banks win Basel Concession     CON 
01/07/2015 Vickers reject banks concern     VIC 
15/10/2015 Banks win concession     CON 
_____________________________________________________ 
CON – Concessions 
IC – Independent Committee  
VIC – Sir John Vickers Announcements 
TUR – Turner’s Review 
 
